Monadic second order logic and linear temporal logic are two logical formalisms that can be used to describe classes of infinite words, i.e., first-order models based on the natural numbers with order, successor, and finitely many unary predicate symbols.Monadic second order logic over infinite words can alternatively be described as a first-order logic interpreted in${\cal P}\left$, the power set Boolean algebra of the natural numbers, equipped with modal operators for ‘initial’, ‘next’, and ‘future’ states. We prove that the first-order theory (...) of this structure is the model companion of a class of algebras corresponding to a version of linear temporal logic without until.The proof makes crucial use of two classical, nontrivial results from the literature, namely the completeness of LTL with respect to the natural numbers, and the correspondence between S1S-formulas and Büchi automata. (shrink)

This paper constructs a cirquent calculus system and proves its soundness and completeness with respect to the semantics of computability logic. The logical vocabulary of the system consists of negation \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\neg}}$$\end{document}, parallel conjunction \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\wedge}}$$\end{document}, parallel disjunction \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\vee}}$$\end{document}, branching recurrence ⫰, and branching corecurrence ⫯. The article is published in two parts, with (the previous) (...) Part I containing preliminaries and a soundness proof, and (the present) Part II containing a completeness proof. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes (...) as if primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

Primary care presents distressful moral problems for nurse practitioners (NPs) who report frustration, powerlessness, changing jobs and leaving advanced practice. The purpose of this grounded theory study was to describe the process NPs use to manage moral problems common to primary care. Twenty-three NPs were interviewed, commenting on hypothetical situations depicting ethical issues common to primary care. Coding was conducted using a constant comparative method. A theory of maintaining moral integrity emerged consisting of the phases of encountering (...) conflict, drawing a line, finding a way without crossing the line, and evaluating actions. The NPs varied in their awareness and the discord encountered in conflict, and in clarity, flexibility and justification of the line drawn. A critical juncture occurred when NPs evaluated how well integrity had been maintained. Some experienced no distress while others experienced self-doubt, regret, outrage and frustration at external constraints, and attempted to reconcile through avoiding, convincing themselves, and compensating. (shrink)

The first half of this review article on Locke on primary and secondary qualities leads up to a fairly straightforward reading of what Locke says about the distinction in Essay II.viii, one that, in its general outlines, represents a sympathetic understanding of Locke’s discussion. The second half of the paper turns to consider a few of the ways in which interpreting Locke on primary and secondary qualities has proven more complicated. Here we take up what is sometimes called (...) the Berkeleyan interpretation of Locke, the understanding of Locke’s resemblance thesis, and Locke’s views of qualities and their relationship to powers. (shrink)

The capability approach to distributive justice, as defended by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, represents perhaps the most influential recent attempt to reconcile the competing demands of liberty and equality. Specifically, capability theorists have claimed that their insistence on the universal cultivation of a set of capabilities for basic human “functionings” is fully consistent with a liberal neutrality commitment. Their reason is that these capabilities are, like Rawls's primary goods, rational to want “whatever else one wants.” This article suggests, (...) in contrast, that the capability approach fails to satisfy the neutrality requirement endorsed by both Sen and Nussbaum. It further suggests that the non-neutral character of the approach reflects its Rawlsian lineage, and raises serious doubts about the coherence of Rawls's account of primary goods. (shrink)

Michael J. Loux here presents a fresh reading of two of the most important books of the Metaphysics, Books Z and H, in which Aristotle presents his mature theory of primary substances. Focusing on the interplay of Aristotle's early and late views, Loux maintans that the later concept of ousia should be understood in terms of a theory of predication that carries interesting implications for contemporary metaphysics. Loux argues that in his first attempt in identifying ousiai in the Categories, (...) Aristotle encountered a set of ontological problems which he wrestled with again in Metaphysics Z and H. In the Categories, where the primary realities are basic subjects of predication construed in essentialist terms as things falling under natural kinds, familiar particulars are the primary ousiai. In subsequent works, Aristotle holds that since familiar particulars come into being and pass away, they must be composites of matter and form; and in Metaphysics Z and H, he explores the implications of this insight for the search for ousia. Maintaining that the substantial forms of familiar particulars are the primary ousiai, the later Aristotle interprets forms as predicable universals rather than as particulars, each uniquely possessed by a single object. (shrink)

