Whitehead’s cosmology centers on the self-creation of actual occasions that perish as they come to be, but somehow do combine to constitute societies that are persistent agents and/or patients. “Instance Ontology” developed by D.W. Mertz concerns unification of relata into facts of relatedness by specific intensions. These two conceptual systems are similar in that they both avoid the substance-property distinction: they differ in their understanding of how basic units combine to constitute complex unities. “Process Structural Realism” (PSR) draws from (...) both of these approaches in developing an account of how combinations of processes may produce ontologically significant coherences. When a group of processes achieves such closure that a set of states recurs continually, the effects of that coherence differ from what would occur in the absence of that closure. Such altered effectiveness is an attribute of the system as a whole, and would have consequences. This indicates that the network of processes, as a unit, has ontological significance. The closed network of processes, together with the conditions that prevail, constitute the form of definiteness of the coherence. That form continues to obtain as long as the coherence persists. Constituents contribute to, rather than share, that characteristic. Aspects of some recent research in systems biology, microeconomics, and social psychology illustrate the application of PSR. (shrink)

Combinations of molecules, of biological individuals, or of chemical processes can produce effects that are not simply attributable to the constituents. Such non-redundant causality warrants recognition of those coherences as ontologically significant whenever that efficacy is relevant. With respect to such interaction, the effective coherence is more real than are the components. This ontological view is a variety of structural realism and is also a kind of process philosophy. The designation ‘process structural realism’ (PSR) seems appropriate.

Darwinists classify biological traits either by their ancestry (homology) or by their adaptive role. Only the latter can provide traditional natural kinds, but only the former is practicable. Process structuralists exploit this embarrassment to argue for non-Darwinian classifications in terms of underlying developmental mechanisms. This new taxonomy will also explain phylogenetic inertia and developmental constraint. I argue that Darwinian homologies are natural kinds despite having historical essences and being spatio-temporally restricted. Furthermore, process structuralist explanations of biological form require (...) an unwarranted assumption about the space of developmental possibility. (shrink)

In the spirit of William James, we present a process view of human consciousness. Our approach, however, follows upon Charles Tart’s original systems theory analysis of states of consciousness, although it differs in its reliance on the modern sciences of complexity, especially dynamical systems theory and its emphasis on process and evolution. We argue that consciousness experience is constructive in the sense that it is the result of ongoing self-organizing and self-creating processes in the mind and body. These (...) processes follow a broad developmental agenda already described by psychologists such as Jean Piaget. Similar constructive transformations of consciousness appear to have occurred across the course of human history. In this sense, phylogeny indeed recapitulates ontogeny. Finally, modern developmental research suggests that the most advanced levels of human growth transform consciousness in the direction of increasing selflessness and spirituality, rather than simply toward greater intelligence. (shrink)

The cerebral cortex is a rich and diverse structure that is the basis of intelligent behavior. One of the deepest mysteries of the function of cortex is that neural processing times are only about one hundred times as fast as the fastest response times for complex behavior. At the very least, this would seem to indicate that the cortex does massive amounts of parallel computation.This paper explores the hypothesis that an important part of the cortex can be modeled as a (...) connectionist computer that is especially suited for parallel problem solving. The connectionist computer uses a special representation, termed value unit encoding, that represents small subsets of parameters in a way that allows parallel access to many different parameter values. This computer can be thought of as computing hierarchies of sensorimotor invariants. The neural substrate can be interpreted as a commitment to data structures and algorithms that compute invariants fast enough to explain the behavioral response times. A detailed consideration of this model has several implications for the underlying anatomy and physiology. (shrink)

Contemporary architecture is increasingly grounded in science and mathematics. Architectural discourse has shifted radically from the sometimes disorienting Derridean deconstruction, to engaging scientific terms such as fractals, chaos, complexity, nonlinearity, and evolving systems. That's where the architectural action is -- at least for cutting-edge architects and thinkers -- and every practicing architect and student needs to become conversant with these terms and know what they mean. Unfortunately, the vast majority of architecture faculty are unprepared to explain them to students, not (...) having had a scientific education themselves. Here is an architecture book by an architect/scientist, just in time to help architects in the new millennium. Alexander discusses many of the scientific terms arising in cutting-edge architecture, and explains them to those who don't have scientific training or advanced mathematical knowledge. We find discussions of the evolution of forms; the importance of process in design; iteration; genetic algorithms; sequences of transformations; different levels of scale (i.e. fractals); etc. They are explained here by an architect who is also a scientist, because he wants to change the way architects think and build. Alexander is not merely popularizing other scientists' results and making them accessible to architects: he is in fact presenting new and original scientific work that ties many of these concepts together in a way that will be useful to architects. (shrink)

