Ressentiment describes a psychological process in which a subject responds to feelings of inadequacy by altering his evaluative orientation in a way that enables him to blame the inadequacy on some outgroup. Ressentiment is taken to have far-reaching applicability: it has been used to explain many different forms of political antagonism, including those present in the authoritarian far-right, the far left, identity politics, populism, neo-Nazi movements, the manosphere, incels, and fanaticism. This essay asks what exactly ressentiment is (...) and whether it gives a good account of political antagonism. Is ressentiment an emotion? If so, what kind of emotion is it? How is it linked to strife and discord? Section 1 begins by analyzing the key features of ressentiment. Section 2 asks how ressentiment is linked to the narratives or ideologies with which people and groups operate. Section 3 considers the way in which ressentiment leads to changes in the subject’s identity. Section 4 concludes by discussing the way in which ressentiment generates politically antagonistic emotions and stances. (shrink)

This article investigates conceptions of morality within the framework of ressentimentful victimhood in the manosphere, while also exploring avenues for resistance among young individuals encountering the “hatred pipeline”. In Study 1, we use the emotional mechanism of ressentiment to examine how incels construct narratives of victimhood rooted in the notion of sexual entitlement that remains owed and unfulfilled, alongside its “black pill” variant emphasising moral and epistemic superiority. Through a linguistic corpus analysis and content examination of 4chan and Incel.is (...) blog posts, we find evidence of ressentiment morality permeating the language and communication within the incel community, characterised by blame directed at women, and the pervasive themes of victimhood, powerlessness, and injustice. In Study 2, we delve into young individuals’ reflections on incel morality and victimhood narratives as they engage with online networks of toxic masculinity in the manosphere. Drawing from semi-structured interviews with young participants who have accessed the manosphere, we explore their perceptions of risks, attribution of blame, and experiences of empathy towards individuals navigating the “hatred pipeline”. Our analysis underscores the significance of ressentiment in elucidating alternative conceptions of morality and victimhood, while shedding light on the potential for acceptance or resistance within online environments characterised by hatred. (shrink)

Nietzsche famously discusses a psychological condition he calls ressentiment, a condition involving toxic, vengeful anger. I offer a free-standing theory in philosophical psychology of the familiar...

This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); (...) 2) its place in the taxonomy of the affective mind (ontology); and 3) the psychological mechanisms responsible for the inversion of value (psychology). The early phenomenological accounts are then analyzed in the light of recent accounts of Ressentiment elaborated by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. It is argued that the early phenomenological accounts provide central insights on the interrelation between affectivity and value. (shrink)

Nietzsche's remarks on ressentiment and power and Foucault's analytics of power form the backdrop to this chapter. My concern is with certain feminist discursive and non-discursive practices, primarily in those institutions in which feminists have achieved a degree of success-bureaucracy, educational institutions and the professions. The question is: in what strategies of power are these practices participating and with what conception of power are they operating?

This chapter argues that _ressentiment_ should be understood as involving a process of intentional, albeit not reflectively strategic, self-deception about one’s own conscious mental states. The values avowedly adopted by the _ressentiment_ subjects are not genuinely internalized by them but are rather adopted with an instrumental aim, the subjects being ignorant about their actual conscious commitments and aims as a result of an intentional project of avoiding reflective self-knowledge. This idea of intentional self-deception has often been thought to be paradoxical. (...) It is argued that we can explain the possibility of self-deception as an intentional project by utilizing a distinction emphasized by phenomenological philosophers between non-conceptualized yet conscious contents and attitudes on the one hand and their reflective conceptualization on the other. The chapter also offers a critical discussion of the sophisticated but in my view unsuccessful deflationist construal of _ressentiment_ proposed by R. Jay Wallace. (shrink)

In this paper I track the deployment of Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment by three major thinkers in postcolonial theory, namely Frantz Fanon, Edward Said and Achille Mbembe. My argument is that while postcolonial theory has used ressentiment in a captivating way, which may have the potential for accounting for how contemporary moral culture conditions racism, nativism and xenophobia, the deployment remains incoherent. The postcolonial deployment of ressentiment begins with an incoherent reading of Nietzsche by Fanon, a (...) mistake which is creatively appropriated by Said and Mbembe. As ressentiment travels into the postcolony Nietzsche’s insights are discarded and the term is transformed through Hegelian and psychoanalytic schematics that take morality to be a universal and prescriptive code, the very problem that Nietzsche was attempting to overcome. For Fanon, ressentiment explains how colonial projection or the racial gaze is internalized by the colonized subject to produce a relation... (shrink)