As characterized here, primary examples are universal judgements which make the connection between theory and natural language, and contribute to the instantiation of a theory or a whole research domain. They are segments of reasoning that are constructed from perceptual states had as part of wide-ranging experiences accessible to those thinkers who encounter primary examples. There are at least three traits that Primary Examples must have in order to be considered as such. Primary examples must be (...) pertinent to a theory, to the point of being fully inserted and implemented in the theory. Primary examples must exhibit generality, where generality is seen as the template for a general dynamic hidden in space-time and revealed by primary examples. Primary examples must be convincing, to the point that by nature of their perceptual states, their reasoning should prove undeniable, as opposed to abstract principles and notions. In order to prove the merit of primary examples, I will refer to the literature on objectivity in science and show how primary examples are employed in scientific experiments. (shrink)

Review of Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H, by Michael J. Loux (Cornell University Press: 1991).

The term 'primary health care' (PHC) has come into widespread use by policy-makers, managers and health professionals in the past two decades. There is a variety of definitions and an even wider variety of uses of the term. The purpose of this paper is to examine critically existing definitions and uses, with a particular focus on their usefulness in health policy, clinical practice and research relating to health care systems. The paper has three parts. First, we examine the principal (...) types of definition and identify core features of primary care common to most definitions. Second, we discuss the application of these criteria to a range of services in the UK National Health Service (NHS). Lastly, we examine the ways in which policymakers, health professionals, researchers and lay people use the term, also drawing primarily on UK experience. We conclude by reflecting on the likelihood of achieving a single unambiguous definition and the usefulness of the term for different purposes. (shrink)

Fourteen newly commissioned essays trace the historical development of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which lies at the intersection of issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of perception. 'Primary and Secondary Qualities' focuses on the age of the Scientific Revolution, the 'locus classicus' of the distinction, but begins with chapters on ancient Greek and Scholastic accounts of qualities in an effort to identify its origins. The remainder of the volume is devoted to philosophical reflections on qualities (...) from the seventeenth century to the present day. Virtualliy every major figure is represented from Gassendi to Kant, and special attention is paid to Locke, Descartes, and Hume. The essays collected here cover a wide range of topics, including the foundation for the distinction, the question of whether it is lmetaphysical or merely epistemic, the status of secondary qualities, the nature of sensoriy representation, the relation between philosophy and science, the status of dispositions, and the semantics of sensible-quality terms"--Publisher's description, p. [4] of dust jacket. (shrink)

Psychopathology has highlighted the pivotal role of revelation in schizophrenic primary delusions. However, empirical studies on the topic remains limited. Therefore, this research aimed to explore the basic forms of subjectivity underpinning delusions in schizophrenia and to compare the experiential structure of these delusional phenomena with the experience of the sacred. The study involved eleven participants diagnosed with schizophrenia and adopted the qualitative methodology of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Participants’ accounts revealed four core experiential themes: 1) fragility of presence, (...) 2) disposition to delusion, 3) apophany, and 4) eccentric existential reorientation. Primary delusional experiences may constitute a state-like phenomenon unfolding in four structural phases toward the formation of delusional contents: 1) a weakened bodily resonance with the world, 2) a predominance of the “physiognomic” properties, 3) an imposition of idiosyncratic and self-referential meanings, and 4) an active elaboration through delusion-like ideas. Formal similarities may be found with the “numinous” experience and with the specific articulations of the manifestation of the sacred or “hierophany.” Disembodiment may be posited as the common underlying scaffolding for both delusions in schizophrenia and the sacred, albeit persistent and forced upon the subject in the former, and transient, voluntarily sought, and socio-culturally integrated in the latter. (shrink)

I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.

