This paper examines the wave of anti-transgender legislation in Western countries as a contemporary form of scapegoating. Drawing on René Girard’s theory of mimetic violence and Talia Mae Bettcher’s analysis of transphobic violence and essentialization, it argues that trans people are culturally constructed as deceptive or dangerous, and that such narratives become institutionalized through law. By examining legislation concerning education, sports, identification, and healthcare, the paper shows how moral panic and political rhetoric redirect social anxieties onto a vulnerable group, (...) fostering unity among those who view themselves as “protected.” A feminist extension of Girard’s model reveals scapegoating as both gendered and structural: it reinforces patriarchal and cisnormative norms while obscuring the deeper social and political causes of instability. (shrink)

Due to the ‘civilizing process’ (Elias), the overall level of violence is decreasing; yet its transforming patterns persist. The article aims at examining the contemporary structures and mechanisms responsible for violence control, while also exploring the newly emerging, naturalized patterns of cruelty. Firstly, René Girard’s mimetic theory is overviewed: while in archaic societies, mimetic crisis is controlled by sacrificial rites, modernization reconfigures this paradigm. Secondly, these transformations are mapped: mimetic desire is channelled into the market processes, while mimetic crisis is (...) managed by the state monopolizing violence. Thirdly, the structural transformations of late modernity upsetting the fragile balance of state and market are analysed: secular scapegoating becomes part of the political toolset, while the private sphere is overwhelmed by undetectable new forms of hurting and self-harming. As a culture of cruelty is naturalized, mimetic crisis becomes a continuous threat, which generates a need for the functional equivalents of sacrificial violence control. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Lacanian theory describes the subject in terms of split and lack. It does so by illustrating the process by which the subject becomes constructed. In the present article, I critically engage with the version of Lacanian theory that Yannis Stavrakakis has promoted and with the shift that has marked the development of this version. I argue that the shift in question reveals Stavrakakis’ initial misreading of Jacques Lacan and sheds light on some of the implications of the Lacanian (...) theory of subjectivity for theorizing socio-political issues of identity operations. The misconception of important and interconnected aspects of the theorization of the subject as desiring and lacking makes room for ontologizing the incrimination of an “enemy”. However, I argue, demonizing an “enemy” should not be interpreted as resulting from the fundamental desire for meaning enclosure. It is rather correlated with the jouissance that is lost in the process of the subject construction and, by implication, with the affect invested in identity (the collective identity notwithstanding). Setting the record straight allows alternative (re)conceptualizations of (collective) identity that de-naturalize the modernist assumption that the construction of a present enemy is ontologically tied with, and thus, indispensable to, (collective) identity construction. (shrink)

For years, violence against doctors and healthcare workers has been a growing social issue in China. In a recent series of studies, we provided evidence for a motivated scapegoating account of this violence. Specifically, individuals who feel that the course of their (or their family member's) illness is a threat to their sense of control are more likely to express motivation to aggress against healthcare providers. Drawing on existential theory, we propose that blaming and aggressing against a single individual (...) represents a culturally afforded scapegoating mechanism in China. However, in an era of healthcare crisis (i.e., the global COVID-19 pandemic), it is essential to understand cultural variation in scapegoating in the context of healthcare. We therefore undertook two cross-cultural studies examining how people in the United States and China use different scapegoating responses to re-assert a sense of control during medical uncertainty. One study was conducted prior to the pandemic and allowed us to make an initial validating and exploratory investigation of the constructs of interest. The second study, conducted during the pandemic, was confirmatory and investigated mediation path models. Across the two studies, consistent evidence emerged that, both in response to COVID-related and non-COVID-related illness scenarios, Chinese (relative to U.S.) individuals are more likely to respond by aggressing against an individual doctor, while U.S. (relative to Chinese) individuals are more likely to respond by scapegoating the medical industry/system. Further, Study 2 suggests these culture effects are mediated by differential patterns of primary and secondary control-seeking. (shrink)

This article gives an anarchist account of politics as war to theorise an anarchist Realpolitik. Mikhail Vereshchagin’s killing in War and Peace provides the springboard to review the claim that sovereign power secures peace and to explore the merit of scapegoating. We elaborate the anarchist account of politics as war by juxtaposing Foucault’s and Proudhon’s interpretations of Hobbes’ sovereign and adopt the term ‘reverse ethics’ to describe the proposal that citizens retain the philosophical right to forcefully disrupt the state’s (...) supposed peace. The anarchist embrace of war conflicts with the common view that anarchism’s alignment of the means and ends of political action commits anarchists to reject violence. To meet this objection, we discuss Frazer and Hutchings’ theorisation of anarchist ambivalence. We argue that reverse ethics complicates tensions between the presumption of non-violence and the critique of state violence. To consider the use of force in liberal democracy, we connect reverse ethics to Hyams’ anarchist defence of upward scapegoating and targeted assassination. Considering applications in contemporary politics, we argue that reverse ethics constructively redirects attention from the need to justify political violence to the demand to hold sovereign power to its contractual obligation. This is anarchist Realpolitik. (shrink)

If the agent responsible for an action is to be given praise or blame by the moral community for that action, then accurate responsibility ascriptions must be made. Since the moral community may have to evaluate the actions of corporate agents, care must be taken to insure that the assumption of Methodological Individualism (MI) does not infect that process. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that accurate responsibility ascriptions will be made in cases connected with corporate action as long as corporate (...) scapegoating may occur. Because corporate scapegoating is a behavior pattern that attempts to falsify correct responsibility ascriptions it will be of interest to the moral theorist. Once I have considered three objections to the idea of corporate scapegoating I shall offer a fictional description of it found in Ayn Rand''s work,Atlas Shrugged. Finally, I shall raise a question about its present day use by corporations in our society. (shrink)

