Ingemar Nordin’s Using Knowledge: On the Rationality of Science, Technology, and Medicine is a critical rationalist examination of medicine as a social system, largely science-based, but including quackery. Thus rationality is limited, as befits the author’s fallibilism.

Argument When electricity became a commodity in 1900, it furnished Germany with new attractions and revolutionized everyday life with all kinds of tools and gadgets; it also opened up a new space for investigating psycho-physical interaction, reviving ideas of a close linkage between psychic life and electricity. The paper traces the emergence of this electro-psychological framework beyond “electroencephalography,” the recording of electrical brain waves, to “diagnoscopy,” personality profiling by electric phrenology. Diagnoscopy opens a window onto the scientific and public cultures (...) of electricity and psychical processes in Weimar Germany. It garnered enormous attention in the press and was quickly taken up by several institutions for vocational guidance, because it offered a rapid and technological alternative to laborious psychological testing or “subjective” interviewing. Academic psychology and leading figures in brain research reacted with horror; forging counter measures which finally resulted in this technique being denounced as quackery. A few years later, the press celebrated electroencephalography as a mind-reading device, whereas the neuroscientists remained initially skeptical of its significance and the very possibility of an “electroencephalogram” (EEG) before they adapted electroencephalography as a tool for representing various neuro-psychiatric conditions in patterns of recorded signals. The blending of psychophysiology and electrical engineering marks the formation of an electric epistemology in scientific as well as public understanding of the psyche. The transformations of electrodiagnosis from diagnoscopy to the EEG are indicative of a cultural shift in which electricity changed its role from being the power source for experimental apparatuses to becoming a medium of psychic processes. (shrink)

From the PREFACE. The aim of this work is given in its title. First, it is an "introduction" only, and does not go into the details or the literature of the subject. The aim is to point out the highways of psychology, rather than its myriad byways. Secondly, it is an "introduction to psychological theory," and aims less at a knowledge of facts than at an understanding of principles. Until principles are settled there is no bar to the most fantastic (...) theories and interpretations. These principles being illustrated in the most common facts of experience, it is not necessary to psychological insight to make an anthology of madhouse and hospital stories. Such a procedure has about the same relation to psychology that the various books of "wonders" or the "brilliant experiments" of the popular lecturer have to sober physical science. An odor of quackery is perceptible in both cases. The plan of the work precludes much attention to physiological psychology. Whatever the merits of this science may be, it presupposes pure psychology. If our aim is to give a physiological explanation of psychological facts, we must' first know the facts. Or if our aim is the more modest one of finding the physical conditions or attendants of mental facts, again we must know the facts. But this knowledge is not possible by the way of physiology, and in any case the mental facts remain what they always were. Their likenesses and differences and essential nature would not be changed if physiology were supreme. Even the "new psychology " would not give us new mental facts, but only a new interpretation of the old facts. The Zeitgeist itself begins at last to see this; and the naive onslaughts on the "old psychology" are happily growing fewer. Psychological literature shows very marked progress in this respect within the last twenty years. Physiology remains a most estimable science, but the physiological reconstruction of psychology has been postponed. The study of the physical conditions of our mental life has a pathological and practical importance; but it does not promise any valuable psychological results, at least for those who can distinguish between the physical conditions and the mental facts which they condition. The limitation of plan involves many omissions; and in these there will seem to be a measure of arbitrariness. Hence many will not find here what they want, and probably still more will find what they do not want. There seems to be no way of adjusting so grave a difficulty except by maintaining, on the one hand, freedom to publish, and, on the other, freedom not to read. (shrink)

