Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an "isomorphic model" schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, (...) to the explanation of physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction. (shrink)

This volume investigates the notion of reduction. Building on the idea that philosophers employ the term ‘reduction’ to reconcile diversity and directionality with unity, without relying on elimination, the book offers a powerful explication of an “ontological” notion of reduction the extension of which is (primarily) formed by properties, kinds, individuals, or processes. It argues that related notions of reduction, such as theory-reduction and functional reduction, should be defined in terms of this explication. Thereby, (...) the book offers a coherent framework, which sheds light on the history of the various reduction debates in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind, and on related topics such as reduction and unification, the notion of a scientific level, and physicalism. (shrink)

Recently, several philosophers have discussed conjunction reduction and other tests for polysemy/homonymy with reference to the potential ambiguity of certain expressions central to various philosophical debates. However, it has been argued that the conjunction reduction tests are not decisive in settling such matters, because some polysemous terms are acceptable under conjunction reduction. For example, conjunctions involving polysemous book and lunch can be reduced: The book is heavy and interesting and Lunch was delicious but took forever. Against this (...) contention, the paper argues that polysemy does not undermine ambiguity tests. Terms that are acceptable in copredicational contexts in some or even in many cases also generate zeugma in other cases. We also argue, however, that conjunction reduction and similar tests have holes: monosemous terms can also give rise to zeugmatic readings. We analyze two classes of verb as potential examples. (shrink)

I argue that there are two distinct approaches to understanding reduction: the ontology-first approach and the theory-first approach. They concern the relation between ontological reduction and inter-theoretic reduction. Further, I argue for the significance of this distinction by demonstrating that either one or the other approach has been taken as an implicit assumption in, and has in fact shaped, our understanding of what statistical mechanics is. More specifically, I argue that the Boltzmannian framework of statistical mechanics assumes (...) and relies on the ontology-first approach, whereas the Gibbsian framework should assume the theory-first approach. -/- . (shrink)

A mechanism describing state reduction dynamics in relativistic quantum field theory is outlined. The mechanism involves nonlinear stochastic modifications to the standard description of unitary state evolution and the introduction of a relativistic field in which a quantized degree of freedom is associated to each point in spacetime. The purpose of this field is to mediate in the interaction between classical stochastic influences and conventional quantum fields. The equations of motion are Lorentz covariant, frame independent, and do not result (...) in divergent behavior. It is shown that the mathematical framework permits the specification of unambiguous local properties providing a connection between the model and evidence of real world phenomena. The collapse process is demonstrated for an idealized example. (shrink)

This paper defines relational properties and argues for their reducibility in a, broadly speaking, Armstrongian framework of state of affairs ontology and truthmaking. While Armstrong’s own characterisation and reduction of them arguably is the best one available in the literature of this framework, it suffers from two main problems. As will be shown, it neither defines relational properties very clearly (if at all), nor provides an adequate conception of their reduction. This paper attempts to remedy this situation in (...) four steps. First, it introduces relational properties and why they matter in metaphysics in general. Second, by briefly comparing and contrasting them with extrinsic properties, and by briefly mapping them onto a tripartite division of relations, the particular kinds of relevant relational properties are identified. Third, it classifies relational properties and thereby makes possible an apt definition of them. Finally, using the notion of truthmaking, it outlines a more satisfactory case for their reduction. (shrink)

The claim that reduction entails grounding (but not vice versa) – called ‘the grounding-reduction link’ – is potentially very important but not clearly correct. After working through a fruitful debate between Gideon Rosen (who maintains the link) and Paul Audi (who maintains its impossibility), I distinguish between what I call ‘strict’ and ‘broad’ reduction. Strict reduction is incompatible with grounding, but broad reduction is not. Thus the link is possible, at least for broad reduction. (...) However, neither strict nor broad reduction entails grounding. Ultimately, there may be a link between grounding and some highly qualified form of reduction. However, the philosophical traction that one might hope to gain for grounding via such a link is considerably diminished if not outright lost. (shrink)

