Substantial form is a pivotal topic in the Metaphysics. While being is the subject of the entire work, ousiai are the primary cases of being. Among ousiai, individual material things are the ones directly available for examination. Substantial form is the chief determinant of such things. Aristotle assures us, moreover, that an understanding of this type of form will carry us forward, eventually, to an understanding of the formal being which exists totally apart from matter (...) and change--the necessary reality somewhat inadequately discerned by Plato. (shrink)

Beginning from the apparent failure of Aristotelian natural philosophy in the last centuries, I propose key questions internal to that tradition, most importantly this: Are the central theses of Aristotelian natural philosophy true and do they continue to contribute to our knowledge of the natural world in light of modern discoveries in the sciences? In this paper, I answer this question affirmatively by drawing on the most general mathematical theory used in the sciences to study natural change. I propose an (...) Aristotelian extension of that theory to include substantial change. With such an extension, it becomes possible to see the physical aspect of substantial form, the role that each natural thing plays in making the cosmos what it is. Understood this way, substantial form allows the cosmos itself to be seen in a new way, one that integrates modern scientific discoveries with an Aristotelian approach to nature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Where Do Substantial Forms Come From?—A Critique of the Theistic Evolution of Mariusz Tabaczek*Michael Chaberek O.P. and Monika Metlerska-ColerickIntroductionThe question posed in the present article is whether it is possible to be a proponent of theistic evolution and, at the same time, of the metaphysical [End Page 239] principles elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas. The authors of Thomistic Evolution: a Catholic Approach to Understanding Evolution in the Light (...) of Faith, recently published in Polish, imply that Aquinas's doctrine was not only compatible with the idea of biological macroevolution, but also—on some level—endorsed it.1 In his "Afterword" to the above publication, Mariusz Tabaczek points out certain deficiencies in the argumentation provided by its authors, simultaneously underlining that he agrees with the book's principal thesis.I will not examine the book by the American Dominicans in this article because I have already addressed their arguments in full in my book entitled Aquinas and Evolution,2 where I demonstrated that it is impossible to be both a proponent of theistic evolution and a follower of the philosophical views proposed by St. Thomas. In his "Afterword," Tabaczek presents a contradictory thesis. He claims that being both of the above is possible, provided that one modifies St. Thomas's teaching in four "essential aspects." The very approach of this kind already raises doubts. After all, if St. Thomas's doctrine indeed needs to be modified in order to reconcile his thought with evolution, it suggests that, in fact, it cannot be reconciled with it. Therefore, perhaps the problem comes down to asking whether the four points of incompatibility indicated by Tabaczek really constitute an "essential" part of Aquinas's doctrine? If it is not the case, they might be omitted or modified. If, however, they relate to certain essential elements of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, disregarding them equals denying St. Thomas's teaching and, consequently, makes it impossible to reconcile it with theistic evolution.In order to settle the problem, I devote the first part of my article to determining whether the points presented by Tabaczek refer to the essential elements of Aquinas's discourse. In the second part of my text, however, I move to a more important point, namely the fact that theistic evolution encounters many more problems in the context of Thomistic metaphysics. Since I have already addressed this matter in several places,3 I limit the scope [End Page 240] of the second part of my article to only one such problem: the emergence of new substantial forms (new species) via the mechanism of evolution. Thus, the object of the present analysis is to examine whether the solution suggested by Tabaczek provides an explanation to the problem of the origin of new substantial forms in theistic evolution.Commentary on the Four Points of IncompatibilityAccording to Tabaczek, the teaching of St. Thomas can be reconciled with theistic evolution under the conditions of:(1) recognizing the possibility of the emergence of new species, that is, acknowledging that the perfection of the universe can increase every day not only in terms of the number of individual beings, but also as regards the number of species; (2) emphasizing the fact that God's initial act of creation is limited to the derivation of matter of the lowest degree of complexity out of nothing (ex nihilo); (3) recognizing the fact that the processes of chemical, biochemical, and biological evolution belong to the work of adornment (opus ornatus), whose subsequent stages spread out across the entire history of the universe and, therefore, are not limited to a finished and past time period; and finally (4) acknowledging that God's direct intervention in the creation of the first representatives of plant and animal species (with the exception of man) is not necessary.4Ad (1) and ad (3). Points 1 and 3 boil down to the same idea, since they are both concerned with the fact that evolution continues, whereas from the Christian perspective, the divine work of creation had already finished. Therefore, if one adopts theistic evolution, the Christian truth of God completing his creative work with the creation of man has to be rejected. The... (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui explique l'unité d'une substance leibnizienne, au-dessus des attributs compris dans sa notion individuelle complète? C'est une question commune dans la littérature sur la notion de la substance chez Leibniz. Cet article soutient qu'elle n'admette pas de réponse consistante dans le système leibnizien. Premièrement, je discute la manière dans laquelle Leibniz a essayé de répondre à la question en „rehabillitant" a les formes substantielles des scholastiques. Puis je cherche à montrer que ça lui a ammené à une conception composée (...) de la nature de la substance, une position similaire de quelques façons à celle de Duns Scotus. Cette conception composée, cependant, n'est pas soutenable étant donné que Leibniz a rejeté la „distinction formelle" de Scotus. (shrink)

