Argues for the primacy of the phylogenetic system as the general reference system in biology. This book, first published in 1966, generated significant controversy and opened possibilities for evolutionary biology.

It is time to escape the constraints of the Systematics Wars narrative and pursue new questions that are better positioned to establish the relevance of the field in this time period to broader issues in the history of biology and history of science. To date, the underlying assumptions of the Systematics Wars narrative have led historians to prioritize theory over practice and the conflicts of a few leading theorists over the less-polarized interactions of systematists at large. We show (...) how shifting to a practice-oriented view of methodology, centered on the trajectory of mathematization in systematics, demonstrates problems with the common view that one camp straightforwardly “won” over the other. In particular, we critique David Hull’s historical account in Science as a Process by demonstrating exactly the sort of intermediate level of positive sharing between phenetic and cladistic theories that undermines their mutually exclusive individuality as conceptual systems over time. It is misleading, or at least inadequate, to treat them simply as holistically opposed theories that can only interact by competition to the death. Looking to the future, we suggest that the concept of workflow provides an important new perspective on the history of mathematization and computerization in biology after World War II. (shrink)

In this response article, I focus on two issues. First, I discuss the problem, raised by the commentators, of ‘categorial ambiguity’ in membership categorization analysis, and make suggestions about how to approach it. Second, I argue that, as conversation analysts have demonstrated the ‘systematics’ of interactional practices, membership categorization analysis should also begin to build a robust corpus of studies of ‘categorial systematics’.

Early nineteenth century systematists sought to describe what they called the Natural System or the Natural Classification. In the nineteenth century, there was no agreement about the basis of observed patterns of similarity between organisms. What did these systematists think they were doing, when they named taxa, proposed relationships between taxa, and arranged taxa into representational schemes? In this paper I explicate Charles Frederic Girard’s (1822–1895) theory and method of systematics. A student of Louis Agassiz, and subsequently (1850–1858) a (...) collaborator with Spencer Baird, Girard claimed that natural classificatory methods do not presuppose either a special creationist or an evolutionary theory of the natural world. The natural system, in Girard’s view, comprises three distinct ways in which organisms can be related to each other. Girard analyzed these relationships, and justified his classificatory methodology, by appeal to his embryological and physiological work. Girard offers an explicit theoretical answer to the question, what characters are evidence for natural classificatory hypotheses? I show that the challenge of simultaneously depicting the three distinct types of relationship led Girard to add a third dimension to his classificatory diagrams. (shrink)

Two new modes of thinking have spread through systematics in the twentieth century. Both have deep historical roots, but they have been widely accepted only during this century. Population thinking overtook the field in the early part of the century, culminating in the full development of population systematics in the 1930s and 1940s, and the subsequent growth of the entire field of population biology. Population thinking rejects the idea that each species has a natural type (as the earlier (...) essentialist view had assumed), and instead sees every species as a varying population of interbreeding individuals. Tree thinking has spread through the field since the 1960s with the development of phylogenetic systematics. Tree thinking recognizes that species are not independent replicates within a class (as earlier group thinkers had tended to see them), but are instead interconnected parts of an evolutionary tree. It lays emphasis on the explanation of evolutionary events in the context of a tree, rather than on the states exhibited by collections of species, and it sees evolutionary history as a story of divergence rather than a story of development. Just as population thinking gave rise to the new field of population biology, so tree thinking is giving rise to the new field of phylogenetic biology. (shrink)

Drawing on drafts and other material from the Harvey Sacks archive this paper examines the development of one of the defining papers of Conversation Analysis, _A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking for Conversation_ (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). The discussion examines four drafts of the paper along with correspondence between the authors and with William Bright, the editor of the journal _Language_ where it was to be published. The four drafts trace the development of the paper from (...) a 13-page draft to the final 106-page final draft submitted to the journal. By exploring the drafts as they evolved the discussion highlights the development of the central ideas in the paper, the distinctive style of the paper as it is revised, the changes of authorship, and the role of the editor of _Language,_ William Bright, in helping to shape the paper through his own detailed reviews. (shrink)

