This article challenges contemporary Kantian arguments for universal basic income (UBI) by reinterpreting Kant's political philosophy through the lens of political realism. Current defences of UBI from a Kantian perspective often rely on an idealist reading that overlooks the practical realities of state power and global politics. I argue that Kant is better understood as a ‘transcendental political realist’ who saw a republican state, defined by the separation of powers, as the necessary precondition for any moral society. From this realist (...) viewpoint, politics is not simply applied ethics; rather, a just political structure is the autonomous foundation upon which ethical life can be built. Applying this framework, the article finds UBI to be a problematic solution to economic dependence. In the current global landscape, UBI risks creating a new form of state domination, undermining the core Kantian value of civic independence. The article concludes that a truly Kantian approach prioritises the establishment of robust republican institutions that empower citizens to become their ‘own masters’, achieving independence through a just system of labour, not through state provision. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the concept of unity in Kant’s system, as laid out by Lara Ostaric. One of the key claims Ostaric makes is that, for Kant, the idea of a harmonious and ethical society is not merely a utopia, but a robust project grounded in what she terms ‘Moral-Image Realism’ (MIR). The MIR thesis, according to Ostaric, renders different and sometimes seemingly incompatible aspects of Kant’s system coherent and, more than that, unified. I try to further develop (...) the implications of Ostaric’s view by exploring how Kant’s view, known as ‘Primacy of the Practical’, can be used to reinforce the claim that human beings progress toward fulfilling their ends as moral agents in what is famously known as the ‘kingdom of ends’. Furthermore, the MIR thesis, I try to show, renders Kant’s practical philosophy not just theoretically, but empirically driven. Namely, once established that the moral image of the world is more than just an empty hope or a utopia, it becomes paramount to consider how exactly such a goal can be realised, given the complexities of the real world (Kant’s as well as ours). This leads us to an entirely new way, I argue, of addressing the question of the applicability of Kant’s practical philosophy, which has often been deemed to be an impossible endeavour. This also leads us to re-evaluate Kant’s views and subsequent interpretations of the relationship between ethics, politics, and history. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the view that, surprisingly, the more citizens deliberate about politics, the less likely they are to participate in the realm of the political, and vice versa. In the first part of the paper, I approach the problem from the perspective of the paradox of voting, the claim that voting itself is instrumentally irrational because of the very low probability that a single vote will make any difference at the elections. In the second part of the (...) paper, I argue that rather than analyzing voting instrumentally, it is better to view it as part of the civic commitments that constitute what it means to be a citizen in a democratic society. The act of voting is not primarily an individual?s attempt to decisively influence any particular outcome, but an affirmation of the key practice that upholds the democratic society in which citizens play a part. This reveals a meta-paradox of voting. Namely, to not vote is to exhibit a type of behavior that implies acceptance of democracy simultaneously with rejecting its defining component. Because of that, I will claim, not voting is itself irrational. In light of that conclusion, in the third part of the paper, I explore the extant divide between deliberation and participation by referring back to the analysis of civic commitments. Whereas participation without deliberating reveals ideological bias, deliberation without participation expresses a lack of understanding of what it means to be a citizen. The way to connect them is to engage in a process of attaining reflective equilibrium between the two, starting from the practice of deliberation that would be fully informed by the awareness of our democratic commitments and disconnected from ideologically motivated participation. (shrink)

Even after decades of emphasizing the importance of competent, impartial, and widely understandable communication of scientific claims, one can still often hear the phrase ‘but it’s just a theory’. Trust in science seems easily shaken, hard to acquire, and almost impossible to regain. The aim we have in this paper is to discuss the problem of trust in science and to outline a viable solution to it. Our approach unfolds in three successive stages. First, we will go through the empirical (...) research pertaining to the issue. Second, we will take a more nuanced look at what the phrase ‘trust in science’ actually means. Third, we will point to some commonly suggested substantive strategies for restoring trust in science and argue that they will not be successful if they are not accompanied by methodological strategies aimed at a thorough understanding of the phenomenon of trust in science. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the debate between political moralists and political realists. I will try to show that it is possible to find the middle ground that simultaneously satisfies the main demands of both camps while resisting objections directed against each. In the first part, I start with the view shared by both moralists and realists: that the main challenge lying before a political theory is solving the problem of legitimacy. I first sketch Rawls? moralist approach. I then (...) move to outline the realist criticisms of such moralism. I will mainly follow one of the most detailed recent theories - Sleat?s realist theory, although I will also draw from other well-known realists. In the second part, I outline objections against realism. They somewhat similar to the same criticisms they themselves direct against moralists. The main issue is, in short, the problem of underdetermination - that is, the insufficient determination of political action by facts. Since realists hold that a political theory has to be applicable, their view is thus considerably weakened by such criticism. In the third part of the paper, I point to deliberative theory as a view that can answer both realist criticism - because its main aspect is dealing with the way things work in actual politics of concrete societies - but it can also answer criticisms directed against realists themselves, because empirical research of deliberation suggests an actual and viable way to solve the problem of legitimacy - by raising the quality of deliberation. Moreover, a deliberative theory retains autonomy of the ethical, although it doesn?t do that, unlike moralism, by encroaching on the autonomy of politics. Thus, at the end of the paper, I claim that such a deliberative approach can be accepted by both realists and moralists. (shrink)