It has long been a philosophical problem to explain the commonly accepted distinction between two kinds of qualities: primary and secondary. While the roots of this debate can be traced back to Plato’s Euthyphro, it was John Locke who, more clearly than others, articulated the distinction and introduced the terms “primary quality” and “secondary quality.” Similar distinctions, under labels such as “primary affections,” “primary attributes,” or “original qualities,” also appear in the writings of earlier thinkers, including (...) Galileo Galilei, Robert Boyle, and René Descartes. This article’s focus is not on the historical development of the distinction, but rather on Crispin Wright’s contemporary and well-known “Judgment-Dependent” account of this distinction, which aims to provide a criterion for determining whether a quality should be regarded as secondary. -/- Metaphysically, a primary quality is often understood as a quality whose instantiation or existence is constituted, or metaphysically determined, by something independent of human responses formed under certain conditions, such as seeing, smelling, or touching. Typical examples include shape, extension, motion, solidity, and number. These qualities are said to be objective because, for instance, if an object’s surface is square-shaped, it has this shape regardless of whether one perceives it as such. In other words, such qualities are mind-independent. Epistemologically, knowledge that an object’s surface is square-shaped is not infallible precisely because the fact that the object possesses this quality is independent of how one perceives it or what one believes about it. Therefore, even if one’s beliefs about these qualities are formed under optimal conditions, they can still be false. -/- By contrast, a secondary quality is one whose instantiation or existence depends on how one perceives, judges, or responds to it. Typical examples include color, taste, smell, and sound. Consequently, these qualities are often considered subjective. For example, whether an object is red appears to depend on how it looks or how one sees it under certain conditions. Thus, the quality of being red is said to be mind-dependent. Epistemologically, knowledge that an object is red can be infallible because the object’s having that quality depends on one’s perception: if one’s beliefs about these qualities are formed under optimal conditions, they will be guaranteed to be correct. -/- Wright’s judgment-dependent account offers a criterion for determining whether a given quality is treatable as secondary or “judgment-dependent,” as Wright prefers to call it. By employing this account, he aims to answer two fundamental questions: one metaphysical and one epistemological. If the account successfully shows that a quality is judgment-dependent, Wright can claim that facts about whether an object has that quality are metaphysically determined by the judgments of a suitable subject. The epistemological question, that is, how the subject knows such facts, is answered by appealing to the subject’s direct knowledge of her own judgments. In what follows, this account is introduced step by step and then applied to several crucial cases. (shrink)

Social studies content, with its difficult content and often inadequate sources, can pose challenges for students with disabilities. Though secondary sources, such as textbooks, are a popular choice for instruction, primary sources may provide a more authentic view of history. This study examines the experiences of a U.S. history teacher and their students, with and without disabilities, in engaging with primary source documents in a secondary history classroom. Through qualitative analysis, three overarching themes emerged: strategies for access, engagement, (...) and independence. The teacher employed various strategies such as guided questions and organization techniques to support student comprehension. Students, both with and without disabilities, preferred primary sources but acknowledged challenges in understanding them. The findings highlight the importance of Universal Design for Learning (UDL) principles and explicit instruction in literacy strategies and historical writing to enhance student comprehension and engagement with primary sources. Overall, this study underscores the value of primary sources in history education and the need for tailored instructional approaches to support student learning. (shrink)

Rwanda is a country that experienced the tragic genocide against Tutsi in 1994. In the aftermath of this, a number of initiatives were taken in the country for sustainable peace through reconstruction and reconciliation. In the education sector, peace and values education is part of the school curricula. The study at hand explores, through document analysis, the perspectives of peace education in primary school curricula of Rwanda. This study aims at explicit and implicit perspectives in which primary school (...) curricula reflect peace education. Though the identified perspectives seem to be promising as far as sustainable peace education is concerned, further empirical studies are recommended to explore how the stated topics, values and teaching methods are put into practice in teaching and learning process. (shrink)

The primary objects of hearing are sounds: everything we hear we hear by hearing a sound. (This claim differs from Berkeley’s that we hear only sounds and from Aristotle’s that we only hear sounds.) Colored regions are primary objects of sight, and pressure resistant regions are primary objects of perception by touch. By definition, the primary objects of perception are physical. The properties of the primary objects of perception are exactly the properties sense-datum theories attribute (...) to sense-data. Indirect Realism holds that awareness of sense-data (or something similar) mediates our perception of primary objects. Direct Realism denies this. The question when the perception of a primary object, such as parts of the surfaces of a hat and coat, is thereby the perception of a non-primary object, such as a person, is independent of the disagreement between Direct and Indirect Realism. (shrink)

Descartes’ derivation of the primary qualities of matter and their role in explaining observed physical phenomena are briefly reviewed. The lesson drawn from Descartes’ methodology of explanation is that we ought to aim to reduce complex phenomena to simple unifying principles and conceptual primitives. Three proposed solutions to the apparent paradoxes in contemporary quantum physics (primarily associated with the notion of entanglement) are briefly compared with lessons taken from Descartes. It is argued that further research in this field should (...) provide criteria for selecting modifications to the standard (largely Cartesian) conceptual scheme, along the lines of either visualisable causality or the physical spatial separability of all material objects. (shrink)

The paper argues for realism in quantum mechanics. Specifically, the formalism of quantum mechanics should be understood as giving a complete description of quantum situations. When it is understood in this way, traditional primary properties of matter can be seen as similar to traditional secondary properties, though at a different level.