The article develops three complementary lines of argument. It first points to the great theoretical gap that characterizes Koselleck's work: quasi-transcendental anthropology on the one hand, and historical semantics on the other. The hybrid status of historical semantics, both macro- and micro- sociological, is also specified. Secondly, the article critiques the neo-Hobbesianism implicit in Koselleck's historical ontology. Departing from Jean Baechler's anthropology, it reformulates the conceptual framework within which the initial foundational ambition could be maintained without however renewing the aporiai (...) of the Koselleckian systematics. Finally, it asks how to connect the three M's (the meta-historical, the macro- and the micro-sociological levels). The solution focuses on the core aspects of the intermediate, macro-sociological level to make the case for a heuristic reciprocal hybridization of meta-historical anthropology, of comparative historical sociology and of the pragmatic history of historical semantics. (shrink)

The paper shares the principal emphases to date in an attempt to begin a contemporary systematic theology and invites the collaboration of others in the development of that theology. Lonergan’s understanding of systematics as the imperfect and analogical understanding of the mysteries of faith is adopted from the outset, but so is his insistence (1) that a contemporary systematic theology must be grounded in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousnessand (2) that such a theology will be a theology of history. (...) The dogmatic-theological context of such a development is found in a hypothesis that links the four relations in the Trinity to four distinct created supernatural participations and imitations. A brief outline of the author’s work on the theology of history is presented, and then central elements in the ‘four-point hypothesis’ are discussed, especially the relation between sanctifying grace and charity. Thepaper concludes with a suggestion regarding the theological importance of the mimetic theory of René Girard. (shrink)

Many of the elements of the problem of implementation have been assembled in Philip McShane’s paper and addressed in his life’s work to date. The dimension to which I wish to contribute is the need to lift the chapter on Systematics in Method in Theology out of its tired and minimalist context into the context that Lonergan seems to have had in mind when, at the time of the breakthrough to functional specialization, what eventually was called Systematics was (...) named ‘Explanation’ and its mediated object was said to be Geschichte. At that point Lonergan had in mind, I submit, not simply summing up and integrating the dogmatico-theological context – and even that task does not emerge clearly in Method’s chapter – but also advancing that context, in fact catapulting it into the third stage of meaning and onto the plateau where a normative source of meaning has been articulated that, while remaining normative, pays full recognition to historical mindedness. (shrink)

This is a rich, dense book. Hines provides sensible analyses of the communications networks that unite systematics—the science devoted to understanding and standardizing descriptions of the relationships among living things—and systematists in the 21st century. This work will be useful for introducing graduate students to these aspects of modern systematics and to the sociology of this science.

When developing phylogenetic systematics, the entomologist Willi Hennig adopted elements from Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology. In this historical essay I take on the task of documenting this adoption. I argue that in order to build a metaphysical foundation for phylogenetic systematics, Hennig adopted from Hartmann four main metaphysical theses. These are (1) that what is real is what is temporal; (2) that the criterion of individuality is to have duration; (3) that species are supra-individuals; and (4) that there are (...) levels of reality, each of which may be subject to different kinds of law. Reliance on Hartmann’s metaphysics allowed Hennig to ground some of the main theoretical principles of phylogenetic systematics, namely that the biological categories—from the semaphoront to the highest rank—have reality and individuality despite not being universals, and that they form a hierarchy of levels, each of which may require different kinds of explanation. Hartmann’s metaphysics thereby provided a philosophical justification for Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics, both as a theory and as a method of classification. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of species have focused on multicellular, sexual animals and have often neglected to consider unicellular organisms like bacteria. This article begins to fill this gap by considering what species concepts, if any, apply neatly to the bacterial world. First, I argue that the biological species concept cannot be applied to bacteria because of the variable rates of genetic transfer between populations, depending in part on which gene type is prioritized. Second, I present a critique of phylogenetic bacterial species, (...) arguing that phylogenetic bacterial classification requires a questionable metaphysical commitment to the existence of essential genes. I conclude by considering how microbiologists have dealt with these biological complexities by using more pragmatic and not exclusively evolutionary accounts of species. I argue that this pragmatism is not borne of laziness but rather of the substantial conceptual problems in classifying bacteria based on any evolutionary standard. (shrink)