The article draws a conceptual distinction the (French) structuralism of the 50’s–60’s and the post-structuralism of the 70’s, which are discussed as overlapping in their intellectual paths; their mutual dynamics is defined as a reaction of the intelligence to the pressure of depersonalized unified schemes within the logic of structuralism against free improvisation and loose interpretation instead of total explanations in the post-structuralism interpretation. The article establishes a conceptual identity of the paradoxical nature between post-structuralism (...) (and deconstructionism, which is homogeneous and identical thereto in a number of aspects), on the one hand, and constructionism with its specific process of language dismantling – social/ideological languages, social group dialects, on the other hand, which naturally leads the authors to the analysis of the paradoxicality principles, defined by post-structuralism (five principles of paradoxicality of Gilles Deleuze – paradox of regress, paradox of sterile reiteration, paradox of neutrality, paradox of absurd, paradox of Levi-Strauss); poststructuralists’ paralogisms are examined through paradoxical denotation; the late Roland Barthes’ phenomenon of paradoxicality, becoming a plot-forming principle of narration, is analyzed. Poststructuralism is conceptualized in the article as the first decisive step of post-modernism; the affinity of post-structuralist and postmodernist commitment to parody, game and irony is stated; the theory of language games in post-modern interpretation is explored; one of those games – a game of carnival – is explored within the diachronic retrospective; the affinity of parody and carnival tradition of post-structuralism and post-modernism to the romantic irony of the XIXth century and its inconsistency with the popular culture of laugh is established. The genesis of poststructuralism and post-modernism is connected with the ideological restart of the Western society before the “very end” of the Resistance ideas and the disappointment of the left European intellectuals in the “great legends” and illusions of Marxism. The blurred concepts of relativism are connected with the mutual disproportion of different layers of historical experience. (shrink)

Peter Godfrey-Smith recently introduced the idea of representational ‘organization’. When a collection of representations form an organized family, similar representational vehicles carry similar contents. For example, where neural firing rate represents numerosity (an analogue magnitude representation), similar firing rates represent similar numbers of items. Organization has been elided with structural representation, but the two are in fact distinct. An under-appreciated merit of representational organization is the way it facilitates computational processing. Representations from different organized families can interact, for example to (...) perform addition. Their being organized allows them to implement a useful computation. Many of the cases where organization has seemed significant, but which fall short of structural representation, are cases where representational organization underpins a computationally useful processing structure. (shrink)

This paper is informed by Charles Sanders Peirce’s philosophy as semiotics or the doctrine of signs. The paper’s purpose is to explore Peirce’s category of abduction as not being limited to the inference to the best explanation. In the context of the logic of discovery, abduction is posited as a necessary although not sufficient condition for the production of meanings. The structure of a genuine sign is triadic and represents a synthesis between precognitive ideas and conceptual representations. The novel model (...) of reasoning is offered, based on the mathematical formalism borrowed from Gauss’ interpretation of the complex number. It is suggested that this model in a form of a diagram not only represents a semiotic process-structure but also overcomes the long-standing paradox of new knowledge. For Peirce, it is a diagram as a visual representation that may yield solutions to the otherwise unsolvable logical problems. What appears to us as a paradox is the very presence of abductive, or hypothetical, inference, as Peircean generic category of Firstness within the Thirdness of the total thought-process. Firstness , Secondness , and Thirdness together constitute a dynamic structure of experience. (shrink)

Predictive processing posits that prediction-error minimization underlies all perception, action, and cognition. Yet, despite its considerable popularity and explanatory scope, it is unclear how this enables higher-level cognitive abilities, such as representing and reasoning over abstract concepts. We combine insights from predictive processing, structural representations and grounded cognition to address this issue. It has been argued from predictive processing and the free energy principle that an anticipatory model of the person-relevant environment is simulated. Structural representations state that these representations are (...) isomorphic to, i.e., retain the relational pattern of the world. Building on this assembly, grounded cognition research provides three insights into how abstract concepts are represented. First, a hierarchical organization allows abstracting from specific sensory qualities. Second, language glues together sensory qualities into representations that share no intrinsic properties, and acts as a social tool. Third, metaphoric mapping allows fragments of concrete percepts to represent abstract concepts. By transplanting these three insights to predictive processing’s (structural) hierarchical generative model, we explain higher-level cognition through detached models of perception and action simulations, isomorphic to actual behavior. This constitutes a significant expansion to life-mind continuity approaches by providing specific mechanisms for how the principles driving the emergence of life also account for sophisticated higher-level cognition in humans. By synthesizing insights from these literatures, we generate a coherent description of higher-level cognition under predictive processing. (shrink)

First a sketch of the current state of the debate of the phenomenon of consciousness is provided; based on it David Chalmer’s distinction between the weak and the hard problem of consciousness will be introduced. It will be indicated that Whitehead’s process philosophy is able to offer a promising basis for solving the hard problem by showing how the concept of consciousness is anchored in his metaphysical theory. In the remaining parts of the paper the so-called weak problem of (...) consciousness will be addressed in more detail by comparing Whitehead’s speculative account with Piaget’s empirical research results concerning the phenomenon of consciousness. By showing that Whitehead’s and Piaget’s positions on consciousness overlap widely a kind of indirect empirical support of Whitehead’s philosophical position will be achieved. At those points where the two positions deviate – that is in only two points – there are indications that Whitehead holds the more plausible position. So this investigation confirms William Seager’s suggestion that more attention should be drawn to Whitehead’s process philosophy when trying to solve the hard, as well as the weak problem of consciousness. In order to substantiate this claim two topics are discussed from the point of view of Whitehead’s position of consciousness: (a) learning and consciousness and (b) artificial consciousness. (shrink)

Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at (...) odds with ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations. (shrink)

In his books on the cinema, Gilles Deleuze describes the sign as an expression of semiotic matter. Importantly, expression is a process whereby semiotic matter is molded into form, but this process is not rightfully guided by any structure transcendent to semiotic matter itself. It is the result of matter’s self-modulation. Using an early essay of Deleuze’s called ‘How do we recognize structuralism?’, I take a closer look at the cinema books and unpack exactly what is involved (...) in the process of expression, and the implications of expression for established ideas of the sign and meaning in semiotics. (shrink)

