Spoken language consists of a linear sequence of units, from which the existence of particular underlying hierarchical processing mechanisms is inferred. Uddén et al. use graph theory to provide a framework for describing the possible structural relationships that may underlie a linear output sequence. Being more explicit in defining different structures can help identifying and testing for such structures in AGL experiments, as well as help showing how behavioral and neuroimaging data reveals signatures of hierarchical processing in humans.

Spoken language consists of a linear sequence of units, from which the existence of particular underlying hierarchical processing mechanisms is inferred. Uddén et al. use graph theory to provide a framework for describing the possible structural relationships that may underlie a linear output sequence. Being more explicit in defining different structures can help identifying and testing for such structures in AGL experiments, as well as help showing how behavioral and neuroimaging data reveals signatures of hierarchical processing in humans.

A recent hypothesis in empirical brain research on language is that the fundamental difference between animal and human communication systems is captured by the distinction between finite-state and more complex phrase-structure grammars, such as context-free and context-sensitive grammars. However, the relevance of this distinction for the study of language as a neurobiological system has been questioned and it has been suggested that a more relevant and partly analogous distinction is that between non-adjacent and adjacent dependencies. Online memory resources are central (...) to the processing of non-adjacent dependencies as information has to be maintained across intervening material. One proposal is that an external memory device in the form of a limited push-down stack is used to process non-adjacent dependencies. We tested this hypothesis in an artificial grammar learning paradigm where subjects acquired non-adjacent dependencies implicitly. Generally, we found no qualitative differences between the acquisition of non-adjacent dependencies and adjacent dependencies. This suggests that although the acquisition of non-adjacent dependencies requires more exposure to the acquisition material, it utilizes the same mechanisms used for acquiring adjacent dependencies. We challenge the push-down stack model further by testing its processing predictions for nested and crossed multiple non-adjacent dependencies. The push-down stack model is partly supported by the results, and we suggest that stack-like properties are some among many natural properties characterizing the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms that implement the online memory resources used in language and structured sequence processing. (shrink)

This article examines the human rights of minorities (huquq al-aqalliyyah) in the context of the Iraqi region. In the first part of the study, the general course of Iraqi political history, including Saddam's tenure, is discussed. After an overview of the historical and political conditions of minorities in Iraq, the political discrimination against Shiite and Kurdish groups, especially during the Saddam era, and the unofficial political oppression of Shiites on Sunnis, the dominant political element in post-Saddam Iraq, against Sunni and (...) other minorities, are compared. The research also focuses on the ethnoreligious political mobilization developed by societies against this discrimination. In addition, our article explores the current situation and rights of minorities in Iraq and the reasons for their migration from Iraq. In addition, this study points out the difficulties of minority law in Iraqi practice as it is used in "Western" states and discusses the reasons for this. Because this unofficial repression against Sunnis and Kurds paved the way for the emergence of a fanatical Sunni group called ISIS in Iraq, they described non-Muslim minorities as "dhimmis" using Islamic terminology, thus trying to legitimize their murders. From this point of view, the article aims to analyze the political discrimination applied by the Iraqi state and the murders committed by ISIS in the name of Islam from the perspective of contemporary Islamic law. (shrink)

Participants were unknowingly exposed to complex regularities in a working memory task. The existence of implicit knowledge was subsequently inferred from a preference for stimuli with similar grammatical regularities. Several affective traits have been shown to influence AGL performance positively, many of which are related to a tendency for automatic responding. We therefore tested whether the mindfulness trait predicted a reduction of grammatically congruent preferences, and used emotional primes to explore the influence of affect. Mindfulness was shown to correlate negatively (...) with grammatically congruent responses. Negative primes were shown to result in faster and more negative evaluations. We conclude that grammatically congruent preference ratings rely on habitual responses, and that our findings provide empirical evidence for the non-reactive disposition of the mindfulness trait. (shrink)