This paper develops and tests a model of fingerpointing behaviors that board members experience because of regulatory reforms. We present the partial results of a large study of 138 board members on 54 publicly traded boards in the United States. We found that recent governance reforms that mandate increased accountability of board members are associated with less board cohesion and thatlower board cohesion is associated with fingerpointing behaviors. These findings suggest that the stages of institutionalization following regulatory shock falter when (...) negative group behaviors develop under scrutiny. (shrink)

J.M. Coetzee’s book, 'Elizabeth Costello' is one of the stranger works to appear in recent years. Yet if we focus our attention on the book’s two chapters dealing with animals, two preoccupations emerge. The first sees Coetzee use animals to evoke a particular conception of ethics, one similar to that of the philosopher Mary Midgley. Coetzee’s second theme connects animals to the phenomena of scapegoating, as it has been characterized by the philosophical anthropologist René Girard. While both themes involve (...) human interactions with animals, each transcends application to that particular issue and raises deeper questions, respectively concerning the foundations of morality and the therapeutic allure of political violence. Making explicit these two preoccupations enhances our understanding of Coetzee’s fiction, particularly Disgrace. However, when Coetzee’s two philosophical strands are analyzed in their own terms, the ethics of sympathy is shown to be a more coherent notion than the understanding of politics he takes over from Girard. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIMESIS AND SCAPEGOATING IN THE WORKS OF HOBBES, ROUSSEAU, AND KANT Wolfgang Palaver Universität Innsbruck i: "ntellectual fashion in our academic world forces us towards -originality. Searching for mimetic desire or traces of scape-goating in literature or philosophical texts gets therefore some applause because it has not been done before. It has become fashionable in the humanities to have your own special French intellectual to be innovative and (...) conquer new fields. For many ofus Girard's mimetic theory might be of some help to better our standings in originality. But what seems to be an easy game at first sight has its disadvantages, too. Applying mimetic theory gets at least as much criticism as it earns applause. What is praised as an original contribution by some might atthe same time be debased as something quite idiosyncratic by many others. I still remember the reaction of a quite reputable political scientist from Berkeley to a paper of Girard given at a little seminar at Stanford, in which he reflected on the origin of human culture in the scapegoat mechanism. The political scientist welcomed the paper in a friendly way, asking us, however, ifby taking Girard's thesis for granted one might not as well be allowed to say that culture is based on jellybeans. This strange joke is in a way a typical reaction to the mimetic theory ifwe remember how often people do not understand at all why it is of any importance to deal with mimetic desire and scapegoating. Mimetic theory seems to be either one of those fashions which are caused by the necessity to be original or a strange obsession of a small sect following a Wolfgang Palaver127 guru who at least understood that you just have to insist on some bizarre ideas long enough to get some recognition in the end. My paper will try to show that such a critique ofthe mimetic theory is definitely wrong. Whatever major work in political philosophy I read I often came across exactlythose questionsthat are addressed by the mimetic theory. I think the collaboration of some scholars in mimetic theory would allow it to write a history of political philosophy by focusing on mimesis and scapegoating without excluding any ofthe major authors. I will try to do this today by the examples ofHobbes, Rousseau and Kant. In a first step I will show you how these three founding fathers of modern political philosophy were all concerned with mimetic desire. The rise ofthe modem world forced them to view human beings as mimetic competitors. In a second, more difficult step I will focus on traces of the scapegoat mechanism in the works ofthese three authors. Although scapegoating is less visible than mimetic desire it is nevertheless possible to see how this relates to the violent origin of human culture. A third part will address the differences between Girard's view on mimetic desire and scapegoating and the comparable views taken by Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. These differences are caused by the respective relationships to the biblical revelation. Whereas Girard's theory emphasizes the importance of the Bible to understand mimesis and scapegoating, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant are representatives of the modern neglect of the biblical revelation. A comparison ofthese three authors with an Augustinian perspective helps to understand the way, in which they differ from Girard's mimetic theory. 1. Mimesis in the works of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant A. Hobbes Hobbes's anthropology describes human beings as genuinely mimetic (Achterhuis 23f; Palaver 1991, 40-45). In Hobbes's early treatise The Elements ofLaw Natural andPolitic this is most explicitly visible. Human beings desire according to the other by always comparing themselves with one another. "All joy and grief of mind" consists "in a contention for precedence to them with whom they compare themselves" (Hobbes 1994, 163f; see also 50-60; 1991, 119). Human life with all its passions is paralleled in this book to a race, which has "no other goal...but being foremost" (Hobbes 1994, 59). It is a race in which "Continually to be out-gone is misery. Continually to out-go the next before is felicity. 128 Mimesis and Scapegoating in Hobbes, Rousseau, & Kant And... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A National Shrine to Scapegoating? The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Washington, D.C. Jon Pahl Valparaiso University In a recent survey I conducted of visitors to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C, 92 percent agreed that "the memorial is a sacred place, and should be treated as such."1 Clearly, this place, by some reports the most visited site in the U.S. capital, draws devotion. But how does a pilgrimage (...) to this memorial function?2 Does pilgrimage to "the wall" serve to "heal a nation," as its builders intended, or does pilgrimage to the memorial ironically legitimize structures of violence like those which led the United States into the Vietnamese conflict in the first place?3 My argument builds upon the work of René Girard to suggest that pilgrimage to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial can legitimize the violence of American culture by 'The survey was of 185 pilgrims attending ceremonies during Veterans Day, November 11, 1993 and 1994. Several recent works explore the interface between civil religion and violence, notably John E. Bodnar, Karal Ann Marling, and Edward T. Linenthal. On sacred places, the pioneering work of Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, remains important but must be supplemented by Jonathan Z. Smith's Imagining Religion. 1 Victor and Edith Turner argue cogently that "if a tourist is half pilgrim, a pilgrim is half tourist" (20). Many visitors to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial understand themselves only as tourists, but their behavior appears to me to warrant treatment under the category of "pilgrimage." 3 I assume a "maximalist" definition of violence, which understands the word to refer not only to physical harm to individuals, but also to systemic, social structures of exclusion (such as racism), and ideological (or symbolic) justifications of violence (see Robert McAfee Brown; for a minimalist approach, see Gerald Runkle). 166Jon Pahi reinforcing scapegoating.4 At the same time, however, the established religious pluralism and voluntarism of American culture—evident in this pilgrimage process—diffuses violence. Furthermore, the democratic character of this pilgrimage empowers pilgrims to critique idolatrous worship of the nation, and to witness to authentic reverence for life. Mimesis on the mall A brief impressionistic portrait ofthe way visitors experience the Vietnam Veterans Memorial will demonstrate how the memorial draws pilgrims into a mimetic process—a key feature of Girard's theory. Many pilgrims stop at the memorial as part of a National Park Service 'Tourmobile' circuit of museums and memorials, or as part of another bus tour (school and senior citizens groups are especially common ). These busses disembark pilgrims at the base of the Lincoln Memorial, directly in front of the reflecting pool on the national mall, in sight of the Washington Monument and the Capitol. Pilgrims may, or may not, first climb the steps of the Lincoln Memorial (a powerful shrine with implications for understanding violence in its own right). Moving north, they eventually proceed along a sidewalk lined with Fig. 1 "Three Men Statue".,. several tents where veterans organizations sell T-shirts, medals, bumper-stickers, books, and other memorabilia. The first stop for many pilgrims is the "Three Men Statue" (Fig. 1) located in a grove just past the tents. 4 I summarize Girard's theory as follows: Beginning with mimetic desire, rivalry for an object escalates and threatens the social order. Religion—and notably sacrifice of the scapegoat—creates sufficient unanimity to restore a sense of social order, but does so through violence itself, masking through myth and ritual a vicious cycle of aggression we know as the history of human culture. A National Shrine to Scapegoating?167 This bronze statue (and the American flag which flies nearby) was not part ofthe original design for the memorial, and was dedicated in 1985, three years after the wall of names. It was the result of a compromise between founders of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund led by veteran Jan Scruggs and a group led by 1992 Presidential candidate H. Ross Perot which was dissatisfied with the wall and felt the need for a more 'heroic' representation of the survivors ofthe war.5 Most pilgrims understand little of the history behind the statue, or its intent to create a more heroic... (shrink)