Comparative biology builds up systematic knowledge of the diversity of life, across evolutionary lineages and levels of organization, starting with evidence from a sparse sample of model organisms. In developmental biology, a key obstacle to the growth of comparative approaches is that the concept of homology is not very well defined for levels of organization that are intermediate between individual genes and morphological characters. In this paper, we investigate what it means for ontogenetic processes to be homologous, focusing specifically on (...) the examples of insect segmentation and vertebrate somitogenesis. These processes can be homologous without homology of the underlying genes or gene networks, since the latter can diverge over evolutionary time, while the dynamics of the process remain the same. Ontogenetic processes like these therefore constitute a dissociable level and distinctive unit of comparison requiring their own specific criteria of homology. In addition, such processes are typically complex and nonlinear, such that their rigorous description and comparison not only requires observation and experimentation, but also dynamical modeling. We propose six criteria of process homology, combining recognized indicators with novel ones derived from dynamical systems modeling. We show how these criteria apply to animal segmentation and other ontogenetic processes. We conclude by situating our proposed dynamical framework for homology of process in relation to similar research programs, such as process structuralism and developmental approaches to morphological homology. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to argue for the idea that processes and process-based entities are to be modelled as relational structures. Relational structures are genuine structures, namely entities not committed to the existence of basic objects. My argument moves from the analysis of Whitehead’s original insight about process-based entities that, despite some residual of substance metaphysics, has the merit of grounding the intrinsic dynamism of reality on the holistic and relational characters of process-based entities. The (...) current model of process ontology requires genuine emergence and this, in turn, requires organizations, i.e., emergence in organizations. Another view about processes rely on a structural specification of processes. I suggest that the two views can be made compatible by the help of a specific sort of structures, namely relational structures. The appeal to the mathematical theory of genuine structures, category theory, reveals the formal plausibility of this convergence. According to this formal approach, genuine structures are essentially dynamic entities for they are relational, namely, as well as organizations, they are not existentially committed to particulars. (shrink)

Spoken language consists of a linear sequence of units, from which the existence of particular underlying hierarchical processing mechanisms is inferred. Uddén et al. use graph theory to provide a framework for describing the possible structural relationships that may underlie a linear output sequence. Being more explicit in defining different structures can help identifying and testing for such structures in AGL experiments, as well as help showing how behavioral and neuroimaging data reveals signatures of hierarchical processing in humans.

Spoken language consists of a linear sequence of units, from which the existence of particular underlying hierarchical processing mechanisms is inferred. Uddén et al. use graph theory to provide a framework for describing the possible structural relationships that may underlie a linear output sequence. Being more explicit in defining different structures can help identifying and testing for such structures in AGL experiments, as well as help showing how behavioral and neuroimaging data reveals signatures of hierarchical processing in humans.

This paper presents a unified theory of consciousness from the perspective of Judgemental Philosophy (JP), arguing that consciousness is not a static property but the dynamic process of judgement itself, which emerges upon a necessary three-layered architecture: physical, biological, and judgemental. We posit that the biological layer is instantiated through the emergence of an 'autopoietic' system, an event that gives rise to primordial 'Affectivity' and the 'Resonance Drive' (RD)—the core impetus for meaning-making. This RD propels the judgemental layer to (...) operate through the complex processes of the 'Enhanced Ten-Step Model,' wherein 'Resonance' (R) is the fundamental flow that encompasses Constructivity (C1) and Coherence (C2) as its modalities. This framework exhibits a profound structural equivalence with Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, suggesting both are describing the same dynamic of reality's formal phenomenalization. Ultimately, this paper reframes consciousness not as an attribute of being, but as the very 'architecture of resonating reality'—a process-oriented ontology grounded in the structural conditions of how a meaningful world comes into being. (shrink)

This bold and lively essay is one of those rarest of intellectual achievements, a big small book. In its short length are condensed enormous erudition and impressive analytical scope. With verve and self-assurance, it addresses a broad, central question: How can we improve our understanding of the large-scale processes and structures that transformed the world of the nineteenth century and are transforming our world today? Tilly contends that twentieth-century social theories have been encumbered by a nineteenth century heritage of “pernicious (...) postulates.” He subjects each misleading belief to rigorous criticism, challenging many standard social science paradigms and methodologies. As an alternative to those timeless, placeless models of social change and organization, Tilly argues convincingly for a program of concrete, historically grounded analysis and systematic comparison. To illustrate the strategies available for such research, Tilly assesses the works of several major practitioners of comparative historical analysis, making skillful use of this selective review to offer his own speculative, often unconventional accounts of our recent past. Historically oriented social scientists will welcome this provocative essay and its wide-ranging agenda for comparative historical research. Other social scientists, their graduate and undergraduate students, and even the interested general reader will find this new work by a major scholar stimulating and eminently readable. This is the second of five volumes commissioned by the Russell Sage Foundation to mark its seventy-fifth anniversary. "In this short, brilliant book Tilly suggests a way to think about theories of historical social change....This book should find attentive readers both in undergraduate courses and in graduate seminars. It should also find appreciative readers, for Tilly is a writer as well as a scholar." —Choice. (shrink)

