There is a growing focus on public health initiatives that prioritise well-being. The main question of our study is whether this, in its current form, can really represent a new response to the challenges of previous strategies, or whether there is a greater chance that it will essentially reproduce the problems associated with the paradoxical situation of public health. Based on a review, analysis and evaluation of the literature on well-being in public health, we outlined the foundations of a new (...) meta-theory of well-being and a possibility for its social application. In our view, well-being is seen as a social representation of a combination of positive and negative freedom of choice concerning the quality of everyday life, used in a positioning process involving both individual and collective aspects. Health is a particular aspect of the social representation and positioning of well-being, which encompasses aspects of the physical, psychological, social and spiritual functioning of individuals. The well-being meta-theory also opens up the possibility for more effective solutions to the social challenges related to well-being and salutogenetic health. It underscores the importance of the need for a dedicated social subsystem where the goals and organizational culture of the organizations involved are focused on well-being and health promotion. In our study, we consider this to be the Public Well-being System (PWS). (shrink)

The meaning of the term ‘tarka’ is not clear in the modern literature on Classical Indian Philosophy. This paper will review different modern readings of this term and try to show that what the Nyāyasūtra and its classical commentaries called a ‘tarka’ should be understood as the following: a tarka is a cognitive act that validates a content (of a doubt or a cognition or a speech-act) by demonstrating its logical fitness or invalidates a content by demonstrating (...) its logical unfitness. A tarka can act as a metatheory too. Generating certainty is, according to the Classical Nyāya, a job assigned to an epistemic instrument ( pramāṇa ). It fails to do so when there arises a doubt regarding it. The moment a tarka dispels the doubt, the epistemic instrument generates certainty. Tarkas of different types will be exemplified by critically analyzing Gaṅgeśa’s applications of tarka in his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi . These examples will clarify the definition of tarka formulated in this paper. (shrink)

This paper encapsulates the debate as to whether or not tarka is an additional source of knowledge. In this regard, Jaina thinkers opine that they are, unlike Buddhists and Nyāya thinkers, an additional source of knowledge, for what we come to know through tarka is not known through any other means of knowledge. En route, Jaina’s understanding of tarka is put forth, thereafter their criticism of others’ understanding is supplied. Eventually, some recent discussions over this debate are (...) intimated that seem to go in support of Jaina understanding of tarka. These recent discussions hint at the direction in which Jaina thinkers need to advance their stand. (shrink)

‘Tarka’ is a technical term that occupies a significant position in the logico-epistemological traditions in India. In this paper, it is attempted to expound the exact meaning of the term, in particular in the early Nyaya tradition, on the basis of the explanations found in the Nyayabhasya. The view that the essential feature of tarka consists in the differentiating approach (vibhaga) to the matter on discourse is substantiated, and with it a possible explanation is given for the well-known (...) ambivalent valuations that tarka was often loaded with a negative connotation on the one hand and, was considered as the positive characteristic feature of the Naiyayika approach to epistemological problems on the other. In the case of tarka, the general applicability and the impression of logically exhaustive access to any given problem was combined with the danger of misuse of the reason without any quasi-formal deficiency. It is hoped that my suggestion to characterize tarka as the differentiating approach to the given matter without any factual information may give a plausible explanation for the double-pole character of tarka in the history of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

The technical term “ tarka ” in the Nyāya tradition is the object of the present investigation. Diverse texts including Buddhist ones exhibit a negative estimation of activities using tarka . In contrast, more often than not, later treatises dealing with logico-epistemic problems, especially certain Naiyāyika works, identify the methodological peculiarity of Nyāya with tarka . Such an ambivalent attitude toward tarka can be understood in a coherent way if the essential features of tarka that (...) gave rise to it can be grasped. Starting from the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.40 and the explanation given in the Nyāyabhāṣya on it, the present researcher sorted out three characteristic features of tarka in the early Nyāya tradition. These three features focus on the main feature of tarka : namely, reflective analysis without requiring further factual information on the object of investigation. Based on this, the present researcher critically reviewed what promoted an understanding of tarka as a reductio ad absurdum argument or an a priori reasoning. Furthermore, certain passages from the Nyāyamañjarī , Nyāyakalikā , and Tarkasaṅgraha were examined to demonstrate that the present researcher’s interpretative understanding of tarka was adequate for explaining the usage of this term in a broad sense, with positive connotations. (shrink)

Compendium of the basic concepts and terminology of the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy; includes auto commentary with English translation.

Jaina interpretation of Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa, work on Hindu logic ; includes Sanskrit commentary.

Treatise on Nyaya and Vaiṣeṣika philosophy with Hindi and Sanskrit commentaries.

Commentary on Tarkasangrahadīpikā with Bālapriyā and Prasāraṇa suppercommentaries on Tarkasȧngraha of Annambhaṭṭa, 17th century work on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy; includes complete text of Tarkasaṅgraha and Tarkadīpikā by Annaṃbhaṭṭa.