Studying the complex systems within Islamic law reveals a profound commitment to societal organization and advancement, rooted in a religion that values order and progress. Early Islamic society embraced various mechanisms ‒from postal services to policing and traffic regulations‒ illustrating an early form of a traffic security system. This legislative framework predates many modern legal systems, reflecting an integration of universal, humane, and civilizational principles. Islamic jurisprudence, with its pragmatic understanding of traffic dynamics and individual responsibility for physical well-being and (...) material assets, extends its scope to include guarantees and compensation for bodily harm or financial loss arising from traffic incidents. Central to this exploration is an examination of the defining elements of traffic security in Islamic jurisprudence. What defines the traffic security system in Islamic jurisprudence? Does it comprehensively cover all aspects of traffic? Can it be unequivocally asserted that Islamic law takes precedence in shaping this system? This research examines these questions by assessing the system’s historical development and the meticulous precision of its legal edicts, fully realized by the third century AH. It investigates pedestrian conduct and broader regulatory complications, drawing upon insights dispersed across classical texts. Integrating historical, inductive, descriptive, and analytical methodologies, the study offers a holistic understanding of Islamic traffic law, providing timeless insights pertinent to contemporary legal discourse. However, a key limitation of this study is its exclusive focus on Islamic law, without addressing or comparing the legal frameworks of other religious traditions. (shrink)

This letter responds to the article “Defining Death Anew: Reexamining the Twentieth‐Century Brain Death Debates and the Uniform Determination of Death Act,” by Anne E. Clinton, and the responding commentary, “The Enigma of Brain Death,” by Robert D. Truog in the November‐December 2025 issue of the Hastings Center Report.

The intent of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) was to facilitate a consistent legal standard for death and align the law with medical practice throughout the United States subsequent t...

Volume 25, Issue 9, September 2025, Page 59-61.

Nair-Collins argues that there is a discrepancy between law and practice regarding the determination of death by neurological criteria (brain death). The law requires irreversible cessation of “all...

Arian Lewis provides a comprehensive overview of how the United Kingdom’s medicolegal context manages challenges to determining death by neurologic criteria (DNC) and suggests that a well-crafted s...

Discrepancies between the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the adult and pediatric diagnostic guidelines for brain death (BD) (the “Guidelines”) have motivated proposals to revise the UDDA. A revision proposed by Lewis, Bonnie and Pope (the RUDDA), has received particular attention, the three novelties of which would be: (1) to specify the Guidelines as the legally recognized “medical standard,” (2) to exclude hypothalamic function from the category of “brain function,” and (3) to authorize physicians to conduct (...) an apnea test without consent and even over a proxy’s objection. One hundred seven experts in medicine, bioethics, philosophy, and law, spanning a wide variety of perspectives, have come together in agreement that while the UDDA needs revision, the RUDDA is not the way to do it. Specifically, (1) the Guidelines have a non-negligible risk of false-positive error, (2) hypothalamic function is more relevant to the organism as a whole than any brainstem reflex, and (3) the apnea test carries a risk of precipitating BD in a non-BD patient, provides no benefit to the patient, does not reliably accomplish its intended purpose, and is not even absolutely necessary for diagnosing BD according to the internal logic of the Guidelines; it should at the very least require informed consent, as do many procedures that are much more beneficial and less risky. Finally, objections to a neurologic criterion of death are not based only on religious belief or ignorance. People have a right to not have a concept of death that experts vigorously debate imposed upon them against their judgment and conscience; any revision of the UDDA should therefore contain an opt-out clause for those who accept only a circulatory-respiratory criterion. (shrink)

In response to recent debates on the need to abandon the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) to facilitate vital-organ transplantation, I claim that, through a detailed philosophical analysis of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the DDR, some acts that seem to violate DDR in fact do not, thus DDR can be upheld. The paper consists of two parts. First, standard apparatuses of the philosophy of language, such as sense, referent, truth condition, and definite description are employed to (...) show that there exists an internally consistent and coherent interpretation of UDDA which resolves the Reduction Problem and the Ambiguity Problem that allegedly threaten the UDDA framework, and as a corollary, the practice of Donation after the Circulatory Determination of Death (DCDD) does not violate DDR. Second, an interpretation of the DDR, termed ‘No Hastening Death Rule’ (NHDR), is formulated so that, given that autonomy and non-maleficence principles are observed, the waiting time for organ procurement can be further shortened without DDR being violated. (shrink)