The long-awaited revision of the industry standard on phylogenetics Since the publication of the first edition of this landmark volume more than twenty-five years ago, phylogenetic systematics has taken its place as the dominant paradigm of systematic biology. It has profoundly influenced the way scientists study evolution, and has seen many theoretical and technical advances as the field has continued to grow. It goes almost without saying that the next twenty-five years of phylogenetic research will prove as fascinating as (...) the first, with many exciting developments yet to come. This new edition of Phylogenetics captures the very essence of this rapidly evolving discipline. Written for the practicing systematist and phylogeneticist, it addresses both the philosophical and technical issues of the field, as well as surveys general practices in taxonomy. Major sections of the book deal with the nature of species and higher taxa, homology and characters, trees and tree graphs, and biogeography—the purpose being to develop biologically relevant species, character, tree, and biogeographic concepts that can be applied fruitfully to phylogenetics. The book then turns its focus to phylogenetic trees, including an in-depth guide to tree-building algorithms. Additional coverage includes: Parsimony and parsimony analysis Parametric phylogenetics including maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches Phylogenetic classification Critiques of evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics, and transformed cladistics Specimen selection, field collecting, and curating Systematic publication and the rules of nomenclature Providing a thorough synthesis of the field, this important update to Phylogenetics is essential for students and researchers in the areas of evolutionary biology, molecular evolution, genetics and evolutionary genetics, paleontology, physical anthropology, and zoology. (shrink)

Although molecular systematists may use the terminology of cladism, claiming that the reconstruction of phylogenetic relationships is based on shared derived states , the latter is not the case. Rather, molecular systematics is based on the assumption, first clearly articulated by Zuckerkandl and Pauling , that degree of overall similarity reflects degree of relatedness. This assumption derives from interpreting molecular similarity between taxa in the context of a Darwinian model of continual and gradual change. Review of the history of (...) molecular systematics and its claims in the context of molecular biology reveals that there is no basis for the “molecular assumption.”. (shrink)

Phylogenetic trees are meant to represent the genealogical history of life and apparently derive their justification from the existence of the tree of life and the fact that evolutionary processes are treelike. However, there are a number of problems for these assumptions. Here it is argued that once we understand the important role that phylogenetic trees play as models that contain idealizations, we can accept these criticisms and deny the reality of the tree while justifying the continued use of trees (...) in phylogenetic theory and preserving nearly all of what defenders of trees have called the “importance of tree thinking.”. (shrink)

The foundations of systematics lie in ontology, not in subjective epistemology. Systems and their elements should be distinguished from classes; only the latter are constructed from similarities. The term classification should be restricted to ordering into classes; ordering according to systematic relations may be called systematization.The theory of organization levels portrays the real world as a hierarchy of open systems, from energy quanta to ecosystems; followingHartmann these systems as extended in time are considered the primary units of reality. Organization (...) levels should be distinguished from levels of differentiation within each organization level.Certain biological systems, such as species, continue to be misinterpreted as classes, particularly by logicians unfamiliar with modern biological theory. Replacement of Aristotelian definitions of species by “polytypic” definitions achieves nothing, because species are individual systems which can be defined from an ontological viewpoint only as wholes. The dispute whether classes are real per se or only in individuals is of no scientific importance; irrespective of which view is taken, any ordering of physical objects into classes constitutes an hypothesis about the structure of the real world.The distinction between essential and contingent characters is relevant only to classification. There are no universal rules for evaluating characters for purposes of systematization. Character statements do not form separate linear sequences. The search for “unit characters” in an absolute sense is futile. All real characters are reducible to relations and are in principle measurable, although there are limitations on the extent to which this can be presently achieved.The concept of the sexual species is fundamental to theories of biosystematics. Sexual species may be defined as lineages consisting at any given time of series of populations between which genetic exchange can occur and delimited in time by two successive processes of speciation. Linnaean nomenclature needs modification; in its traditional form it is appropriate only to non-truncated hierarchies, whereas real phylogenies form truncated hierarchies. In consequence of the distinction between systematization and classification it is concluded that, while taxa may be classified into age classes or evolutionary grades, their limits as taxa can be no different in either case. Classification into evolutionary grades remains an imprecise endeavour, since no general measure of evolutionary differentiation has been devised.The spatial and temporal extent of ecosystems, the postulated basic units of ecosystematics, remains unclarified. Nevertheless there are grounds for expecting progress in this field as the energetic relations between organisms become better understood. Biotic communities are not “abstract” classes, but systematic units. Physiognomic classification should not be confused with systematization of plant communities; both approaches contribute to an understanding of vegetational structure. (shrink)