In this dissertation I develop a philosophical theory of scapegoating that explains the role of blame-shifting and guilt avoidance in the endurance of oppression. I argue that scapegoating masks and justifies oppression by shifting unwarranted blame onto marginalized groups and away from systems of oppression and those who benefit from them, such that people in dominant positions are less inclined to notice or challenge its workings. I first identify a gap in our understanding of oppression, namely how oppression (...) endures despite widespread formal commitments to principles of equality and justice. I argue that prominent theories of oppression do not place enough weight on the question of how oppression is justified and concealed from us through blame-shifting, in ways that enable its persistence without our explicit approval of its systems. Scapegoating, a concept as old as the Bible, offers potential insight into the means through which we shift blame and avoid responsibility. However, my survey of the genealogy of scapegoating shows that existing conceptualizations of scapegoating are limited in their scope and cannot be applied to explain the endurance of oppression. I propose an ameliorative theory of scapegoating that accounts for deficiencies in prevailing theories of both oppression and scapegoating. Distinct from interpersonal theories and psychologistic analyses of scapegoating, my theory characterizes scapegoating according to its social function in oppression, thereby explaining structural dimensions that are not already captured by other accounts.With the motivation and ingredients in place, I develop my theory of scapegoating as made up of three sub-mechanisms: essentialization of marginalized groups as blameworthy, collective interest in protection against a threat, and social exclusion of the blamed. These sub-mechanisms work together to construct certain groups as scapegoats and encourage us to treat them accordingly through various structural and interpersonal means. I argue that scapegoating has important implications for the formation of social identities; namely, scapegoating constructs social identities in an oppressive arrangement that is largely hidden from us but informs our social and affective relations. By constructing some identities as essentially blameworthy and threatening, dominantly situated identity groups are encouraged to internalize a protected status, act together in defense of their status, and maintain systems of oppressive exclusion. Finally, I elaborate the epistemic dimensions of my theory of scapegoating to argue that scapegoating functions within our social imaginaries and structural epistemic practices. In particular, I focus on the ways that ignorance functions to maintain the scapegoat mechanism, and how scapegoating helps insulate structural forms of ignorance. I end by considering the potential for resistance to scapegoating. (shrink)