Loneliness, while a common human experience, is something to which people often respond quite differently. Here, I examine how an individual’s social position, as well as his socialization into a particular cultural milieu, can shape his response to the fact of his loneliness (as well as the features of human existence that loneliness makes salient). Specifically, I argue that in cases where the individual experiencing loneliness has been socialized to disvalue the features of existence that loneliness makes salient (e.g., our (...) dependence on and vulnerability to others) and/or to feel entitled to the social goods that they are, or perceive themselves to be, lacking (e.g., recognition or intimate connection), loneliness may catalyze the vicious, extremist attitude of ressentiment. This analysis allows us to see how loneliness may play a role in catalyzing vicious, extremist attitudes—though I contend that loneliness never warrants such attitudes. (shrink)

In psychological research, ressentiment is alluded to as a negative emotional response directed at social groups that are mostly marked as ‘inferior others’. However, conceptual work on this notion is sorely missing. In our conceptual proposal, we use the notion of ‘moral emotions’ as a starting point: typically referred to as “other-condemning” moral emotions (Haidt), psychologists have loosely conceptualised anger, contempt and disgust as a set of negative emotions that have distinct elicitors and involve affective responses to sanction moral (...) misconduct of ‘others’. Though this conglomerate of different other-condemning emotions might describe emotions of ressentiment, we argue that the phenomenon itself is a more complex sentiment. Therefore, we apply Withy’s concept of ‘disclosive posture’ to account for the different psychological processes underlying ressentiment. Disclosing refers to a specific openness to the world, which in the case of ressentiment implies a specific awareness of and sensibility for instances of inequality, grudge, or disfavour. Ressentiment thus becomes a perceptual tool in morally relevant everyday situations. The term ‘posture’ refers to a habitualised, embodied comportment or action tendency that leads to the adoption of a negative attitude and stance towards others. Drawing on Withy, we discuss ressentiment’s similarities (and differences) to the closely related concept of hatred (Szanto, Vendrell Ferran) to embed the analysis of ressentiment in a broader social framework. (shrink)

Following Nietzsche, we can discern two types of therapeutical voice on ressentiment, which find themselves in a polemical relation to one another: The philosopher and the priest. In this paper, I turn to a third polemical voice, embodied by Jean Améry, namely that of the victim who bears witness to his own ressentiment. A dialectical reconstruction of this standpoint within the polemical triangle contributes to the Améry reception in three ways: It is no longer necessary to justify his (...) tactlessness through the exceptional context of the objectively recognized lived experience of victimhood. It shows that Améry’s assumption of his “authentic ressentiment” is not just “anti-Nietzschean” but first of all anti-pastoral. Beyond the question of authenticity, this also implies that the political significance of Améry’s testimony lies in its literary and conceptual systematicity no less than as a description of lived experience. (shrink)

A critical discussion of Bernard Reginster's book The Will to Nothingness. The contribution engages with Reginster's interpretation of Nietzschean ressentiment, arguing that it is an essentially interpersonal attitude in two different senses. It is a response to a social situation of structural deprivation, and it involves an element of antagonism toward those who are better off within this social structure. The contribution then discusses Reginster's claim that modern morality restores the sense of power of the masses by adjusting the (...) goals that they aim to pursue. I argue that this interesting interpretation does not do full justice to the themes of hostility or hatred that permeate the Genealogy of Morals, extending from Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt to his treatments of the bad conscience and of ascetic ideals. (shrink)