The combination of corporate-community conflicts and oil transnational corporations' (TNCs) rhetoric about being socially responsible has meant that the issue of community development and poverty reduction have recently moved from the periphery to the heart of strategic business thinking within the Nigerian oil industry. As a result, oil TNCs have increasingly responded to this challenge by adopting partnership strategies as a means to contribute to poverty reductions in their host communities as well as secure their social licence to operate. (...) This paper critically examines the strengths and weaknesses of the different community development partnership (CDPs) initiatives employed by Shell, Exxon Mobil and Total to contribute to poverty reduction within their host communities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Drawing on empirical data and critical analysis, the paper argues that while the CDP initiatives by SPDC, MPN and EPNL have the potential to contribute to community development, the failure to integrate negative injunction duties into existing partnerships means that the partnerships make no difference to how oil TNCs conduct their core business operation. Consequently, CDPs have had limited positive impact on poverty reduction in the Niger Delta. The paper concludes by examining the implications of the emerging issues for partnership and poverty reduction. (shrink)

Cystic fibrosis (CF) is a life-limiting genetic disease frequently associated with pancreatic insufficiency (PI), traditionally considered irreversible. CF transmembrane conductance regulator modulators such as elexacaftor/tezacaftor/ivacaftor (ETI; Trikafta) have transformed CF care yet remain FDA-approved only for children aged 2 years and older. We present the case of a 9-month-old female with CF and PI whose mother, highly health-literate and resourceful, pursued early ETI exposure through breastmilk transfer and later direct off-label dosing, despite medical guidance and regulatory restrictions. Remarkably, the child (...) achieved pancreatic sufficiency, discontinued pancreatic enzyme replacement therapy and showed no evidence of hepatic or ophthalmologic toxicity. This case raises significant ethical questions: What constitutes an appropriate physician’s response when parents pursue unapproved but plausibly effective therapies? Should monitoring and harm reduction be seen as ethically permissible, or should stronger discouragement—including refusal of guidance or child protective intervention—be considered? Using an adapted risk–benefit framework derived from complementary and complementary medicine ethics, we argue that the medical team’s approach—recommending standard of care while monitoring for safety and efficacy—was ethically justifiable harm reduction in light of the mother’s persistence, the plausible biological rationale and early positive outcomes. We further explore how this assessment may shift when FDA-approved alternatives become available and compare this case to analogous dilemmas such as paediatric stem cell tourism. Ultimately, we suggest that calibrated physician responses, scaled to the degree of risk and potential benefit, best serve the child’s interests in ethically ambiguous contexts of parental pursuit of unproven but potentially beneficial treatments. (shrink)

We apply spatialized game theory and multi-agent computational modeling as philosophical tools: (1) for assessing the primary social psychological hypothesis regarding prejudice reduction, and (2) for pursuing a deeper understanding of the basic mechanisms of prejudice reduction.

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important particular case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the (...) class='Hi'>reduction is unexplanatory. In defense of this claim, I offer evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences. (shrink)

We argue that traditional formulations of the reduction thesis that tie it to privileged relational operations do not suffice for Peirce’s justification of the categories and invite the charge of gerrymandering to make it come out as true. We then develop a more robust invariant formulation of the thesis, one that is immune to that charge, by explicating the use of triads in any relational operations. The explication also allows us to track how Thirdness enters the structure of higher (...) order relations and even to propose a numerical measure of it. Our analysis reveals new conceptual phenomena when negation or disjunction are used to compound relations. (shrink)

Intertheoretic reduction in physics aspires to be both to be explanatory and perfectly general: it endeavors to explain why an older, simpler theory continues to be as successful as it is in terms of a newer, more sophisticated theory, and it aims to relate or otherwise account for as many features of the two theories as possible. Despite often being introduced as straightforward cases of intertheoretic reduction, candidate accounts of the reduction of general relativity to Newtonian gravitation (...) have either been insufficiently general or rigorous, or have not clearly been able to explain the empirical success of Newtonian gravitation. Building on work by Ehlers and others, I propose a different account of the reduction relation that is perfectly general and meets the explanatory demand one would make of it. In doing so, I highlight the role that a topology on the collection of all spacetimes plays in defining the relation, and how the selection of the topology corresponds with broader or narrower classes of observables that one demands be well-approximated in the limit. (shrink)

Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction. Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. An example of a downward inference is (...) provided and an objection is considered. (shrink)

A number of philosophers—among them Joseph Levine, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson and Jaegwon Kim—have claimed that there are conceptual grounds sufficient for ruling out the possibility of a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Their claim assumes a functional model of reduction (regarded by Kim as an alternative to the traditional Nagelian model) which requires an a priori entailment from the facts in the reduction base to the phenomena to be explained. The aim of this paper is to show (...) that this is an unreasonable requirement—a requirement that no reductive explanation in science should be expected to satisfy. I argue that the functional model is not substantively different from the Nagelian model properly understood, and that the question whether consciousness is reductively explainable—in a sense involving property identifications or in some weaker sense compatible with Nagelian reduction—is a fundamentally empirical question, not one that can be settled on conceptual grounds alone. 1. Introduction2. Kim's critique of the Nagelian model of reduction3. The functional model of reduction4. Is consciousness reducible?5. Psychophysical reduction: concluding remarks. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of theory structure in biology and considers the implications of those theoretical structures for theory reduction. An account of biological theories as interlevel prototypes embodying causal sequences, and related to each other by strong analogies, is presented, and examples from the neurosciences are provided to illustrate these middle-range theories. I then go on to discuss several modifications of Nagel''s classical model of theory reduction, and indicate at what stages in the development of reductions (...) these models might best apply. Finally I consider several implications of these analyses of theory structure and reduction for disciplinary integration in biology. (shrink)

The argument from absence of analysis (AAA) infers primitivism about some x from the absence of a reductive analysis ofx. But philosophers use the word ‘primitive’ to mean many distinct things. I argue that there is a robust sense of ‘primitive’ present in the metaphysics literature that cannot be inferred via the AAA. Successfully demonstrating robust primitivism about somexrequires showing two things at once: that a reduction ofxis not possible and that an explanatorily deep characterization ofxis not available. In (...) order to secure this second explanatory claim, the AAA must wrongly assume that reductive analysis is our only source of explanatory characterization. I argue that this is false by offering a distinct way of providing explanatory characterizations backed by suitably understood metaphysical constraints. While there remains a minimal sense of ‘primitive’ inferable via the AAA, this sense is exhausted by the denial of reduction. With minimal primitivism as its target, the AAA is uninteresting. (shrink)

How to think a unique and determinative turn in analytic philosophy of mind? To answer this question this article first presents an attempt to render clear that analytic phenomenology, by contrast with conceptions of phenomenology of the XXth century, beneficially dispenses with several methodological and conceptual assumptions that were assumed to be compulsory, as phenomenological reduction, a notion of synthesis, and a philosophical notion of the a priori. It then presents some eventual difficulties to the achievement of a phenomenological (...) turn within analytic philosophy, which are, the neglect of historicity, abstractionism, the acknowledgement of the place of language in our lives, and solipsism. It finally presents several demands that concern the felicity of contemporary analytic phenomenologies, namely, anti-abstractionism, fallibilism, attention to polyadic relations, and the integration of ecological and decolonial concerns of our cultures. (shrink)

Hume claims that his _Treatise_ presents “a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new.” This chapter presents a new, literal interpretation of Hume’s claims. It argues that the key to Hume’s construction of a hierarchy of the sciences is Boyle’s conception of a step-wise “reduction” or “resolution” of the respective sciences to a small set of fundamental terms derived from physics. Such reduction appears in a more powerful form in Newton’s method of analysis (...) and synthesis in the Principia. The chapter shows that Hume presents his method in terms almost identical to those of Newton’s. But Hume differs from Newton in claiming that all of experience can be reduced to psychological “elements” that are simpler and more general than those provided by physics. These, in Hume’s system, serve as the new and more secure foundation for the sciences. (shrink)

I present a mechanistic explanation consistent with reduction-ism in economics. I claim that pure individualist explanations are, prima facie, a type of mechanistic reduction in economics or the social sciences. Economists may acknowledge the reality of other entities embedded in their explanations since the external stimuli that impinge on agents’ minds are correlated and, therefore, understandable in terms of agents’ interpretation. Positive reductive explanations enable a unified causal principle shared amongst dissimilar agents to explain macro phenomena and can (...) be applied to theoretical and/or empirical models. (shrink)

