Theories of skill acquisition have made radically different predictions about the role of general problem‐solving methods in acquiring rules that promote effective transfer to new problems. Under one view, methods that focus on reaching specific goals, such as means‐ends analysis, are assumed to provide the basis for efficient knowledge compilation (Anderson, 1987), whereas under an alternative view such methods are believed to disrupt rule induction (Sweller, 1988). We suggest that the role of general methods in learning varies with both (...) the specificity of the problem solver's goal and the systematicity of the strategies used for testing hypotheses about rules. In the absence of a specific goal people are more likely to use a rule‐induction learning strategy, whereas provision of a specific goal fosters use of difference reduction, which tends to be a non‐rule‐induction strategy. We performed two experiments to investigate the impact of goal specificity and systematicity of rule‐induction strategies in learning and transfer within a complex dynamic system. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that during free exploration of a problem space, greater learning occurred if participants adopted more systematic strategies for rule induction, and that participants come to favor such strategies. Experiment 2 revealed that participants who were provided with a specific goal performed well on the initial problem but were impaired on a transfer test using a similar problem with a different goal. Instruction on a systematic rule‐induction strategy facilitated solution for both the initial and transfer problems, but participants' use of this strategy declined if they had a specific goal. Our results support Sweller's (1988) proposal that general problemsolving methods applied to a specific goal foster acquisition of knowledge about an isolated solution path but do not provide an effective way of learning the overall structure of a problem space. We interpret these results in terms of dualspace theories of search through problem space. (shrink)

Whether or not quantum physics can account for molecular structure is a matter of considerable controversy. Three of the problems raised in this regard are the problems of molecular structure. We argue that these problems are just special cases of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics: insofar as the measurement problem is solved, the problems of molecular structure are resolved as well. In addition, we explore one consequence of our argument: that claims about the reduction or emergence of (...) molecular structure cannot be settled independently of the choice of a particular resolution to the measurement problem. Specifically, we consider how three standard putative solutions to the measurement problem inform our under- standing of a molecule in isolation, as well as of chemistry’s relation to quantum physics. (shrink)

William Jaworski shows how hylomorphism can be used to solve mind-body problems--the question of how thought, feeling, perception, and other mental phenomena fit into the physical world. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle, and is responsible for individuals being the kinds of things they are, and having the powers or capacities they have. From a hylomorphic perspective, mind-body problems are byproducts of a worldview that rejects structure, and which lacks a basic principle which distinguishes the (...) parts of the physical universe that can think, feel, and perceive from those that can't. Without such a principle, the existence of those powers in the physical world can start to look inexplicable and mysterious. But if mental phenomena are structural phenomena then they are uncontroversially part of the physical world. Hylomorphism thus provides an elegant way of solving mind-body problems. (shrink)

The brain is an operationally closed system. At it’s boundary, every incoming signal gets translated into neural activity. The intrinsic nature of the distal causes perturbing the brain at its sensory surfaces cannot be grasped from the inside. Moreover, the brain exploits change detection and relational coding. Hence, the external relations between any distal causes are transformed into internal relations between neural activities. The picture of a thoroughgoing structuralism about the mind emerges: all mental states are relationally individuated and thereby (...) provide structural representations. But structuralism is vulnerable to a rather generic logico-mathematical problem: the Newman problem. The specific “Newman problem of the brain” is the concern that the brain’s operational closure is accompanied by a representational closure, where neither the intrinsic nature of the distal causes nor the nature of the external relations can be grasped from the inside. Potentially, this applies to any operationally closed structural representation system, including brains and AI systems. If the Newman problem persists, then such systems “know” nothing, the outside world remains completely hidden. This is nothing less than a skeptical scenario of the most extreme form. However, I will present a solution to this conundrum. It works by “spatio-temporal grounding”: spatial and temporal relations are unalteredly transferred from the external world to systems of structural representation. (shrink)

Hermann Weyl was one of the early contributors to the mathematics of general relativity. This article argues that in 1929, for the formulation of a general relativistic framework of the Dirac equation, he both abolished and preserved in modified form the conceptual perspective that he had developed earlier in his “analysis of the problem of space.” The ideas of infinitesimal congruence from the early 1920s were aufgehoben in the general relativistic framework for the Dirac equation. He preserved the central (...) idea of gauge as a “purely infinitesimal” aspect of symmetries in a group extension schema. With respect to methodology, however, Weyl gave up his earlier preferences for relatively a-priori arguments and tried to incorporate as much empiricism as he could. This signified a clearly expressed empirical turn for him. Moreover, in this step he emphasized that the mathematical objects used for the representation of matter structures stood at the center of the construction, rather than interaction fields which, in the early 1920s, he had considered as more or less derivable from geometrico-philosophical considerations. (shrink)