In philosophical literature, the complex emotional state of ressentiment gained popularity through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment was a bad feeling that reflected the suppressed anger, the pain of impotence, and the general misery of the weak when they compared themselves to the strong and talented members of society. Max Scheler took up Nietzsche’s thesis and described ressentiment as a complex condition characterised by a thirst for revenge. Moreover, ressentiment has the annoying (...) property of presenting itself as having some merit: the modern social and political context offers more than enough examples. First, the aim of this article is to take a closer look at Nietzsche’s ‘man of ressentiment,’ an odious personality characterised by weakness, deep frustrations, and hypocrisy. It will turn out that ressentiment has many different shades that paint a somewhat different picture and raise philosophical questions about positive valuation, vulnerability, and the sense of injustice. Second, we shall be working on the link between the psychology of ressentiment and the temptation to lack integrity in writing, art, or science. The well-described and well-known fact that academic fraudsters evolve in disguise, that they first reactively endorse values very different from their own values, and that these plagiarist authors, second, embark on long-term projects repeating their misdeeds and errors, as if it were normal, are two facts worthy of our attention. (shrink)

This article is about the connection between envy and ressentiment. Both are understood as emotional strategies for dealing with desire. Ressentiment is understood as the perpetuation and radicalization of a strong form of envy. Lacan’s mirror stage as well as Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s theories of ressentiment serve as a frame of reference for the development of this thesis.

This monograph constitutes a response to the criticisms of Christianity outlined in Nietzsche's GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, in which Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a "slave revolt" of the weak--an attempt by the impotent to bring down the vitality of the capable nobility. Scheler's response is multi-faceted but centers on Nietzsche's failure to understand the nature of Christian love. Christianity is not a destructive enterprise trying to bring everyone down to the same low level of its impotent faithful, who must put (...) their trust in the next world because they can get nowhere in this one. Rather, it attempts constructively to bring everyone up to a new level of human flourishing. Christianity's preoccupation with the poor, weak, and marginalized stems from a recognition, through divine love, of the miracle of God's creation and infinite possibilities present even in them. (shrink)

Nietzsche's thinking on justice and punishment explores the motives and forces which lie behind moral concepts and social institutions. His dialogue with several writers of his time is discussed here. Eugen Dühring had argued that a natural feeling of ressentiment against those who have harmed us is the source of the concept of injustice, so that punishment, even in its most impersonal form, is always a form of revenge. In attacking this theory, Nietzsche developed his own powerful critique of (...) moral concepts such as responsibility and guilt. He borrowed his ‘historical’ approach to moral concepts from Paul Ree, who suggested that the utilitarian function of punishment had been obscured by its practice, which appears to be directly linked with moral guilt. Nietzsche responds that punishment has quite different purposes and meanings at different times, so that any single explanation or justification is inadequate. In this way, he rejects the pre-suppositions common to the retributivists and utilitarians of his time. (shrink)

There is scant serious work examining the influences of Nietzsche upon Žižek. Most points of contact are concealed in missed opportunities.. In a common thread that runs throughout most of Žižek’s work there is a way that he casts cynicism and irony as always implying a gap, a beyond in which the ironic, cynical subject “knows” and feigns foolishness. A negation of a negation, sublated into a new positivity as cynical-subject. In the realm of cynical postmodern entertainment the phantasy-based foolishness (...) is always posited as an ‘end of history’ whereby the cynical subject now ‘knows’ the error of incorrect ideology, and the cynical irony reinforces a reactionary metaphysics through this gap which alleges to conceal a kernel of truth that knows better. Hence, as Žižek is correct to point out, the most heinous abuses of postmodern methods of vulgarity now occur on the right wing of politics, because the vulgarity is readily appropriated into the cynical-irony of the knowing subject who “knows better”; because this direct experience of a postmodern vulgarity is always presumed to have a metaphysical “gap” that reinforces the reactionary political ideology, the ‘kernel of truth’ (an illusion that seems real) that we now know better that nothing will ever actually change. Žižek does not speak highly of Nietzsche (and various Nietzscheans such as Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida), and this makes his work much more difficult, because the cynicism Žižek relies on is not too dissimilar to the ways Nietzsche understands ressentiment and this gap in the metaphysics appearance versus ‘true reality’ that is deeper. Nietzsche painstakingly argues throughout his many books that this is precisely what is most problematic about ridding Christian metaphysics from western culture (especially starting early on in Untimely Meditations, and all the way through to his last books such as Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christian, this is a common thread for Nietzsche throughout) among the ‘slave’-morality that mocks, humiliates, drags down the authentic master-morality, and we can see how a subject emerges through cynical disbelief, while actually reproducing the structures of power it discursively claims to resist, transcend, or perhaps destroy. The transvaluation of values takes from within the structures of power that the Ubermensch attempts to transvaluate, and therefore it is a temporal stasis, changes seem to occur, but these changes are occurring at the level of content rather than form. The point is to disrupt form, and rather than repeat the same tropes over and over again, create new stories. What Žižek often refers to as “cynicism” in his work bears a striking resemblance to Nietzsche’s “ressentiment”; or, the slave-morality that forms a negative relation to power as its vengeful other, this vengeful attitude festers, but never actually forms into a revolutionary ontology.Working definition of the concept: Ressentiment—is the vengeful morality of the weak and powerless who imagine revenge enacted on the strong and powerful through metaphysical forces like Gods, Angels, etc. because the meek are not in power, they enact revenge in their imagination and find comfort through the narratives offered by religion. (shrink)