This article explores the nature of "the phenomenological attitude," which is understood as the process of retaining a wonder and openness to the world while reflexively restraining pre-understandings, as it applies to psychological research. A brief history identifies key philosphical ideas outlining Husserl's formulation of the reductions and subsequent existential-hermeneutic elaborations, and how these have been applied in empirical psychological research. Then three concrete descriptions of engaging the phenomenological attitude are offered, highlighting the way the epoché of the natural sciences, (...) the psychological phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction can be applied during research interviews. Reflections on the impact and value of the researcher's stance show that these reductions can be intertwined with reflexivity and that, in this process, something of a dance occurs—a tango in which the researcher twists and glides through a series of improvised steps. In a context of tension and contradictory motions, the researcher slides between striving for reductive focus and reflexive self-awareness; between bracketing pre-understandings and exploiting them as a source of insight. Caught up in the dance, researchers must wage a continuous, iterative struggle to become aware of, and then manage, pre-understandings and habitualities that inevitably linger. Persistance will reward the researcher with special, if fleeting, moments of disclosure in which the phenomenon reveals something of itself in a fresh way. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the ontological interpretation of the concepts of reduction and emergence is often misleading in the philosophy of science and should nearly always be eschewed in favor of an epistemological interpretation. As a paradigm case, an example is drawn from the philosophy of chemistry to illustrate the drawbacks of “ontological reduction” and “ontological emergence,” and the virtues of an epistemological interpretation of these concepts.

In his recent article ‘Consciousness and Reduction’, Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws. Introduction Nagelian Reduction, Functional (...) class='Hi'>Reduction, and Bridge Laws Marras on Functional Reduction The Logical Space of ‘Bridge Law’ Views of Reduction [RP] as an Account of Realization Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

I claim that the question of whether chemistry is reduced to quantum mechanics is more ambiguous and multi-faceted than generally supposed. For example, chemistry appears to be both reduced and not reduced at the same time depending on the perspective that one adopts. Similarly, I argue that some conceptual issues in quantum mechanics are ambiguous and can only be laid to rest by embracing paradox and ambiguity rather than regarding them as obstacles to be overcome. Recent work in the (...) class='Hi'>reduction of chemistry is also reviewed, including discussions of the ontological reduction of chemistry and the question of the emergence of chemistry from physics. (shrink)

Although the harm-reduction approach to policy is most familiar from debates over public health and drug abuse, it provides a perfectly general framework for thinking about normative aspects of policy in non-ideal contexts. This paper seeks to apply a generalized harm reduction approach to the problem of attitudinal racism. Psychological research suggests that racism is unlikely to be completely eradicated, as a result of which a zero-tolerance approach risks becoming both counterproductive and overly punitive. Harm reduction recommends (...) minimization of prevalence with respect to the primary phenomenon combined with attenuation of impact for the ineliminable portion. (shrink)

Intertheoretic relations are an important topic in the philosophy of science. However, since their classical discussion by Ernest Nagel, such relations have mostly been restricted to relations between pairs of theories in the natural sciences. This paper presents a case study of a new type of intertheoretic relation that is inspired by Montague’s analysis of the linguistic syntax-semantics relation. The paper develops a simple model of this relation. To motivate the adoption of our new model, we show that this model (...) extends the scope of application of the Nagelian models and that it shares the epistemological advantages of the Nagelian model. The latter is achieved in a Bayesian framework. (shrink)

This article exposes the disjunction between the progressive rhetoric of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on rehabilitation and the reality for life-sentenced prisoners. It illuminates the tensions between the Court’s jurisprudence on the prisoner’s right to rehabilitation and a nebulous ‘right to security’ of the public that threatens to undermine prisoners’ rights. It is argued that two distinct conceptual frameworks for understanding rehabilitation for life-sentenced prisoners underpin the ECtHR’s jurisprudence: rehabilitation as risk reduction and rehabilitation as redemption. (...) The first is shaped by a preoccupation with identifying and reducing risk factors for offending. The second reflects the idea that offending indicates bad character but that people can atone for their crimes by working hard to change themselves. The article concludes that the ECtHR, by placing the onus on life-sentenced prisoners to demonstrate they have achieved rehabilitation, risks entrenching the trends of popular punitiveness and precautionary penal warehousing that it has sought to oppose. (shrink)