La claridad y la argumentación sirven de refugio frente a la charlatanería en el filosofar, pero quienes enfatizan tales principios metodológicos tienden a identificar la claridad con la literalidad y la argumentación con la formalización. En este trabajo, considero los límites de una elucidación filosófica de nuestras prácticas morales que descanse en tal identificación; para ello, examino la relevancia de la posición original de John Rawls para la determinación de los principios de la justicia y, en general, de los experimentos (...) mentales para el estudio de la moralidad. La relevancia de la posición original depende, a mi entender, de un supuesto de concordancia según el cual, a menos que incurramos en algún error deliberativo, no puede haber discrepancia alguna entre nuestros juicios relativos a la justicia acerca de una situación hipotética y nuestros juicios cuando nos enfrentamos realmente a la misma. A lo largo del texto, trato de mostrar que tal supuesto es insostenible a partir del examen de una experiencia moral particular: a saber, la experiencia del soldado; y, para ello, revindico las virtudes deliberativas de la conciencia expresiva de ciertos hechos frente a una mera conciencia declarativa de los mismos; finalmente, extraigo algunas consecuencias de esta distinción para la definición de un estilo filosófico. Astress on clarity and argumentation may serve as a refuge against quackery, but often those who focus on such methodological principles tend to identify clarity with literalness and argumentation with formalization. My reflection upon the limits of a philosophical style inspired in such an identification is mainly concerned with the use of thought experiments in the elucidation of our moral practices and, more specifically, with the relevance of John Rawls' original position for the determination of the basic principles of justice. To this purpose, I emphasize that the relevance of the original position rests on a matching assumption according to which, if agents deliberate appropriately, there should not be any gap between our judgments concerning justice about a hypothetical situation and our judgments whenever we are actually confronted with it. I will, nevertheless, explore a particular moral experience, namely, that of the soldier, only to conclude that such an assumption is untenable. More specifically, I will defend the deliberative virtues of an expressive awareness of certain facts as opposed to a mere declarative awareness of them. In the last section, I will derive some implications of this distinction as to the articulation of a philosophical style. (shrink)

We think we know what healers do: they build on patients' irrational beliefs and treat them in a 'symbolic' way. If they get results, it's thanks to their capacity to listen, rather than any influence on a clinical level. At the same time, we also think we know what modern medicine is: a highly technical and rational process, but one that scarcely listens to patients at all. In this book, ethnopsychiatrist Tobie Nathan and philosopher Isabelle Stengers argue that this commonly (...) posed opposition between traditional and modern medicine is misleading. They show instead that healers are interesting precisely because they don't listen to patients, using techniques of 'divination' rather than 'diagnosis'. Healers construct genuine therapeutic strategies by identifying the origins of symptoms in external forces, outside of the mind of the sufferer, and in this regard African healers are virtuosos. Though it may claim otherwise, modern medicine, for its part, is characterised by empiricism rather than rationality. What appears to be the pursuit of rationality is ultimately only a means to dismiss and exclude other forms of treatment. Blurring the distinctions between traditional and modern practices and drawing on perspectives from across the globe, this ethnopsychiatric manifesto encourages us to think in radically new ways about illness, challenging accepted notions on the relationship between sufferer and symptom. It will be of great interest to those working in medicine and healthcare, as well as anthropologists, social scientists and those in the humanities more broadly. (shrink)

In this paper we try to make a clear distinction between quantum mysticism and quantum mind theory. Quackery always accompanies science especially in controversial and still under development areas and since the quantum mind theory is a science youngster it must clearly demarcate itself from the great stuff of pseudo-science currently patronized by the term "quantum mind". Quantum theory has attracted a big deal of attention and opened new avenues for building up a physical theory of mind because its (...) principles and experimental foundations are as strange as the phenomenon of consciousness itself. Yet, the unwarranted recourse to paranormal phenomena as supporting the quantum mind theory plus the extremely bad biological mismodeling of brain physiology lead to great scepticism about the viability of the approach. We give as an example the Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR model with a list of twenty four problems not being repaired for a whole decade after the birth of the model in 1996. In the exposition we have tried not only to pesent critique of the spotted flaws, but to provide novel possibilities towards creation of neuroscientific quantum model of mind that incorporates all the available data from the basic disciplines (biochemistry, cell physiology, etc.) up to the clinical observations (neurology, neurosurgery, molecular psychiatry, etc.). Thus in a concise fashion we outline what can be done scientifically to improve the Q-mind theory and start a research programme (in Lakatos sense) that is independent on the particular flaws in some of the existing Q-mind models. (shrink)

In his classic, The Idea of a University, John Henry Cardinal Newman advanced three arguments for the inclusion of theology in the liberal arts curriculum. These include the very nature of a university in its profession to teach all subjects, the interdisciplinary value of theology, and the danger of academic quackery and usurpation, when a subject matter is not given its due place in the curriculum. The arguments for theology are intimately connected to Newman's high ideal of education, rightly (...) celebrated by educators today. The crisis in contemporary liberal education is reflected in a dispute between Edward O. Wilson and Richard Rorty over the concept of "consilience." Yet there are promising signs of a renewal of liberal education through a deeper appreciation of theology in the course of studies in higher education. (shrink)

