According to the popular-choice theory of secession, the inhabitants of any territory, as a group, should have an internationally recognized right to secede from a sovereign state if their majority chooses by referendum to do so, and if they are capable of sustaining legitimate state institutions. Prior efforts to defend this group right on individualistic grounds—such as the individual right to associate freely or to participate as an equal in democratic decision-making—have failed. As a result, some recent defenders of (...) the choice theory have suggested that the group right the theory implies is “irreducibly collective.” I argue, to the contrary, that this group right can be grounded fully in the fundamental right of each individual to be treated as an equal by the political institutions to which he is subject. The territorial implications of the choice theory are, moreover, consistent with a plausible account of the territorial rights of states. (shrink)

Central to politicized academic projects such as cultural studies and politicized work in cultural theory and philosophy is a critique of the cultural power of institutions—pedagogical institutions...

In a recent paper devoted to my topic, music and morality, my fellow philosopher of music Peter Kivy makes a helpful tripartite distinction among ways in which music could be said to have moral force. The first is by embodying and conveying moral insight; Kivy labels that epistemic moral force. The second is by having a positive moral effect on behavior; Kivy labels that behavioral moral force. And the third is by impacting positively on character so as to make someone (...) a better human being; Kivy labels that character-building moral force. (shrink)

Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular theories to which they subscribe and increase burdens of justification for proponents of alternative theories. Responses of participants in ten focus groups indicate strong consensus on basic points. Participants strongly believe they have political obligations, although they make exceptions for particular laws, which seem to them to serve no real social purpose. They (...) ground their obligations on benefits provided by the state, and strongly connect up their own requirements to obey the law with requirements that all other people behave similarly. The moral principle that appears to coincide most closely with their views is a variant of the principle of fairness. (shrink)

Originally published in 1928, this book contains a general introduction to the science of map reading. Laborde builds on the materials he used to teach the subject at Harrow School to create a thoroughly illustrated and practical guide to maps, their creation and their decipherment. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of cartography or the history of education.

This book presents a new explanation of the rise, development and demise of social movements and cycles of protest in autocracies; the conditions under which protest becomes rebellion; and the impact of protest and rebellion on democratization. Focusing on poor indigenous villages in Mexico's authoritarian regime, the book shows that the spread of US Protestant missionaries and the competition for indigenous souls motivated the Catholic Church to become a major promoter of indigenous movements for land redistribution and indigenous rights. The (...) book explains why the outbreak of local rebellions, the transformation of indigenous claims for land into demands for ethnic autonomy and self-determination, and the threat of a generalized social uprising motivated national elites to democratize. Drawing on an original dataset of indigenous collective action and on extensive fieldwork, the empirical analysis of the book combines quantitative evidence with case studies and life histories. (shrink)

Popular sovereignty is one of the most widespread but poorly understood notions in modern politics. Exalted as the highest principle of democratic legitimacy, the idea of popular sovereignty has been given various but broadly similar formulations....

Popular sovereignty - the doctrine that the public powers of state originate in a concessive grant of power from 'the people' - is perhaps the cardinal doctrine of modern constitutional theory, placing full constitutional authority in the people at large, rather than in the hands of judges, kings, or a political elite. Although its classic formulation is to be found in the major theoretical treatments of the modern state, such as in the treatises of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, this (...) book explores the intellectual origins of this doctrine and investigates its chief source in late medieval and early modern thought. Long regarded the principal source for modern legal reasoning, Roman law had a profound impact on the major architects of popular sovereignty such as François Hotman, Jean Bodin, and Hugo Grotius. Adopting the juridical language of obligations, property, and personality as well as the model of the Roman constitution, these jurists crafted a uniform theory that located the right of sovereignty in the people at large as the legal owners of state authority. In recovering the origins of popular sovereignty, the book demonstrates the importance of the Roman law as a chief source of modern constitutional thought. (shrink)

In this unconventional article, Sarah Banet-Weiser, Rosalind Gill and Catherine Rottenberg conduct a three-way ‘conversation’ in which they all take turns outlining how they understand the relationship among postfeminism, popular feminism and neoliberal feminism. It begins with a short introduction, and then Ros, Sarah and Catherine each define the term they have become associated with. This is followed by another round in which they discuss the overlaps, similarities and disjunctures among the terms, and the article ends with how each (...) one understands the current mediated feminist landscape. (shrink)

Digital data inundation has far-reaching implications for: disciplinary jurisdiction; the relationship between the academy, commerce and the state; and the very nature of the sociological imagination. Hitherto much of the discussion about these matters has tended to focus on ‘transactional’ data held within large and complex commercial and government databases. This emphasis has been quite understandable – such transactional data does indeed form a crucial part of the informational infrastructures that are now emerging. However, in recent years new sources of (...) data have become available that possess a rather different character. This is data generated in the cultural sphere, not only as a result of routine transactions with various digital media but also as a result of what some would want to view as a shift towards popular cultural forms dominated by processes of what has been termed prosumption. Our analytic focus here is on contemporary prosumption practices, digital technologies, the public life of data and the playful vitality of many of the ‘glossy topics’ that constitute contemporary popular culture. (shrink)