Determinism is established in quantum mechanics by tracing the probabilities in the Born rules back to the absolute (overall) phase constants of the wave functions and recognizing these phase constants as pseudorandom numbers. The reduction process (collapse) is independent of measurement. It occurs when two wavepackets overlap in ordinary space and satisfy a certain criterion, which depends on the phase constants of both wavepackets. Reduction means contraction of the wavepackets to the place of overlap. The measurement apparatus fans (...) out the incoming wavepacket into spatially separated eigenpackets of the chosen observable. When one of these eigenpackets together with a wavepacket located in the apparatus satisfy the criterion, the reduction associates the place of contraction with an eigenvalue of the observable. The theory is nonlocal and contextual. Keywords:. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 03, December 2022. Hirschfeldt and Jockusch (2016) introduced a two-player game in which winning strategies for one or the other player precisely correspond to implications and non-implications between [math] principles over [math]-models of [math]. They also introduced a version of this game that similarly captures provability over [math]. We generalize and extend this game-theoretic framework to other formal systems, and establish a certain compactness result that shows that if an implication [math] between two (...) principles holds, then there exists a winning strategy that achieves victory in a number of moves bounded by a number independent of the specific run of the game. This compactness result generalizes an old proof-theoretic fact noted by H. Wang (1981), and has applications to the reverse mathematics of combinatorial principles. We also demonstrate how this framework leads to a new kind of analysis of the logical strength of mathematical problems that refines both that of reverse mathematics and that of computability-theoretic notions such as Weihrauch reducibility, allowing for a kind of fine-structural comparison between [math] principles that has both computability-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and can help us distinguish between these, for example by showing that a certain use of a principle in a proof is “purely proof-theoretic”, as opposed to relying on its computability-theoretic strength. We give examples of this analysis to a number of principles at the level of [math], uncovering new differences between their logical strengths. (shrink)

At least three meanings of the word reduction have been theorized by philosophers: epistemic, ontological, and methodological reductions. In this article, I suggest a fourth meaning to complement the literature: the axiological meaning. Theorizing reduction as an epistemic value refers to the normative pull that reduction sometimes has on scientific reasoning. The example of genetic reductionism in evolutionary biology shows that in cases of underdetermination of theory by evidence, reduction can influence theory acceptance just like other (...) values do. I suggest that reduction, in this context, is involved in a value trade-off that also features parsimony and explanatory power. (shrink)

A cycle-free and label-free reduction procedure for the modal logic S4F is provided. Our method consists in constructing for a given Mints form a reduction, that is, a finite sequence of finite sets of sequents with the property that every nonfinal term is valid (that is, each of its elements is valid) iff so is its immediate successor, and the final term consists of some simple sequents (whose status concerning validity is easy to establish).

This chapter starts with Goodman's project, saying what his aim was, spelling out the resources that he allowed himself to use in order to accomplish this aim, and explaining why the aim could not be accomplished with these resources. The author considers Goodman's response to the acknowledged failure of his initial attempt at analysis: how he proposed to redefine his Humean project. The chapter sketches David Lewis's project, which has two parts: an abstract formal semantic analysis of conditionals, and an (...) attempt to explain the primitive parameters of the semantic models in a way that is austere enough to satisfy the Humean structures. The author argues that Lewis does not succeed in identifying a suitable base for a reduction of counterfactuals and other causal notions. The chapter concludes with a brief remark on the problems that remain if we reject the project of Humean reduction. (shrink)