British systematics was distinctly marked by a raft of vituperative controversies around the turn of the 1830s. After the local collapse of broad consensus in the Linnaean system by 1820, the emergence of new schemes of classification—most notably, the “quinarian” system of William Sharp Macleay—brought with it an unprecedented register of public debate among zoologists in Britain, one which a young Charles Darwin would bitterly describe to his friend John Stevens Henslow in October 1836 as possessing a “mean quarrelsome (...) spirit,” conducted in “a manner anything but like that of gentlemen.” This article aims to provide a social and conceptual account of the remarkable tenor of zoological discourse in Britain in the late 1820s and early 1830s, with joint attention to the philosophical and interpersonal commitments at play. In doing so, it analyzes the three of the period’s most striking public controversies, each of which counted key advocates of the quinarian system as central participants. (shrink)

In Sandra Waddock’s article “Taking Stock of SIM” in this journal, she identifies key issues in the work of the Social Issues in Management (SIM) Division of the Academy of Management. This article challenges her analysis of SIM scholarship and her arguments of what is necessary for the division to progress. Scholarship in SIM should emphasize two key streams: First, scholars in SIM should seek to develop a science of social forensics, design, and social repair—in essence, develop a method of (...) problem diagnosis, an approach to practical solution design, and a systematic understanding of the selection and implementation of social repair—in other words, seek to understand how to systematically troubleshoot and engineer solutions to fundamental issues in the business and society interface. The second stream, which informs the first, involves the development of original, core, transferable systematics that can “travel”—be the source of understanding-generating analysis—in other disciplines, including the topical regions of the Academy of Management. The article argues that laying claim to and developing true normative theory applicable across disciplines should be a distinctive identifier of work in SIM. The article concludes with an illustration of how systematics can be applied to address the literature’s failure to even seek to understand the logic underlying the standard ethical theories. These theories are properly seen as complements rather than substitutes. We need to ask and answer the “fundamental question of business ethics”: What should I do?.We suggest an approach labeled “integrative ethics,” employing ethical frames/injunctive formats, framed contexts for action, and the distribution of desires. (shrink)

A “parallel” exists between the threefold parallelism of Agassiz and Haeckel and the three valid methods of polarity determination in phylogenetic systematics. The structural gradation among taxa within a linear hierarchy, ontogenetic recapitulation, and geological succession of the threefold parallelism resemble outgroup comparison, the ontogenetic method, and the paleontological method, respectively, which are methods of polarity determination in phylogenetic systematics. The parallel involves expected congruence among similar components of the distribution of character states among organisms. The threefold parallelism (...) is a manifestation of a world view based on linear hierarchies, whereas polarity determination is part of the methodology of phylogenetic systematics which assumes that organisms are grouped into a nested hierarchy. The threefold parallelism facilitated the ranking of previously established taxa into linear hierarchies consisting mostly of paraphyletic groups. In contrast, methods of polarity determination identify apomorphies that determine and diagnose monophyletic taxa (clades) in the nested genealogical hierarchy. Taxa in linear hierarchies are defined by sets of character states, whereas clades are defined by common ancestry. Although the threefold parallelism was ostensibly abandoned with the rejection of Haeckel's biogenetic law, some of its components continue to facilitate the progressive scenarios that are common in evolutionary thought. Although a general view of progression in organismal history may be invalid, the progressive or directional sequence of character state changes that results in the characterization of a particular clade has considerable heuristic value. Agassiz's ostensibly nested hierarchy and other pre-Darwinian classifications do not provide support for the view that the natural system can be discovered without recourse to the principle of common descent. (shrink)

The field of phylogenetic systematics, founded by the German entomologist and theorist Emil Hans Willi Hennig (1913-1976), became a central battleground in the so-called systematics wars, a period of intense conflict between competing schools of taxonomic thought. A critical turning point in this debate was Joseph Felsenstein’s articulation of “Hennig’s Dilemma,” a critique which asserted that Hennig relied on biologically unrealistic assumptions: that one must know with absolute certainty the ancestral state of every character, that evolutionary reversals to (...) an ancestral state are impossible, and that homoplasy is prohibited. In this way, there would be no solution to resolving tree incompatibilities. This so-called dilemma and assumptions were highly effective; they successfully painted parsimony as a fatally flawed method, clearing the path for the dominance of maximum likelihood and other model-based approaches to systematic theory and practice. The consequences of this “victory” are still felt today, with morphological data and parsimony analysis largely marginalized. This paper aims to move away from this accepted view by examining original historical works, such as Hennig’s 1950 work. It argues that these so-called assumptions constitute a profound misrepresentation of Hennig’s actual writings and epistemic assumptions, and that “Hennig’s Dilemma” is more accurately understood as “Felsenstein’s Dilemma,” a persistent uncertainty over this historical misinterpretation of Hennig’s work. Hennig's so-called dilemma, I argue, functioned as a powerful rhetorical device that, while influential, does not hold up to scrutiny against Hennig’s original texts. The enduring nature of this conflict suggests that we have not, in fact, moved beyond the systematics wars. (shrink)