In the twentieth century, following the development of advanced life‐support technology, recognition of perimortem states such as brain death challenged traditional definitions of death. A series of debates in the 1960s and 1970s regarding the need to adapt the social and legal frameworks in the face of new medical capabilities culminated in the publication and widespread adoption of the Uniform Determination of Death Act. However, in the interests of uniformity, the drafters of the UDDA compromised its internal conceptual clarity (...) in favor of ensuring that the UDDA was broadly acceptable. A uniform statute proposed by James Bernat and collaborators in the 1980s demonstrates that increased clarity regarding underlying philosophical commitments in a model statute could help to resolve this confusion. (shrink)

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) provides that “an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.” We show that the UDDA contains two conflicting interpretations of the phrase “cessation of functions.” By one interpretation, what matters for the determination of death is the cessation of spontaneous functions only, regardless of their generation by artificial means. (...) By the other, what matters is the cessation of both spontaneous and artificially supported functions. Because each UDDA criterion uses a different interpretation, the law is conceptually inconsistent. A single consistent interpretation would lead to the conclusion that conscious individuals whose respiratory and circulatory functions are artificially supported are actually dead, or that individuals whose brain is entirely and irreversibly destroyed may be alive. We explore solutions to mitigate the inconsistency. (shrink)

In “Neither Ethical nor Prudent: Why Not to Choose Normothermic Regional Perfusion” Omelianchuk and colleagues offer an exceptionally clear and methodical critique of the ethical and legal permissibility of in situ normothermic regional perfusion (NRP). NRP involves, in part, the reperfusion of organs via extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) after a declaration of death and the occlusion of the arteries supplying blood to the brain. The authors’ main conclusion is that NRP invalidates the declaration of death via the standards set by (...) the Uniform Determination of Death Act (which requires either permanent cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all brain functions for a determination of death) and thereby violates the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) (which, minimally, requires that organ recovery not be the cause of death). Their arguments for these points, however, are flawed. Most notably, this conclusion rests on mistaken assumptions about the role of circulation in both the UDDA and DDR. A close examination of the role of circulation in sustaining life shows that NRP is consistent with both the UDDA and the DDR. (shrink)

Nair-Collins and Joffe (2023) highlighted the noncongruence between the language of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the accepted brain death bedside testing standard by showing th...

My commentary on Nair-Collins’ (2025) article examines the prerogatives that the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) grants the medical profession to interpret its statutory language to delin...

Legal interpretations of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) can and have evolved over time. Interpretation of the statutory term “irreversible” (circulation cannot ever resume) to mean “...

In early 2017, Nevada amended its Uniform Determination of Death Act, in order to clarify the neurologic criteria for the determination of death. The amendments stipulate that a determination of death is a clinical decision that does not require familial consent and that the appropriate standard for determining neurologic death is the American Academy of Neurology’s guidelines. Once a physician makes such a determination of death, the Nevada amendments require the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment within twenty-four hours with limited exceptions. (...) Neurologists have generally supported Nevada’s amendments for clarifying the diagnostic standard and limiting the ability of family members to challenge it. However, it is more appropriate to view the Nevada amendments with concern. Even though the primary purpose of the UDDA is to ensure that all functions of a person’s entire brain have ceased, the AAN guidelines do not accurately assess this. In addition, by characterizing the determination of death as solely a clinical decision, the Nevada legislature has improperly ignored the doctrine of informed consent, as well as the beliefs of particular faiths and cultures that reject brain death. Rather than resolving controversies regarding brain death determinations, the Nevada amendments may instead instigate numerous constitutional challenges. (shrink)