Rawls's Difference Principle holds that basic social institutions are just if they maximize the worst-off individual's potential welfare, which depends on the vector of amounts of “primary goods.” As Rawls recognized, the multiplicity of primary goods poses an index number problem. This paper uses the machinery of social choice to characterize the class of procedures for aggregating quantities of several primary goods into a composite ordinal index that are consistent with Rawls's analysis. Only very simple and unattractive (...) aggregation methods in which the various primary goods play roles of radically different magnitudes are compatible with Rawls's argument. (shrink)

Certain problems with standard two-dimensional semantics are addressed and cases in which these problems arise explored. In such cases the primary intension cannot be univocally mapped in one and only one indexical world, thus standard two-dimensional semantics cannot efficiently address the problems presented. Subsequently, a modified model is presented which leads these problems to be averted in the replicated cases. This modified model admits primary intensions that are not univocally mapped. The conclusion discusses the advantages and disadvantages of (...) the modified model and analyzes its possible consequences for the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

With the exception of solidity, Locke's list of primary qualities matches his list of ideas of "divers senses," that is, ideas that are perceived in multiple sensory modalities. I argue that for these ideas, the fact that they are robust in our sensory experience in a way that single-modality ideas are not provides the main reason for taking them to be ideas of primary qualities. Solidity, however, is taken as primary because it is ineliminable from experience in (...) a way that other ideas are not, and because the multiply-sensed ideas are all tied to it. Since solidity is experienced through touch, Locke is thus offering us an account of primary quality perception grounded in our embodied interaction with the world. (shrink)

In confirmation of the conclusions of Ch. 11, examination of the principal relevant texts from the period 1685–1704 shows that Leibnizian primary matter is not an ultimate substratum or subject of properties, but only an aspect of, and abstraction from, such a subject or substance. Specifically it is the passive principle in the essence or primitive force of an unextended, perceiving substance, and all its operations are aspects of the perceptual operation of the substance.

While Chile's partial decriminalization of abortion in 2017 was a long overdue recognition of women's sexual and reproductive rights, nearly four years later the caseload remains well below expectations. This pattern is the product of standing barriers in access to abortion‐related health services, especially at the primary care point of entry. This study seeks to identify and describe these barriers. The findings presented here were obtained through a qualitative, exploratory study based on 19 semi‐structured interviews with relevant actors identified (...) through non‐random sampling and snowballing techniques. Coding was inductive and complemented by semantic content analysis. The authors find that the key barriers in primary care to accessing legal abortion are unfamiliarity with the law, insufficient practitioner training, intersectoral discrimination, and the stigma surrounding abortion. They conclude that the government needs to exercise its constitutional mandate as guarantor of public health and act promptly to safeguard and guarantee the abortion rights of Chilean women. (shrink)

In The Primary Way, the distinguished scholar of Chinese philosophy Chung-ying Cheng synthesizes his lifetime of work on the Yijing, also known as the I Ching or Book of Changes--Back cover.

Once dismissed as vestigial organelles, primary cilia have garnered the interest of scientists, given their importance in development/signaling, and for their implication in a new disease category known as ciliopathies. However, many, if not all, “cilia” proteins also have locations/functions outside of the primary cilium. These extraciliary functions can complicate the interpretation of a particular ciliopathy phenotype: it may be a result of defects at the cilium and/or at extraciliary locations, and it could be broadly related to a (...) unifying cellular process for these proteins, such as polarity. Assembly of a cilium has many similarities to the development of other polarized structures. This evolutionarily preserved process for the assembly of polarized cell structures offers a perspective on how the cilium may have evolved. We hypothesize that cilia proteins are critical for cell polarity, and that core polarity proteins may have been specialized to form various cellular protrusions, including primary cilia. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to give an account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in a way which allows the distinction a useful place in an explanation of scientific enquiry. this is done by modifying certain of locke's criteria for primacy, and by showing that this procedure has certain advantages over keith campbell's account of the distinction. in particular, i argue that primary qualities cannot be specified in a theory-neutral way, and that this has (...) important consequences for an account of scientific observation and the relation between the scientific and everyday images of the world. (shrink)