The politicization of trans identity—also affecting gender non-binary and gender non-conforming persons—is a form of backlash to the Obergefell ruling (legalizing same sex marriage) and increased LGBTQ equality. This book provides a conceptual analysis and application of the notions of backlash, scapegoating, dog whistling, and virtue signaling.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Drieu, Céline: French Fascism, Scapegoating, and the Price of Revelation Richard J. Golsan Texas A &M University Although the Girardian concept of the scapegoat and its attendant phenomena have a number of obvious implications for the study of fascism, to date the connection has been addressed only in broadly theoretical terms. In Des Choses cachées and in subsequent works, René Girard has alluded to modern political scapegoating (...) such as the Nazi persecution of the Jews as examples of mass victimizations where the enormous number of victims represents an effort to compensate for the failure of the scapegoating process itself in the wake of Christian revelation.1 While the victims are initially vilified, they are not sacralized after their sacrifice, and order is maintained only so long as a steady stream of victims is forthcoming. As Andrew McKenna explains in Violence and Difference, "with the passing of the sacred order, of the sacred tout court, sacrifice becomes less and less capable of uniting the community and therefore demands more and more victims... the decline of symbolic violence brings an increase of real victims; their quantity mounts in inverse proportion to the ritual efficacy of sacrifice, and victimage appears more and more gratuitous" (159-60). Moreover, McKenna continues, victimage of this sort becomes increasingly untraceable, rootless, and it is this aspect of official Nazi anti-Semitism, for example, which allowed many Nazis in their postwar trials to proclaim their innocence for their roles in the Final Solution by insisting that they were "only following orders" (162-3). 1 See Things Hidden 128-9. For a more general discussion of the persecution of ethnic minorities as a source of social cohesiveness, see the essays "Violence and Representation" and "Generative Scapegoating." Drieu, Céline: French Fascism173 These observations certainly help to illuminate the role of scapegoating in Nazi racial politics and in the Holocaust in particular. They are less helpful, however, in understanding other paradigms of fascism in which antiSemitism did not play as central a role or in cases in which fascist ideology was not synonymous with government policy or political hegemony. The role of scapegoating in Italian Fascism, for example, is more difficult to ascertain than it is in Nazism because anti-Semitism was less crucial as a means of establishing social cohesiveness, at least until Nazi influence became predominant during World War II (Soucy xviii). In France, the presence of a number of fascist movements from the twenties through the end of the Occupation, and the absence of an autonomous fascist state during the same period, make the task of assessing the role of scapegoating even more difficult. This is especially true in light of the fact that a number of French fascist movements were not anti-Semitic, at least until it became expedient to be so to curry favor with the Nazis. In French Fascism: The First Wave, Robert Soucy notes that during the interwar years, fascist groups including "the Jeunesse Patriotes, the Croix de Feu and the Faisceau... welcomed Jews into their ranks" (xviii). The lack of a consistent attitude towards the Jews is, in fact, just one of several points of divergence among French fascists and fascist groups prior to World War Two. As a result, historians and political theorists who have studied French fascism have strongly disagreed as to its origins as well as its basic ideology. In Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France, Zeev Sternhell argues that "the history of fascism can be described as a continuous attempt to revise marxism and create a national form of socialism" (20). Soucy, on the other hand, insists that on many of the most important social and political issues, including "taxation, government spending, nationalization, property rights, class conflict, religion, education, and foreign policy, French Fascism was overwhelmingly conservative" (xi). Other historians, especially among the French themselves, have gone so far as to insist that there is no such thing as French fascism, that such a creature, if it existed at all, was merely an import, a watered-down version of Nazism or Italian Fascism.2 If no consensus as to the nature or even the existence of French fascism can be reached by analyzing the programs... (shrink)

Criminalizing unintentional mistakes in medicine as the offence of gross negligence manslaughter has always been a contentious issue. The threshold of prosecution is not well-defined, and even less clear when faced with a situation in which an intern doctor is held liable. This commentary attempts to review the current legal position of holding an intern doctor liable for gross negligence medical manslaughter.

This essay is part of a larger project on the singular in Toni Morrison's novels. The essay focuses on Morrison's early novels, particularly her first two novels, The Bluest Eye and Sula, and makes...

The abiding cultural significance of swords, in an age of technologicallysophisticated weapons of mass destruction, is as much a semiotic puzzle as it is a socio-psychological one. The semiotics of swords displays certain features — commodity fetishism, the business speak of ‘cutting edge’ performance, primitive vitality, and related elements — that reveal the doubleness of desire in market society, the simultaneous desire to negate the capitalist present in favor of a primitivist past, together with an invigoration of the present through (...) tropes of violent conflict. The edginess of swordsemiotics also marks certain points of cultural instability, in terms of race, gender, and sexuality, evincing an incessantly transgressive impulse. (shrink)

Near the end of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, the Reverend Arthur Dimmesdale stands on the scaffold of shame and tears away his shirt to reveal something to the community. The narrator exclaims: “It was revealed! But it were irreverent to describe that revelation.”1 The actual manner in which this revelation is manifest is hidden, allowing readers to fill in the details. What is presumed, however, is that there indeed was some mark on the minister’s chest, and the narrator provides (...) three explanations, derived from eyewitnesses, as to how it came into existence. It was the result of Dimmesdale’s self-flagellation, or the effects of Chillingworth’s evil potions, or the seemingly supernatural transference .. (shrink)

Mimetic theory draws support from diverse disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. But arguably Girard would have even more influence if his theory had stronger life data, and one field well positioned to provide such input is psychology. Girard distinguished his thinking from Freud, while critiquing the psychoanalytic tradition more generally, in Book III of Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World1—a work taking the form of an extended dialogue with two psychiatrists. One of these, Jean-Michel Oughourlian, has (...) begun to develop the Girard-inspired practice of "interdividual psychology."2 In Girard's own hands, albeit to a limited degree, mimetic theory has been applied to mental health issues.3... (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to interpret Little Red Riding Hood’s most famous variants in light of its recent film adaptations. With reference to René Girard’s theory of sacrifice, we will argue that the latest one of these, Catherine Hardwicke’s 2011 adaptation offers the chance to see in Perrault’s “Little Red Riding Hood” the result of a diachronical evolution in four steps of the misrecognizing narration of a collective lynching, a full-fledged scapegoating of an anonymous villager accused and persecuted (...) as werewolf. We will find further support in Vladimir Propp’s and Alan Dundes’s contributions. (shrink)