The 1981 Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) established the validity of both cardio-respiratory and neurological criteria of death. However, many religious traditions including most forms of Haredi Judaism (ultra-orthodox) and many varieties of Buddhism strongly disagree with death by neurological criteria (DNC). Only one state in the U.S., New Jersey, allows for both religious exemptions to DNC and provides continuation of health insurance coverage when an exception is invoked in its 1991 Declaration of Death Act (NJDDA). There is (...) yet no quantitative or qualitative data on the frequencies of religious exemptions in New Jersey. This study gathered information about the frequency of religious exemptions and policy in New Jersey that was created out of respect for religious beliefs. Literature and internet searches on topics related to religious objections to DNC were conducted. Fifty-three chaplains and heads of bioethics committees in New Jersey hospitals were contacted by phone or email requesting a research interview. Respondents answered a set of questions about religious exemptions to DNC at the hospital where they worked that explored the frequency of such religious exemptions in the past five years, the religious tradition indicated, and whether any request for a religious exemption had been denied. This study was approved by the Northeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB #: 16–03-15). Eighteen chaplains and bioethics committee members participated in a full research interview. Of these, five reported instances of religious exemptions to DNC occurring at the hospital at which they worked for a total of approximately 30–36 known exemptions in the past five years. Families sought religious exemptions because of faith in an Orthodox Judaism tradition and nonreligious reasons. No failed attempts to obtain an exemption were reported. Religious exemptions to DNC in New Jersey do occur, although very infrequently. Prior to this study, there was no information on their frequency. Considering religious exemptions do occur, there is a need for national or state policies that addresses both religious objections to DNC and hospital resources. More information is needed to better understand the impact of granting religious exemptions before new policy can be established. (shrink)

Nair-Collins and Joffe (2023) rightly call attention to an incompatibility between brain-based criteria for death, as defined by the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), and what the current...

The family of a patient who is unconscious and respirator-dependent has made a decision to discontinue medical treatment. The patient had signed a donor card. The family wants to respect this decision, and agrees to non-heart-beating organ donation. Consequently, as the patient is weaned from the ventilator, he is prepped for organ explantation. Two minutes after the patient goes into cardiac arrest, he is declared dead and the transplant team arrives to begin organ procurement. At the time retrieval begins, it (...) is not certain that the patient's brain is dead or that cardiac function cannot be restored. Procurement follows uneventfully, and two transplantable kidneys are retrieved.Many people now consider such cases of non-heart-beating organ donation to be ethically permissible. However, widespread disagreement persists as to how such practices are to be justified and whether such practices are compatible with the Uniform Declaration of Death Act. In this paper, I argue that non-heart-beating organ donation can be ethically justified, that in the justified cases the patients are in fact dead, and that the early declarations of death required for such donation do comply with the UDDA. (shrink)

In 2023, an effort to revise the 1981 Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which defines human death as the complete absence of all functions of the entire brain, was paused indefinitely. This failure to revise the UDDA was not unexpected given the ongoing and heated debate over the integrity and validity of brain death or death by neurological criteria, which in my view, has led to the collapse of moral certitude for brain death among secular and Catholic (...) bioethicists. (shrink)

This is a commentary on an historical analysis by Anne E. Clinton in the Hastings Center Report's November‐December 2025 issue on the creation of the Uniform Determination of Death Act in 1980, focusing on the attempt by the Uniform Law Commission to revise the act in 2020. The original UDDA was based on scientific evidence that the brain is responsible for maintaining the integrated functioning of the body, such that brain death quickly leads to the biological death of the (...) person. During the deliberations, however, it became clear that this was not scientifically correct and that biological life can continue for years after the diagnosis of brain death. This commentary argues that this new understanding of brain death generated intractable disagreement among the commissioners, leading the committee to abandon its efforts in 2023. The commentary closes with how the impact of this failure to revise the act will affect clinical practice and organ transplantation in the years to come. (shrink)

Yûsuf b. Hussein al-Kirmāstī (d. 900/1494), a figure who lived in the 15th century, studied under scholars of his time such as Khujazāda Muṣliḥuddīn Efendi (d. 893/1488). Kirmāstī was from the district of Kirmāstī (Mustafakemalpaşa) in Bursa. Yûsuf b. Hussein al-Kirmāstī was a qadi (judge) during the reign of Sultan Bâyezid II (1481-1512). Kirmāstī, originally from Kirmāstī (Mustafakemalpaşa), Bursa, established a medrese (theological school) in Istanbul named Kirmâstî. After serving as a lecturer in various madrasahs, he transitioned to the judicial (...) field, carrying out qadi duties in Bursa and Istanbul. His just decisions and courageous stance during his tenure as a qadi earned him the appreciation of Sultan Bâyezid II. Kirmāstī, who had a mosque, a madrasah, and a school in Istanbul, is known to have had an additional school in his hometown of Kirmāstī. He passed away in 900/1494 and was buried next to the school he built in Fatih Mosque. This study aims to reintroduce Kirmāstī to the contemporary academic world from a fresh perspective, considering his proficiency in religious and linguistic sciences of the time, including rhetoric, badiʿ, bayān, uṣūl, fiqh, debate and ʿaqāid. The focus is on this study the stylistic elements of literary technique styles (al-muḥassināt al-maʿnewiyyah) within his specific work titled “al-Mukhtār fi-l-maʿānī wa-l-bayān”. Through this exploration, the significant Ottoman scholar and his works are presented, followed by an analysis of the literary technique styles in “al-Mukhtār fi-l-maʿānī wa-l-bayān” bringing attention to interested parties. (shrink)