We propose a pluralist account of content for predictive processing systems. Our pluralism combines Millikan’s teleosemantics with existing structural resemblance accounts. The paper has two goals. First, we outline how a teleosemantic treatment of signal passing in predictive processing systems would work, and how it integrates with structural resemblance accounts. We show that the core explanatory motivations and conceptual machinery of teleosemantics and predictive processing mesh together well. Second, we argue this pluralist approach expands the range of empirical cases to (...) which the predictive processing framework might be successfully applied. This is because our pluralism is practice-oriented. A range of different notions of content are used in the cognitive sciences to explain behaviour, and some of these cases look to employ teleosemantic notions. As a result, our pluralism gives predictive processing the scope to cover these cases. (shrink)

This essay continues the philosophical synthesis developed in Reality as a Structured Process. Part I argued that reality is not exhausted by factual actuality, but must be understood as a structured open process in which actuality emerges from potentiality without eliminating it. The present essay examines how this structured openness becomes accessible, centered, experienced, and interpreted. The argument unfolds in four steps. First, the distinction between observable and non-observable structure is interpreted epistemically rather than ontologically. What becomes measurable (...) is not opposed to the real, but represents a finite mode of disclosure within a richer physical organization. Second, consciousness is understood neither as a universal property of all things nor as a miraculous emergence from pure exteriority. It arises where openness, selective stabilization, resonance, integration, self-reference, and centering generate a stable inner domain. Third, the essay distinguishes between pre-subjective openness, pre-phenomenal subjectivability, and phenomenality. Reality may be intrinsically open to the emergence of experience without already being experiential in its most basic structure; yet this openness becomes relevant to consciousness only insofar as it can be organized, under specific conditions, as an inner perspective. This allows for a non-reductive account of consciousness that avoids both reductive physicalism and classical panpsychism. Finally, the essay turns to meditative, nondual, and spiritual experience. Such experiences may be profound, transformative, and therapeutically significant, yet they do not by themselves establish a final metaphysical ontology. The structure of an experience is not automatically the structure of reality. A responsible philosophy of consciousness must therefore distinguish experience, interpretation, ontology, usefulness, and epistemic authority. The result is an open realism in which observability, consciousness, healing, and spiritual meaning appear as modes of disclosure within the space of possibilities, without reducing reality to factuality or inflating experience into metaphysical certainty. (shrink)

Background: Concerns have been expressed regarding the adequacy of ethics review systems in developing countries. Limited data are available regarding the structural and functional status of Research Ethics Committees (RECs) in the Middle East. The purpose of this study was to survey the existing RECs in Egypt to better understand their functioning status, perceived resource needs, and challenges. Methods: We distributed a self-administered survey tool to Egyptian RECs to collect information on the following domains: general characteristics of the REC, membership (...) composition, ethics training, workload, process of ethics review, perceived challenges to effective functioning, and financial and material resources. We used basic descriptive statistics to evaluate the quantitative data. Results: We obtained responses from 67% (12/18) of the identified RECs. Most RECs (10/12) have standard operating procedures and many (7/12) have established policies to manage conflicts of interests. The average membership was 10.3 with a range from 7-19. The predominant member type was physicians (69.5% of all of the REC members) with little lay representation (13.7%). Most RECs met at least once/month and the average number of protocols reviewed per meeting was 3.8 with a range from 1-10. Almost three-quarters of the members from all of the 12 RECs indicated they received some formal training in ethics. Regarding resources, roughly half of the RECs have dedicated capital equipment (e.g., meeting room, computers, office furniture, etc); none of the RECs have a formal operating budget. Perceived challenges included the absence of national research ethics guidelines and national standards for RECs and lack of ongoing training of its members in research ethics. Conclusion: Our study documents several areas of strengths and areas for improvements in the operations of Egyptian RECs. Regarding strengths, many of the existing RECs meet frequently, have a majority of members with prior training in research ethics, and have written policies. Regarding areas for improvements, many RECs should strive for a more diverse membership and should receive more financial resources and administrative support personnel. We recommend that RECs include more individuals from the community and develop a continuing educational program for its members. Institutional officials should be aware of the resource capacity needs of their RECs. (shrink)

We recorded participants' eye movements while they read sentences containing verb‐phrase coordination. Results showed evidence of immediate processing disruption when a reflexive pronoun embedded in the conjoined verb phrase mismatched the sentence subject. We argue that this result is incompatible with models of human parsing that employ only bottom‐up parsing procedures, even when flexible constituency is employed. Models need to incorporate a mechanism similar to the adjoining operation in Tree‐Adjoining Grammar, in which one structure is inserted into another.

Based on the 'Partnership Model of Corporate Ethics' (Wood, 2002), this study examines the ethical structures and processes that are put in place by organizations to enhance the ethical business behavior of staff. The study examines the use of these structures and processes amongst the top companies in the three countries of Australia, Canada, and Sweden over two time periods (2001–2002 and 2005–2006). Subsequendy, a combined comparative and longitudinal approach is applied in the study, which we contend is a unique (...) approach in the area of business ethics. The findings of the study indicate that corporations operating in Sweden have utilized ethical structures and processes differently than their Canadian and/or Australian counterparts, and that in each culture the way that companies fashion their approach to business ethics appears congruent with their national cultural values. There does, however, appear to be a convergence of views within the organizations of each culture, as the Swedish companies appear to have been more influenced in 2005–2006 by an Anglo-Saxon business paradigm than they have been in the past. (shrink)

