Substitution and simple sentences -- Simple sentences and semantics -- Simple sentences and implicatures -- The enlightenment problem and a common assumption -- Abandoning (EOI) -- Beyond matching propositions -- App. A : extending the account -- App. B : belief reporting.

Is it morally acceptable to use artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of computer-driven algorithms in the determination of sentences on those who have broken the law? If so, how should such algorithms be used? This book is the first collective work devoted exclusively to the ethical and penal theoretical considerations of the use of AI at sentencing. It deals with a wide range of highly pertinent issues, such as the following: Should algorithmic-based decision-making be transparent? If so, what does (...) this mean and why is it important? Does a conflict between algorithmic transparency and algorithmic accuracy always constitute a moral dilemma? What does it mean to require that algorithmic sentencing decisions should be fair? When should an algorithm be regarded as discriminatory? Is it acceptable to use algorithms to produce risk assessments of future criminal conduct? Can algorithms ever be used in the exercise of mercy? Should AI only be used to guide judicial decision-making or could it ever be justified to replace a human sentencing judge with a robojudge? (shrink)

Equative sentences like Hesperus is Phosphorus are interesting not only because they convey information about identity but also because of the atypical linguistic means they employ to do so. An equative sentence appears to be composed of a pair of referential singular terms (grammatical arguments) and to lack a logical predicate. Yet in the absence of such a predicate, how can equatives constitute well-formed, meaningful sentences? This rarely acknowledged “problem of symmetry” is assumed to have an obvious predicativist solution, (...) according to which equatives would actually contain some predicative constituent(s). We expose the problem of symmetry, critically review various predicativist solutions, and outline an alternative hypothesis according to which equatives are distinctive both syntactically, by virtue of their symmetrical [DP DP] structure, and semantically, by virtue of their meaning corresponding to an instruction to perform a mental act of identification rather than to a traditional predication (the ascription of a property or relation). (shrink)

The paper proposes the first unified account of deictic/sentence-external and sentence-internal readings of singular different. The empirical motivation for such an account is provided by a cross-linguistic survey and an analysis of the differences in distribution and interpretation between singular different, plural different and same (singular or plural) in English. The main proposal is that distributive quantification temporarily makes available two discourse referents within its nuclear scope, the values of which are required by sentence-internal uses of singular (...) different to be distinct, much as its deictic uses require the values of two discourse referents to be distinct. Thus, we take sentence-internal readings to be a form of ‘association with distributivity’ that is similar to association with focus. The contrast between singular different, plural different and same is explained in terms of several kinds of quantificational distributors that license their internal readings. The analysis is executed in a stack-based dynamic system couched in type logic, so we get compositionality in the usual Montagovian way. Quantificational subordination and dependent indefinites in various languages provide additional motivation for the account. Investigating the connections between items with sentence-internal readings and the quantificational licensors of these readings opens up a larger project of formally investigating (i) the typology of quantificational distributors and distributivity-dependent items and (ii) the fine-grained contexts of evaluation needed to capture this typological variation. (shrink)

We study possible Scott sentence complexities of linear orderings using two approaches. First, we investigate the effect of the Friedman–Stanley embedding on Scott sentence complexity and show that it only preserves $\Pi ^{\mathrm {in}}_{\alpha }$ complexities. We then take a more direct approach and exhibit linear orderings of all Scott sentence complexities except $\Sigma ^{\mathrm {in}}_{3}$ and $\Sigma ^{\mathrm {in}}_{\lambda +1}$ for $\lambda $ a limit ordinal. We show that the former cannot be the Scott sentence (...) complexity of a linear ordering. In the process we develop new techniques which appear to be helpful to calculate the Scott sentence complexities of structures. (shrink)

The five English words—sentence, proposition, judgment, statement, and fact—are central to coherent discussion in logic. However, each is ambiguous in that logicians use each with multiple normal meanings. Several of their meanings are vague in the sense of admitting borderline cases. In the course of displaying and describing the phenomena discussed using these words, this paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyzes several senses of these and related words, focusing on a constellation of recommended senses. One of the purposes of this (...) paper is to demonstrate that ordinary English properly used has the resources for intricate and philosophically sound investigation of rather deep issues in logic and philosophy of language. No mathematical, logical, or linguistic symbols are used. Meanings need to be identified and clarified before being expressed in symbols. We hope to establish that clarity is served by deferring the extensive use of formalized or logically perfect languages until a solid “informal” foundation has been established. Questions of “ontological status”—e.g., whether propositions or sentences, or for that matter characters, numbers, truth-values, or instants, are “real entities”, are “idealizations”, or are “theoretical constructs”—plays no role in this paper. As is suggested by the title, this paper is written to be read aloud. I hope that reading this aloud in groups will unite people in the enjoyment of the humanistic spirit of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