The concept of ‘problem’ has been recently promoted by the official academic institutions and put at the centre of a new field of research, self-styled ‘transdisciplinary studies’, in order to provide a foundation to a resolutely transdisciplinary approach to research and thought in general. The paper notes that the same move (i.e. connecting a problem-centred approach to thought with transdisciplinary method) can be found in Deleuze’s philosophy, which provides us with what the technocratic image of thought advocated by (...) transdisciplinary studies ultimately cannot provide: a positive concept of problems where those are not negative moments but originary and active matrices of thought. It then argues that Deleuze owes this concept to the French epistemological tradition, and more specifically to Bachelard, where it is nothing other than the concept of structure. It ends by explicating what particular version of structuralism Deleuze was thus led to construct in order to account for the role of problems in a radically transdisciplinary account of thought: it is the fact that all structures are multi-structured that grounds the essentially transdisciplinary nature of thought. The fact that we could think differently is precisely what makes us think. (shrink)

In this book, the author develops a new form of structural realism and deals with the problem of representation. The work combines two distinguished developments of the Semantic View of Theories, namely Structural Realism, a flourishing theory from contemporary philosophy of science, and Ronald Giere and colleagues’ Cognitive Models of Science approach. Readers will see how replacing the model-theoretic structures that are at issue in SR with connectionist networks and activations patterns helps us to deal with the (...) class='Hi'>problem of representation. The author suggests that cognitive structures are not only the precise formal tools for regimenting the structure of scientific theories but also the tools that the biological brain uses to capture the essential features of its environment. Therefore, replacing model-theoretic structures with cognitive structures allows us to account for the theories-reality relationship on the basis of the most reliable theories of neurology. This is how a new form of SR, called Cognitive Structural Realism is introduced through this book, which articulates and defends CSR, and shows how two diverging branches of SVT can be reconciled. This ground-breaking work will particularly appeal to people who work in the philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. (shrink)

A promising strategy for defending the role that representation plays in explanations of cognition frames the concept in terms of internal models or map‐like mechanisms. “Structural representation” offers an account of representation that is grounded in well‐specified, empirical criteria. However, anti‐representationalists continue to press the issue of how to account for the paradigmatic semantic properties of representation at the subpersonal level. In this paper, I offer an account of how the proponent of structural representation should think about content. There are (...) really two problems of content any account of representation must overcome: the “hard problem of content” and the “content determination problem.” I argue that the structural representation account has the resources to provide a naturalistically respectable notion of content that overcomes both problems. (shrink)

Structure and organization seems to be at the root of many of the questions raised about institutional behaviour; however, with respect to research on university capacity building, few studies have examined research organizational problems, particularly in developing countries. This study investigates academic reactions to the structure and organization of research at four leading Vietnamese universities. Through document analysis and semi-structured interviews with 55 participants, the study finds that the four case-study Vietnamese universities have accomplished a number of the more visible (...) tasks of research management such as creating research and research management positions; deciding primary organizational units for research delivery; creating a research office; and creating research oversight committees. However, they seem to neglect the other less visible tasks of organizing and structuring research such as developing rules for research integrity; developing a mechanism for evaluating the quality of research outcomes; preparing researchers and research managers for the necessary skills and knowledge; and deciding vertical and horizontal decentralization. The study concludes that even though research has been formally structured and organized, the management of research has not yet been professionalized. The key problem in organizing and structuring research is the lack of an effective system for research behaviour formalization. A more effective system for better formalizing research behaviours should be developed so that Vietnamese universities can integrate more successfully into the global research. (shrink)

According to realist structuralism, mathematical objects are places in abstract structures. We argue that in spite of its many attractions, realist structuralism must be rejected. For, first, mathematical structures typically contain intra-structurally indiscernible places. Second, any account of place-identity available to the realist structuralist entails that intra-structurally indiscernible places are identical. Since for her mathematical singular terms denote places in structures, she would have to say, for example, that 1 = − 1 in the group (Z, +). (...) We call this the identity problem and conclude that nominalism is presently the safest route for the structuralist. (shrink)

Introduction: Science and Common Sense Long before the beginnings of modern civilization, men ac- quired vast funds of information about their environment. ...