This essay brings together the central ontological claims developed across fifteen earlier articles. It argues that reality is identical neither with mere factuality nor with an abstract reserve of bare possibilities. Reality must instead be understood as a structured open process in which actuality emerges from potentiality without ever fully exhausting it. The ontological point of departure thus shifts: in place of a being determined by a hidden principle, there appears an immanent nexus of processual dynamics in which structures (...) take shape as metastable orders. This same basic tension appears dynamically as the relation between structure and openness, or, equivalently, between determinacy and contingency. Processes are ordered and directed without thereby being fully fixed; alternative possibilities remain really operative within the unfolding of events. Contingency is therefore not merely a function of the observer’s ignorance, but an ontological feature of nondeterministic reality. From this follows an epistemological consequence: because reality comprises more than what is presently actual, it can only be adequately described through models. Space-time structures, possibility spaces, attractor landscapes, or comparable formal architectures are indispensable for articulating the inner complexity of real processes. Yet such models, however necessary, are not themselves constituents of reality. On this basis, teleodynamic field ontology interprets meaning, consciousness, and teleology not as secondary additions to an otherwise meaningless world, but as immanent modes in which a relationally structured reality becomes articulable, intelligible, and oriented toward coherence. Reality thus appears neither as rigid being nor as sheer flux, but as recursively organized, structured openness. (shrink)

Information‐theoretic complexity metrics, such as Surprisal (Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008) and Entropy Reduction (Hale, 2003), are linking hypotheses that bridge theorized expectations about sentences and observed processing difficulty in comprehension. These expectations can be viewed as syntactic derivations constrained by a grammar. However, this expectation‐based view is not limited to syntactic information alone. The present study combines structural and non‐structural information in unified models of word‐by‐word sentence processing difficulty. Using probabilistic minimalist grammars (Stabler, 1997), we extend expectation‐based models to include (...) frequency information about noun phrase animacy. Entropy reductions derived from these grammars faithfully reflect the asymmetry between subject and object relatives (Staub, 2010; Staub, Dillon, & Clifton, 2017), as well as the effect of animacy on the measured difficulty profile (Lowder & Gordon, 2012; Traxler, Morris, & Seely, 2002). Visualizing probability distributions on the remaining alternatives at particular parser states allows us to explore new, linguistically plausible interpretations for the observed processing asymmetries, including the way that expectations about the relativized argument influence the processing of particular types of relative clauses (Wagers & Pendleton, 2016). (shrink)

This investigation draws from research on negative polarity item (NPI) illusions in order to explore a new and interesting instance of misalignment observed for grammatical sentences containing two negative markers. Previous research has shown that unlicensed NPIs can be perceived as acceptable when occurring soon after a structurally inaccessible negation (e.g. ever in *The bills that no senators voted for have ever become law). Here we examine the opposite configuration: grammatical sentences created by substituting the NPI ever with the negative (...) adverb never (e.g. The bills that no senators voted for have never become law). The processing and acceptability of these sentences was studied using three tasks: a speeded acceptability judgment (experiment 1), a self-paced reading task (experiment 2), and an offline acceptability rating (experiment 3). The results are consistent across measures in showing that the integration of the adverb never is disrupted by the linearly preceding but structurally inaccessible negative quantifier no in the relative clause. In our view, this pattern of results is in line with Parker and Phillips’ (2016) proposal that NPI illusions arise when the context containing the inaccessible negation has not been fully encoded by the time the NPI ever is encountered, making the embedded negative quantifier transparently available as a licensor. In a similar vein, the disruption effects observed for grammatical sentences containing two negative elements could arise if the negative quantifier is still being integrated when never is encountered, forcing the parser to deal with two negative elements simultaneously. This interpretation suggests that the same incomplete encodings that could be ameliorating the online perception of unlicensed NPIs could also be responsible for deteriorating the perception of the sentences under investigation here. This would represent an illusion of ungrammaticality. Furthermore, these results provide evidence against the speculation that NPI illusions are the consequence of misrepresenting ever as its near neighbor never, given that continuations with never are judged as unacceptable in spite of their grammaticality. Together, these findings inform the landscape of hypotheses on NPI illusions and offer valuable insights on the complexity of multiple negation and the relation between processing difficulty and acceptability. (shrink)

The significance of political-economic context for scientific citizenship is argued through an analysis of New Zealand’s Royal Commission on Genetic Modification. My intention is not to provide an account of why the commission came to the decisions it did but to illustrate how the political-economic context and the culture of regulatory science both exacerbate public concerns about unacknowledged uncertainty and commercial influence and make it difficult for those concerns to influence the outcomes of public dialogues. The discursive flexibility of science (...) as alternately predictive and provisional silences concerns about uncertainty, while a further interpretive choice of science as the autonomous activities of individuals unconstrained by political-economic context occludes the nature of concerns about commercial influence. Rather than the increasingly prevalent focus on processes of engagement, I argue that it is essential that researchers in this area attend to how public dialogue is placed in relation to the cultures and structures of regulatory science and neoliberalism. (shrink)

BackgroundInformed consent is an important factor in a child’s moral structure from which different types of doctor–patient relationships arise. Children’s autonomy is currently under discussion in terms of their decent treatment, beyond what doctors and researchers perceive. To describe the influential practices that exist among clinicians and researchers toward children with chronic diseases during the process of obtaining informed consent.MethodsThis was a cross-sectional, qualitative study via a subjective and interpretivist approach. The study was performed by conducting semi-structured interviews of (...) 21 clinicians and researchers. Data analysis was performed using the SPSS version 21® and Atlas Ti version 7.0® programs.ResultsThe deliberative and paternalistic models were influential practices in the physician–patient relationship. In the deliberative model, the child is expected to have a moral awareness of their care. The paternalistic model determined that submission was a way of structuring the child because he or she is considered to be a subject of extreme care.ConclusionsThe differentiated objectification [educational] process recognizes the internal and external elements of the child. Informed consent proved to be an appropriate means for strengthening moral and structuring the child. (shrink)

