Spinoza’s epistemology aims at the development of ‘adequate’ and the removal of ‘confused’ ideas. His theory of confusion raises many questions, however. It has often been thought that the confusion of an idea is mind-relative, such that an idea might be confused in my mind but adequate in God’s. In this paper I argue that confusion cannot be mind-relative, because an idea’s confusion is determined by what it represents and for Spinoza, ideas are individuated by their representational content. Instead, I (...) propose that although it is possible to consider one and the same idea both adequately and confusedly, what such acts of considering pick up on are mind-independent features of ideas. (shrink)

This article explores the connections between David Hume's theory of prejudice, present-day theories of structural ignorance, and Hume's own racist attitudes. Charles Mills has identified certain types of ignorance, including racial ignorance, that result from social structures. Here, I argue that Hume can do something similar. Hume uses the concept of prejudice to theorize the misjudgment of someone based on their perceived membership of a certain group. Despite its seemingly individualist presentation in the Treatise, Hume's theory can, as a result (...) of his deeply social view of the mind, be expanded to account for social-structural influences on the formation of prejudices. In fact, in several places he himself develops such structural explanations. On the resulting picture, both his racism and his theory of prejudice are seen to play important roles in his philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues that Spinoza held substances other than God to be inconceivable. It uses this claim to develop a novel response to the Problem of Other Substances, the problem of explaining why some of Spinoza’s proofs for God’s existence cannot be used to prove the existence of a non-divine substance instead.

The link between leadership and mental health at the workplace is well established by prior research. However, most of the studies have addressed this relationship from a single-source perspective. The aim of this study was to examine how supervisor and employee ratings of health-oriented leadership correspond to each other and which sources are predictive for employee mental health. We assessed data within 99 teams containing 713 employees in 11 different companies in Southern Germany. Supervisors and their staff completed questionnaires on (...) the supervisors’ health-oriented staff-care dimensions awareness, value of health and health behavior and current mental distress. Hierarchical linear models revealed that supervisors’ self-ratings were significantly related to their employees’ ratings only on the health behavior dimension, but not on the health awareness and value of health dimensions. Also, supervisors rated themselves significantly higher on HoL compared to their employees. Employee ratings of HoL significantly predicted their own level of mental distress, whereas supervisor ratings of HoL did not predict employees’ mental distress at the team level. Supervisors’ self-ratings of HoL did not influence the relationship between employee ratings of HoL and their mental distress on an individual level. These results highlight the complex relationship between multisource assessments of HoL and employee mental health, emphasizing the importance of subjective perception for mental health. Future studies should investigate under which conditions supervisor and employee ratings correspond to each other and are predictive for mental health at the workplace. (shrink)

Una de las categorías empleadas en la sistematización de las posturas en teología filosófica es “teísmo clásico”, con la que se hace referencia a un grupo indeterminado de autores que mantendrían posturas comunes acerca de Dios y la religión. Hay numerosos intentos de definición del teísmo clásico: se recogen cinco que parecen especialmente relevantes, y se valora la caracterización de Dios que atribuyen al teísmo clásico. Esta valoración revela que sólo coinciden en un atributo: la inmutabilidad. Se analizan las razones (...) y consecuencias de esta característica, lo que da pie a mostrar que tomar como punto de partida para las discusiones teológicas una definición del teísmo clásico es un modo problemático de proceder; a partir de esto se sugieren métodos alternativos que tengan en cuenta la relevancia tanto de las religiones en las que surgen las posturas denominadas clásicas, así como los sistemas propios de los principales autores identificados como teístas clásicos. Abstract: One of the categories used in the systematization of positions in philosophical theology is “classical theism,” which refers to an indeterminate group of authors who uphold common views regarding God and religion. There are numerous attempts to define classical theism; five particularly relevant definitions are examined, along with an evaluation of the characterization of God they attribute to classical theism. This assessment reveals that these definitions converge on only one attribute: immutability. The reasons for and consequences of this characteristic are analyzed, leading to the conclusion that using a definition of classical theism as a starting point for theological discussions is a problematic approach. Based on this, alternative methods are suggested that take into account both the relevance of the religious traditions in which so-called classical positions arise, and the specific systems of the major authors identified as classical theists. (shrink)

In various of my writings, both in Philosophical Studies and elsewhere, I have argued that an account of trying sentences is available that does not require quantification over alleged attempts or tryings. In particular, adverbial modification in such sentences can be dealt with, without quantification over any such particulars. In ‘Attempts’, Jonathan D. Payton (Payton, 2021) has sought to dispute my claim. In this paper, I consider his claims and reply to them. I believe that my account withstands such scrutiny.