In so curious, lively, and passionate an epoch as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, the life and work of few other persons generated as much admiration, as many repercussions and so much influence as did his. At the same time, few others caused as much animosity and hostility. And yet, there are few others about whose work and thought we are less informed. Who was this infamous vagabond? Was he a profound scientist, whose struggles against Aristotelian physics and classical medicine supposedly (...) laid the foundations of modern experimental medicine? Was he a precursor to nineteenth century rational science? Was he an erudite physician, or an ignorant charlatan? A peddler of superstition and quackery, an astrologist, a magician, a gold maker? Was he one of the greatest minds of the Renaissance, or simply a latecomer to Middle Age mysticism, a ‘gothic’? Was he a pantheistic cabalist, an adept of a vague Neo-Platonism and natural magic? Or was he ‘the physician’, ever watchful over suffering humanity; a man who found and formulated a new conception of life, the universe, of God and humanity? Was he, with a deeply Christian mind, one who attempted his own ‘reformation’ in the solitude of the Swiss mountains, who preached an evangelical, sophisticated form of mysticism, without clergy, dogma, and rites? Or was Paracelsus ultimately a Christian who, in spite of his frequently heterodox, even heretical opinions, remained faithful to his Church, preferring Catholicism to the new Protestant churches? (shrink)

This essay discusses the question of health in the Kingdom of Hungary during the Age of Enlightenment. It explores the relationships and tensions between central theories of medical police and the local expectations of government administrators, as well as those between academic or official knowledge and implicit or alternative knowledge about health. The reigns of Maria Theresia and Joseph II marked the moment at which particular kinds of folk and practical knowledge about healing became visible and above all legible. This (...) is to be seen in the enormous rise in book production, which in itself represented an ‘approved knowledge’ that found legitimation in new academic and bureaucratic institutions, such as the reformed medical faculty of the University of Vienna, the newly-founded medical faculty at Tyrnau, the establishment of a health department within the Hungarian Statthalterei, as well as in the emission of royal legislation supporting the agendas of the new enlightened science of ‘medical police’. (shrink)

Educated historians of philosophy reluctantly expose connections between Western esotericism and the mainstream modern philosophy. Esotericism is usually associated with intellectual quackery, which leads many of its followers to heresy and exclusion from the Christian world. However, prominent representatives of the European philosophy sometimes drew their inspiration from esoteric knowledge, e.g. G. Bruno and Spinoza from kabbalah or F. W. J. Schelling from F. C. Oetinger’s theosophy. G. W. F. Hegel was probably aware that the esoteric thought played an (...) essential role in the establishing of the modern scientific method. Therefore, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy he devoted a separate chapter to J. Boehme, who provided the basis for the modern dialectic in his theosophy. The author of this article makes a comparative analysis between the elected elements of Boehme’s and Hegel’s thought and exposes many structural similarities in their works. At the same time, the author suggests that Boehme’s theory could have been an important source of inspiration for Hegel, especially in the early phase of his intellectual development. (shrink)

This badly written book has many marks of quackery--it is jargonic, repetitious, sometimes weird. But there are a few traces of a kernel of significant critique of philosophical method from a viewpoint combining elements of extreme operationalism and psychoanalysis. Philosophy is viewed as an activity which could have considerable therapeutic value--i.e., lead to growth in "awareness," released creativity, and increased emotional and intellectual maturity--if it is conducted under the guidance of the author's precepts.--L. K. B.