Building on Philip Tagg’s timely intervention (2011), I investigate four things in relation to three dominant Anglophone popular music studies journals (Popular Music and Society, Popular Music, and the Journal of Popular Music Studies): 1) what interdisciplinarity or multidisciplinarity means within popular music studies, with a particular focus on the sites of research and the place of ethnographic and/or anthropological approaches; 2) the extent to which popular music studies has developed canonic scholarship, and the (...) citation tendencies present within scholarship on both Western and non-Western popular musics; 3) the motivations for two scholarly groups, Dancecult and ASARP, to breakaway from popular music studies; 4) the forms of music analysis and the kinds of musical material commonly employed within popular music studies. I suggest that the field would greatly benefit from a true engagement with anthropological theories and methods, and that the “chaotic conceptualization” of musical structuration and the critical discourse would likewise benefit from an attention to recorded sound and production aesthetics. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that existing democracies might establish popular rule even if Joseph Schumpeter’s notoriously unflattering picture of ordinary citizens is accurate. Some degree of popular rule is in principle compatible with apathetic, ignorant and suggestible citizens, contrary to what Schumpeter and others have maintained. The people may have control over policy, and their control may constitute popular rule, even if citizens lack definite policy opinions and even if their opinions result in part from (...) elites’ efforts to manipulate these opinions. Thus, even a purely descriptive, ‘realist’ account of democracy of the kind that Schumpeter professed to offer may need to concede that there is no democracy without some degree of popular rule. (shrink)

Este texto busca abordar o pensamento de Rosa Luxemburgo a partir da idéia fundamental que sustenta toda sua concepção de política: a noção de que a participação ativa das massas é a base de qualquer processo político e é essencial nos processos revolucionários. Esta idéia nos encaminha para a compreensão da política em Rosa Luxemburgo como aquisição de autonomia popular e é também o cerne de suas idéias acerca de um modelo de socialismo democrático, atravessando sua obra como um (...) todo e repercutindo, até os dias de hoje, na dinâmica política de muitos movimentos sociais e em partes da esquerda contemporâneos. (shrink)

This short contribution argues that Professor Mark Tushnet’s scholarship has always been animated by his deep commitment to democratic ideals. Tushnet’s writings on different constitutional law topics reveal his consistent commitment to democracy as a foundational value of his constitutional thinking. As a constitutional law scholar, he is particularly interested in the concept of popular constitutionalism. The key feature of popular constitutionalism is that the people ultimately control the interpretation of constitutional law. In his own articulation of (...) class='Hi'>popular constitutionalism, Professor Tushnet seeks to retrieve and reinvent this prominent tradition of American constitutionalism. Building upon the work of Larry Kramer’s seminal historical account of popular constitutionalism, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, Professor Tushnet argues that one key feature of this model is that it is a dialogic process. The picture that emerges from the sketches of popular constitutionalism clearly reveals that Professor Tushnet’s conceptualization of popular constitutionalism is not the case against judicial review as such, or, even worse, against the courts and their independence. The core claim of his work is that judges are no better than citizens in making informed decisions about their political choices. (shrink)

What explains the continuity of legal systems over time? The existing accounts of continuity, I suggest, face various challenges. I consider five existing accounts: (1) the basic-norm-based account, (2) the rule-of-recognition-based account, (3) the state-based account, (4) the reasonableness-based account and (5) the official-recognition-based account. I focus on challenges for the official-recognition-based account, as it is the most recent contribution to the literature, and it sets the stage for the account that I propose. In this article, I propose an alternative (...) account: the popular-recognition-based account, which holds that a legal system continues to exist just if the people recognise it continues to exist. The account incorporates the key insight of the official-recognition-based account, namely that the continuity of a legal system depends on social recognition, but it takes the social recognition to come from the people rather than only the legal officials. In short, I propose that popular recognition grounds the existence, identity and continuity of a legal system. This account, I suggest, vindicates certain features of existing accounts, including the compelling idea that the people somehow explain what legal systems there are, and accommodates various examples that existing accounts have trouble accommodating. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza la relación entre el proceso de laicización o secularización de lo religioso y el crecimiento de los rituales de religiosidad popular en el contexto de las sociedades modernas contemporáneas a partir de un análisis etnográfico del ritual de la Semana Santa de la ciudad de Huelva. Haciendo uso de una metodología etnográfica de corte cualitativo, imbricada con técnicas de investigación cuantitativas de carácter sociológico, ponemos sobre análisis las significaciones religiosas e ideológico políticas de actores (...) que participan y producen este ritual religioso popular, en atención a la diversidad y el pluralismo de ideas que se ponen en juego en torno a la Semana Santa y a la relativización de valores, creencias y prácticas que la hace posible. Asimismo, se analizan las características antropocéntricas y antropomórficas que permean el ritual y la relación colectiva con los iconos religiosos. (shrink)

It has been over two decades since Miranda Fricker labeled epistemic injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their capacity as a knower. The philosophical literature has proliferated with variants and related concepts. By considering cases in popular music, we argue that it is worth distinguishing a parallel phenomenon of art-interpretive injustice, in which an agent is wronged in their creative capacity as a possible artist. In section 1, we consider the prosecutorial use of rap lyrics in court (...) as a central case of this injustice. In section 2, we distinguish art-interpretive injustice from other categories already discussed in recent literature. In section 3, we discuss the relationship between genre discourse and identity prejudice. The case for recognizing the category of art-interpretive injustice is that it allows one to recognize a class of harms as being importantly related in ways that one would otherwise overlook. (shrink)

The common assumption is that works of popular are less serious, less artistically valuable. Popular art is driven by a profit motive; real art, high art, is produced for loftier goals, such as aesthetic appreciation. Further, popular art is formulaic and gravitates toward the lowest common denominator. High art is innovative. It enriches, elevates, and inspires; popular art just entertains. Worse, popular art inculcates cultural biases. It is a corporate tool of ideological indoctrination, making contingent (...) social and economic arrangements seem necessary. Or so the common view holds. In light of these common assumptions, we must ask just what marks the distinction between high art and popular art? Is there really any important difference at all? Is there reason to think that popular is by its very nature aesthetically inferior to high art? In this article, I consider some of the prominent answers to these questions. The discussion is organized around questions concerning two general topics: (1) the nature of popular art, and (2) the putative aesthetic deficiencies of popular art. (shrink)