On the philosophical base of dialectical materialism.

Treatise, with Tātparyasaṅgraha commentary, on Jaina logic.

One of the most important characteristic of human mind is that it can go back and forth beyond the given and lend those space and time framework to highly intelligent philosophical speculations. Human mind has an uncanny ability to schematize, thematize, and problematize otherwise plain looking facts of the world to construct intelligible narratives about its creation, sustenance, destruction, and so on. One such grand narrative is the age old notion of ‘designer god’. One such brilliant piece of speculative metaphysics (...) is found in one of the Nyāya masterpieces, namely Nyāyakusumānjali. Authored by Udayana this text presents interesting and compelling arguments to prove the existence of God within the metaphysical framework of realism. Some of these arguments are later put to severe criticisms by the Jainas among other schools. This paper attempts to investigate some of the criticisms offered by the Jaina philosopher Guṇaratna against the Nyāya conception of God in the Īśvarotthāpaka section of his Tarka-Rahasya-Dīpikā which is a commentary on the Ṣad-Darśana-Samuccaya of Haribhadra Suri. As a part of the concluding note it is suggested that the notion of God is a unique and distinct idea where the conception of ‘all’ in the absolute sense is considered in ways that requires more systematic examination. (shrink)

This paper looks at cognition from the perspective of Yaśovijaya-sūri’s Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā. Considering the nature of sensory cognition (mati-jñāna), represented by the four stages (sensation, speculation, perceptual judgement, retention) and of verbal cognition (śruta-jñāna), it reflects on the form and rendering of the word as a raw, physical sound or the meaningful particle of language linked to an infinite number of other such particles, deeply rooted in reliance on linguistic convention. The author considers here what properties such cognition recognises and (...) relates to them especially in light of the theory of viewpoints, providing a contribution to reflections on its meaning. The other questions posed in the article are: which prerequisites are met by people between whom this kind of communication takes place and what role do the scriptures play? Yaśovijaya-sūri’s thought is set in the broader context (Siddhasena Divākara, Jinabhadra Gaṇi, Vādideva-sūri, Dharmabhūṣana, Vinayavijaya Gaṇi), with emphasis of his sources of inspiration. (shrink)

Study of Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa of Siddhasena Divākara, classical work on Jaina philosophy and doctrines; includes text.

Classical commentary, with supercommentaries, on Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāsūtra, basic work of the Mīmāṃsā school in Hindu philosophy.

Study of logic in Mimamsa philosophy with special reference to Mīmāmṣābhāṣya of Śabarasvāmi, classical commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini.

Arthāpatti does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is certain in the sense that when S cognizes P through postulation, no other epistemic instrument would invalidate P. The Naiyāyika tries to reduce postulation to anumāna and/or tarka. I shall argue that it is neither. Due to its explanatory role, one may think that postulation plays an essential role in lakṣaṇā or indication. But this too is a misconception. Both tarka and lakṣaṇā depend on observation (...) and background knowledge. Neither of them has the epistemic certainty postulation enjoys. I think, due to its observation-independent nature and certainty, postulation can be seen as the source of the knowledge of the truths of reason. (shrink)

This is an enquiry based on the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, the primary focus of which is to present viveka along with its three catalysts, namely, śruti, tarka, and anubhava as the unique pramāṇa of Ultimate Knowledge. This paper discusses the significance of the six popular pramāṇas of Advaita Vedānta and reiterates that as far as AV is concerned epistemologically those pramāṇas have merely a provisional value. In accordance with the purport of VC this paper argues that śruti and tarka, culminating (...) in anubhava are blind in themselves and are enthusiastically carried forward by viveka for the attainment of the final realisation. This paper concludes that viveka, along with its three catalysts namely, śruti, tarka, and anubhava is the sole pramāṇa of the trans-empirical experiential knowledge of Brahman. (shrink)

A reasoned argument or tarka is essential for a wholesome vāda that aims at establishing the truth. A strong tarka constitutes of a number of elements including an anumāna based on a valid hetu. Several scholars, such as Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu and Dignāga, have worked on theories for the establishment of a valid hetu to distinguish it from an invalid one. This paper aims to interpret Dignāga’s hetu-cakra, called the wheel of grounds, from a modern philosophical perspective by deconstructing (...) it into a simple probabilistic mathematical model. The objective is to understand how and why a vāda based on a probabilistically weaker hetu can degrade into a Jalpa or vitaṇḍā. To do so, the paper maps the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’ onto the hetu-cakra. Bounded Rationality, an idea coined by the management thinker Herbert Simon, is often employed in understanding decision-making processes of rational agents. In the context of this paper, the concept would state that the prativādin and ālocaka (debater) may not hold unbounded information to back their pratijñā (proposition). The paper argues that within the probabilistically deconstructed hetu-cakra model, most people argue in the ‘Zone of Bounded Rationality’, and thus, the probability of a debate degrading into Jalpa or vitaṇḍā is high. -/- . (shrink)