Aristotle's reasoning in Z, 10-11 has three stages. In the first, Aristotle proposes two different definitions for our consideration. The definitions contrast, at least superficially, for one appears to elucidate a whole by reference to its material parts, while the other does not appear to do so. Aristotle then in effect shows that the form of a whole can be taken in three somewhat different ways: We may be concerned with form by itself, or with the essential determinacy (...) which is form-having- its-formal-effect-in-a-milieu; in the latter alternative, the essential determinacy may be so taken as to be particular or as to be typical. In each of the three cases, form as the primary intelligible is the governing factor. On this basis, it is possible to clarify the character of the two definitions originally proposed as suggestive of a difficulty. (shrink)

This paper investigates the late medieval controversy over the causal role of substantial forms in the generation of new substances. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, when there were two basic positions in this debate (section II), an original position was defended by Walter Burley and Peter Auriol, according to which accidents alone—by their own power—can generate substantial forms (section III). The paper presents how this view was received by the next generation of philosophers, i.e., around 1350 (...) (section IV), and how, even though some of the initial theoretical motivations for this view were quickly abandoned, the view was still defended by several philosophers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (section V). It is finally shown that this theory, still discussed by Suárez and early modern scholastics, and despite being generally rejected, contributed in its own way to the evolution of hylomorphism in the late Middle Ages and, to a certain extent, its gradual decline (section VI). (shrink)

"Wherein can consist the unity of that, the formula of which we call a definition, as for instance in the case of man, 'two-footed animal'; for let this be the formula of man. Why, then, is this one, and not many, viz. 'animal' and 'two-footed'? This is how the problem is stated. 'Animal' and 'two-footed' do make a unity, and they should, since: "The definition is a single formula and a formula of substance, so that it must be a formula (...) of some one thing; for substance means a 'one' and a 'this', as we maintain." All the same, there is a need to trace the unity of genus and difference back to its origin, and to see just how this unity differs from others. (shrink)

Leibniz considered that there are substances in a body, each of which does not solely have a shape and size and can act spontaneously. Although he started to regard bodies as having inherent substantial forces in 1678–79, what exactly led him to suppose this is not obvious. The author aims to articulate Leibniz's most important motivation for "restoring" substantial forms. He first notes that Leibniz considered that every body tends to slow down because of its natural inertia. He (...) then discusses that Leibniz had two arguments to postulate the existence of substantial forms, the first of which is based on his view that God providentially manages the universe in the most efficient way. The second and more interesting argument is based on Leibniz's understanding of science, according to which a scientific explanation of motion should be given in terms of the nature of the body. (shrink)

Z.1 gives rise to three interpretations. One takes substantial forms to constitute substantial being and individual composites to be the basic constituents that have this being. The other two take universal substantial forms, or particular substantial forms, to be basic constituents. Support can be found in Z.1 for each of them, but questions also arise for each of them. Z.1 doesn’t seem to contain enough to decide between them. So, one should accept the interpretation that best (...) fits the rest of Z. But until the rest of Z has been investigated, individual composites and substantial forms should each be regarded as candidates for basic constituents. (shrink)