_Ressentiment_—the hateful desire for revenge—plays a pivotal role in Nietzsche’s _On the Genealogy of Morals_. _Ressentiment _explains the formation of bad conscience, guilt, asceticism, and, most importantly, it motivates the "slave revolt" that gives rise to Western morality’s values. _Ressentiment_, however, has not enjoyed a thorough treatment in the secondary literature. This book brings it sharply into focus and provides the first detailed examination of Nietzsche’s psychology of _ressentiment_. Unlike other books on the _Genealogy_, it uses _ressentiment_ as a key (...) to the _Genealogy_ and focuses on the intriguing relationship between _ressentiment_ and justice. It shows how _ressentiment_, despite its blindness to justice, gives rise to moral justice—the central target of Nietzsche’s critique. This critique notwithstanding, the _Genealogy_ shows Nietzsche’s enduring commitment to the virtue of _non-moral_ justice: a commitment that grounds his provocative view that moral justice spells the ‘end of justice’. The result provides a novel view of Nietzsche's moral psychology in the _Genealogy_, his critique of morality, and his views on justice. (shrink)

The article deals with Max Scheler's philosophical concept of ressentiment. In “Ressentiment in the Structure of Morals”, he uses Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of "ressentiment" to describe an important negative phenomenon in modern moral and culture in general. The article shows that Max Scheler's descriptive method organically grows out of the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and at the same time imitates some specific features of Wilhelm Diltai's descriptive and analytical psychology. On the basis of this methodological approach, (...) Max Scheler does not explain ressentiment and does not give a clear definition of this concept, but instead reproduces its formation in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and describes the phenomenon of ressentiment. Using the descriptive method, Scheler concludes that ressentiment is related to the desire for revenge and feelings of powerlessness. He also describes the different dimensions of ressentiment, which can be formulated as follows: Kinship and sexual dimension. Age dimension. Professional dimension. Class dimension. There is also noted in the article that Scheler demonstrates national ressentiment rather than critically analyzes it. This circumstance to some extent brings to light the Zeitgeist, i.e. the spirit of time, when authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies and regimes such as Russian Bolshevism and German Nazism were formed, being undoubtedly feed by the destructive energy of resentment. The author of the article also discovers a connection between Scheler's concept of ressentiment and Freud's concept of suppression. The study shows how, on the theoretical basis of Max Scheler's concept of ressentment, it is possible to critically deconstruct not only such historical manifestations of ressentiment as Bolshevism and Nazism, but also some dangerous and destructive trends in the modern world, namely the ideology of the "Russian world" (“Russkii mir”). (shrink)

This project attempts a joint reading of the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Frantz Fanon. This task, however, is problematic because this body of work is in tension or contradictory. These problems are so acute that a careful reading method is necessary to successfully carry out this reading. In order to facilitate this reading I elaborate and apply a particular philosophical methodology, Mestizaje. The methodology is intended to address works that are contradictory by attempting to read the texts as they (...) are presented while at the same time balancing their positions. The goal is to honestly reflect the thought of each thinker and to illuminate a perspective that incorporates but transcends their respective positions. What the application of Methodological Mestizaje finds is that while Nietzsche and Fanon stand in tension to one another, their respective works share several interesting and important convergences. In particular, they share thoughts on ressentiment, morality and violence. With ressentiment, Nietzsche creates the concept and two manifestations of it, while Fanon works with the concept to develop a third manifestation of this form of moral valuation. Furthermore, their works share the view that morality and violence are fundamental to understanding the origin, development and possible overcoming of a morality. This work contributes to the area of Africana Studies by offering a picture of Nietzsche that addresses concerns of these areas of study. Additionally, Methodological Mestizaje intends to follow in the tradition of non-ideal theory. Finally, while each thinker contributes to the discussion of ressentiment, morality and violence, their positions taken together reveal a broad and thorough perspective on colonialism and its concomitant morality, including their inception, and consequent progression and persistence in the current world. (shrink)