The new system of axioms we propose is based on the foundational theory of De Giorgi et al. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Preprints di Matematica 26: 1 (1996) slightly modified. In that paper (which is dedicated to a new axiomatic framework for mathematics, informatics and logic) the authors use two kinds of primitive notions: relations and qualities. Since their system is based on the distribution paradigm, they start from distinction. We propose to shift the perspective and to start from (...) unity and then from within unity to pass to distinction; to this end we apply ideas of Lesniewski, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series 44 (1992). We introduce only one kind of entity as a primitive notion, namely relations, and treat qualities as articulations of relations. The new concept of "primary relation" permits the introduction of a dynamic, non-standard form of identity, which we hope will find application in various fields where self-referential structures are required. (shrink)

The primary problems of philosophy are those "whose answers directly bear on our lives." Scriven believes definitive answers to primary questions can be given and justified, and he gives his answers in a straightforward, vigorous, no-holds-barred manner: judgments of greatness in art are usually best construed as expressions of personal preference; there is no God; "man is not just an animal or a machine, but yet he is an animal and a machine"; brain determinism is in no way (...) incompatible with free choice; it is rational to be moral. The work is intended as an introductory text, and could be good as such, despite the tendency for arguments to give way to sermons. The student would be forced to come to grips with philosophical questions by coming to grips with Scriven. Since alternative positions are not always indicated or presented in the strongest light, there is something left for the teacher to do.—A. E. J. (shrink)

The arguments advanced in this paper are the following. Firstly, that just as Trevarthen’s three subjective/intersubjective levels, primary, secondary, and tertiary, mapped out different modes of access, so too response is similarly structured, from direct primordial responsiveness, to that informed by shared pragmatic concerns and narrative contexts, to that which demands the distantiation afforded by representation. Secondly, I propose that empathy is an essential mode of intentionality, integral to the primary level of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, which is crucial to our (...) survival as individuals and as a species. Further to this last point, I argue that empathy is not derived on the basis of intersubjectivity, nor does it merely disclose intersubjectivity, rather it is constitutive of intersubjectivity at the primary level. Empathy is a direct, irreducible intentionality separable in thought from the other primary intentional modes of perception, rationality, memory and imagination, but co-arising with these. In regard to the inter-personal level, the concrete relations with others, primary empathy is both the ground for the possibility of the secondary manifestations—pity, sympathy, perspective taking, etc., and motivates them. Thirdly, it is the movement in the core of subjectivity initially generated by shifting attention between the ‘I’ and ‘we’ perspectives and later ‘solidified’ through affect to become shifting identification, which opens up the intersubjective domain. So we can affirm that we are not only born into sociality but our sociality goes to the roots of our being as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have claimed. (shrink)

Primary amoebic meningoencephalitis (PAM) or “brain-eating amoeba disease” is a relatively rare but typically fatal infectious disease of increasing global concern. Discovery of PAM and that Naegleria fowleri is the causative agent responsible are frequently credited to a paper published by the Australian pathologists Malcolm Fowler and Rodney F. Carter in 1965. It was significant as confirmation of an earlier suspicion that free-living, non-parasitic amoebae may be opportunistic pathogens of the human central nervous system. Like many discoveries, however, the (...) historical details are rather more complicated and involved a number of researchers and clinicians working over a decade from 1958 to 1971. Philosophical accounts of scientific discovery since Kuhn (Science, 136, 760–764, 1962) agree that discovery requires both recognition that something exists and understanding what it is. But there is little agreement about how much or what kind of understanding is required. This paper (i) excavates the complex array of observations, inferences, experiments, re-evaluations, and public statements by a number of scientific researchers and physicians that collectively resulted in the recognition of PAM as a novel form of central nervous system infection caused by a novel species of free-living amoeba; and (ii) considers how well several recent accounts of discovery apply to these achievements. (shrink)

This is a linguistic study of two primary metaphors with the same target-domain concept, “IMPORTANCE IS SIZE” and “IMPORTANCE IS WEIGHT,” in English and Chinese. It is suggested that these two primary metaphors are derived from the OBJECT image schema, abstracted from our embodied, sensorimotor experience, especially our visual and tactile perception, in dealing with physical objects in everyday life. The study focuses on size and weight adjectives in both languages and on linguistic evidence in two areas: their (...) lexicalizations of the importance senses as found in the dictionaries, and their roles in the instantiation of the two primary metaphors in natural discourse as found in the corpora. Our further analysis also shows that the primary metaphors can be manifested without explicit use of size and weight words when relevant conceptual frames in the source, evoked by other words or images, are mapped onto the target domain, thus activating the relevant region of our encyclopedic knowledge and triggering off the primary metaphors in our conceptual system. We also construct a hypothetical mapping scheme for primary metaphors based on the OBJECT image schema, in which OBJECT is mapped onto its target via three of its fundamental dimensions: SIZE, WEIGHT, and SOLIDITY. It is hoped that this mapping scheme will benefit future comparative studies of primary metaphors across languages and cultures in a more systematic way. (shrink)