This paper presents an original interpretation of John Duns Scotus’s theory of hylomorphism. I argue that Scotus thinks, contrary to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, that at least some of the extended parts of a substance—paradigmatically the organs of an animal—are themselves substances. Moreover, Scotus thinks that the form of corporeity is nothing more than the substantial forms of these organic parts. I offer an account of how Scotus thinks that the various extended parts of an animal are substantially (...) unified. First, a plurality of substances can become parts of a complex substance if they are essentially ordered to one another in the order of final causality. Second, a plurality of substances do become parts of a complex substance if they are together informed by a soul. The paper closes with some reflections on some of the ramifications of the substancehood of organic parts on the function of soul. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, contrary to what one might think, early modern rationalism displays an increasing and well-grounded sensitivity to certain metaphysical questions substantial form was designed to answer—despite the fact that the notion itself was in such disrepute, and emphatically banished from natural philosophy. This main thesis is established by examining the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz through the framework constituted by what have been designated as the two aspects, metaphysical and physical, of (...) class='Hi'>substantial form. This examination shows that Descartes ends up assigning to soul a notable metaphysical task formerly assigned to substantial form, whereas Spinoza advances a theory of essences motivated by the philosophical concerns behind the two aspects of substantial form. Leibniz finally makes a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and metaphysics as he develops a dynamistic theory that deliberately aims at understanding substantial form in a new fashion. This line of development is designated as one major factor contributing to the separation of philosophy and natural science. (shrink)

In this essay Suárez’s defense of the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms is critically examined. Suárez’s innovative solution to the problem of the eduction of form from matter during substantial change is shown to rely on a reversal of the traditional priorities of the Thomists. Because Suárez made the substantial form in some sense physical rather than metaphysical, he was able to solve the problem of eduction. But in solving this he did irreparable damage to (...) the Scholastic account of scientific explanation and paved the way for the rise and acceptance of the mechanical philosophy in the seventeenth century. (shrink)

This chapter begins the final part of the book, which focuses on the unity and identity of substances over time. For scholastic authors, the critical notion here is that of substantial form. This chapter argues that such forms may play two quite different roles, either as metaphysical principles as individuation, or as physical agents.

Suarez isn't really a Unitarian about substantial form.

John Pecham was a Franciscan theologian who took both a strongly anti-Thomist position and a strongly anti-Averroist position in late-13th-century debates in philosophy of mind. Following a successful career as a theologian, Pecham was Archbishop of Canterbury from 1279 until his death in 1292. Pecham is one of a number of Franciscan philosophers who advocated for what has become known as the “Binarium Famosissimum,” or the two famous and related doctrines of the plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism.1 These two (...) doctrines were vigorously opposed by Thomas Aquinas. They had a history prior to the 13th century, with an embryonic presence in the work of Augustine and then fuller expression in Avicebron... (shrink)

Leibniz argued that (i) substantial forms only begin to exist via Divine creation; (ii) created substances cannot transeuntly cause accidents in distinct substances; and yet (iii) created substances immanently produce their accidents. Some of Leibniz’s support for (i) came from his endorsement of a widely-made argument against the eduction of substantial forms. However, in defense of eduction, Suárez argued that if creatures cannot produce substantial forms, they also cannot produce accidents, threatening the consistency of (i) and (iii). (...) In this paper, I argue that Leibniz successfully defends the consistency of (i) and (iii) against Suárez’s argument, but at the expense of the consistency of (ii) and (iii). (shrink)

Francisco Suárez claims that forms may be efficient causes. There is an action whose proximate efficient cause is a substantial form, namely, the natural resulting. Also a substantial form is the principal efficient cause of the eduction of other forms, although it causes this through the substance’s own accidents. The souls insofar as substantial forms participate of both features. However, they pose a new complexity because of the actions they are exclusively principles of, namely vital (...) actions. This kind of actions may seem no different from natural resulting, if vitality is mainly described as some sort of immanence. However, there is a Suarezian approach to vital actions that does not rely completely on the immanence and therefore allows to consider souls as efficient causes without turning their actions into natural. (shrink)

The Avicennan text De congelatione et conglutinatione lapidum had a great influence on the alchemical thought of the thirteenth century. This Latin text disputed both the veracity of alchemy and the possibility of alchemical transmutation by arguing that art is inferior to nature and that the alchemists cannot manipulate a metal because its true characteristics are hidden from our senses; thus an alchemist cannot change something which is unknown to him. Newman’s pioneer studies examined the diffusion and impact of the (...) first Avicennan argument on medieval alchemy and he shed light on the art-versus-nature debate. This paper has a twofold aim: on the one hand it aims to further Newman’s study by focusing on the second Avicennan argument, which is closely related to the problem of substantial form, and on the other hand it aims to show how the aforesaid problem paved the way for the emergence of corpuscularianism, which flourished during the early modern period. In this regard, it will become clear that the historiographical case of alchemy and its problem of substantial form can serve as an exegetical tool for ‘bridging’ the Middle Ages and the early modern period with respect to the relation between Aristotelianism and corpuscularianism. (shrink)