Many philosophers accept the view that, when one object constitutes a second, the two objects can be entirely in the same place at the same time. But what of two objects such that neither constitutes the other? Can they be collocated? If there can be such a pair of objects, they would have to share the same material constituents. To show that there are two collocated objects and not just one object at a specific time and place, one has to (...) show that one of the objects has some property that the other fails to have. I claim that the properties I use in my example are legitimate substitution instances in the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I offer a metaphysically possible example that illustrates such collocation, a possible case from ‘raw nature’, two trees. (shrink)

Whether some condition is equivalent to a conjunction of some conditions has been a major issue in analytic philosophy. Examples include: knowledge, acting freely, causation, and justice. Philosophers have striven to offer analyses of these, and other concepts, by showing them equivalent to such a conjunction. Timothy Williamson offers a number of arguments for the idea that knowledge is ‘prime’, hence not equivalent to or composed by some such conjunction. I focus on one of his arguments: the requirement that such (...) conjuncts must be freely recombinable. Although there has been a great deal of discussion of Williamson's arguments, the flaw I describe has gone unnoticed. Williamson's argument is expressed in terms of conditions, and cases of the condition. Does the condition include specific information, or is the specific information only part of the case? His argument equivocates between more and less general specifications of the conditions. Once this distinction is clarified, his argument can be seen to be vitiated by this conflation. Neither option yields a sound argument for Williamson's desired conclusion. (shrink)

There appear to be multifunctional artefacts of a type such that none of their functions can be attributed only to some proper part of the artefact. I use two examples of allegedly multifunctional artefacts of this kind in what follows, one due to Lynne Rudder Baker (aspirin) and another of my own (a spork). The two examples are meant to make the same point. I discuss her aspirin example, since its discussion has entered the literature, but without its being dealt (...) with satisfactorily. My example is, I believe, more intuitive than that of aspirin, which Baker introduced in her response to a challenge to her views, and so I will mostly rely on my example of a spork, especially at the end of the paper, to make my case. -/- I argue that in at least those two cases, if the standard arguments for distinguishing between an object and what constitutes it are sound, an argument showing that what we might have taken to be a single multifunctional object is in fact a case of multiple single-function artefacts which collocate. Or almost. There is one further assumption needed for these cases, beyond what the constitution cases require, and I produce reasons for accepting that assumption. (shrink)

Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel are two representatives of German Idealism, both of whom developed impressing category systems. At the core of both systems is the question of the relation of the Absolute to its determinations and the determinations of finite beings. Both idealists try to deduce their respective category systems from the immediacy of the Absolute. Both use combinatorial methods to get from known to new categories or constellations in the system, which then unfold in (...) the world. Krause is thereby considered the eponym of so-called panentheism, the doctrine that “Everything is in God.” Hegel is also often referred to as a panentheist. Through a comparison of the two systems of categories, in this essay the thesis will be advocated that Hegel was in no sense a panentheist. Krause is and remains the gold standard of panentheism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

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Nietzsche employs the Child as a futural ????igure of af????irmation be-yond the human, which overcomes the “spirit of revenge” and the weight of the past. As Nietzsche dreams of the Child, colonial-ism/coloniality speci????ically targets children to sever communities and impose a civilizational-colonial future. In this article, I read Nietzsche’s question of the human/Overman through Wynter’s so-ciogenic terms of Man/the human. Then, I turn to Fanon’s soci-ogeny of childhood and its transformation during the Algerian Rev-olution. Recasting Nietzsche’s questions in light of (...) violence against children, Fanon provides a different response: overcoming the spirit of revenge and the creation of new values occur through the shared commitment and praxis of decolonization. Children participate in and are witnesses to this transformation beyond the ????igures of Man and Child. Nietzsche utilise l’Enfant comme une ????igure future de l’af????irmation au-delà de l’humain, qui surmonte l’« esprit de vengeance » et le poids du passé. Alors que Nietzsche rêve de l’Enfant, le colonia-lisme/la colonialité cible spéci????iquement les enfants pour rompre les communautés et imposer un avenir civilisationnel-colonial. Dans cet article, je lis la question de Nietzsche sur l’humain/ Surhomme à travers les termes sociogéniques de Wynter sur l’Homme/l’humain. Ensuite, je me tourne vers la sociogénie de l’enfance de Fanon et sa transformation pendant la Révolution al-gérienne. En recontextualisant les questions de Nietzsche à la lu-mière de la violence contre les enfants sous le colonialisme/la colo-nialité, Fanon offre une réponse différente: surmonter l’esprit de vengeance et créer de nouvelles valeurs se réalisent à travers l’engagement partagé et la praxis de la décolonisation. Les enfants participent à et sont témoins de cette transformation au-delà des ????igures de l’Homme et de l’Enfant. (shrink)