The passage of human civilization into the new geological era of the Anthropocene raises the question of species extinction. How can we confront the possibility of collective death in a way that does not descend into uncontained anxiety or melancholy? Michel Serres’s works in the Foundations and Humanism series offer critical insights into the way in which human violence and death operate as mechanisms for binding together human collectives. Serres draws attention to the role of “social technologies” based around sacrificial (...) practices, the scapegoating mechanism, and the use of corpses as markers of social relations (or “statues”). He argues that these mythic logics and practices persist in modern societies and technoscience. They may also be at work in a modified way in the proposed technical solutions to climate change around space travel and planetary colonization. Drawing on the tradition of Folk Horror film-making and literature, it is argued that reversing the direction of travel, back into the Earth, provides better instruction about how to live and die in the Anthropocene. Reflection on the puteal sites where this may be accomplished will serve as the mechanism. (shrink)

Many utopian visions operate by scapegoating an Otherness. They blame an ‘enemy’ for an unbearable, dystopian current reality, holding the ‘enemy’ responsible for it or for obstructing the passage to a desired, new reality. Then they exclude (or even promise the elimination of) this ‘enemy’. Despite the renewed interest in utopias, such utopian frames remain theoretically neglected or, worse, they are considered typical of the logical structure of utopianism. This paper aims to show that this issue merits a different (...) political-philosophical attention. We begin with operations of utopian predicates in the relevant scholarship and distinguish them from the operations of the term ‘incriminatory’ that we are introducing. We term incriminatory the kind of utopian frame whose future-oriented, idealized and desired image is constructed in and through an incriminated ‘Other’. We indicate the re-conceptualizing merits of this new term and then we discuss the affirmative utopianism that does not incriminate a specific Other. Our main argument, which we deploy contra Yannis Stavrakakis’s position, is that utopias are not unavoidably or inherently incriminatory. (shrink)

The Greek words `pharmakon' and `pharmakos' allude to the complex relations between political violence and the health or disorder of the body politic. This article explores analogies of war as disease and contagion, and contrasts these with metaphors of war as politically healthy and medicinal - as in Randolph Bourne's notion of war as `the health of the state'. It then applies these to the unfolding US `War on Terrorism' through the concept of `pharmacotic war', by way of examining the (...) disturbing political implications of both unfolding US military actions abroad and the scapegoating of internal `enemies' within the United States. The article then critiques various strategies for interrupting the momentum towards a catastrophic `clash of civilizations' between the US and the Islamic world, and proposes a strategy of broadly based, grassroots political mobilization for opposing this trend. (shrink)

Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski offer experimental confirmation for Ernest Becker's claim that the fear of death is a powerful unconscious motive producing polarized worldviews and scapegoating. Their suggestion that their findings also prove Sigmund Freud's theory of repression, with worldviews as its irrational products, is questionable, although Becker's own statements about worldviews as “illusions” seem to invite such interpretation. Their basic theory does not depend on this, however, and abandoning it would enable them to take better (...) advantage of their finding that worldviews incorporating the values of rationality and tolerance tend to counteract polarization effects. (shrink)

Smoke and Mirrors is a passionate, richly nuanced work that shows television as a circus, a wishing well, and a cure for loneliness. Ranging from Ed Sullivan to cyberspace, from kid shows to cable, and from the cheap thrills of "action adventure" to the solemn boredom of PBS pledge week, Leonard argues for a whole new way of thinking about television. For Leonard, the situation comedy is a socializing agency, the talk show is a legitimating agency, the made-for-television movie is (...) the last redoubt of social conscience, and television criticism itself is the last refuge of time-serving thugs and postmodernists. Instead of scapegoating television as the cause of crime in our streets, stupidity in our schools, and spectacle rather than substance in our government, Leonard sees something else inside the box: an echo chamber and a feedback loop, a medium neither wholly innocent of nor entirely responsible for the frantic disorder it brings into our homes. (shrink)

Companies faced with a crisis sometimes blame others in their communications, when they feel that responsibility for the negative event lies elsewhere. Research has argued that stakeholders often react negatively to this type of message, because they perceive them as an unfair attempt to deny responsibility. In four experiments, examining blame directed at an employee and a supplier, we complement existing research by demonstrating that blame-giving messages can be persuasive in certain circumstances. Blame-giving communications can improve perceptions of firm ethicality (...) more than apologies or an absence of corporate communication. This effect, in turn, reduces negative word-of-mouth intentions. The study identifies several boundary conditions for this effect. For blame-giving to be effective, a credible third party needs to identify who is responsible for wrongdoing, and the company needs to use vivid communication with detailed information about the culprit. Furthermore, blame-giving can backfire: when stakeholders doubt the company’s honesty, this type of messaging is seen as manipulative. The study contributes to a developing research stream on the relative effectiveness of different types of crisis communications by demonstrating that, in certain circumstances, blame-giving messages are more persuasive than apologies. Moreover, our analysis offers guidelines on how to design these messages to make them acceptable to stakeholders. (shrink)