At first glance, it seems difficult to object to any program that merits the label “harm reduction.” If harm is bad, as everyone recognizes, then surely reducing it is good. What’s the problem? The problem, we submit, is twofold. First, there’s more to “harm reduction,” as that term is typically used, than simply the reduction of harm. Some of the wariness about harm-reduction programs may result from the nebulous “more.” Thus, part of our task is to (...) provide a clear definition of harm reduction. Next, we turn to a second problem: a worry about complicity. Those who object to harm reduction programs fear that participation in such programs would make them complicit in activities they deem immoral. In this paper we argue that this fear is largely unwarranted. We use supervised injection sites —safe spaces for the use of risky drugs—as our paradigmatic case of harm reduction. These SISs are generally offered in the hope of reducing harm to both the drug user and the public. For this reason, our analysis focuses on complicity in harm. We draw upon the work of Gregory Mellema as our framework. Mellema offers three ways one can be complicit in harm caused by another: by enabling, facilitating or condoning it. We argue that one who operates an SIS is not complicit in any of these ways, while also laying out the conditions that must be met if one is to argue that harm reduction entails complicity in non-consequentialist wrongdoing. (shrink)

The main claim in this paper is that because organisms have teleological constitutions, the reduction of biology to physical science is not possible. It is argued that the teleology of organisms is intrinsic and not merely projected onto them. Many organic phenomena are end-oriented and reference to ends is necessary for explaining them. Accounts in terms of functions or goals are appropriate to organic parts and processes. siis is because ends as systemic requirements for survival and health have explanatory (...) significance with respect to the processes that contribute to and constitute them. Reductionism cannot accommodate this sort of higher-level to lower-level explanation and so cannot account for why lower-level phenomena are as they are. Reductionism, it is claimed, is ultimately descriptive and not explanatory because it cannot regard teleological requirements as themselves basic. In seeking to explain them away it forfeits explanatory power. (shrink)

In this paper, we use our descriptions of Borel Wadge classes from [A. R. Day, N. Greenberg, M. Harrison-Trainor and D. Turetsky, An effective classification of Borel Wadge classes] to characterize those Borel Wadge classes that have the separation property, and those that have the reduction property. Our analysis shows that both properties are equivalent to their effective versions. To do so, we give a characterization of containment between Borel Wadge classes based on their descriptions, and give a direct (...) proof that all such classes admit admissible descriptions. (shrink)

All suggested notions of reduction of two scientific theories are critically reviewed and analyzed. In particular those applied to the case of the alleged reduction of Chemistry to Quantum mechanics are examined. Since it is recognized that the weakness of this field of research is the lack of a definition of a scientific theory, it is suggested that a scientific theory is characterized by two choices regarding two dichotomies, that is, the kind of mathematics and the kind of (...) logic. According to this view a reduction is only possible between two theories in which the same choices are shared. As a consequence, only one case of reduction in the history of physics is recognized: physical optics to electromagnetism, a case that is commonly accepted. The other cases of claimed reductions are recognized as impossible, owing to the different choices of the two theories at issue and hence the radical variations in meaning of their shared basic notions. In particular, the claimed reduction of Chemistry to Quantum mechanics is disproved in detail. (shrink)

Using simple stochastic models, we discuss how cooperative breeders, especially wasps and bees, can improve their productivity by reducing foraging work. In a harsh environment, where foraging is the main cause of mortality, such breeders achieve greater productivity by reducing their foraging effort below full capacity, and they may thrive by adopting cooperative breeding. This could prevent the population extinction of cooperative breeders under conditions where a population of lone breeders cannot be maintained.