In the first half of the paper, it is argued that while the prospects for a criterion for demarcating scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones are exceedingly dim, it is a mistake to fall back to the position that these differ only with regard to how well they are confirmed. One may admit that different pseudoscientific theories are flawed in different ways yet still insist that their flaws are structural rather than empirical in character. In the second half of the paper, (...) this view is extended to cover the cases of pseudoscientific correlations and therapies, and it is suggested that the pseudosciences are best thought of as radically flawed practices. (shrink)

The discussion about complementary and alternative medicine is sometimes rather heated. “Quackery!” the cry goes. A large proportion “of unconventional practices entail theories that are patently unscientific.” “It is time for the scientific community to stop giving alternative medicine a free ride. There cannot be two kinds of medicine — conventional and alternative. There is only medicine that has been adequately tested and medicine that has not, medicine that works and medicine that may or may not work.” “I submit (...) that if these treatments cannot withstand the test of empirical research, … then we have wasted a lot of time and effort. The time has been wasted on all the people who have spent years learning falsehoods about acupuncture points and the principles of homeopathy. And the patients have wasted their time, money, and efforts receiving treatments that were not what they were represented to be or were harmful.”. (shrink)

This chapter examines whether complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) should be covered by health insurance. It first considers the philosophical and practical obstacles to science in medicine before discussing the (sometimes) unfounded bias that paints all alternative medicine as quackery and the (sometimes) unwarranted confidence that portrays all conventional medicine as science. In order to respond appropriately to the health-related needs of patients, the chapter argues that health plans must avoid a double standard by using the same criteria for (...) evaluating conventional and alternative modalities. A just system should promote good care within prudent limits by avoiding waste and harm, and by requiring empirical substantiation of the value of all interventions, conventional as well as alternative ones. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Demystifying the Mystery of Alzheimer's as Late, No Longer Mild Cognitive ImpairmentPeter J. Whitehouse (bio)Keywordsaging, Alzheimer’s disease, deconstruction, mild cognitive impairmentProfessor Tom Kirkwood and Michael Bavidge's comments are welcome additions to our discourse as both emphasize the importance of considering mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD) in relationship to the normal biological and cultural processes of aging. Whereas I agree with my colleague and co-author, Atwood Gaines' (...) response, I wish to add my own commentary to update the reader concerning the dynamic political processes at work in the social construction and deconstruction of MCI and AD. I have referred to MCI as autodeconstructing AD because whatever we come to think of the MCI label on the spectrum of cognitive aging should alter our beliefs about the ultimate utility of the concept of AD. Tensions in the field of study of MCI have increased since the project reported in this journal began. The social science and philosophical contributions toward understanding MCI need to inform our debate now; otherwise, we will be less effective at influencing a critical debate for society about its relationships to medicine, science, and modern capitalism.This past year, Ron Petersen, the major proponent of the concept of MCI was awarded the prestigious Potamkin Prize for research in Alzheimer's disease by the American Academy of Neurology. The National Institute on Aging (NIA) placed the discovery of MCI as first on the list of contributions during twenty years of research funded through hundreds of millions of dollars poured into the NIA Alzheimer's Research Centers. Some have even suggested that we relabel MCI of the amnestic type, Petersen syndrome. Yet, John Morris, who was co-awarded the Potamkin Prize, has continued to write that MCI is early AD and most recently has suggested (Morris 2006) that we should revise our diagnostic criteria. He joins me and a growing list of other so-called thought leaders who believe (but do not always state publicly) that the term MCI is not useful clinically. Lon Schneider (2005) has recently joined the camp of critics publicly by suggesting that MCI is [End Page 87] not only confusing clinically but is now possibly retarding research.The proliferation of different kinds of MCI indicates that we are studying heterogeneous processes of brain aging. Whereas, John Morris suggests that we relabel MCI as early AD, I have suggested the converse. For example, in a grand rounds lecture at Johns Hopkins in March 2004, I used the lecture title "LNLMCI (late no longer MCI)" as a synonym for AD.Kirkwood is right to compare the quest for biological therapy for AD to the search to treat aging processes in other organs. He has been an outspoken critic of anti-aging medicine quackery that claims that aging itself is a disease that can be reversed today. But, if AD is brain aging, are we not in fact creating a "disease" category that raises false hopes and expectations?Kirkwood also points out that aging is a lifespan process. To prevent dementia in older individuals, we should prevent damage to neurons in younger individuals. Recently, it has been claimed, for example, that exposure to lead in young animals makes these animals more at risk for amyloid deposition in later life (Basha et al. 2005). Whether or not lead directly affects the pathogenesis of AD, it seems eminently reasonable to try to prevent damage to neurons in young children so that they may have maximum cognitive capacity throughout their lifespan.Almost ten years ago, when I stepped down as the editor of the Alzheimer's Disease and Associated Disorders Journal and as John Morris took over this responsibility, I wrote an editorial calling for the end of AD (Whitehouse 2001). In other words, I argued that thinking through the invention of the term mild cognitive impairment reveals that we are attempting to assign medical categories to what are a heterogeneous set of processes that affect our brains as we age. At the hundredth anniversary of the first case of what we have come to call Alzheimer's disease, perhaps it is time to reflect on the individual and social... (shrink)