This is a philological and critical analysis of two crucial philosophical concepts, viz., reaso and experienceâ. The study shows that, though there is no word in Sanskrit which may be taken as equivalent of Western reason and thought, such terms as tarka, yukti, nyaya, anumana, buddhi, etc., clearly capture parts or aspects of what is meant by reason and thought (Denken). Moreover, it is misleading to trans- late sruti as revelation. Construing sruti as revelation surreptitiously imports a Semitic theological (...) concept into the Vedic tradition. The case of experience is more promising because we have such Sanskrit words as anubhava or anubhuti that do translate into experience. However, experience in Western thought has acquired many shades of meaning, and the study determines in what sense the Indian anubhava captures the Western experience. Finally, the book demonstrates that Indian philosophy provides an account of the cognitive process that begins with perception and culminates in wisdom (highest experience). This whole process may be called reason, at both ends of which we can talk of experience, which places experience not in an external opposition to reason, but rather as something that belongs to it internally. Thus, the modern Western opposition between reason and experience collapses and the two toge-ther yield an integrated process of acquisition, validation, and practical application of knowledge. (shrink)

According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘parāmarśa’? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in (...) the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’ is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable coexistence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke” (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana). (shrink)

The classical Indian variety of history may be called ‘istory’. It is not completely true that no real importance was attached to istory in classical India. But much of oral istorical literature is lost since—perhaps—narrating istory was considered a performance. Unlike historical narratives, istorical narratives are presentative, not representative. Istory can be understood as a system of narrating past events that has a purpose and poetic beauty. Finally, the paper will argue that istory is based on cognitive tools of two (...) types: epistemic tools such as testimony, inference, tarka and aesthetic tools. Thus, it has a hybrid cognitive method. (shrink)

ʾAbū Saʿīd al-Siǧzī was a prominent fourth/tenth century astronomer and mathematician who was one of the first contributors to the new genre of ʿilm al-hay ʾa (science of the configuration). However, little is known about the initial steps taken in the formation of the discipline, or its independence from other astronomical writings and practices. In this paper, I will discuss new findings about Siǧzī’s life to determine details of his biography and a more precise time period for his scientific activities. (...) I then describe, for the first time, a composition in theoretical astronomy from the fourth/tenth century, the “Structure of the orbs” ( Tarkīb al-aflāk ) by Siǧzī to show its place in the formation of the discipline of ʿilm al-hay ʾa, comparing Siǧzī’s book to the earlier work of al-Farġānī on the size of the earth and the number of celestial spheres. I conclude that Siǧzī’s Tarkīb al-aflāk is the earliest known example of a book that contains only topics found in later hay ʾa and may be the first appearance of the ninth celestial orb that became standard in the later genre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decolonizing Universality:Postcolonial Theory and the Quandary of Ethical AgencyEsha Niyogi De (bio)Living in colonial India, the Bengali thinker and creative writer Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) often meditated on ways that "concord" (milan) and "harmony" (sāmanjasya) could be established between persons and cultures [BIC 450-51]. Noting that "ruptures in balance and harmony" (bhār sāmanjasyer abhāv) that once were more localized now affected the whole world, he maintained that these reinforced the (...) progressive message of the modern age that the local "problems of a people are a part and parcel of humankind's" (swajātir samasyā samasta mānusher samasyār antargata) [RC 279]. In his view, the means to reestablish harmony in this unequal world lay in social practices and ideas conducing "freedom" (mukti) rather than enforcing "power" (shakti) and "coercive discipline" (shāsan) [SaS 408-09]. He argued that such progressive trends of practice and thought would be found not in one culture alone but through traveling across different cultural "seas of knowledge (jnān)" [SwSm 699]. For only through such conceptual journeys would we enkindle in ourselves "arguments with and doubts about" (yukti tarka o sandeher udbhav) our own cultures, and also learn from all the "voyagers in the path of progress" (unnatipather yātri) who emerge in different locations and times [SJ 39-40].As these comments reveal, Rabindranath maintained that inequalities could be rectified by making individual and collective norms and actions accountable to and measurable in terms of a speculative notion of universal humanity. While alert to the injustices proliferating from European colonization, he insisted that coercive practices and imbalances of power could not be entirely localized, and that in order to correct multiple forms of coercion we must seek across cultures and societies for (partial) achievements of human freedom and harmony. In so viewing transcultural negotiations of a common humane proclivity as the means to decolonize the world, Rabindranath did not stand alone but in a diverse company of anti-imperialist thinkers who adapted modern humanism to their ends: W. E. B. Dubois—who lauded Rabindranath's appropriation of [End Page 42] such liberal notions as democracy and equal opportunity "for greater ends" than were allowed by the "inconsistencies" of a racist European perspective [74]—Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and from Rabindranath's own colonial context, the Bengali Anarchist poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (to name but a few). Reflecting upon worldwide experiences of subjection, these radical modern intellectuals tried above all to avoid reinventing separatism by declaring non-Western cultures to be unilaterally superior to Western imperialist culture. Driven by an activist ethics, they attempted instead to correct the roots of separatism through objectively evaluating, against a common frame of reference, right and wrong, relatively successful or failed practices of human empowerment and community.In this essay, I consider if and how we could characterize as "postcolonial" these evaluative ethics that rationally seek to correct coercive relations between persons and societies through referring to an affirmative idea of a human nature shared by all. If we take postcolonial agency to rest on a thorough critique of and resistance to all political and epistemic maneuvers that subordinate or exclude people and cultures, might this form of resistant agency reside in the ethical normativity of anti-imperialist humanism? This question elicits conflicting responses from contemporary postcolonial theorists.The argument, on the one hand, is that if postcolonial theory is to ethically address the multiple and interlocked hierarchies of a postimperial world, it indeed must take into account how people mobilize against separatism by working through critiques of ethnic divisiveness to negotiate a common human ground. Commenting on the universalism of thinkers such as Rabindranath Tagore and W. E. B. DuBois, Edward Said, for example, suggests that "vital" critiques of chauvinistic separatism arise only from viewing "local identity as not exhaustive" but as elaborating in reference to "larger, more generous realities of community between cultures, peoples, and societies" [Culture and Imperialism 217, 229]. His implication is that only through evaluating ourselves on the basis of a notion of noncoercive universality are we able to think against the identity politics that pervade our world, stemming at once from a nativist... (shrink)