In a 1642 letter to Regius, Descartes elaborates several reasons for rejecting Aristotelian substantial forms including that (1) they are explanatorily impotent, (2) they are explanatorily unnecessary, and (3) they threaten the incorporeality and immortality of the human soul. Various ideas have already been proposed as to why Descartes thought Aristotelian substantial forms are susceptible to these criticisms. Here I suggest one further such idea, centered on the ways Descartes and medieval scholastics thought substantial forms—and souls in (...) particular—are related to their powers. (shrink)

The most pedigreed line of thought about mind is the simplicity argument: that the unity of thinking entails the simplicity, immateriality, and immortality of soul. It is widely taken to be a rationalist argument, as opposed to an empiricist or peripatetic argument (see Mijuskovic, The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments), which was completely destroyed by Kant in the First Critique. In this paper it is argued that there is a conceptual connection between the downfall of the Aristotelian conception of soul as (...) substantial form and the downfall of this argument in that in the downfall of the Aristotelian conception of soul it became acceptable to view the functional unity of a material system as constituting a genuine unity per se. This then undermined all philosophical motivation for the postulation of substantial forms. As a result, there was no longer reason for rooting the unity of apperception in the simplicity of a subsistence soul as opposed to some simply emergent power of thinking. (shrink)

Terence Nichols recently pointed to three examples from modern science that seem to refute Aquinas’ doctrine of the unicity of substantial form: water in man, organ transplants, and the genetic material received from one’s parents. These examples are intended to demonstrate the quasi-independent existence of parts from the substantial form of the whole. Nichols proposes modifying Aquinas’s hylomorphism by adding a third category of form, which can be called subsidiary forms, subsidiary wholes, or holons. In (...) simpler terms, a holon is a semi-autonomous whole within a larger whole. Nichols’ overall argument suggests that we revise Thomistic metaphysics to account for these scientific findings. I argue that Nichols’ suggestion is unwarranted for two reasons. First, Aquinas argues that holons are a logical impossibility within his metaphysical framework. Second, while Nichols rejects the virtual presence of forms, this does not demonstrate a failure of the Thomistic account of substances within larger wholes. (shrink)

This article considers Avicenna’s insistence on the disunity between the souls of humans, animals, and plants and the mixed elemental bodies in which they inhere. In particular, it looks at (1) why Avicenna rejects their unity and (2) why this rejection, pace some contemporary scholars, is compatible with the status of these souls as substances. I show that both points derive from the causal role that these souls and the elements play in the coming to be and passing away of (...) mixed elemental bodies. (shrink)

La doctrine thomiste de l’unité de la forme substantielle explique l’unité près de l’âme cartésienne avec le corps, mais pour leur indépendance Paul Hoffman a conseillé la lecture pluraliste du composite attribuable à Guillaume d’Ockham et Duns Scot. Principalement pour lier la pensée cartésienne à une tradition éthique plus étendue, je suggère que la doctrine thomiste pourrait être développée pour répondre aux objections de Marleen Rozemond à une lecture scolaire si la forme substantielle est considérée comme l’argument d’incliner le conatus (...) ou de l’appétit de l’existence. (shrink)

The concept of Substantial motion (حركت جوهرى) is fundamentally flawed and severely muddled. Aristotle and Mulla Sadra’s conception of motion, substance (جوهر) and substantial form صورت نوعيه)) were all based on a severe misunderstanding of nature as later was established by the scientists and philosophers that came after them. Here, by recalling the established facts of modern science, particularly the universally accepted scientific fact that, properties of objects are reducible to the motion of their electrons and there’s (...) no such thing as ‘substantial form’ much less substance, the author puts an end to a 400-year-old glorious error called ‘substantial motion’. Naturally any attempt to reconcile the paradigms of modern physics with Aristotle/Sadra paradigms of form/matter and substance/accidents, and to try to draw parallel between the two and revive their philosophy would be an exercise in futility. (shrink)