I start by explaining what an intrinsic event is. The expression, ‘intrinsic event’, is not innocent; I explain it as best I can here, but the remainder of the book returns repeatedly to this idea and further clarifies it.Philosophers and linguists interested in the question of the relation between doing and causing often refer to, and often conflate, two claims. One of the claims, which is often referred to as Causative Alternation (CA) in the linguistics literature, is an indisputable truth (...) of semantics and the other, (PT) (for ‘Paraphrase Thesis’), is a controversial philosophical analysis. A theme of the chapter is the need to separate out views on the semantics of action verbs from views about the metaphysics of action.The Paraphrase Thesis (PT) says, roughly, that an agent acts iff he [but note: he, not his action] causes some event, for instance, e, and e is then said (in many cases) to be intrinsic to that action. (PT) is false. Since it entails a biconditional, it has two parts: a left-to-right entailment and a right-to-left entailment. In this chapter I examine only the right-to-left entailment.I distinguish the expressions ‘P caused such-and-such’, ‘P was a cause of such-and-such’, and ‘P was the cause of such-and-such’. I also introduce a distinction about causation in order to support my dismissal of the right-to-left entailment: remoteness of cause and partiality of cause. (shrink)

Parallel to the evolution of art history as a discrete discipline during the 1800s and 1900s, the rediscovery of medieval ivories is closely linked to their progression from their origins, to private collections, to public spaces in museums. Although the dynamics of the art market today still often lead newfound objects to private, sometimes untraceable, places, other items have followed opposite paths – as in the case of two fragments of a Late Antique ivory pyxis considered here. These fragments, recently (...) put on display at New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, entered the collection only in 2020, having made their way through generations of the family of art collector and dealer Dikran Kelekian (1867–1951). This study, the first to be devoted to these fascinating fragments, examines their iconography and tries to trace their provenance, dating, and function. (shrink)

Does the LHS of (PT) entail its RHS? When a person acts (and the action verb is an ergative verb), isn’t it trivially true that he causes, i.e., that he is a cause of, the event intrinsic to the action, trivially true that he brings that very event about? Are all doings causings even if not all causings are doings? It is this question that this chapter addresses.I do hold that the LHS of (PT) entails the RHS. But should we (...) understand the LHS and the RHS of (CA) as being about two particulars or as using two descriptions of a single particular? I describe one-particularism as the view that takes the second of those options. I strengthen the case for one-particularism by looking at the idea of Cambridge changes (and hence Cambridge actions). I examine two obvious counter-arguments to one-particularism: (a) that, on an action chain, an action doesn’t cause another action, but it only causes the event that is intrinsic to its successor action on the chain, if it has one; (b) Alvin Goldman’s view, shared by many others, that would imply that one-particularism gets the time of an action wrong. (shrink)

Ethics in the USSR revived in the middle of the twentieth century after more than twenty years of silence. The impetus for the development of research and teaching in this area was given by the supreme power, which considered ethics as one of the more effective tools of state propaganda, corresponding to the new social realities. But pretty soon, the very logic of research immersion in the subject required ethicists to deepen the philosophical and normative analysis of morality. This ultimately (...) led to the revision of the postulates of orthodox Soviet social science and to the formation of a strict moral theory within its framework. The latter, by the very fact of its appearance, called into question the agenda of moralizing ideologization. The renewal of Soviet ethics proceeded in several directions, but in theoretical perspective, the key one was the turn from understanding morality as a form of ideological superstructure (which was dogmatically asserted in historical materialism), to understanding it as a way of regulating human behavior with specific functional characteristics. Today one can trace that transition by a number of intermediate steps in the interpretation of morality, the reconstruction of which, based on the texts of the 1950s to early 1970s, is of interest not only in the context of the history of ideas, but also in terms of the development of the methodology of ethical research and understanding of how a rigorous moral theory can be formed. Some episodes of the history of Soviet ethics are relevant today as examples of emancipated thought and intellectual opposition to the domination of state ideology. (shrink)