We give Scott sentences for certain computable groups, and we use index set calculations as a way of checking that our Scott sentences are as simple as possible. We consider finitely generated groups and torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank. For both kinds of groups, the computable ones all have computable \ Scott sentences. Sometimes we can do better. In fact, the computable finitely generated groups that we have studied all have Scott sentences that are “computable d-\” sentence and (...) a computable \ sentence). In [9], this was shown for the finitely generated free groups. Here we show it for all finitely generated abelian groups, and for the infinite dihedral group. Among the computable torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank, we focus on those of rank 1. These are exactly the additive subgroups of \. We show that for some of these groups, the computable \ Scott sentence is best possible, while for others, there is a computable d-\ Scott sentence. (shrink)

Algorithmic transparency has received much attention in the current debate on the use of AI in sentencing. Concern has been expressed that the introduction or increased use of algorithms in the sentencing process may challenge the scrutability of and insight into the decision-making. However, there is a striking contrast between the repeated emphasis on the alleged challenge of algorithmic opacity and the lack of elaborate attempts at answering precisely what this challenge consists of. Drawing on the traditional discussion of the (...) importance of judicial reason-giving, this chapter examines various reasons as to why and with regard to what algorithmic transparency may be morally important. It is argued that adherence to openness in the form of judicial reason-giving does not necessarily commit one to a view with regard to algorithmic transparency. Furthermore, even though there are strong reasons in favor of algorithmic transparency, the field still suffers from a lack of empirical research. (shrink)

The principle that a sentence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence remains at the centre of penal practice and scholarly debate. This volume explores highly topical aspects of proportionality theory that require examination and further analysis. von Hirsch and Ashworth explore the relevance of the principle of proportionality to the sentencing of young offenders, the possible reasons for departing from the principle when sentencing dangerous offenders, and the application of the principle to socially deprived offenders. They (...) examine the claim that the principle tends to be associated with greater severity in sentencing, and explore the relevance of penance and of restorative justice to proportionality theory. Their examination of arguments and counter-arguments culminates in a re-statement of the main criteria for proportionate sentencing.The authors are well known for their previous writings on proportionality theory, and this volume broadens the theory to deal with important contemporary issues in crime and punishment. (shrink)

In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.

The paper argues that two apparently attractive conceptions of an eternal sentence are defective. An alternative conception is presented which the authors think allows greater insight into the nature of semantic concepts.

The Sentence in Language and Cognition is about the significant role of the sentence in linguistic cognition and in the practical domains of human existence. Dr. Tista Bagchi has written a comprehensive assessment of the structure and cognitive function of the sentence and the clause in the context of real-world discourse and activities.The notions of sentencehood and clausehood with special reference to the semantic histories of the terms sentence and clause, including their ethical, legal, and administrative (...) uses, are assessed. This is followed by a concise historical survey of the treatment of the sentence in a few of the ancient linguistic traditions, notably the Greek, Roman(-Alexandrian), Arab, and Sanskrit scholastic traditions. A wide variety of sentence types, from a cross-section of languages spoken in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, are presented by way of factual evidence for sentences and clauses as linguistic units. Formally defined notions of the sentence and the clause as syntactic constituents in major theoretical frameworks are examined and assessed for their essential properties and points of convergence. The Sentence in Language and Cognition is an essential book for advanced students and researchers of linguistics. (shrink)