The concept of social structure is crucial in social analysis, yet sociologists' use of the term is often ambiguous and misleading. Contributing to the ambiguity is a tendency to imply the meaning of "social structure" either by opposing it to agency or by contrasting it to culture, thus reducing "structure" to pure constraint and suggesting that "culture" is not structured. Even more damaging is the tendency to conflate these two contrasts. To add to the confusion, these contrasts are often mapped (...) inappropriately onto other dichotomies prevalent in social theorizing, including material versus ideal, external versus internal, static versus active, and objective versus subjective, to produce a conceptual prism in which structure, agency, and culture are all poorly understood. This article attempts to disentangle these concepts from the aforementioned system of contrasts, to specify the connections between structure and agency, and to make a case for the inclusion of culture in the sociological conception of social structure. (shrink)

There exist two conjectures for constraint satisfaction problems of reducts of finitely bounded homogeneous structures: the first one states that tractability of the CSP of such a structure is, when the structure is a model-complete core, equivalent to its polymorphism clone satisfying a certain nontrivial linear identity modulo outer embeddings. The second conjecture, challenging the approach via model-complete cores by reflections, states that tractability is equivalent to the linear identities satisfied by its polymorphisms clone, together with the natural uniformity (...) on it, being nontrivial. We prove that the identities satisfied in the polymorphism clone of a structure allow for conclusions about the orbit growth of its automorphism group, and apply this to show that the two conjectures are equivalent. We contrast this with a counterexample showing that [Formula: see text]-categoricity alone is insufficient to imply the equivalence of the two conditions above in a model-complete core. Taking another approach, we then show how the Ramsey property of a homogeneous structure can be utilized for obtaining a similar equivalence under different conditions. We then prove that any polymorphism of sufficiently large arity which is totally symmetric modulo outer embeddings of a finitely bounded structure can be turned into a nontrivial system of linear identities, and obtain nontrivial linear identities for all tractable cases of reducts of the rational order, the random graph, and the random poset. Finally, we provide a new and short proof, in the language of monoids, of the theorem stating that every [Formula: see text]-categorical structure is homomorphically equivalent to a model-complete core. (shrink)

"Ernest Nagel's work, _The Structure of Science_, has earned for itself the status of an outstanding standard work in its field. It offers an exceptionally thorough and comprehensive methodological and philosophical exploration encountered in those diverse fields. Nagel's discussion is distinguished by the lucidity of its style, the incisiveness of its reasoning, and the solidity of its grounding in all the major branches of scientific inquiry. _The Structure of Science_ has become a highly influential work that is widely invoked in (...) the methodological and philosophical literature. Recent controversies between analytics and historic-sociological approaches to the philosophy of science have not diminished its significance; in fact, it seems to me that the pragmatist component in Nagel's thinking may be helpful for efforts to develop a rapprochement between the contending schools." --Carl G. Hempel. (shrink)

Structuralism is one of the most popular contemporary accounts of mathematics. Despite its popularity, it has been challenged on the grounds of consistency. In this paper, I show that existing arguments purporting to establish an inconsistency miss the mark. I then proceed to develop a new argument against realist structuralism, to show that the commitment to mathematical pluralism and the structural identity criterion embraced by the realist structuralist jointly entail a contradiction.

Recent work by Frigg et. al. and Mayo-Wilson have called attention to a particular sort of error associated with attempts to model certain complex systems: structural modeling error. The assessment of the degree of SME in a model presupposes agreement between modelers about the best way to individuate natural systems, an agreement which can be more problematic than it appears. This problem, which we dub “the system individuation problem” arises in many of the same contexts as SME, and (...) the two often compound one another. This paper explores the common roots of the two problems in concerns about the precision of predictions generated by scientific models, and discusses how both concerns bear on the study of complex natural systems, particularly the global climate. (shrink)

The central problem of social theory is 'structure and agency'. How do the objective features of society influence human agents? Determinism is not the answer, nor is conditioning as currently conceptualised. It accentuates the way structure and culture shape the social context in which individuals operate, but it neglects our personal capacity to define what we care about most and to establish a modus vivendi expressive of our concerns. Through inner dialogue, 'the internal conversation', individuals reflect upon their social (...) situation in the light of current concerns and projects. On the basis of a series of unique, in-depth interviews, Archer identifies three distinctive forms of internal conversation. These govern agents' responses to social conditioning, their individual patterns of social mobility and whether or not they contribute to social stability or change. Thus the internal conversation is seen as being the missing link between society and the individual, structure and agency. (shrink)