Ensina-se que a Inglaterra e os EUA se tornaram referenciais do primeiro jornal e do primeirocurso superior na área da imprensa, e que o jornalismo resulta dos impulsos dasRevoluções Industrial, Americana e Francesa. Há quem conteste, indicando outras informaçõesa respeito da história da mídia impressa e da graduação superior para jornalistascomo fatos próximos da Reforma Protestante. Este artigo resulta de um levantamentobibliográfico em Jorge Pedro Sousa (2008) e Wilson Martins (1996), do videodocumentáriohistórico “As verdades sobre a corte de Henrique VIII” (...) (2015), da Philos TV, e dosconceitos da Teoria da Engenharia do Discurso. (shrink)

This chapter has two sections, both of which develop some of the consequences of one-particularism. The first section is about the possibility that some regress, vicious or otherwise, arises on the conjunction of one-particularism and the left-to-right inference of (PT), since I accept both of those conjuncts.The second question is a sceptical question. Could there be a possible world in which no other agents, minded like ourselves, ever act, either intentionally or unintentionally, although, for all the events that would have (...) been intrinsic or extrinsic to their actions had they acted, there are intrinsically qualitatively identical mere events that occur anyway? If there were such a possible world, how would a person know whether the world that he is in is that world or some other world in which the other agents really do act?Do I solve the sceptical question about knowledge of the actions of others that I introduce? No. I tentatively outline (but do not commit myself to) a ‘disjunctivist’ suggestion for addressing the sceptical question. The discussion on scepticism also allows me to apply (CTT) from Chap. 10.1007/978-3-319-90347-7_4 and to demonstrate how it works in thinking about this question about others’ actions. It also allows me to make some points of (I believe) some interest about the epistemology of action. (shrink)

Cette contribution utilise le potentiel heuristique du concept de mystique – qui encourt à lui seul le risque de poser plus de problèmes qu’il n’en résout – pour porter un regard enrichissant sur l’expérience et la croyance pentecôtiste. À partir d’un examen des contributions récentes dans le domaine de la théologie pentecôtiste, nous chercherons à montrer les modifications que le concept encourt lorsqu’il est appliqué au pentecôtisme, et que cette application l’ouvre à des trajectoires communautaires, apocalyptiques et missionnaires.

I intend to use this introduction as a vehicle for situating the topics discussed in this book within a wider philosophical context, and to describe the main ideas in each chapter. This introduction contains no arguments defending or justifying that context or the presuppositions of my discussion (there will be arguments aplenty about other matters in the following chapters). In theology, a distinction is sometimes drawn between apologetic and confessional theological literature. Apologetic literature seeks to defend a point of view (...) to an audience that is outside the circle of believers; it attempts to convince them of something. Confessional theological literature accepts a point of view as given, but then explains and develops it for those inside the tradition, those who have already ‘bought in’ to the basic assumptions. This Introduction might be thought of as a piece of confessional philosophy, making explicit some of the doxological presuppositions of the book to the already-believers. (shrink)

This is an updated and expansed edition of the 1990 Explaining Explanation, Routledge.