Introduction in chapter viii of book ii of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke provides various putative lists of primary qualities. Insofar as they have considered the variation across Locke's lists at all, commentators have usually been content simply either to consider a self-consciously abbreviated list (e.g., "Size, Shape, etc.") or a composite list as the list of Lockean primary qualities, truncating such a composite list only by omitting supposedly co-referential terms. Doing the latter with minimal judgment (...) about what terms are co-referential gives us the following list of eleven qualities (in the order in which they appear in this chapter of the Essay): solidity, extension, figure, mobility, motion or rest, number, bulk, texture, motion, size, and situation. Perhaps surprisingly given the attention to the primary/secondary distinction since Locke, Locke's primary qualities themselves have received little more than passing mention in the bulk of the subsequent literature. In particular, no discussion both offers an interpretation of Locke's conception of primary qualities and makes sense of Locke's various lists as lists of primary qualities. A central motivation for this paper is the idea that these two tasks are not independent. (shrink)

This article addresses primary and universal ousia, the first level of the intelligible, in Plotinus’ metaphysics. In Treatise 43 (6.2), Plotinus argues that the five ‘great kinds’ of the Sophist constitute its exclusive ‘completives’ (τὰ συµπληρωτικὰ τῆς οὐσίας); species only appear later within the intelligible realm, at the level of particular ousiai. The relationship between universal Intellect and particular intellects therefore finds an exact correspondence in the connection between primary ousia and particular ousiai within the intelligible realm. Plotinus’ (...) innovative ontology thus integrates the heritage of the Sophist while breaking with the Aristotelian model connecting genus and species. (shrink)

The understanding of the primary-secondary quality distinction has shifted focus from the mechanical philosophers’ proposal of primary qualities as explanatorily fundamental to current theorists’ proposal of secondary qualities as metaphysically perceiver dependent. The chapter critically examines this shift and current arguments to uphold the primary-secondary quality distinction on the basis of the perceiver dependence of color; one focus of the discussion is the role of qualia in these arguments. It then describes and criticizes reasons for characterizing color, (...) smell, taste, sound, and warmth and color as secondary qualities on the basis of our commonsense divisions among sensory modalities; Grice’s proposal for distinguishing among the sensory modalities is focal here. The general conclusion is that reasons for drawing the primary-secondary quality distinction are unconvincing. (shrink)

1. The distinction between primary and secondary rules is frequently used both in general legal theory and in specific legal disciplines. But the use that is made of it is far from stable, it varie...

Primary Science Education: A Teacher's Toolkit is an accessible and comprehensive guide to primary school science education and its effective practice in the classroom. Primary Science Education is structured in two parts: Planning for Science and Primary Science in the Classroom. Each chapter covers fundamental topics, such as: curriculum requirements (including the Australian Curriculum and Australian Professional Standards for Teachers); preparing effective learning sequences with embedded authentic assessment; combining science learning with other learning areas, such as (...) technologies and STEM; and critically analysing the teacher's role in the classroom. The text features short-answer and 'Bringing it Together' questions to encourage readers to consolidate their understanding of key themes. Case studies throughout provide guidance on the classroom experience and Teacher Background Information boxes explore topics where more in-depth knowledge is required. The book is supported by a suite of online resources, including interviews with Australian primary teachers and students, and downloadable activities. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are simple, (...) valid and (in one case) persuasive as well. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between epistemic and ontic divisions of qualities into primary and secondary. It identifies two functions which ontic division has been called upon to fulfill - setting the limits on what a realist philosophy of science must achieve, And providing a means of judging between rival realist philosophies of science. It argues for an interaction pattern criterion of primacy, And concludes that while this enables the first function to be achieved, No primary/secondary distinction can fulfill the (...) second. (shrink)

SummaryFor the study of the first year of life, Sander, Stern, and Gomez each chose the adult–infant relationship as the unit of analysis; they followed its development, respectively, in moments of meeting, in the proto-conversation and in the focus of attention. The authors explicitly refer to the Gestalt theory and support the need to interpret the behavior of the child as part of a wider context, as the experiences of a person in relation (Galli, 2010) since birth.