It is proposed that there are important generalizations about problem solving in design activity that reach across specific disciplines. A framework for the study of design is presented that (a) characterizes design as a radial category and fleshes out the task environment of the prototypical cases; (b) takes the task environment seriously; (c) shows that this task environment occurs in design tasks, but does not occur in every nondesign task; (d) explicates the impact of this task environment on the (...) design problem space; and (e) demonstrates that, given the structure of the information-processing system, the features noted in the problem spaces of design tasks will not all occur in problem spaces where the task environment is vastly different. This analysis leads to the claim that there are a set of invariant features in the problem spaces of design situations that collectively constitute a design problem space. Protocol studies are reported in which the problem spaces of three design tasks in architecture, mechanical engineering, and instructional design are explored and compared with several protocols from nondesign problem-solving tasks. (shrink)

Structural Omission, originated by Deborah Scott, is a framework in contemporary realist painting that addresses the limits of observation, perception, and knowing. It is not an abstract theory but a practice formalized through three principles—Ground (Perceptual Limits), Structure (Structural Incompleteness), and Consequence (Narrative Without Resolution). It organizes painting around what can be seen and what remains beyond reach, holding the known and the unknowable together. This paper defines Structural Omission as an epistemological framework that repositions realism after the collapse of (...) certainty. By connecting art practice to the philosophical problem of incomplete knowledge, it proposes that absence within representation can operate as load-bearing structure rather than deficiency. Drawing on thinkers such as Michael Fried, Jacques Rancière, Roland Barthes, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the text argues that Structural Omission offers realism a conceptual survival strategy in an era of algorithmic completion and digital closure. (shrink)

A unique multilevel perspective-structural social psychology-is explicated to help build theoretical bridges between micro and macro levels of analysis in sociology. The perspective portrays actors (human or corporate) as having minimal properties of purposiveness and responsiveness, encounters as interaction episodes between multiple actors, microstructures as local patterns of interaction emerging from and subsequently influencing encounters, and macrostructures as networks of social positions. These levels of analysis are connected via mutually contingent processes. Applying these assumptions, we illustrate the ability of the (...) framework to strengthen the macrosociological import of micro theories of power, status, and justice. We argue that structural social psychology is an important metatheoretical strategy for developing testable connections between individual and collective units of sociological analysis. (shrink)

Structures without time and dynamics are considered. The principle is proposed how to build space-time in a structure without time and dynamics. It is found what can be objects in such a space-time, and what can be an interaction between such objects.Within the framework of the considered class of structures, answers were found to the following problems of philosophy and physics: the nature of consciousness and the connection between the body and consciousness (mind-body problem), nature of time, (...) anthropic principle and the problem of fine-tuning the universe, the effectiveness of mathematics in describing physical phenomena, limits of knowledge.The considered class of structures makes it possible to find answers to questions that cannot be answered for our Universe. This shows the fundamental possibility of finding answers to these questions for our Universe as well. (shrink)

Ante rem structuralism is the doctnne that mathematics descubes a realm of abstract (structural) universab. According to its proponents, appeal to the exutence of these universab provides a source distinctive insight into the epistemology of mathematics, in particular insight into the so-called 'access problem' of explaining how mathematicians can reliably access truths about an abstract realm to which they cannot travel andfiom which they recave no signab. Stewart Shapiro offers the most developed version of this view to date. Through (...) an examination of Shapiro's proposed structuralist epistemology for mathematics I argue that ante rem structuralism faib to provide the ingredients for a satisfactory resolution of the access problem for infinite structures (whether small or large). (shrink)

This chapter discusses the problem of structure and agency. Structure and agency inescapably contradict each other so that sociological analysis perpetually undermines itself. Ironically, this situation arose out of the development of sociology as a discipline. This chapter shows a way out of this problem by presenting the picture given by the concepts of structure and agency as a case of forced perspective inducing of a loss of depth in sociological imagination. We can correct this optical illusion by (...) adopting metric/nonmetric in place of structure/agency as guiding distinction. To assemble the metric/nonmetric distinction, we have to operationalize the structure/agency distinction as well as the micro/macro distinction and the individual/society distinction: none of these distinctions applies universally; they all vary from context to context. The metric/nonmetric distinction offers the means for reconstituting these variations and for restoring the perception of depth as the difference in modalities between cases. (shrink)

Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem, and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.