Are there any characteristics by which we can reliably identify and distinguish quackery from genuine medicine? A commonly offered criterion for the distinction between medicine and quackery is science: genuine medicine is scientific; quackery is non-scientific. But it proves to be the case that at the boundary of science and non-science, there is an entanglement of considerations. Two cases are considered: that of homoeopathy and that of the Quantum Booster. In the first case, the degree to which (...) reported phenomena that question established theory should be doubted arises; in the second case, the status of pleomorphism as a scientifically plausible doctrine is discussed. The application of the criterion of being scientific to these cases reveals something of the nature and density of the entanglement. (shrink)

Dr Kottow in his paper Classical medicine v alternative medical practices (1) places the alternative/orthodox medicine debate within an historical context of anti-quackery literature. My paper explores the nature of science as it is applied to clinical practice and challenges the narrow view of the diagnostic process as outlined by Dr Kottow. Research methodologies more appropriate to 'whole person' medicine are suggested as having more ethical value than those based on the clinical trial.

The putative Pueyo’s vaccine was a commercial venture that obtained marketing authorization in 1946, a turbulent period of Argentine history. After a few months, health authorities withdrew financial support from the state to buy the vaccine and required patients to sign a written consent to receive that product. An independent investigation did not find any evidence of benefit in non-clinical and clinical evaluation of the putative vaccine.

Summary This article discusses the intersection of science and culture in the marketplace and explores the ways in which radium quack and medicinal products were packaged and labelled in the early twentieth century US. Although there is an interesting growing body of literature by art historians on package design, historians of science and medicine have paid little to no attention to the ways scientific and medical objects that were turned into commodities were packaged and commercialized. Thinking about packages not as (...) mere containers but as multifunctional tools adds to historical accounts of science as a sociocultural enterprise and reminds us that science has always been part of consumer culture. This paper suggests that far from being receptacles that preserve their content and facilitate their transportation, bottles and boxes that contained radium products functioned as commercial and epistemic devices. It was the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act that enforced such functions. Packages worked as commercial devices in the sense that they were used to boost sales. In addition, ‘epistemic’ points to the fact that the package is an artefact that ascribes meaning to and shapes its content while at the same time working as a device for distinguishing between patent and orthodox medicines. (shrink)

It is doubtful that any feature of the American health care system in the last several decades has had as profound an effect on the way Americans pursue their perceived health needs as complementary and alternative medicine. Almost half of all Americans take care of some of their health care needs outside of contemporary scientific medicine. The number of visits to CAM practitioners was estimated 6 years ago to be 629 million a year, with expenditures of $27 billion a year. (...) The use of CAM has been expanding rapidly despite little objective evidence of its safety or effectiveness. Little more than a decade ago CAM was viewed by the traditional medical community as a nuisance that offered unproven treatments at best and as outright quackery at worst. In any case, alternative medicine, as it was known at that time, seemed unworthy of serious attention. (shrink)