This essay advances a structural thesis concerning the crisis of American constitutional democracy under the second Trump administration: that the present assault on republican self-governance represents a historically novel synthesis combining the structural objective of Julius Caesar — the replacement of distributed republican authority with personalist autocratic rule while preserving institutional forms as empty vessels — with the tactical methods of Adolf Hitler — systematic epistemological destruction through the Big Lie, the manufacture of emergency through scapegoating and dehumanisation, institutional (...) capture through a process analogous to Gleichschaltung, the politicisation of the military, and the cultivation of a quasi-religious cult of personality — driven by the same motive that impelled Caesar across the Rubicon: the existential need for power as a shield against criminal prosecution. Drawing on the republican political philosophy of Polybius, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and the American Founders, and informed by Arendt's analysis of the epistemological conditions of totalitarianism, the essay develops each element of the synthesis through detailed historical and contemporary analysis. It identifies a three-layered mechanism by which the movement's popular base was manufactured over more than a decade: the domestic cultivation of xenophobic resentment under the guise of Christian patriotism by organisations such as Turning Point USA; the amplification and identity-fusion operations conducted by Russia's Internet Research Agency; and the weaponisation of performative cruelty toward immigrants as the primary bonding mechanism between the leader and his following, a mechanism whose effectiveness derives not from policy conviction but from the leader's unique willingness to transgress norms of political decency in the service of ethnic persecution. The essay argues that the motive for the autocratic consolidation is not ideological but personal, grounded in the threat posed by the Jeffrey Epstein files, which contain, according to congressional testimony, more than one million references to the president in their unredacted form, including FBI interview materials relating to allegations of sexual abuse of a minor that the Department of Justice has withheld or removed from the public record. The launch of the Iran war on February 28, 2026, is analysed as the motive made operational: a diversionary conflict serving simultaneously to suppress the Epstein revelations, relieve strategic pressure on Russia in Ukraine, and generate the rally-round-the-flag effect that renders domestic opposition politically hazardous. The role of Vladimir Putin is theorised as structurally analogous to that of Marcus Licinius Crassus in the fall of the Roman Republic: the foreign patron whose financial and operational support underwrites the domestic seizure of power. The thesis is tested against established democracy measurement indices including V-Dem, Freedom House, the Century Foundation, Bright Line Watch, and Polity, all of which confirm unprecedented democratic deterioration. The essay engages the strongest disanalogies, conceding that Trump lacks Caesar's military genius and Hitler's genocidal programme while demonstrating that the structural logic of republican destruction operates independently of the personal qualities of its agents. Written from Canada by a Canadian physicist and scholar of history and philosophy, this essay simultaneously represents a sincere warning to Americans from a concerned non-partisan outside observer and loyal democratic ally, an attempt to convey to Americans the growing seriousness of the determined threat their republic now faces to its continued existence as the Land of the Free, and an act of solidarity and support for Americans already fighting to preserve their republic. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection of René Girard's mimetic theory and the algorithmic society, particularly in the context of the potential advent of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Girard's theory, which elucidates the dynamics of desire, rivalry, scapegoating, and the sacrificial crisis, provides a unique lens through which to examine the complexities of our relationship with AI and its role in the creation of the sacred. As individuals increasingly rely on AI recommendations, the distinction between personal choice and algorithmic manipulation (...) becomes less clear, raising concerns about the authenticity of cultural expressions and the role of algorithms in shaping cultural narratives. The triangular structure of desire, with AI as the model and individuals as the imitators, underscores the power of algorithms in this process. The sacrificial crisis, a key concept in Girard's theory, becomes a critical point of reflection in the algorithmic society. The exposure of the scapegoating mechanism reveals the destructive potential of algorithmic manipulation and calls for new forms of understanding, empathy, and non-violent solutions. This paper argues that recognizing the sacrificial crisis can prompt individuals and society to critically examine the impact of AI's influence, challenge the narratives it perpetuates, and reclaim agency in the face of algorithmic dominance. This paper further discusses the potential implications of the emergence of AGI, which could intensify the influence of algorithms on the creation of the sacred due to its advanced cognitive capabilities and deep understanding of human desires and behaviors. This could fuel a rapid evolution of the mimetic ecosystem, with profound implications for personal freedom, independent decision-making, and the formation and preservation of individual identity. This paper concludes by emphasizing the need for responsible algorithmic practices and ethical considerations to ensure that the creation of the sacred serves the common good in the algorithmic society. (shrink)