A free and lucid translation of Scheler's first mature work on social and ethical theory. It represents an imaginative reinterpretation of Nietzsche's concept of "ressentiment," the structural key to the phenomenon of "slave morality." Generously sprinkled with apt illustrations, Ressentiment is a sustained attack on the notions of "work" and the "universal love of mankind" as ultimate sources of value. Such ressentiment-laden social tendencies are seen to form the faulty cornerstone of modern morality, both bourgeois and socialist.--K. (...) R. D. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation of the condition of ressentiment. It reviews the two most prominent philosophic accounts of ressentiment: Nietzsche's genealogy of ressentiment as the moral perversion resulting from the ancient Roman/Palestinian cultural conflict and giving birth to the ascetic ideal; and Scheler's phenomenology of ressentiment as a complex affective unit generative of its own affects and values. A single sketch of the typical elements of ressentiment is drawn from the review of these two (...) accounts. One element in particular, the exigency of rationality, is highlighted. The rationality of ressentiment is found to be essential to the phenomenon as a whole and to its constitutive parts. Curiously, while their accounts imply and suggest the role of rationality, neither Nietzsche or Scheler make the centrality of rationality to ressentiment implicit. (shrink)

Les mémorialistes témoignent du ressentiment persistant qui accompagne les édits de pacification des années 1563 à 1598. Non publiés à cette époque, ils reflètent le mécontentement de voir les édits favoriser leurs adversaires, croient-ils, et les divers moyens par lesquels une population peut traduire la permanence des agressivités détournées, quelles que soient la date et les clauses d’oubli. Le peu de crédit apporté à la décision royale de coexistence pacifique ne construit, au delà des apparences disciplinées, que la perception (...) d’une régression à ce qui était l’origine des conflits. (shrink)

Patricia White (Stud Philos Educ 18:43–52, 1999) argues that the virtue gratitude is essential to a flourishing democracy because it helps foster universal and reciprocal amity between citizens. Citizens who participate in this reciprocal relationship ought to be encouraged to recognize that “much that people do does in fact help to make communal civic life less brutish, pleasanter and more flourishing.” This is the case even when the majority of citizens do not intentionally seek to make civic life better for (...) others. Were citizens to recognize the appropriateness of gratitude in these situations, the bonds of our democratic communities would be strengthened. In this paper, I examine White’s argument more carefully, arguing that it fails to address adequately the difficulties that arise when we attempt to encourage the virtue of gratitude in our students. To address these difficulties, I turn to an unlikely source for democratic inspiration: Friedrich Nietzsche. In spite of his well-known anti-democratic sentiments, Nietzsche offers democratic citizens insights into the social value of gratitude. I argue that Nietzsche’s ideas resolve the educational difficulties in White’s argument and viably establish gratitude as an important democratic virtue that ought to be cultivated. (shrink)

The paper examines Nietzsche's claim that valuations born out of a psychological condition he calls "ressentiment" are objectionable. It argues for a philosophically sound construal of this type of criticism, according to which the criticism is directed at the agent who holds values out of ressentiment, rather than at those values themselves. After presenting an analysis of ressentiment, the paper examines its impact on valuation and concludes with an inquiry into Nietzsche's reasons for claiming that ressentiment (...) valuation is "corrupt." Specifically, the paper proposes that ressentiment valuation involves a form of self-deception, that such self-deception is objectionable because it undermines the integrity of the self, and that the lack of such integrity ensnares the agent in a peculiar kind of practical inconsistency. The paper ends with a brief review of the problems and prospects of this interpretation. (shrink)