Local sentences were introduced by Ressayre in [6] who proved certain remarkable stretching theorems establishing the equivalence between the existence of finite models for these sentences and the existence of some infinite well ordered models. Two of these stretching theorems were only proved under certain large cardinal axioms but the question of their exact strength was left open in [4]. Here we solve this problem, using a combinatorial result of J. H. Schmerl [7]. In fact, we show that the stretching (...) principles are equivalent to the existence of n -Mahlo cardinals for appropriate integers n. This is done by proving first that for every integer n, there is a local sentence φn having well ordered models of order type τ, for every infinite ordinal τ > ω which is not an n -Mahlo cardinal. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Isaac Taylor warned against the unconstrained use of algorithms as instruments to determine sentences in criminal cases. More precisely, what he argued is that it is important that the sentencing process serves a condemnatory function, and that the introduction of sentencing algorithms threatens to undermine this function. In this reply to Taylor, it is argued that even though his considerations are interesting as they direct attention to the sentencing process and not merely the (...) output of algorithmic sentencing, there are nevertheless reasons to be skeptical of his argument. More precisely, it is argued, first, that it is far from clear that we must accept the basic premise underlying Taylor’s argument, namely, that the sentencing process should serve a condemnatory function and, second, that even if this premise is true, it does not follow that the condemnatory element of the sentencing process is undermined by introducing algorithms as advisory instruments at sentencing. (shrink)

This article argues that the use of algorithmic sentencing in the criminal justice system can be in tension with the state’s duty to respect the human dignity of offenders. Sentencing law in many legal systems requires judges to make complex normative judgments about a person, their conduct, and how the state may treat them in light of that conduct. These judgments implicate an offender’s dignity because they engage with their self-understanding as a moral agent and their sense of worth as (...) a human being. However, algorithms and other forms of predictive artificial intelligence do not engage in anything like the kind of normative reasoning that sentencing law demands. Accordingly, when the state substitutes one or more elements of this normative reasoning with an algorithm’s output, it risks failing to respect the offender’s moral status. Treating the normative judgments sentencing law demands as mere empirical predictions is not only a category mistake but a failure to justify the sentence and to recognize the offender as a moral agent. (shrink)

Predictive Sentencing addresses the role of risk assessment in contemporary sentencing practices. Predictive sentencing has become so deeply ingrained in Western criminal justice decision-making that despite early ethical discussions about selective incapacitation, it currently attracts little critique. Nor has it been subjected to a thorough normative and empirical scrutiny. This is problematic since much current policy and practice concerning risk predictions is inconsistent with mainstream theories of punishment. Moreover, predictive sentencing exacerbates discrimination and disparity in sentencing. Although structured risk assessments (...) may have replaced 'gut feelings', and have now been systematically implemented in Western justice systems, the fundamental issues and questions that surround the use of risk assessment instruments at sentencing remain unresolved. This volume critically evaluates these issues and will be of great interest to scholars of criminal justice and criminology. (shrink)

Predictive _accuracy_ and _transparency_ are generally recognized as ethically desirable features of algorithms at sentencing. However, it is often explicitly or implicitly assumed that there may be a conflict between transparency and accuracy. If an algorithmic tool is made more transparent, this will result in a loss of predictive accuracy and vice versa. The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss the nature of this conflict. More precisely, it is first argued that even if there is a conflict between (...) transparency and accuracy, this does not demonstrate the conflict to be of genuine ethical significance. Second, even when there is a genuine ethical conflict between transparency and accuracy, this may sometimes be resolved in ways other than by engaging in trade-offs. Finally, the chapter discusses the theoretical and practical implications of these conclusions. (shrink)

L’intellectuel aux multiples facettes Thomas Ebendorfer de Haselbach est l’une des figures-clés de la Vienne du xv e siècle. Cet article est une première étape pour retracer le profil académique d’Ebendorfer à travers une lecture complète des diverses rédactions de son commentaire des Sentences conservées à l’Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. Sont analysés le contenu des manuscrits et la relation des différentes rédactions avec d’autres commentaires viennois connus. On trouvera en annexe la liste complète des questions, d’après toutes les rédactions du commentaire des (...) Sentences. (shrink)

Why do speakers of all languages use different grammatical structures under different communicative circumstances to express the same idea? In this comprehensive study, Professor Lambrecht explores the relationship between the structure of sentences and the linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts in which they are used. His analysis is based on the observation that the structure of a sentence reflects a speaker's assumptions about the hearer's state of knowledge and consciousness at the time of the utterance. This relationship between speaker assumptions (...) and formal sentence structure is governed by rules and conventions of grammar, in a component called 'information structure'. Four independent but interrelated categories are analysed: presupposition and assertion, identifiability and activation, topic, and focus. (shrink)