The comprehension of anaphoric relations may be guided not only by discourse, but also syntactic information. In the literature on online processing, however, the focus has been on audible pronouns and descriptions whose reference is resolved mainly on the former. This paper examines one relation that both lacks overt exponence, and relies almost exclusively on syntax for its resolution: adjunct control, or the dependency between the null subject of a non-finite adjunct and its antecedent in sentences such as Mickey talked (...) to Minnie before ___ eating. Using visual world eyetracking, we compare the time course of interpreting this null subject and overt pronouns (Mickey talked to Minnie before he ate). We show that when control structures are highly frequent, listeners are just as quick to resolve reference in either case. When control structures are less frequent, reference resolution based on structural information still occurs upon hearing the non-finite verb, but more slowly, especially when unaided by structural and referential predictions. This may be due to increased difficulty in recognizing that a referential dependency is necessary. These results indicate that in at least some contexts, referential expressions whose resolution depends on very different sources of information can be resolved approximately equally rapidly, and that the speed of interpretation is largely independent of whether or not the dependency is cued by an overt referring expression. (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to discuss if and in what sense semiosis (meaning process, cf. C. S. Peirce) can be regarded as an "emergent" process in semiotic systems. It is not our problem here to answer when or how semiosis emerged in nature. As a prerequisite for the very formulation of these problems, we are rather interested in discussing the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. The first step (...) in this work is to summarize a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. Along the summary of this analysis, we pose fundamental questions that have to be answered in order to ascribe a precise meaning to the term "emergence" in the context of an understanding of semiosis. After discussing a model for explaining emergence based on Salthe's hierarchical structuralism, which considers three levels at a time in a semiotic system, we present some tentative answers to those questions. (shrink)

Predictive processing is an ambitious neurocomputational framework, offering an unified explanation of all cognitive processes in terms of a single computational operation, namely prediction error minimization. Whilst this ambitious unificatory claim has been thoroughly analyzed, less attention has been paid to what predictive processing entails for structure–function mappings in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that, taken at face value, predictive processing entails an all-to-one structure–function mapping, wherein each individual neural structure is assigned the same function, namely minimizing prediction error. Such a (...) structure–function mapping, we show, is highly problematic. For, barring few, rare occasions, such a structure–function mapping fails to play the predictive, explanatory and heuristic roles structure–function mappings are expected to play in cognitive neuroscience. Worse still, it offers a picture of the brain that we know is wrong. For, it depicts the brain as an equipotential organ; an organ wherein structural differences do not correspond to any appreciable functional difference, and wherein each component can substitute for any other component without causing any loss or degradation of functionality. Somewhat ironically, the very neuroscientific roots of predictive processing motivate a form of skepticism concerning the framework’s most ambitious unificatory claims. Do these problems force us to abandon predictive processing? Not necessarily. For, once the assumption that all cognition can be accounted for exclusively in terms of prediction error minimization is relaxed, the problems we diagnosed lose their bite. (shrink)

The article analyzes some key motives of both classical German phenomenology and contemporary French phenomenology. The theme of sense-formation, a recurring thread throughout Husserl's entire body of work, serves as a discussion starting point.A special emphasis is put on one of Husserl's posthumously published texts from 1933, in which he distinguishes between the open process of sense-formation [Sinnbildung] and the closed sense-structures [Sinngebilde]. The “phenomenon” to which phenomenological philosophy refers here is not a “pre-given thing” yet, but rather the (...) horizon in which its sense is shaped. This fundamental intuition is crucially important for the project of “nonstandard” phenomenology, which Richir is developing in the context of Francophone philosophy. Drawing equally from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ phenomenology of language, Richir refers to “the sense that creates itself.” In this way, he is continuing to develop one of the key intuitio... (shrink)