At least as important as a particular item of medical knowledge itself is to know something about the relationships of that knowledge to the experiential world it is talking about. The reason is that the patients the physician is concerned with are parts of that experiential world. So, when using any knowledge in her practice, e.g., some knowledge on infectious diseases, a morally conscientious doctor will be interested in whether, and in what way, this knowledge relates to the ‘world out (...) there’. Does the medical knowledge she employs bear any relevance to the bodies and souls of her patients? Does it enable her to understand the patient’s suffering, illness experience, and illness narrative? Will it help her find useful diagnoses and treatments? Are there in fact any indicators of such qualities of medical knowledge? Why not use astrology, Ayurveda, or exorcism instead of the theory of infectious diseases? A prerequisite for dealing with such questions is the awareness of the relationships between medical knowledge and its referent, i.e., of the semantics of medical knowledge, on the one hand; and of the pragmatic factors beyond this semantics, which influence the role medical knowledge plays in health care, on the other, e.g., social and economic processes. In the present chapter, we shall look at these issues with an eye toward understanding why some particular information is allowed to enter the medical world as knowledge, whereas other information is considered unacceptable or quackery. Is there a clear line of demarcation between medical knowledge and self-deception? To begin with, we will discuss the issues of truth and justification because, as pointed out in Section 10.1 on page 402, knowledge is traditionally defined as justified true belief . These two defining features of knowledge, truth and justifiedness, are due to the classical conception of knowledge as the representation of some ‘reality’. This ancient, representational postulate brings with it that the predominant view on the semantics of medical knowledge is realism, i.e., the view that medical knowledge is concerned with and represents ‘the real world out there’. We shall therefore need to inquire into the philosophy and medical relevance of this doctrine before we proceed to alternative views. Our discussion thus divides into the following five parts: 12.1 Justified True Belief; 12.2 Realism; 12.3 Anti-Realism; 12.4 Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism in Medicine; 12.5 Social Epistemology. (shrink)

Innovative therapy is a matter of recent public interest, particularly following Lord Saatchi's Medical Innovation Bill. The purpose of the Bill is to encourage responsible innovation in medical treatment. We argue for the need to achieve a balance between the risks of medical innovation and patient safety considerations. We make the case for statutory regulation of medical innovation on the basis of responsible innovation, choice and patient-centred care. At the heart of regulation of medical innovation is care delivered by a (...) process which is accountable, transparent and allows full consideration of all relevant matters. This paper proposes a two-stage test (to assess applicability of medical innovation as well as suitability for the choice of intervention to be undertaken). It is suggested that this model would provide safeguards for patients as well as define limits for doctors in the context of innovative therapy. Implementation and application of such therapy must be underpinned by due process and governance oversight, which could be provided through context-specific professional peer review. A combination of these ethicolegal principles would permit responsible medical innovation and maximise benefit in terms of therapy and patient-centred care. (shrink)

ArgumentThis article examines the medical and political discussions regarding a controversial medicinal bark from Ecuador – cundurango – that was actively sponsored by the Ecuadorian government as a new botanical cure for cancer in the late nineteenth century United States and elsewhere. The article focuses on the commercial and diplomatic interests behind the public discussion and advertising techniques of this drug. It argues that diverse elements – including the struggle for positioning scientific societies and the disapproval of the capacities of (...) Ecuadorian doctors, US abolitionist history, regional and local political struggles – played a role in the quackery accusations against cundurango and its promoters. The development and international trade of this remedy offer interesting insights into the global history of drugs, particularly how medical knowledge was challenged during a period when scientific medicine was struggling for hegemony. It explores how newspapers expanded “the public interest” in a possible cancer cure. (shrink)

This article uses a reading of John Wesley's Primitive Physic, or An Easy and Natural Method of Curing Most Diseases (1747) to resist the common rejection—often as "quackery"—of Wesley's treatments for common maladies. We engage Wesley not because he was right but because his approach offers useful moments of pause in light of contemporary medical epistemology. Wesley's recommendations were primarily oriented towards the categories of personal responsibility and capability, but he also sought to empower individuals—especially the poor—with the knowledge (...) to safely and affordably treat maladies of their own. We leverage Primitive Physic to rethink contemporary medical knowledge production, especially as sanctioned by randomized clinical trials and legitimate views of experience and contemporary institutions such as the AMA. Ultimately, we suggest that the medical humanities has a key role to play in mining the discarded and dismissed for what they can tell scholars about medical knowledge. (shrink)

Antipsychiatry : alternative psychiatry -- The doctor of irresponsibility -- The trickster and the tricked -- Antipsychiatry and anti-art -- Antipsychiatry abroad.

The Latin term “qua” is used occasionally in ordinary discourse but more often as a philosophical term of art. Its purpose is sometimes to avoid what would otherwise be contradictions, as in “necessarily two‐legged qua cyclist, contingently two‐legged qua mathematician.” In this paper, I identify and clarify several of the philosophical uses of “qua,” approving some and criticizing others. I discuss the use of “qua” in connection with six different authors: David Lewis, Kit Fine, and Donald Davidson in Part One, (...) and Aristotle, Spinoza, and Kant in Part Two. (shrink)