This article is an engagement with the effects of speed in global politics through the lens of what it terms “Brown’s Paradox,” Wendy Brown’s insight that, in a radically accelerating world we “feel a greater political impotence than humans may have felt before, even as we occupy a global order more saturated by human power than ever before.” It begins by discussing the two dominant responses to Brown’s Paradox: the first, the neoliberal embrace and valorization of the uncertainty of an (...) accelerating world, and the second, the reactionary attempt to aggressively (re)secure the foundations of politics and society (in this latter discussion, the article engages with the specific case study of the treatment of Tamil refugees in Canada). The discussion of this latter approach will lead us to the central concept of this article, the idea of a ressentiment against speed. The article will discuss how this ressentiment inhibits our ability to productively respond to the challenges of an accelerating world, while at the same time frequently authorizing policies of violence, marginalization, and exploitation against those constituencies which are already most subject to the conditions of accelerating globalization. Conversely, this understanding of ressentiment against speed will be used to point the way to a politics which, while not resolving the contradiction inherent in Brown’s Paradox, might teach us to live with it—and within it—in a productive and ethical manner. (shrink)

This paper is forthcoming in The Moral Psychology of Resentment (Rowman & Littlefield).

The current political climate is awash with groups that we might be tempted to label irrational, extremist, hyper-partisan; it is full of echo-chambers, radicalization, and epistemic bubbles. Philosophers have profitably analyzed some of these phenomena. In this essay, I draw attention to a crucial but neglected aspect of our time: the way in which certain groups are fanatical. I distinguish fanatical groups from other types of problematic groups, such as extremist and cultish groups. I argue that a group qualifies as (...) fanatical only if it has features that promote individual fanaticism. But how might a group promote individual fanaticism? I argue that a typical feature of fanatical groups is their tendency to encourage an emotion that philosophers sometimes call “ressentiment,” which differs from ordinary resentment. I explain what ressentiment is, how it can be fostered, and how it can lead to fanaticism. I contend that this account helps us to identify a disturbing and increasingly widespread feature of contemporary social and political groups. (shrink)

The rise of populism, cynicism, fanaticism and fundamentalism challenges us to reconsider the problem of ressentiment, characterized by Friedrich Nietzsche in 'On the Genealogy of Morals' (1887) as the self-poisoning of the will by interiorization of trauma in the form of a postponed and imaginary revenge. The concept of ressentiment is now making a comeback in political discourse"-- Back cover.

I argue that recent interpretations of Nietzsche's political theory that make him out to be a Machiavellian elitist are misguided. While Nietzsche's philosophy advocates a return to an order of rank among individuals, it does not entail the domination of the few over the many. Rather, it is meant to benefit all individuals, whatever their rank. To this end, I examine several Machiavellian interpretations and demonstrate the inadequacy of their exegetical evidence. I then turn to Nietzsche's educational theory and show (...) the ways it supports and expands his political vision for the flourishing of the few and the many. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

First off I would like to thank the editors of this journal for allowing me this space to respond to Jim Mackenzie’s ‘Dahlbeck and pure ontology’ (written in reply to my ‘Towards a pure ontology’). I would also like to thank Mackenzie for taking the time to read and to respond at length to my article. I’m pleased Mackenzie engaged with my article so intensely. In response, I will not quibble—word by word—with Mackenzie’s vigorous attack upon my work. I think (...) curious readers should read it for themselves. Here, I would like to focus upon the larger issues and assumptions at play in our debate. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz nimmt den Kasseler Documenta-Eklat von 2022 zum Anlass, um Antisemitismus in der Kunst zu analysieren und auf den bundesrepublikanischen Konsens-Künstler Joseph Beuys und seine paradoxe Destruktion der Kunstautonomie zurückzublicken.

A central aspect of Nietzsche's critique of morality is that morality is born in _ressentiment_. Personal slights are felt as impersonal offenses — offenses by _someone_ against _someone_ — violations of a standing anyone has and that anyone can be held responsible for violating. This chapter argues that Nietzsche is right to see morality as tied distinctively to guilt and distinctively moral responsibility, but that there are significant differences between _ressentiment_ and the second-personal resentment and other reactive attitudes that are (...) conceptually implicated in morality. In Nietzsche's view, the ‘value’ of morality is compromised when _ressentiment_'s retaliatory and destructive force is turned against the self: moral guilt involves a form of self-hatred. The chapter argues, however, that second-personal resentment expresses a _reciprocal_ respect that differs fundamentally from any attitude that seeks to degrade, contemn, retaliate against, or otherwise devalue their objects. (shrink)