This thesis addresses fundamental issues in sustainability thinking, especially in relation to its epistemological and methodological bases. The sustainability crisis has invoked multiple schools of thought cross-cutting wide range of human activities/ scholarships. The resultant diversity of perspectives has imparted a high degree of ambiguity, and an intellectual ‘looseness’, potentially obfuscating many sustainability issues, which in consequence deepened social confusion and political inaction. Despite this, sustainability has taken on a certain moral tone as a normative goal of society, which is (...) based upon implicit assumptions about the constituent forms of knowledge and the methods by which this knowledge is legitimated. It is out of these normative bases of sustainability that ‘sustainability science’ has emerged as an overt attempt aiming to champion pluralistic and integrated forms of knowledge and research in addressing the sustainability crisis. Chapter 1 analyzes the intellectual standing of sustainability. This reveals the necessity for an intellectual perspective to replace the normative essence associated with the notion, and a necessary pluralistic orientation and avenue of knowledge. This intellectual perspective—formed in Chapter 2—stipulates that sustainability scholarship needs to operate both across and within disciplines, albeit cognizant of a more integrated reality. The reductionist mode of enquiry is unable to do this. Thus, the sustainability crisis requires a new mode of enquiry, which can enable the production of ‘bricks of knowledge while looking at the whole building’, in contrary to the production of ‘specialized bricks of knowledge at the expense of not seeing the whole building’ as characteristic of the reductionist mode. This new mode of enquiry necessitates a fundamental intellectual process, capable of enabling the pluralistic orientation and avenue of knowledge. Accordingly, based on fundamental research the thesis aims to analyze the sustainability science discourse and, through both deductive and inductive methods, develop a fundamental intellectual process to inform on the dimensions and structure of a pluralistic knowledge avenue, leading to the laying of an intellectual foundation for the scholarship of sustainability. This is corresponded to three key research questions : KRQ-1: How can an intellectual process fundamentally be framed in order to study the pluralistic knowledge and research structures regarding sustainability? KRQ-2: What are the basic structures of the discourse of sustainability science and how are they structured? KRQ-3: How might a pluralistic knowledge avenue and the layout of an intellectual foundation for the scholarship of sustainability be elicited based on the rationale, framing and application of the fundamental intellectual process? The thesis takes the first decade’s ‘body of work’ of sustainability science as a dataset for analysis in answering these questions through heuristic fundamental research. Chapters 1-3 reflect fundamental research, while Chapters 4-6 and Chapter 7 present the results of heuristic deductive analysis and inductive analysis, respectively. The rationale for the KRQs is formed in Chapters 1-2, besides forming the intellectual perspective of sustainability. KRQ-1 is addressed in Chapter 3 in empirically framing a fundamental intellectual process. The analysis of the first decade’s ‘body of work’ of sustainability science is presented in Chapters 4-6, elucidating the discursive, integrative and contextual structures of its discourse, thus, addressing KRQ-2. These together form a continuous thread of inquiry on the intellectual treatment of sustainability, leading to addressing KRQ-3 in Chapter 7. In framing the fundamental intellectual process the Chapter 3 produces a fundamental literature organization process resulting in a structure of five cross-connected layers of organizations within the literature archive, while a discourse analysis mechanism produces an analytical process based on a system of five stages of discourse analysis. These together construct a fundamental scheme for analyzing the basic structures of pluralistic knowledge/ research. There are four key findings arising from Chapters 4-6. KF-1 reveals an overall lack of precision in characterizing the concept of ‘human-environment system’ in sustainability science along with an extremely open-ended representation. KF-2, revealing the overall contribution of sustainability science as consistent across its three different basic structures demonstrates mere structural contributions while lacking in intellectual capacities to provide the functional aspects to the intellectual treatment of sustainability. Based on conceptualization and extensive exemplification of a theoretical framework on the language of conversation in sustainability research KF-3 produces a new intellectual lens for approaching effective trans-disciplinary sustainability research through facilitating knowledge co-production. KF-4 reveals a strong correlation between the dominant ‘original nature’ and the characters of ‘literature survey’ and ‘literature archive analysis’ of sustainability science research, together with a dominance of these characters across the other empirical classes. This reveals the significance of fundamental literature organization and analysis process in brokering common language and understanding for the enabling of sustainability scholarship, besides breaking the impasse of the conventional incompatibility between original research and literature analysis processes. In Chapter 7, the KF 1-4 are analyzed in terms of different dimensions of the pluralistic knowledge avenue. The chapter also produces the structure of this avenue through inductively projecting on the characteristics of an integration expertise in light of the new mode of enquiry. Besides, Chapter 7 also extracts nine latent elements/ characters of an intellectual foundation of the scholarship of sustainability from the rationale, framing and application of the fundamental intellectual process as well as the inductive framing of the pluralistic knowledge avenue. These together produce the basis for an integrated theory on the intellectual foundation of sustainability. In summary, new knowledge components are pertinent to KF 1-4 and the inductive framing of the pluralistic knowledge avenue. Through fundamentally analyzing the prevailing scholastic reality of sustainability that is based on normative assumption-based works, the thesis produces a structure of sustainability scholarship based on fundamental intellectual justification. Its implications for sustainability science include: the possibility of overcoming reductionist methods—constraining the contribution of the practice—through active intellectual orientation of the new mode of enquiry, prospects for innovation in the practice stem from the integrative structure of its discourse and in developing functional-intellectual capabilities, and a fundamental intellectual process is a means to overcome its normative impulse. (shrink)

The subject of the present work is noema and its structure in various stages of the objectivating process. Despite its great importance, this issue has never been adequately explained, neither by Husserl nor by his followers. The main objective is to provide the theory that would describe the structure of noema and its function without simplifying the case or appealing to non-phenomenological data. This has been achieved by way of analysis divided into four sections. The first provides an overview (...) of noema. The second section is devoted to analysis of the process of objectivation, i.e., how an active awareness of the object in a logical sense is constituted by a series of passive experiences. The third section refers to a noema as found at different stages of objectivation. It explains how the increasing level of activity, which turns out to be a noetic function, causes changes to the structure of a noema. The last section summarises the results and stresses the advantages of the developed theory in comparison with other interpretations, especially those offered by Drummond, Smith and McIntyre. (shrink)

The theme of this book is the appropriate methodology for the study of the history of life on earth. In particular, it focuses on the interplay between form and structure: the things that we might predict and model and the things we cannot predict -- the arbitrary and the contingent -- which may be as important, or even more important, than the way in which life on earth has evolved. The contributors are drawn from palaeontology, archaeology, anthropology and human evolution; (...) the timescales covered are from the development of life on earth, through human evolution to later prehistory and historic archaeology. Underpinning the theme of the book is the work of Stephen Jay Gould, who has developed a distinctive philosophy of history concerning the nature of long-term and short-term evolutionary processes, particularly stressing the interplay between structure and contingency. (shrink)