Taxa and homologues can in our view be construed both as kinds and as individuals. However, the conceptualization of taxa as natural kinds in the sense of homeostatic property cluster kinds has been criticized by some systematists, as it seems that even such kinds cannot evolve due to their being homeostatic. We reply by arguing that the treatment of transformational and taxic homologies, respectively, as dynamic and static aspects of the same homeostatic property cluster kind represents a good perspective for (...) supporting the conceptualization of taxa as kinds. The focus on a phenomenon of homology based on causal processes (e.g., connectivity, activity-function, genetics, inheritance, and modularity) and implying relationship with modification yields a notion of natural kinds conforming to the phylogenetic-evolutionary framework. Nevertheless, homeostatic property cluster kinds in taxonomic and evolutionary practice must be rooted in the primacy of epistemological classification (homology as observational properties) over metaphysical generalization (series of transformation and common ancestry as unobservational processes). The perspective of individuating characters exclusively by historical-transformational independence instead of their developmental, structural, and functional independence fails to yield a sufficient practical interplay between theory and observation. Purely ontological and ostensional perspectives in evolution and phylogeny (e.g., an ideographic character concept and PhyloCode’s ‘individualism’ of clades) may be pragmatically contested in the case of urgent issues in biodiversity research, conservation, and systematics. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr''s scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr''s participation in a three year (...) expedition to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr''s empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

This paper explores the use of Popper's philosophy of science by cladists in their battle against evolutionary and numerical taxonomy. Three schools of biological systematics fiercely debated each other from the late 1960s: evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics or numerical taxonomy, and phylogenetic systematics or cladistics. The outcome of that debate was the victory of phylogenetic systematics/cladistics over the competing schools of thought. To bring about this "cladistic turn" in systematics, the cladists drew heavily on the philosopher K.R. (...) Popper in order to dress up phylogenetic systematics as a hypothetico-deductivist, indeed falsificationist, research program that would put an end to authoritarianism. As the case of the "cladistic revolution" demonstrates, scientists who turn to philosophy in defense of a research program read philosophers with an agenda in mind. That agenda is likely to distort the philosophical picture, as happened to Popper's philosophy of science at the hands of cladists. (shrink)

I attempt to raise questions regarding elements of systematics—primarily in the realm of phylogenetic reconstruction—in order to provoke discussion on the current state of affairs in this discipline, and also evolutionary biology in general: e.g., conceptions of homology and homoplasy, hypothesis testing, the nature of and objections to Hennigian “phylogenetic systematics”, and the schism between Darwinian descendants of the “modern evolutionary synthesis” and their supposed antagonists, cladists and punctuationalists.

Taking its clues from Popperian philosophy of science, cladistics adopted a number of assumptions of the empiricist tradition. These include the identification of a dichotomy between observation reports and theoretical statements and its subsequent abandonment on the basis of the insight that all observation reports are theory-laden. The neglect of the ‘context of discovery’, which is the step of theory (hypothesis) generation. The emphasis on coherentism in the ‘context of justification’, which is the step of evaluation of the relative merits (...) of alternative theories. The appeal to a total evidence approach in phylogenetic inference. And finally, a silence about causation, which results in an instrumentalist approach to phylogeny reconstruction. This paper explores how these empiricist assumptions are embedded in phylogenetic systematics, and why these assumptions are problematic for cladists (or any taxonomists). (shrink)