It is commonly taken for granted that in Vedānta, as also in Indian philosophy in general, yukti, anumāna, and tarka, translate into “reason” (of Western thought) while śruti is rendered as “revelation.” I reject this translation-interpretation; it is a good example of theway in which Sanskrit philosophical discourse is often misconstrued. The term śruti does not refer to revelation, nor do yukti, anumāna, or tarka to reason. Reason, I argue, comprehends all the pramānas; these are all means of (...) legitimizing beliefs. I distinguish between different levels of the application of “reason,” and I maintain that the mere reasoner (tārkika) has not grasped the true nature of “reason.” In effect, I maintain that śabda, both lauika and alukika, is a component of reason, and so is perception. There is no concept of “revelation” in Indian philosophy, and no opposition between reason and experience. (shrink)

A book of this title needs indeed to be written, but it should be done so after careful study of at least Bhävaviveka's Tarka-jvälä which is preserved in Tibetan. The historical and doctrinal relationships of the four major Buddhist schools, the Vaibhäsikas, the Sauträntikas, the Yogäcärins, and Mädhyamikas, are sufficiently complex that a book of this small size could only present a bare outline of their emergence. And even such an outline can be accurately made only after the pursuit (...) of Buddhist thought through its transformations as presented in Indian and Tibetan texts on tenets. Secondary materials simply are not adequate to take account even of how the Buddhists themselves perceived the development of these texts. Therefore, this work, which relies on the few available translations and much of the older, less adequate scholarship on Buddhism, cannot help but present a scanty picture of such a complicated topic. Such difficulties render the comparisons with Whitehead, existentialism, etc., somewhat weak.--P. J. H. (shrink)

The Vedānta philosophy has its roots in scriptural sources, specifically, in three canonical texts, viz. the Brahmasūtra-s by Bādarāyaṇa, which is called nyāya-prasthāna or tarka-prasthāna; the Upaniṣad-s, which are called the śruti-prasthāna; and the Bhagavadgītā, which is regarded as the smṛti-prasthāna. Thus, like the first two constituents of this trio, the third one has a tangible legacy of commentarial tradition; as almost all well-known advocates of the Vedānta schools have commented on these three sourcebooks. In this paper, an attempt (...) has been made to give a brief sketch of such commentarial tradition of the Bhagavadgītā, starting with its commentary by Śaṃkara to the other major commentaries available up to the 15th–16th centuries. While each of these commentaries finds support in the text for their respective philosophical doctrines, an impartial evaluation, with support of modern scholars, shows that none of the commentaries can claim to represent faithfully the true intent of the text, and that the true import of it can only be had if the text is judged from its literary and historical point of view. (shrink)

Supercommentary, on the benediction (maṅgala) part of Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka, 15th century commentary, by Jayadevamiśra on Tattvacintāmaṇi, 13th century basic work of the new-Nyaya school in Indic philosophy, by Gaṅgeśa; with a treatise on reductio ad absurdum (tarka).

This chapter contains sections titled: Works cited.