This paper examines whether sentencing algorithms – machine-learning-based tools for assessing the likelihood that a convicted individual will commit further offenses if released on parole – are consistent with Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism and the principle of equal consideration of interests. It begins by explaining the functioning and ethical challenges of such algorithms, especially the challenge of individualized sentencing. The paper then explores how these algorithms align with Singer's preference utilitarianism, particularly his principle of equal consideration of interests. Analyzing the (...) key elements of this principle – maximizing and equally weighing interests, impartiality, and rejection of irrelevant group memberships – reveals how critics might use it to oppose the implementation of sentencing algorithms. A contextually more sensitive reading of Singer's views suggests that the same principle, in fact, supports the use of these algorithms. The paper concludes that sentencing algorithms are not only consistent with Singer's position but are, in many respects, reinforced by it. (shrink)

According to Adams and his colleagues, fictional sentences, i.e. sentences featuring fictional names, lack any truth value. To explain intuitions to the contrary, they refer to the pragmatics of fictional assertions and claim that sincere utterances of those sentences generate some conversational implicatures. They argue that all who take fictional sentences to have a truth value tend to mistake implicatures of assertions of such sentences with their literal content. The aim of the paper is to show that this argument is (...) not convincing.The challenge being that it doesn’t provide any satisfactory explanation as to what is negated in seemingly genuine disagreement cases in which fictional sentences are asserted. Sentential negation usually doesn’t affect (i.e. negate) a proposition which is conversationally implied, especially when it comes to the manner implicature. And, as I argue, an advocate of the pragmatic defence should maintain that this is the kind of conversational implicature that the assertion of fictional sentences generates. (shrink)

Despite the recent consolidation of sentencing law and procedure, the fundamental values which underpin the policy and practice of sentencing in England and Wales have remained largely unchanged since the deserts-based model introduced by the Criminal Justice Act of 1991. It is argued that this paradigm is no longer appropriate and presents a significant impediment to reducing imprisonment and mainstreaming restorative forms of intervention within the criminal process. An alternative value-based approach is proposed to counter this trend, one that provides (...) greater structural flexibility and empowers sentencers to engage more effectively with the social impact of penal intervention. (shrink)

Previous work has shown that English native speakers interpret sentences as predicted by a noisy‐channel model: They integrate both the real‐world plausibility of the meaning—the prior—and the likelihood that the intended sentence may be corrupted into the perceived sentence. In this study, we test the noisy‐channel model in Mandarin Chinese, a language taxonomically different from English. We present native Mandarin speakers sentences in a written modality (Experiment 1) and an auditory modality (Experiment 2) in three pairs of syntactic (...) alternations. The critical materials are literally implausible but require differing numbers and types of edits in order to form more plausible sentences. Each sentence is followed by a comprehension question that allows us to infer whether the speakers interpreted the item literally, or made an inference toward a more likely meaning. Similar to previous research on related English constructions, Mandarin participants made the most inferences for implausible materials that could be inferred as plausible by deleting a single morpheme or inserting a single morpheme. Participants were less likely to infer a plausible meaning for materials that could be inferred as plausible by making an exchange across a preposition. And participants were least likely to infer a plausible meaning for materials that could be inferred as plausible by making an exchange across a main verb. Moreover, we found more inferences in written materials than spoken materials, possibly a result of a lack of word boundaries in written Chinese. Overall, the fact that the results were so similar to those found in related constructions in English suggests that the noisy‐channel proposal is robust. (shrink)

This book is the culmination of almost forty years of writing and thinking about speech acts and the use theory of meaning. Chapter 1 sets out and defends a version of the Austin-Searle trichotomy of a sentential act, i.e., uttering a sentence or surrogate, an illocutionary act, i.e., uttering a sentence with a certain "content" as reported by indirect speech, and a perlocutionary act, i.e., producing an effect on an audience by an utterance. Chapter 2 poses the question: (...) what condition C will turn an SA into an IA: F? Perhaps adding a perlocutionary intention to the effect that "U asserts that p only if U utters p with the intention of getting H to believe that p" will meet condition C. Alston argues, contra Schiffer, that it will not. Chapter 3 objects to Searle's analysis of sincere and non-defective promising, on the one hand, because there are too many ways a promise can be defective and, on the other hand, because some of Searle's conditions are not necessary for promising simpliciter. Alston proposes. (shrink)