The question of whether or not to partition data for the purposes of inferring phylogenetic hypotheses remains controversial. Opinions have been especially divided since Kluge's (1989, Systematic Zoology 38, 7–25) claim that data partitioning violates the requirement of total evidence (RTE). Unfortunately, advocacy for or against the RTE has not been based on accurate portrayals of the requirement. The RTE is a basic maxim for non-deductive inference, stipulating that evidence must be considered if it has relevance to an inference. Evidence (...) is relevant if it has a positive or negative effect on a given conclusion. In the case of ℈partitioned’ phylogenetic inferences, the RTE is violated, and the basis for rational belief in any conclusion is compromised, unless it is shown that the partitions are evidentially irrelevant to one another. The goal of phylogenetic systematics is to hypothesize past causal conditions to account for observed shared similarities among two or more species. Such inferences are non-deductive, necessitating consideration of the RTE. Some phylogeneticists claim the parsimony criterion as justification for the RTE. There is no relation between the two – parsimony is a relation between a hypothesis and causal question(s). Parsimony does not dictate the content of premises prior to an inference. ℈Taxonomic congruence,’ ℈supertrees,’ and ℈conditional combination’ methods violate the RTE. Taxonomic congruence and supertree methods also fail to achieve the intended goal of phylogenetic inference, such that ℈consensus trees’ and ℈supertrees’ lack an empirical basis. ℈Conditional combination’ is problematic because hypotheses derived from partitioned data cannot be compared – a causal hypothesis inferred to account for a set of effects only has relevance to those effects, not any comparative relevance to other causal hypotheses. A similar problem arises in the comparisons of hypotheses derived from different causal theories. (shrink)

The taxa that appear in biological classifications are commonly seen as representing information about the traits of their member organisms. This paper examines in what way taxa feature in the storage and retrieval of such information. I will argue that taxa do not actually store much information about the traits of their member organisms. Rather, I want to suggest, taxa should be understood as functioning to localize organisms in the genealogical network of life on Earth. Taxa store information about where (...) organisms are localized in the network, which is important background information when it comes to establishing knowledge about organismal traits, but it is not itself information about these traits. The view of species and higher taxa that is proposed here follows from examining three problems that occur in contemporary biological systematics and are discussed here: the problem of generalization over taxa, the problem of phylogenetic inference, and the problematic nature of the Tree of Life. (shrink)

What does it look like when a group of scientists set out to re-envision an entire field of biology in symbolic and formal terms? I analyze the founding and articulation of Numerical Taxonomy between 1950 and 1970, the period when it set out a radical new approach to classification and founded a tradition of mathematics in systematic biology. I argue that introducing mathematics in a comprehensive way also requires re-organizing the daily work of scientists in the field. Numerical taxonomists sought (...) to establish a mathematical method for classification that was universal to every type of organism, and I argue this intrinsically implicated them in a qualitative re-organization of the work of all systematists. I also discuss how Numerical Taxonomy’s re-organization of practice became entrenched across systematic biology even as opposing schools produced their own competing mathematical methods. In this way, the structure of the work process became more fundamental than the methodological theories that motivated it. (shrink)

This article aims to make a contribution to the problematic history of the transcendental philosophical tradition up to the present day. At the centre is the question of the continuity of transcendental philosophical research in the 20th century with regard to the situation before and after the Second World War. The decisive point of reference here is Neo-Kantianism. Canonical Neo-Kantianism research defines it on the basis of its core phase between 1895 and 1912, which it precedes with an emergence and (...) ends with a dissolution. There is no consensus among researchers when it comes to determining and dating the emergence and end of Neo-Kantianism. However, the majority of researchers agree that the end of Neo-Kantianism was between 1918 and 1945, marking a break in this philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, there is also a research perspective that allows a post-history to follow the core phase of Neo-Kantianism. However, the term Neo-Neo-Kantianism proposed for this is rejected by the majority of research in Neo-Kantianism. Kurt Walter Zeidler and Andrej Noras have taken up research into the post-history of Neo-Kantianism in different ways. On the one hand, Zeidler makes “Post-Neo-Kantian systematics” the guiding principle of his analysis with a view to continuity within the Neo-Kantian school of realist criticism. Andrej Noras, on the other hand, interprets the ontological interpretation of Kant in the 1920s and its critique of epistemologically orientated classical Neo-Kantianism as Post-Neo-Kantianism, which he follows with Neo-Neo-Kantianism as a critique of the critique of Post-Neo-Kantianism. The two authors thus argue in favour of a continuity of the transcendental philosophical tradition in the 20th century, whereby they make the supposed end of neo-Kantianism the starting point of their investigations. In this article, the terms Neo-Kantianism, Neo-Neo-Kantianism and Post-Neo-Kantianism will be clarified and contextualised within Neo-Kantian research. On the basis of this presentation, a perspective for the transcendental philosophical systematics of the 21st century will then be developed, which productively appropriates the 20th century as its problem-historical foundation. (shrink)