Mind-body parallelism is the view that mind and body stand in the same “order and connection,” as Spinoza put it, or that corresponding mental and physical states have corresponding causal explanations in terms of other mental and physical states. This dissertation investigates the nature and role of mind-body parallelism, as well as other forms of parallelism, in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, it also considers how Spinoza’s views relate to current discussions. In present-day philosophy of mind, mind-body parallelism (...) is almost never defended. It is seen as a historical dead-end with insurmountable problems. By contrast, I argue that parallelism powerfully responds to the post-Cartesian mind-body problem (which remains with us today) and that it points a way forward in current debates. The dissertation contains five independent chapters. After an introduction that situates parallelism in relation to both Spinoza’s time and to present discussions, Chapter 1 presents an argument for parallelism aimed at a present-day audience. Chapter 2 discusses Spinoza’s own arguments for parallelism. Both chapters help to clarify what parallelism is, in part by distinguishing between several versions of the view. Chapter 3 discusses what is often considered parallelism’s most problematic feature, its rejection of mind-body interaction. I argue that by distinguishing between the post-Cartesian context in which Spinoza wrote and present-day discussions, we can see that parallelism is compatible with mental causation. Chapters 4 and 5, finally, discuss specific ways in which parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s view of the mind. In Chapter 4, I argue that parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s interesting and distinctive positions on the nature of agency and motivation. In Chapter 5, I show the role of parallelism in his representationalist theory of consciousness. A guiding thread throughout the dissertation is that parallelism presents a distinctive and interesting way to combine realism, non-reductionism and naturalism in relation to those features of human self-understanding that seem difficult to fit into a naturalistic worldview. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant gilt gemeinhin als der große Zerstörer der klassischen Gottesbeweise: Über die Existenz Gottes könne die theoretische Vernunft nichts wissen, lediglich die Moralphilosophie biete uns subjektiv (aber nicht objektiv) zureichende Gründe für die Annahme der Existenz Gottes. Diese Interpretation der kritischen Philosophie Kants ist nicht korrekt. Was Kant bestreitet, ist eine univoke Wesenserkenntnis Gottes, nicht aber ein theoretisches Wissen um die Existenz Gottes im Sinne der negativen Theologie. Damit steht Kant der klassischen Scholastik näher als bisher zugestanden.

This volume focuses on the interrelatedness of morality and language. Apart from explicit ethical statements, implicit NT moral language is analysed in three overlapping aspects based on the interpretation of concrete NT texts: an intratextual level (linguistic and analytic philosophical methods: syntactical form, style and logic), an textual and intertextual level (form criticism, discourse analysis) and an extratextual level (speech act analysis; rhetoric; reader-response criticism). With reference to analytical moral philosophy, the contributions address questions such as: Where does the ethical (...) quality of a statement come from? Which linguistic devices are used to express ethics in the NT writings? In which way does the genre of the text influence its ethical meaning? Which pre- and intertexts are part of the ethical statements, in which way does the text refer to them? Which ethical impact did and do texts have on their readers? Which linguistic and rhetorical style is used to meet the addressees? Why do we consider a text powerful or polemic? Can we speak of an implicit ethical subject in the text from a literary perspective? (shrink)

Body metaphors and body fables were frequently used in ancient discourse for social communities and politics. This article will examine a body fable by the Greek fabulist Babrius that has been overlooked in research so far. It shows a remarkable similarity to 1 Corinthians 12 through the use of central terms such as σῶμα and μέλος or personified speaking body parts such as an eye and head. Even if no literary direct dependence is claimed, the text, which was written at (...) about the same time as 1 Corinthians, sheds light on Paul's understanding of the body fable. It becomes apparent, however, that the rhetorical function is fundamentally different in the two texts. Whilst the body fable in Babrius reinforces hierarchical structures, Paul emphasises the equality of the various body parts. The discussion about the 'implicit ethics' of these two texts is hermeneutically embedded in the current Corona crisis and the management of the crisis in different forms of organisation and state. CONTRIBUTION: The contribution makes the overlooked Babrius Fable 134, a body fable in political context, known in New Testament scholarship. A comparison with 1 Corinthians 12 points out that despite close analogies in plot and vocabulary, the message regarding the social structure diverges radically: While Babrius propagates a reinforcement of hierarchical leadership, 1 Corinthians 12 pleads for a community based on equivalence. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a dialogue between (post-)phenomenological and decolonial approaches to propose a sentipensante ethics. Emancipating from hegemonic approaches to ethics that privilege rationality over feeling bodies, we conceptualise an analogical ethics of virtues that emerge in the framework of an analectic-responsive experience. In this experience, we specify the affective, interoceptive, and inter-bodily aspects as elements of a sentipensante ethics from an enactivist perspective. This exercise allows us to highlight the foundation of the ethical experience as a participatory (...) virtue-making oriented towards solidary well-being. Finally, it invites us to search for pedagogical practices that cultivate this virtue-making. En este artículo introducimos un diálogo entre enfoques (post-)fenomenológicos y decoloniales para proponer una ética sentipensante. Nos emancipamos de perspectivas hegemónicas que privilegian la racionalidad sobre los cuerpos que sienten, y conceptualizamos una ética analógica de virtudes que emergen en el marco de una experiencia responsiva analéctica. De esta experiencia, precisamos los aspectos afectivos, interoceptivos, e inter-corporales, como elementos de una ética sentipensante desde una perspectiva enactivista. Este ejercicio nos permite resaltar el fundamento de la experiencia ética como un hacer-virtud participativo orientado hacia el bienestar solidario. Finalmente, nos invita a buscar prácticas pedagógicas que cultiven este hacer-virtud. (shrink)