Individuals unvaccinated against COVID-19 (C19) experienced prejudice and blame for the pandemic. Because people vastly overestimate C19 risks, we examined whether these negative judgements could be partially understood as a form of scapegoating (ie, blaming a group unfairly for an undesirable outcome) and whether political ideology (previously shown to shape risk perceptions in the USA) moderates scapegoating of the unvaccinated. We grounded our analyses in scapegoating literature and risk perception during C19. We obtained support for our speculations (...) through two vignette-based studies conducted in the USA in early 2022. We varied the risk profiles (age, prior infection, comorbidities) and vaccination statuses of vignette characters (eg, vaccinated, vaccinated without recent boosters, unvaccinated, unvaccinated-recovered), while keeping all other information constant. We observed that people hold the unvaccinated (vs vaccinated) more responsible for negative pandemic outcomes and that political ideology moderated these effects: liberals (vs conservatives) were more likely to scapegoat the unvaccinated (vs vaccinated), even when presented with information challenging the culpability of the unvaccinated known at the time of data collection (eg, natural immunity, availability of vaccines, time since last vaccination). These findings support a scapegoating explanation for a specific group-based prejudice that emerged during the C19 pandemic. We encourage medical ethicists to examine the negative consequences of significant C19 risk overestimation among the public. The public needs accurate information about health issues. That may involve combating misinformation that overestimates and underestimates disease risk with similar vigilance to error. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's "banality of evil" diagnosed mid-20th-century atrocity as the product of thoughtless bureaucrats, ordinary people who enabled horror through unreflective obedience. Today, a more insidious variant has emerged: actors who consciously exploit the language of rights, justice, and virtue to advance exclusionary or destructive agendas. This essay argues that "banality of evil 2.0 (BE 2.0)" operates through a dual mechanism, sophisticated manipulators who weaponize moral vocabulary, and a complicit public too lazy or intimidated to challenge the mask. Through analysis (...) of six structural vectors: weaponizing freedoms as licenses for harm, scapegoating individuals to avoid systemic reform, trivializing historical horror for rhetorical advantage, denying progress to maintain grievance, imposing uniform frameworks as universal truth, and projection/inversion through accusatory mimicry, I demonstrate how contemporary evil parasitically mimics righteousness while systematically negating human recognition. Gathering evidence from philosophy, social psychology, contemporary case studies (academic exclusion, political manipulation, cultural colonization), and the structural advantages afforded to Abrahamic theological frameworks and cult ideological mindset, I show how external reforms alone cannot address the BE 2.0. The solution lies in spiritual inner transformation: confronting one's own motives and projections, not out of guilt or for gains, but from the recognition that societal change is impossible without individual awakening. Democracy itself becomes a vector for BE 2.0, inevitably producing leaders who mirror and amplify the collective patterns of sophisticated evil. External institutions remain necessary guardrails, but the locus of genuine transformation is, and always will be, internal. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection of René Girard's mimetic theory and the algorithmic society, particularly in the context of the potential advent of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Girard's theory, which elucidates the dynamics of desire, rivalry, scapegoating, and the sacrificial crisis, provides a unique lens through which to examine the complexities of our relationship with AI and its role in the creation of the sacred. As individuals increasingly rely on AI recommendations, the distinction between personal choice and algorithmic manipulation (...) becomes less clear, raising concerns about the authenticity of cultural expressions and the role of algorithms in shaping cultural narratives. The triangular structure of desire, with AI as the model and individuals as the imitators, underscores the power of algorithms in this process. The sacrificial crisis, a key concept in Girard's theory, becomes a critical point of reflection in the algorithmic society. The exposure of the scapegoating mechanism reveals the destructive potential of algorithmic manipulation and calls for new forms of understanding, empathy, and non-violent solutions. This paper argues that recognizing the sacrificial crisis can prompt individuals and society to critically examine the impact of AI's influence, challenge the narratives it perpetuates, and reclaim agency in the face of algorithmic dominance. This paper further discusses the potential implications of the emergence of AGI, which could intensify the influence of algorithms on the creation of the sacred due to its advanced cognitive capabilities and deep understanding of human desires and behaviors. This could fuel a rapid evolution of the mimetic ecosystem, with profound implications for personal freedom, independent decision-making, and the formation and preservation of individual identity. This paper concludes by emphasizing the need for responsible algorithmic practices and ethical considerations to ensure that the creation of the sacred serves the common good in the algorithmic society. (shrink)

This essay reads Democracy and Empire as an intervention into contemporary debates regarding the fate of the Western left in the age of neoliberalism. The left often explains (figures like) Trump by pointing out that the ravages of neoliberalism – weakening of the welfare state, stagnating social mobility, concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands – have made it easy to mobilize white working-class voters by scapegoating racialized others. Hillary Clinton infamously dismissed these voters as deplorables; it has since (...) become more popular to try to understand their anger. Neither approach is sufficient without further specification. What is lost in the contours of this debate is that the racism called forth by the extreme right is not the resurgence of an obsolete force but simply the newest expression of an excessive attachment to wealth that defined even the apparent golden age of post-war welfare capitalism. A failure to generate a truly emancipatory, pluralistic democratic imaginary has led the left to fall into its own ‘make America great again’ narrative in its romanticization of this ‘golden age.’ Without a sufficient political-economic analysis of the conditions of possibility of wealth and an explicit commitment to anti-imperial sovereignty, the left risks reproducing – though disavowing – regimes of racialized labour exploitation. This raises the question of possibility and strategy: in a polity flanked by a left complicit in, a right indifferent to, and an extreme right actively pursuing injustice, can the way forward pass through a commitment to an imagined, desirable, radical, but improbable alternative? (shrink)

In recent years, research on morality in organizational life has begun to examine how organizational conduct comes to be socially constructed as having failed to comply with a community’s accepted morals. Researchers in this stream of research, however, have paid little attention to identifying and theorizing the key actors involved in these social construction processes and the types of accounts they construct. In this paper, we explore a set of key structural and cultural dimensions of apparent noncompliance that enable us (...) to distinguish between four categories of actors who engage in constructing the label of moral failure: dominant insiders, watchdog organizations, professional members, and publics. The analysis further clarifies which category of actor is more likely to succeed in constructing the label of moral failure under which circumstances, and what accounts they are likely to use, namely scapegoating, prototyping, shaming, and protesting. (shrink)

Although corruption has become a hot topic in organizational research, few studies have examined how it is socially constructed. To partially bridge this gap, the present paper takes a critical discursive perspective on the representation of corruption in the media. The empirical focus is on the media coverage of a corruption scandal that revolved around two instances of formal corruption charges and successive acquittals. Based on the analysis, the paper exemplifies how the media makes sense of and gives sense to (...) controversial activities in response to changing and at times contradictory information. In particular, the paper highlights interplay between four dominant discourses—transgression, political, public scapegoating, and individualistic—that that were mobilized throughout the media coverage. These discourses were intimately linked with wider dynamics between problematizing and restorative media framings and thus provided crucial means of reconstructing and reformulating the legitimacy of the reported activities throughout the scandal. While the findings are context specific, this study suggests that similar interplay and dynamics are important aspects of media sensemaking around controversial activities related to corruption. (shrink)