Declaration of cardiorespiratory death, as defined by the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), requires irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function. A physician’s ability to confidently declare death is paramount because death is both a biological and social construct, and can afford a dying patient the opportunity to be an organ donor via donation after circulatory death (DCD). Inconsistencies related to cardiorespiratory death and DCD include the specific language used in the UDDA, specifically the use of the (...) word “irreversible”. Additionally, in DCD there is a large focus on the auto-resuscitative capacity of the heart, however recently some have argued that instead the focus should shift to the brain and a determination of how long it needs to be without circulation to cease functioning prior to declaring death. In this paper, I discuss inconsistencies with cardiorespiratory death as they pertain to organ donation and posit several possible solutions to mitigate these inconsistencies. (shrink)

This letter responds to the letter “Reexamining the UDDA: Are We Ready for Significant Change?,” by Paul T. Menzel, in the same, July‐August 2026, issue of the Hastings Center Report.

This letter responds to the letter “Reexamining the UDDA: Are We Ready for Significant Change?,” by Paul T. Menzel, in the same, July‐August 2026, issue of the Hastings Center Report.

In their article, Drabiak et al. review the state laws and ethical debates related to the determination of death by neurologic criteria, analyze the recent 2023 American Academy of Neurology practice guidelines, and make policy recommendations. We call this review ‘just’ because the article correctly focuses on the chief ethical, legal, and medical issue in this debate — namely whether patients declared dead by neurological criteria are actually dead, along with the need to improve integrity, honesty, trust, and residency education (...) and training to reduce moral distress and achieve moral certainty in declaring patients dead, initiating organ procurement, and communicating these realities to patient families/surrogates. As the authors invite the reader to comprehend, it should no longer be considered a minority or fringe opinion that determinations of brain death are rife with false positives, inadvertent misdiagnoses, violations of informed consent, and, ultimately, dissent from the law. For the sake of justice, one would do well to heed these words. (shrink)

Thoracoabdominal normothermic regional perfusion (TA-NRP), a new method of controlled donation after circulatory death, seems to provide more and better organs for patients on organ transplant waiting lists compared to standard controlled donation after circulatory death. Despite its benefits, the ethical permissibility of TA-NRP is currently a highly debated issue. The recent statement published by the American College of Physicians (ACP) highlights the reasons for these debates. Critics’ main concern is that TA-NRP violates the Dead Donor Rule. This paper presents (...) an ethical analysis of the objections raised by the ACP against TA-NRP and argues that TA-NRP is not only morally permissible but also morally required where it is financially and technically feasible. To support this conclusion, the concepts of ‘resuscitation,’ ‘intention,’ ‘irreversibility,’ ‘permanence,’ ‘impossibility,’ and ‘respect’ in the context of TA-NRP are explored. Additionally, the ethical permissibility of this procedure is evaluated through the lenses of Utilitarianism, Kantianism, the core principles of bioethics, and the Doctrine of Double Effect. This ethical analysis demonstrates why the ACP’s objection lacks a solid moral foundation and conflates moral and legal considerations. This paper also argues that extra measures are needed to ensure the moral permissibility of TA-NRP, emphasizing the importance of informed consent, additional brain blood flow and activity monitoring, and a contingency plan to abort the organ procurement process if a sign of morally relevant brain activity is detected. (shrink)

This chapter provides a definition of “death” that accurately describes the way “death” and “dead” are used in both medicine and in everyday conversation. It discusses the characteristics of optimum criteria and tests, and shows how acceptance of the definition provided supports the use of the whole brain criterion for determining death and for using the tests that show that this criterion has been satisfied. A legal definition of death that is believed to be superior to the UDDA statute (...) is provided. (shrink)