Three online mouse cursor-tracking experiments investigated predictive sentence processing at speed. Participants viewed visual arrays with objects like a bike and kite while hearing predictive sentences like, “What the man will ride, which is shown on this page, is the bike,” or non-predictive sentences like, “What the man will spot, which is shown on this page, is the bike.” Based on the selectional restrictions of “ride” (i.e., vs. “spot”), participants made mouse cursor movements to the bike before hearing the (...) noun “bike.” Compellingly, this effect was observed at speech rates of ∼3 (Experiment 1), ∼6 (Experiment 2), and ∼9 (Experiment 3) syllables/s. While prior research suggests striking limits on prediction, these results highlight temporal dynamics that may impact comprehenders’ ability to preactivate information when hearing impressively rapid speech. Implications for theories of sentence processing are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition, according to which a whole hierarchy of (...) congruences leads to different kinds of objects. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) at sentencing. It deals with the questions: What does it mean to talk about using artificial intelligence at sentencing? And why is it important to consider the ethical and penal theoretical aspects of the use of artificial intelligence in the determination of sentences? Furthermore, it provides an overview of the varied topics that are considered in the ensuing chapters of the book.

The question of basic and incorrigible sentences has appeared in connection with certain recent attempts to refine and re-define the meaning of Empiricism. More directly still, the question appears in connection with the problem of verification. It is noteworthy that the question of protocols, more than any other issue, has served to draw out the philosophical differences between the original Wiener Kreis and the Cambridge Analysts. Yet despite their differences both schools are agreed that basic sentences in some sense of (...) the word, are epistemologically necessary.But if one takes the view, say of the Instrumentalists, that all perceptual knowledge is interpretation based upon accepted theories, and corrected in the light of such theories then basic sentences are quite unnecessary. But among those who employ the term “basic” there is little agreement as to its meaning. The common use of the term has not resulted in a common understanding. And instead of drawing Empiricists together it has succeeded only in driving them apart. (shrink)

Researchers in the field of “human factors” have long been aware that when humans devolve certain of their functions to technology, the transfer from human to machine can restructure more than the division of labor between them: humans’ perceptions of themselves and their abilities may also change. Such findings are relevant to the use of algorithmic and data-driven technologies, but whether they hold up in the specific context of recidivism risk assessment is only beginning to be considered. This chapter describes (...) and analyzes some pertinent human factors results, and assesses the extent to which they pose a problem for the use of algorithms in the sentencing of offenders. While the findings from human factors research are themselves robust, they do not seem to translate neatly to the judicial sphere. The incentives, objectives, and ideologies of sentencing judges appear to upset the usual pattern of results seen in many other domains of human factors research. (shrink)

In the last forty years Dummett, Hanks, Künne, and Bobzien have claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question [Satzfrage] was not a thought [Gedanke] ((Dummett 1981: 307–308); (Hanks 2007: 142–143); (Künne 2010: 427–429); (Bobzien 2021: 163–164)). Recently, Textor has claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was not a question [Frage] (Textor 2021: 227 fn.2). I think it is (...) possible that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was a question and a thought. To show that this possibility should not be overlooked, I have written a dialogue in which Frege responds to Dummett, Hanks, Künne, Bobzien, and Textor. Bobzien seems to think that when Frege wrote ‘Die Verneinung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was not a question (Bobzien 2021: 163–165). I think it is possible that when Frege wrote ‘Die Verneinung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was a question and a thought. Hence, I have also written the dialogue to show that this possibility should not be overlooked either. (shrink)

This chapter lays out five different ways of reading the context principle: methodological, metasemantic, pragmatic, semantic, and psychological. It notes several rationales for embracing the principle. It then objects to the principle, on several of its readings, from non-sentence use. The suggested result, in the face of this objection, was three parts consistency and two parts inconsistency: (a) the first reading of the principle would be largely untouched; (b) the second would be left unsupported; but (c) the other readings (...) would be outright falsified. (shrink)

This article considers the sentencing of two eighteenth centuryparricides, one committed by a daughter, the other by a son. In eachcase the sentencing remarks are first subject to generic analysis,derived from the work of Rukiya Hasan and Susan Urmston Philips. Withinthose thematic structures there is a traditional rhetorical analysis. Bycombining both types of analysis one can demonstrate the salientfeatures of each set of judicial remarks. The focus of the article thenshifts from these texts to their contexts, and reveals features in (...) theiroffence narratives which have been omitted in these otherwise powerfulrhetorical utterances. Explanations for these silences are given. (shrink)

Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed (...) as specificational sentences. Second, I show that even if they are to be analysed in this way, Moltmann’s proposed specificational analysis is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

The famous theory of undecidable sentences created by Kurt Godel in 1931 is presented as clearly and as rigorously as possible. Introductory explanations beginning with the necessary facts of arithmetic of integers and progressing to the theory of representability of arithmetical functions and relations in the system (S) prepare the reader for the systematic exposition of the theory of Godel which is taken up in the final chapter and the appendix.