This chapter begins with a discussion of Nagelian and neo‐Nagelian models of reduction. It also considers the multiple realizability argument against reduction of the special sciences and argues that one must think of multiple realizability as an instance of universality. This raises the possibility of providing an account of multiply realized regularities of the special sciences in analogy to that provided for universality in physics. Asymptotic methods provide these explanatory accounts. One particularly important consequence of the discussion is (...) that one can have explanations of special sciences regularities in terms of lower‐level physical theory without having a reduction of the former to the latter. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of clinical practitioners and clinical researchers internationally in establishing the utility of harm-reduction approaches to substance use. It thus illustrates the potential for clinicians to play a pivotal role in health promoting structural interventions based on harm-reduction goals and public health models. Popular media images of drug use as uniformly damaging, and abstinence as the only acceptable goal of treatment, threaten to distort clinical care away from a basis in evidence, which shows that (...) some ways of using drugs are far more harmful than others and that punitive approaches and insistence on total abstinence as the only goal of treatment often increases the harms of drug use rather than reducing drug use. Therefore the leadership and scientific authority of clinicians who understand the health impact of harm-reduction strategies is needed. Through a review of harm-reduction interventions in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, we identify three ways that clinicians have helped to achieve a paradigm shift from punitive approaches to harm-reduction principles in clinical care and in drug policy: through clinical research to provide data establishing the effectiveness and feasibility of harm-reduction approaches, by developing innovative clinical programmes that employ harm reduction, and thereby changing the standard of care to include routine use of these evidence-based approaches in their practices. We argue that through promotion of harm-reduction goals and methods, clinicians have unique opportunities to improve the health outcomes of vulnerable populations. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that some prominent objections to parental licensing rely on dubious claims about the existence of a very stringent, if not indefeasible, right to parent, which would be violated by licensing. I claim that attaching such stringency to the right only makes sense if we make a number of idealising assumptions. Otherwise, it is deeply implausible. Instead, I argue that we should evaluate parental licensing policies in much the same way we would harm reduction (...) policies. By adopting this critical perspective, we can see that there are powerful, but quite different, reasons to be cautious about parental licensing relating to our ability to minimize the harmful effects of mass-parenting in a world of minimal surveillance and intervention. (shrink)

This paper tries to remove some obstacles standing in the way of considering mental properties as both genuine natural kinds and causally efficacious rather than epiphenomena. As the case of temperature shows, it is not justified to conclude from a property being multiply realizable to it being irreducible. Yet Kim's argument to the effect that if a property is multiply realizable with a heterogeneous reduction base then it cannot be a natural kind and possesses only derivative “epiphenomenal” causal efficacy (...) is not conclusive either. The fact that temperature is, but jade is not, a natural kind cannot be established by comparing the heterogeneity of their respective reduction bases, but rather by the fact that the former is and the latter is not embedded in laws of nature. (shrink)

Studies of Aristotle’s syllogistic system, since Corcoran’s deductionist interpretation supplanted Łukasiewicz’ axiomaticist interpretation, misrepresent Aristotle’s logic in two important respects. Following Corcoran, they take indirect deduction to occur only once in a deduction discourse; they then obviate the system having a reductio rule. Second, they represent reduction as a deductive process for deriving ‘imperfect’ syllogisms from ‘perfect’ syllogisms to impose an axiomatic interpretation on the logic. Denying that Aristotle's logic admits of a reductio rule results from this misrepresentation of (...) reduction. This discussion shows that the defects imputed to Aristotle's logic, and systems devised to resolve them, result from misunderstanding reduction, which itself results from misapprehending Prior Analytics expressly to identify in a metadiscourse deduction rules and not deductions per se. (shrink)

It is often thought that the computational paradigm provides a supporting case for the theoretical autonomy of the science of mind. However, I argue that computation is in fact incompatible with this alleged aspect of intentional explanation, and hence the foundational assumptions of orthodox cognitive science are mutually unstable. The most plausible way to relieve these foundational tensions is to relinquish the idea that the psychological level enjoys some special form of theoretical sovereignty. So, in contrast to well known antireductionist (...) views based on multiple realizability, I argue that the primary goal of a computational approach to the mind should be to facilitate a translation of the psychological to the neurophysiological. (shrink)

This article presents data from the Growing up with Media study related to the implementation of a risk reduction protocol that resulted in three groups of youth: low-risk youth (no flags), youth flagged because of violence involvement and not clinically referred; and flagged youth who were referred to a team clinician due to additional risk considerations. Data are from 3,979 US youth 14–15 years of age recruited through social media between October 2018-August 2019. Four in ten youth were flagged (...) for review. Findings suggest that this methodology of identifying and reviewing cases appears to be working as intended: Not only did referred youth have more flags than non-referred youth, but post-hoc analyses suggested that these youth also had higher rates of psychosocial problems (e.g., non-victimization adversity, substance use, and depressed mood). The implementation of a risk reduction protocol such as the one described in this article adds a layer of human subject protection beyond the more standard list of websites and hotlines provided to all participants in most studies. This protocol leads the way for future studies to recreate a similar process to address concerning responses collected from survey research. (shrink)