Some philosophers have offered structural representations as an alternative to indicator-based representations. Motivating these philosophers is the belief that an indication-based analysis of representation exhibits two fatal inadequacies from which structural representations are spared: such an analysis cannot account for the causal role of representational content and cannot explain how representational content can be made determinate. In fact, we argue, indicator and structural representations are on a par with respect to these two problems. This should not be surprising, we contend, (...) given that the distinction between indicator and structural representations is better conceived as one involving degree rather than kind. (shrink)

Recent philosophical work has praised the reward structure of science, while recent empirical work has shown that many scientific results may not be reproducible. I argue that the reward structure of science incentivizes scientists to focus on speed and impact at the expense of the reproducibility of their work, thus contributing to the so-called reproducibility crisis. I use a rational choice model to identify a set of sufficient conditions for this problem to arise, and I argue that these conditions (...) plausibly apply to a wide range of research situations. Currently proposed solutions will not fully address this problem. Philosophical commentators should temper their optimism about the reward structure of science. (shrink)

Multiple criteria decision problems with one decision maker have been recognized and discussed in the recent literature in optimization theory, operations research and management science. The corresponding concept with n-decision makers, namely multicriteria n-person games, has not yet been extensively explored.In this paper we first demonstrate that existing solution concepts for single criterion n-person games in both normal form and characteristic function form induce domination structures (similar to those defined and studied by Yu [39] for multicriteria single decision maker (...) problems) in various spaces, including the payoff space, the imputation space and the coalition space. This discussion provides an understanding of some underlying assumptions of the solution concepts and provides a basis for generalizing and generating new solution concepts not yet defined. Also we illustrate that domination structures may be regarded as a measure of power held by the players.We then illustrate that a multicriteria problem can naturally arise in decision situations involving (partial) conflict among n-persons. Using our discussion of solution concepts for single criterion games as a basis, various approaches for resolving both normal form and characteristic function form multicriteria n-person games are proposed. For multicriteria games in characteristic function form, we define a multicriteria core and show that there exists a single ‘game point’ whose core is equal to the multicriteria core. If we reduce a multicriteria game to a single criterion game, domination structures which are more general than ‘classical’ ones must be considered, otherwise some crucial information in the game may be lost. Finally, we discuss a parametrization process which, for a given multicriteria game, associates a single criterion game to each point in a parametric space. This parametrization provides a basis for the discussion of solution concepts in multicriteria n-person games. (shrink)

The study of MOD Structures is new and innovative. The authors in this book propose several problems on MOD Structures, some of which are at the research level.

With this third edition of Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appear ance, we are pleased to make available once more one of the most in fluential and important works in the philosophy of our times. Professor Geoffrey Hellman's introduction gives a sustained analysis and appreciation of the major themes and the thrust of the book, as well as an account of the ways in which many of Goodman's problems and projects have been picked up and developed by others. Hellman also (...) suggests how The Structure of Appearance introduces issues which Goodman later continues in his essays and in the Languages of Art. There remains the task of understanding Good man's project as a whole; to see the deep continuities of his thought, as it ranges from logic to epistemology, to science and art; to see it therefore as a complex yet coherent theory of human cognition and practice. What we can only hope to suggest, in this note, is the b. road Significance of Goodman's apparently technical work for philosophers, scientists and humanists. One may say of Nelson Goodman that his bite is worse than his bark. Behind what appears as a cool and methodical analysis of the conditions of the construction of systems, there lurks a radical and disturbing thesis: that the world is, in itself, no more one way than another, nor are we. It depends on the ways in which we take it, and on what we do. (shrink)