In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.

John Worrall recently provided an account of epistemic structural realism, which explains the success of science by arguing for the correct mathematical structure of our theories. He accounts for the historical failures of science by pointing to bloated ontological interpretations of theoretical terms. In this paper I argue that Worrall’s account suffers from five serious problems. I also show that Pierre Cruse and David Papineau have developed a rival structural realism that solves all of the problems faced by Worrall. This (...) Ramsey-sentence realism is a significant advance in the debate, but still ultimately fails for its incomplete account of reference. (shrink)

In the paper Randomizations of Scattered Sentences, Keisler showed that if Martin’s axiom for aleph one holds, then every scattered sentence has few separable randomizations, and asked whether the conclusion could be proved in ZFC alone. We show here that the answer is “yes”. It follows that the absolute Vaught conjecture holds if and only if every \-sentence with few separable randomizations has countably many countable models.

Under current law, prosecutors need a warrant from a judge who is “neutral and detached” before searching an Amazon package, but these same prosecutors can force the judge to sentence an offender to decades more prison time than the judge thinks just. The root of the dissonance in the jurisprudence is the baseline problem in criminal procedure. Is the prosecutor’s willingness to forgo the most serious charges an offer or a threat? The Court says this is an offer, because (...) compared to the maximum sentence the menu of charges authorizes, the defendant is getting a break, not being strong-armed. This manifest fiction persists because neither dissenting Justices nor academic critics have justified any alternative baseline. The logical baseline is the set of charges that carry sentences proportionate to the defendant’s culpability. This turn, however, raises another difficult problem. Theorists have failed to advance a persuasive account of proportionate punishment. The doctrinal, baseline, and proportionality problems are so closely intertwined that all three must be solved together. The solution advanced here is to characterize the right against excessive punishment, like the right against erroneous convictions, in terms of procedural justice. (shrink)

Several recent authors identify structural realism about scientific theories with the claim that the content of a scientific theory is expressible using its Ramsey sentence. Many of these authors have also argued that so understood, the view collapses into empiricist anti-realism, since an argument originally proposed by Max Newman in a review of Bertrand Russell’s The analysis of matter demonstrates that Ramsey sentences are trivially satisfied, and cannot make any significant claims about unobservables. In this paper I argue against (...) both of these claims. Structural realism and Ramsey sentence realism are, in their most defensible versions, importantly different doctrines, and neither is committed to the premises required to demonstrate that they collapse into anti-realism.Keywords: Ramsey sentence; Structural realism; Structuralism; Scientific realism. (shrink)

They say that argumentative writing skills are best learned through writing argumentative essays. I say that while this is excellent practice for argumentative writing, an important exercise to practice structuring such essays and build critical thinking skills simultaneously is what I call the four-sentence paper. The exercise has the template They say..., I say..., one might object..., I reply... One might object that the assignment oversimplifies argumentative writing, stifles creativity, promotes an adversarial attitude, or that students can’t consider objections (...) well anyway. I reply that a simplified form of argumentative writing is fine for beginners, especially since the template is ubiquitous in philosophy; that any assignment template has room for creativity; that considering objections is consistent with good manners; and that despite some pitfalls of trying to defend a thesis and consider objections, students are capable of considering objections well with proper instruction and practice. (shrink)

The idea of using artificial intelligence as a support system in the sentencing process has attracted increasing attention. For instance, it has been suggested that machine learning algorithms may help in curbing problems concerning inter-judge sentencing disparity. The purpose of the present article is to examine the merits of this possibility. It is argued that, insofar as the unfairness of sentencing disparity is held to reflect a retributivist view of proportionality, it is not necessarily the case that increasing inter-judge uniformity (...) in sentencing is desirable. More generally, it is shown that the idea of introducing machine learning algorithms, that produce sentencing predictions on the ground of a dataset that is built of previous sentencing decisions, faces serious problems if there exists a discrepancy between actual sentencing practice and the sentences that are ideally desirable. (shrink)