This book examines an important area of Aristotle's philosophy: the generation of substances. While other changes presuppose the existence of a substance (Socrates grows taller), substantial generation results in something genuinely new that did not exist before (Socrates himself). The central argument of this book is that Aristotle defends a 'hylomorphic' model of substantial generation. In its most complete formulation, this model says that substantial generation involves three principles: (1) matter, which is the subject from which the (...) change proceeds; (2) form, which is the end towards which the process advances; and (3) an efficient cause, which directs the process towards that form. By examining the development of this model across Aristotle's works, Devin Henry seeks to deepen our grasp on how the doctrine of hylomorphism - understood as a blueprint for thinking about the world - informs our understanding of the process by which new substances come into being. (shrink)

This article argues that Mulla Sadra's doctrine of substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) cannot survive contact with post-Cartesian inquiry. The doctrine depends on the Aristotelian substantial form, and that form has been progressively retired by four convergent developments: the mechanical philosophy's dismantling of substantial forms, the pragmatist anti-essentialism running from James through Rorty, Quinean holism denying any clean separation of science from metaphysics, and the structural turn in physics, on which fundamental constituents are individuated by relations, (...) not intrinsic essences. With the form retired, the flagship argument from accidental to substantial motion loses its subject. The standard defensive move—recasting the doctrine as a thesis about the act of existence—is then shown to fail on either reading. Read thinly, it is a truism that has existed in various guises since Heraclitus, one that physics replaces rather than confirms. Read richly, its teleological, ascending character contradicts the findings of physics, while the bare gradation of existence (tashkik al-wujud) it invokes under-determines the observed diversity of the universe's furniture. Sadra's argument from the reality of time is disqualified directly: special relativity denies the intrinsic, frame-independent temporality it requires. Sadra's historical isolation was excusable; the doctrine's persistence among contemporary philosophers is not. (shrink)

The article examines the structural-procedural model of the formation of the readiness of bachelors of the automotive profile for the implementation of professional and pedagogical activities in vocational education. The didactic principles and methodological approaches, components of the formation of a system of professional and pedagogical knowledge and skills, pedagogical conditions, stages of evaluating research results, criteria and levels of preparedness of bachelors for the implementation of future professional and pedagogical activities in the SVE system have been substantiated.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SUBSTANTIAL UNITY OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES ACCORDING TO JOHN POINSOT JOHN D. KRONEN The University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota EVERY SUBSTANCE metaphysician must answer several difficult questions peculiar to his or her ontology. In this paper I will examine John Poinsot's answer to two of these questions, one concerning the nature of the form of substantial composites, and one concerning which material objects are (...) substantial composites. I shall argue that Poinsot's answers to these questions show the untenability of a structuralist view of substantial form and of a reductive materialist view of living beings. But before considering these questions I must briefly outline Poinsot's view of what the general nature of substance is, as explained in his treatise on material logic.1 Poinsot's Account of Substance in General In the section of his Material Logic concerned with the categories Poinsot gives a succinct account of the nature of substance 1 Cursus Philosophicus thomisticus; vol. I, Ars logicae prima et secunda pars, ed. P. Beato Reiser (Turin, Italy: Marietti, 1820), Q. XV, pp. 523-527. It should be noted that I am not concerned in this paper with describing either the psychological origin of the notion of substance, or of justifying it against phenomenalism. My only aim is to show how such a view of substance leads to a certain notion of form when it is applied, so to speak, to material objects. For an interesting account of the origin of the concept of substance in Poinsot see John Deely, Tractatus De Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot (Los Angeles, Berkeley, and London: The University of California Press, 1985), p. 86, n. 16. Deely takes it that Poinsot has a deeper categorial scheme than that of Aristotle from which the latter's scheme "emerges," as it were. In this article, then, I am not concerned with that deeper scheme which Deely refers to in this interesting note. 599 600 JOHN D. KRONEN in general and of its relation to the supposit and to the act of existing. He notes that by " substance " narrowly considered is meant that kind of essence to "which it is due to exist in itself as opposed to that kind to which it is due to exist in another" (i.e., an accident).2 He defends this as the primary " definition " 3 of substance against the other definition of it which is " that which stands under accidents," on the grounds that a thing must exist in itself, at least ontologically speaking, before it can support accidents 4 and that to define substance as that which supports accidents is to define it in relation to other things, not itself. This point is important because many modern and contemporary philosophers who have attacked the notion of substance have done so by arguing that there are no beings which stand under accidents. For Poinsot this attack, even if successful, would show that there are no accidents, not that there are no substances. Poinsot insists that " substance " connotes a quiddity to which to exist in itself is due since actual existence does not belong to the essence of any created thing.5 Further, Poinsot insists that to exist in itself " connotes more than a mere negation of existing in another; rather it connotes a positive perfection." This is because to exist in a dependent way is to exist in an imperfect way, so to exist independently must be to exist in a more perfect way.6 Finally, Poinsot distinguishes between the substance and the supposit. The substance is the complete nature of the thing, while 2 Ibid., p. 523. a " Substance " as a supreme genus cannot strictly be defined since it cannot be differentiated from any higher genus. 4 Haec autem proprietas existendi per se intelligitur vel secundum considerationem absolutam et in ordine ad se, et sic dicitur subsistens, quasi non indignes alio ut sustentetur, sed in se sistens; vel dicitur secundum habitudinem ad alia, quatenus ilia sustentat in esse, et sic dicitur non solum subsistens, sed etiam substans. Ibid., p. 523. 5 ••• esse actu per se vel in alio non est ipsa quidditas substantiae vel accidentis, quia esse seu existere in nulla quidditate creata... (shrink)