The program of “neurophenomenal structuralism” is presented as an agenda for a genuine structuralist neuroscience of consciousness that seeks to understand specific phenomenal experiences as strictly relational affairs. The paper covers a broad range of topics. It starts from considerations about neural change detection and relational coding that motivate a solution of the Newman problem of the brain in terms of spatiotemporal relations. Next, phenomenal quality spaces and their Q-structures are discussed. Neurophenomenal structuralism proclaims a homomorphic mapping of (...) the structures of self-organized neural maps in the brain onto Q-structures, and it will be demonstrated how this leads to a new and special version of structural representationalism about phenomenal content. A methodological implication of neurophenomenal structuralism is that it proposes measurement procedures that focus on the relationships between different stimuli (as, for instance, similarity ratings or representational geometry methods). Finally, it will be shown that neurophenomenal structuralism also has strong philosophical implications, as it leads to holism about phenomenal experiences and serves to reject inverted qualia scenarios. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the objection to British structural-functionalism that it is unable to deal with the significance of individuals. There are various ways in which individuals may pose a problem for it. I identify four ways, one of which is novel. This way is when someone does not appear to meet the official role requirements in an organization, which gives rise to the question of whether the anthropologist should posit an alternative structure of roles for the organization.

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the (...) debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems. (shrink)

Phenomenal structuralism marks a significant shift in the study of consciousness, emphasizing the relational properties of experiential qualities rather than their intrinsic properties. This approach highlights how subjective qualities are organized and related, proposing that these structural relationships individuate such qualities within a multidimensional space. This paper focuses on the core tenets of phenomenal structuralism, particularly its commitment to holism, and the challenges it poses for comparing experiences both between and within subjects. These challenges cast serious doubt on whether similar (...) qualitative experiences are possible across different individuals or over time. This issue is especially concerning in cases like pain, which has important ethical implications. While phenomenal structuralism successfully illuminates the relational nature of qualities, it fails to adequately account for shared aspects of qualitative experience and the possibility that different sets of qualities might lead to the same discriminations. The paper concludes by considering alternative approaches, such as representationalism, which might preserve the strengths of phenomenal structuralism without its problematic consequences. This critique calls for further investigation into how qualitative experiences can be rigorously understood without invoking intrinsic properties in mental states. (shrink)

We establish that the isomorphism problem for the classes of computable nilpotent rings, distributive lattices, nilpotent groups, and nilpotent semigroups is \-complete, which is as complicated as possible. The method we use is based on uniform effective interpretations of computable binary relations into computable structures from the corresponding algebraic classes.

The problem of structure and agency has been the subject of intense debate in the social sciences for over 100 years. This book offers a solution. Using a critical realist version of the theory of emergence, Dave Elder-Vass argues that, instead of ascribing causal significance to an abstract notion of social structure or a monolithic concept of society, we must recognise that it is specific groups of people that have social structural power. Some of these groups are entities with (...) emergent causal powers, distinct from those of human individuals. Yet these powers also depend on the contributions of human individuals, and this book examines the mechanisms through which interactions between human individuals generate the causal powers of some types of social structures. The Causal Power of Social Structures makes particularly important contributions to the theory of human agency and to our understanding of normative institutions. (shrink)

Two widespread assumptions concerning networks, including guanxi networks, are that they function in terms of trust relations and that their structure is dyadic. This article subjects both assumptions to critical assessment and proposes alternative formulations. When the distinctions between trust and trustworthiness and between trust and assurance are made, then broader understandings of guanxi relationships emerge. The article shows that the assurance mechanism of guanxi is public exposure of transgressions against network norms, leading to the transgressor’s loss of face (mianzi). (...) The necessity of third-party intervention of this type, typically but not exclusively through gossip, indicates the triadic rather than dyadic structure of guanxi relationships when sanction of reputation is included in the conceptualization of guanxi. Changes in guanxi during economic transition in China, from strong-to weaker-tie associations, require careful consideration of the changing nature of the mechanisms of face-loss. (shrink)

Temporal structure contains geometric structure. When a recurrent neural network is driven by structured sensory input, delay coordinate embedding theory shows that its internal state develops a geometry preserving the relational organization of the environment it tracks. The mechanism mathematically specifies not only where this geometry is faithful but where it must distort. Prediction error and environmental separability together set a resolution floor that maps onto metamers, categorical perception, and discrimination thresholds. This paper develops DCE as a candidate computational mechanism (...) for structuralist quality spaces, addressing exploitation criteria, Shea's misrepresentation requirement, and Kleiner and Hoel's lenient dependency. The results are conditional on an empirical hypothesis about cortical implementation; nine failure-mode predictions test both the hypothesis and the structuralist implications simultaneously. The implications for the Newman problem and for process ontology are developed. The invariance condition that generates the geometry is identical to the equation that defines the system's predictive function; this raises questions about the separation of structure from function presupposed by both structuralist and functionalist programs. (shrink)