The history of brushtail possums in New Zealand is bleak. The colonists who forcibly transported possums from their native Australia to New Zealand in the nineteenth century valued them as economic assets, quickly establishing a profitable fur industry. Over the past 80 or so years, however, New Zealand has increasingly scapegoated possums for the unanticipated negative impact their presence has had on the native environment and wildlife. Now this marsupial—blamed and despised—suffers the most miserable of reputations and is extensively targeted (...) as the nation's number one pest. This paper examines anti-possum rhetoric in New Zealand, identifying the operation of several distinct—yet related—discourses negatively situating the possum as an unwanted foreign invader and a threat to what makes New Zealand unique; the subject of revenge and punishment ; and recognizably “cute, but...” merely a pest and therefore unworthy of compassion. This paper argues that the demonization of possums in New Zealand is overdetermined, extreme, and unhelpfully entangled in notions of patriotism and nationalism. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the work of Rene Girard, thought by many to be one of the most important, if controversial, cultural theorists of the twentieth century. Girard's work is extraordinarily innovative and wide-ranging, cutting across central concerns in philosophy, psychoanalysis, literary theory, anthropology, theology, and sociology. In this much-needed introduction, Chris Fleming traces the development of Girard's thought over forty years, describing the context in which he worked and his influence on a number (...) of disciplines. He unpacks the hypotheses at the centre of Girard's thought - mimetic desire, surrogate victimage and scapegoating, myth, ritual, and the sacred - and provides an assessment of Girard's place in the contemporary academy. Comprehensive and clearly written, this book constitutes an excellent overview of Girard's work and is essential reading for students and researchers in continental philosophy, theology, literary studies, French studies, and cultural studies. (shrink)

_In _Why Knowledge Matters_, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., presents evidence from cognitive science, sociology, and education history to further the argument for a knowledge-based elementary curriculum._ Influential scholar Hirsch, author of _The Knowledge Deficit_, asserts that a carefully planned curriculum that imparts communal knowledge is essential in achieving one of the most fundamental aims and objectives of education: preparing students for lifelong success. Hirsch examines historical and contemporary evidence from the United States and other nations, including France, and affirms that (...) a knowledge-based approach has improved both achievement and equity in schools where it has been instituted. In contrast, educational change of the past several decades in the United States has endorsed a skills-based approach, founded on, Hirsch points out, many incorrect assumptions about child development and how children learn. He recommends new policies that are better aligned with our current understanding of neuroscience, developmental psychology, and social science. The book focuses on six persistent problems that merit the attention of contemporary education reform: the over-testing of students in the name of educational accountability; the scapegoating of teachers; the fadeout of preschool gains; the narrowing of the curriculum to crowd out history, geography, science, literature, and the arts; the achievement gap between demographic groups; and the reliance on standards, such as the Common Core State Standards, that are not linked to a rigorous curriculum. _Why Knowledge Matters_ makes a clear case for educational innovation and introduces a new generation of American educators to Hirsch’s astute and passionate analysis. (shrink)

Lately, a number of referee decisions appear to have reignited the debate over the need to bring more in-game officiating technology into soccer. The fallacies behind the arguments for the inclusion of technology to aid game officials can be narrowed down to those behind current arguments for or against goal-line technology. Both the proponents and opponents of these arguments appear to overemphasise the role of referees to the point of claiming that if refereeing errors could be eliminated in goal-line situations, (...) then the most deserving team would most of the time be expected to win the contest. While we firmly believe that the game of soccer would benefit immensely from infallible officiating, we intend to show that these arguments are founded upon a number of inconspicuous assumptions. First, they assume that goal-line situations can be shown to affect the outcomes of games more than all other game situations. This can easily be shown to be a myth, since goals can be scored from all areas of the playing field. In addition, winning a soccer game, obviously, involves more than just scoring goals. Second, these arguments seem to support the view that referee decisions affect the outcomes of games more than decisions made by players, coaches and managers. This is merely a myth, since one can show that, in light of Cesar Torres's insights, referee involvement in game is limited to regulating situations that demand that the game be restored to its constitutive actualisation. Third, most arguments for goal-line technology tend to support the erroneous view that technology can actually eliminate most ?crucial? human mistakes from sport and, thus, ensure fairness of game outcomes. Such a myth can easily be refuted by reference to numerous cases of inconclusive slow-motion video replays in soccer. Therefore, this paper aims at arguing that, instead of reinforcing the scapegoating of referees and overemphasising the importance of isolated referee decisions to the point of attributing victory or defeat to these ?crucial? decisions, both sides of the goal-line technology debate need to put forth compelling arguments which go beyond the current misguided search for referee infallibility. (shrink)

Steven Soderbergh’s Contagion positions the vaccine as the end point of the arc of ​pandemic, marking both the containment of an elusive virus and ​the resumption of a life not fundamentally different from ​before the disease outbreak. ​The film reinforces the ​assumption that a pandemic will awaken ​all of us to the urgency of vaccination​, persuading us to put aside our reservations and anxieties ​and the idea that compliance is the inevitable outcome of quarantine. This article explores how pro-vaccination cultural (...) products ​such as Contagion might in fact undermine public health efforts by promoting a false narrative, which simplifies the kind of vaccination campaign necessary for herd immunity to develop. An ethic of sacrifice and selflessness drives the public health messaging of the film but leaves intact certain individualistic tropes and plague narrative scapegoating tendencies, while the framing of the vaccine as “gift” takes it out of the realm of medical science altogether. (shrink)