Se explora la naturaleza de los problemas lacunae a partir del análisis de los conceptos elaborados, respectivamente, por Larry Laudan, Theo Kuipers y Atocha Aliseda. Sugeriré que los problemas lacunae pueden surgir del debilitamiento de la noción de ‘falsación empírica’ y repercutir en la noción de ‘implicación lógica’.

This paper appraises the role of critical-feminist figurations within the environmental humanities, focusing on the capacity of figures to produce situated environmental knowledges and pose site-specific ethical obligations. We turn to four environments—the home, the skies, the seas and the microscopic—to examine the work that various figures do in these contexts. We elucidate how diverse figures—ranging from companion animals to birds, undersea creatures and bugs—reflect productive traffic between longstanding concerns in feminist theory and the environmental humanities, and generate new insights (...) related to situated knowledges, feminist care-ethics and the politics of everyday sensory encounters. We also argue, however, that certain figures have tested the limits of theoretical approaches which have emerged as the product of dialogue between feminist theory and environmental studies. In particular, we explore how particular figures have complicated ethical questions of how to intervene in broad environmental threats borne of anthropogenic activities, and of who or what to include in relational ethical frameworks. (shrink)

En los últimas décadas se han elaborado diferentes teorías al interior de la filosofía de la ciencia que pretenden explicar cuál es la mejor manera de entender el progreso científico cognitivo. De entre ellas sobresalen por su extensión, especificidad y alcance las propuestas de Larry Laudan y de Philip Kitcher. Laudan, siguiendo a Karl Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn y retomando varias ideas de Imre Lakatos, defendió una perspectiva funcionalista a partir de la cual propuso la resolución de problemas como el (...) mejor criterio cognitivo para evaluar el progreso científico. Por su parte, Kitcher propuso como criterio del progreso científico la producción de enunciados significativos y verdaderos, defendiendo - no sin ambigüedad - un tipo de realismo científico. En este trabajo pretendo mostrar que los criterios epistémicos, a diferencia de los criterios no epistémicos, complican innecesariamente el análisis de la progresividad científica. (shrink)

En este texto analizo los principales argumentos y contraargumentos realistas y anti-realistas que se han construido a favor y en contra de la capacidad científica para producir conocimiento objetivo y verdadero del mundo social y natural. Argumento que el lenguaje teórico y el lenguaje observacional con el que los científicos sociales y naturales se refieren a las diversas entidades, fenómenos, propiedades y procesos científicos observables e inobservables están determinados, en la práctica, por sus tradiciones teóricas de investigación; lo que muestra (...) que la metodología científica depende en tal medida de las teorías que es, a lo sumo, un proceder constructivo y no un proceder de descubrimiento. (shrink)