The contents and structure of semantic memory have been the focus of much recent research, with major advances in the development of distributional models, which use word co‐occurrence information as a window into the semantics of language. In parallel, connectionist modeling has extended our knowledge of the processes engaged in semantic activation. However, these two lines of investigation have rarely been brought together. Here, we describe a processing model based on distributional semantics in which activation spreads throughout a semantic network, (...) as dictated by the patterns of semantic similarity between words. We show that the activation profile of the network, measured at various time points, can successfully account for response times in lexical and semantic decision tasks, as well as for subjective concreteness and imageability ratings. We also show that the dynamics of the network is predictive of performance in relational semantic tasks, such as similarity/relatedness rating. Our results indicate that bringing together distributional semantic networks and spreading of activation provides a good fit to both automatic lexical processing (as indexed by lexical and semantic decisions) as well as more deliberate processing (as indexed by ratings), above and beyond what has been reported for previous models that take into account only similarity resulting from network structure. (shrink)

This paper formalizes a structural limit on planning, foresight, and intelligence in finite cognitive systems. While planning is often treated as an extensible capacity—bounded primarily by computational resources or information availability—this work argues that foresight is constrained by a finite envelope imposed by coherence, integration cost, and adaptive stability. Beyond a certain horizon, additional planning does not increase intelligence but instead destabilizes the system’s internal organization, forcing reversion to local navigation. -/- Within the Structural Resonance Theory (SRT) framework, intelligence is (...) characterized not as optimal global prediction but as the maintenance of coherence under uncertainty. From this perspective, planning operates as a bounded structural process: useful within a limited range, but necessarily lossy and fragmenting when extended beyond the system’s integrative capacity. This finite envelope applies across biological and artificial agents and is independent of implementation details. -/- By articulating explicit limits on foresight, this paper blocks teleological interpretations of intelligence, clarifies why open-ended exploration persists even in advanced systems, and explains why planning depth saturates rather than converging toward omniscience. The result is a non-teleological account of intelligence as constrained navigation rather than mastery, with implications for cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and theories of rational agency. (shrink)

Blair presumes the validity of the fluid-crystallized model throughout his article. Two comparative evaluations recently demonstrated that this presumption can be challenged. The fluid-crystallized model offers little to the understanding of the structural manifestation of general intelligence and other more specific abilities. It obscures important issues involving the distinction of pervasive learning disabilities (low general intelligence) from specific, content-related disabilities that impede the development of particular skills. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Cet article examine la concurrence entre des structures de gouvernance des entreprises. Il y est souligné qu’une panoplie de structures “constitutionnelles” peut être observée dans le cadre marchand et que cette variété a servi des objectifs transactionnels importants sur un plan historique. L’article met en contraste les approches coasienne et autrichienne de l’explication des structures de gouvernance. Nous examinons la tendance récente du déplacement de la propriété des entreprises vers les investisseurs par opposition aux arrangements coopératifs et “mutuels”. L ’ (...) a r gument a t ion sout i ent que l’intervention étatique peut être une explication importante des tendances récentes au Royaume Uni, notamment dans le domaine des institutions financières. Les suggestions selon lesquelles des modèles de gouvernance des entreprises par les “partenaires” devraient être introduits à travers l’intervention de l’Etat ignorent à la fois les coûts de transaction et l’importance d’assurer l’affectation du talent entrepreneurial en direction des ressources économiques.This paper considers competition between governance arrangements for firms. It is argued that a variety of ‘constitutional’ structures can be observed in the market and that historically this variety has served important transactional purposes. The Coasian and Austrian approaches to the explanation of governance arrangements are contrasted. Recent trends towards investor ownership of firms and away from co-operative and ‘mutual’ arrangements are considered. It is argued that government regulatory intervention may be an important explanation for recent trends in the UK, especially in the area of financial institutions. Suggestions that ‘stakeholder’ models of firm governance should be introduced through state intervention ignore considerations both of transactions costs and the importance of ensuring the allocation of entrepreneurial talent to the direction of economic resources. (shrink)

Informal rigour is the process by which we come to understand particular mathematical structures and then manifest this rigour through axiomatisations. Structural relativity is the idea that the kinds of structures we isolate are dependent upon the logic we employ. We bring together these ideas by considering the level of informal rigour exhibited by our set-theoretic discourse, and argue that different foundational programmes should countenance different underlying logics (intermediate between first- and second-order) for formulating set theory. By bringing considerations (...) of perturbations in modal space to bear on the debate, we will suggest that a promising option for representing current set-theoretic thought is given by formulating set theory using quasi-weak second-order logic. These observations indicate that the usual division of structures into \particular (e.g. the natural number structure) and general (e.g. the group structure) is perhaps too coarse grained; we should also make a distinction between intentionally and unintentionally general structures. (shrink)

Cognition can often be modeled as the transformation of a set of variables into another. At least two kinds of entities are needed in this process: signals and coders. Representations are usually taken to be signals, but sometimes they are the coders: sometimes the computational complexity of variable transformations can be strikingly reduced by relying on a structure that mirrors that of some task-relevant entity. These kinds of coders are what philosophers call structural representations.