This article attempts to determine how Leibniz might safeguard the simplicity of an individual substance (singular) while also retaining the view that causal powers (plural) are constitutive of said individual substance. I shall argue that causal powers are not to be understood as veritable parts of a substance in so far as such an account would render substances as unnecessarily complex. Instead, my proposal is that sense can be made of Leibniz’s metaphysical picture by appeal to truthmakers. In order to (...) develop my argument I critically examine (a) Leibniz’s revival of the scholastic notion of substantial form, (b) his theory of accidents, and (c) his account of metaphysical predication, and argue that an application of truthmaker theory can satisfy each in accordance with his simplicity requirement on individual substances. (shrink)

This article contains a case study of some innovative early fourteenth-century conceptions of the temporal structure of substantial change. An important tenet of thirteenth-century scholastic hylomorphism is that substantial change is an instantaneous process. In contrast, three early fourteenth-century Aristotelian commentators, first Walter Burley and then John Buridan and Albert of Saxony, progressively develop a view on which substantial change is linked to temporal duration. This process culminated, in Buridan and Albert of Saxony, with the explicit recognition (...) of the temporally extended nature of some (if not most) instances of substantial change. This article sheds light on this neglected episode in the history of late medieval hylomorphism taking as its point of departure these commentators’ discussions of the issue of minima naturalia, i.e., the issue of the lowest possible limit of any division of substantial forms coming about through the potentially infinite division of the matter they inform. In short: is there a piece of matter so small that no substantial form can possibly inhere in it? (shrink)

This article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas deny means; that is, (1) as ‘something that stands under or grounds things’ (a position known as generic substantialism); (2) as ‘a particular kind of basic entity’ (specific substantialism); (3) as ‘an individual essence (a haecceity or thisness of that object) by (...) means of which it is identical to that very object, to itself’ (modal essentialism); and (4) as ‘an essence in the absence of which an object could be of a radically different kind or sort of object than it in fact is’ (sortal essentialism). It then proceeds to delineate the Madhyamaka refutation of the specific substantialist position in terms of its argued denial of dharma as basic entity; of generic substantialism and modal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of svabhāva as both foundation for and essence of putative entities; and of sortal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of essentialist conceptions of conceptual thought (vikalpa), mental construction (prapañca), and in short the entire domain of ratiocination (kalpanā), by means of its notion of conceptual imputation (prajñaptir upādāya)—a denial strictly speaking ontological, but of what are putative epistemic entities. The final portion of the article explains the relationship of ontological to other forms of non-foundationalism according to Madhyamaka. (shrink)

According to the substantialist, substances should be regarded as the fundamental ontological category. It is substances that are the bearer of properties, that are causally efficacious and that compose the things we see and touch around us. Cumpa has argued that this metaphysics fits poorly with classical physics and Buonomo has extended this argument into the quantum realm. After reviewing their claims, I shall argue that simple reflection on the form of the Standard Model also undermines substantialism. I will (...) then explore Dasgupta’s qualitative factualism in this context before suggesting that modern physics does not compel us to adopt such a stance. The alternative is to adopt a form of structuralism which, although it may be rendered compatible with factualism, can also stand as a ‘third way’ between these stances. (shrink)