While we typically think of culture as defined by geography or ethnicity (e.g., American culture, Mayan culture), the term also applies to the practices and expectations of smaller groups of people. Though embedded in the larger culture surrounding them, such subcultures have their own sets of rules like those that scientists do. Philosophy of science has as its main object of studio the scientific activity. A way in which we have tried to explain these scientific practices is from the actual (...) ontological commitments that scientists do through their scientific theories. Certainly, we know scientific theories through some specific scientific language, which is, in its turn, a subset of the natural language developed by a particular culture. This study is conducted to explore and evaluate some of the most important epistemological consequences of these ontological commitments, specially the so-called ‘truth-commitment’ and its relation with a linguistic-cultural framework. There is an interesting debate between advocates and opponents of scientific realistic view of the natural world. Some lines of scientific realism argumentation assure that: (i) Mature scientific theories are approximately true. (ii) There are entities and organisms in the world that correspond with the ontology presupposed by the best scientific theories within a specific domain of scientific research and (iii) The new acceptable scientific theories should explain why past theories were successful predecessors (Colyvan 2008, Cocchiarella 2007 & Laudan 1981). Contrary, anti- realist positions ensure against the realist’s true - claim that is a semantic commitment - that the purpose of scientific theories to found the truth it is simple an unattainable goal, especially if the kind of truth they are looking for is a corresponding relation between scientific theories and the ontology of the world. Anti-realist positions held that this relation could be circular and unknowable. I do believe that there is a deep confusion between the way in which we accede to the knowledge of the constitutive structures, entities and organisms of the world (which is an epistemological matter) and the way these structures, entities and organisms are (which is an ontological matter). It seems that there is a bridge between the epistemological and ontological aspect in need for conceptual clarification. I do propose that the type of link between the two extremes have to be linguistic in nature. (shrink)

Analizo los alcances y los límites de las teorías sobre el progreso científico elaboradas por Larry Laudan y Philip Kitcher, respectivamente. Comienzo por caracterizar sus teorías, después hago una comparación entre éstas y finalmente reviso cuáles son sus principales problemas. Al final muestro algunas razones por las cuales sus criterios propuestos para evaluar el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia no son exitosos. Termino sugiriendo una manera de evaluar el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia.

Analizo los principales argumentos en torno a la dependencia teórica de los enunciados y conceptos observacionales tomando como eje de discusión la postura de Gerhard Schurz. Después discuto los principales argumentos sobre la dependencia teórica de la percepción. Finalmente analizo la dependencia teórica de la experimentación científica teniendo como eje de discusión la postura de Allan Franklin. Muestro que un rasgo positivo de la dependencia teórica de la observación y la experimentación es que una teoría científica puede establecer los mecanismos (...) para evaluar la importancia de los fenómenos observados inesperados. Estos mecanismos sin duda constituyen un instrumento esencial para el progreso científico. (shrink)

Recientemente, Alexander Bird (2007) sugirió que la ciencia progresa cuando muestra “acumulación de conocimiento justificado”. Para validar su postura, Bird contrastó sus ideas con los conceptos sobre el progreso científico construidos por Thomas S. Kuhn y Larry Laudan, respectivamente. El objetivo de Bird fue mostrar que el criterio de “resolución de problemas” defendido por estos autores, es regresivo y, por ello, anti-intuitivo. En este texto analizo los argumentos de Bird en contra de estos autores y muestro en qué fallan. Posteriormente (...) se evalúa su postura a partir de sus propios fundamentos epistemológicos. Al final, presento algunas conclusiones que pueden inferirse del presente estudio. (shrink)

Media ecology is not the theoretical stream of communication studies and it is not limited to Marshall McLuhan´s work and thinking; however, we focus on McLuhan’s approach to media ecology for this special issue on the philosophy of Marshall McLuhan. Media ecology is a complex and systemic metadiscipline whose object of study is the changes and effects that have occurred in society as a result of the evolution of technology and media throughout history.

El libro de Lorraine Daston Breve Historia de la Atención Científica, publicado en español por editorial La Cifra en el 2012, consta de seis apartados a través de los cuales Daston formula una interesante pregunta desde las perspectivas de la psicología de la investigación científica y la epistemología de la historia natural: por qué, cuándo y cómo ocurre que los científicos dirigen su atención sobre determinados objetos de estudio y no sobre otros. O visto desde otro punto de vista, cómo (...) emergen los objetos científicos y cómo, en determinado momento, se desvanecen. (shrink)

En este ensayo se analiza el concepto de populismo judicial y se propone una nueva definición. Se advierte que muchas definiciones existentes confunden el concepto con sus manifestaciones, además de mezclar al populismo judicial con otros conceptos como el formalismo y el activismo judicial. Frente a ello, se plantea que el populismo judicial es un conjunto de actividades no jurisdiccionales mediante las cuales las personas juzgadoras se presentan a sí mismas o a sus decisiones como cercanas al pueblo. Finalmente, se (...) estudian diversas manifestaciones de populismo judicial en México, comprobando que la redefinición propuesta las explica adecuadamente. (shrink)