Este libro recoge los fundamentos de la Filosofía para la Paz en la que se viene investigando desde hace más de quince años en la Universitat Jaume I de Castellón. La Filosofía para la Paz pretende dar un sentido más aplicado a la reflexión filosófica que ayude al análisis de desafíos actuales como son la interculturalidad, el género, los conflictos, el compromiso de las empresas y la sensibilización de los medios de comunicación. Para conseguir este objetivo la Filosofía para la (...) Paz parte del principio de la interdisciplinariedad y por este motivo entra en diálogo con las diferentes áreas de estudio con las que nutrir su reflexión. El libro no se muestra sólo como una herramienta útil para las personas que quieren acercarse a los estudios para la paz desde la filosofía, sino también para quienes sienten una inquietud y un compromiso con la transformación pacífica del sufrimiento humano y de la naturaleza. Irene Comins Mingol es profesora contratada doctora del Departamento de Filosofía y Sociología de la Universitat Jaume I de Castellón y codirectora del Máster Universitario y Doctorado Internacional en Estudios de Paz, Conflictos y Desarrollo. Algunas de sus publicaciones son La ética del cuidado y la construcción de la paz y Filosofía del cuidar. Sonia París Albert es doctora por la Universitat Jaume I y profesora contratada doctora del Departamento de Filosofía y Sociología de la Universitat Jaume I. Actualmente, es vicedirectora de la Cátedra UNESCO de Filosofía para la Paz y Coordinadora de Investigación del Máster Universitario Internacional en Estudios de Paz, Conflictos y Desarrollo de la UJI. Su último libro se titula Filosofía de los Conflictos. (shrink)

Detecting Android malware is crucial in safeguarding mobile devices and user data. We introduce a novel approach to android malware detection through convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and Explainable AI. First, we present a methodology for processing android applications, transforming them into images, and through a series of experiments, we demonstrate the efficacy of CNNs in identifying malware within these images. Furthermore, we employ Explainable AI techniques to analyse the decision-making processes of these models. Our approach goes beyond detection; we rigorously (...) analyse the key aspects that distinguish malware, allowing us to improve and validate our data transformation methodology. This emphasis on understanding the decision-making processes of the models is the main aspect of our approach, as it provides insight into the mechanisms of malware, enhancing our understanding of malware detection and reinforcing the robustness of our conclusions. In essence, our work not only provides a comprehensive framework for Android malware detection but also underscores the significance of Explainable AI in cybersecurity research, integrating advanced computational techniques with a detailed understanding of malware behaviour. (shrink)

El pasado 23 de agosto de 2018 murió Vicent Martínez Guzmán, filósofo com-prometido, autor prolífico y gran persona. Vicent, nacido en La Vall d'Uixó en 1949, nos deja un importante y amplio legado académico, de investigación y de política universitaria.

Presentación de la sección de Homenaje a Vicent Martínez Guzmán.

El concepto de ciencia ha adoptado desde la modernidad, e influenciado por lo que académicamente viene siendo conocido como el paradigma galileano frente al paradigma aristotélico, unas características que nos llevan a pensar en la objetividad, la neutralidad, la tecnificación y la razón instrumental, entre otras, cuando hablamos de ciencia. Sin embargo, desde la reflexión filosófica han sido varias las propuestas que se han ido construyendo a favor de nuevas epistemologías para las humanidades con el fin de superar esta visión (...) y dar un sentido más humano a la ciencia. Mediante una reflexión interdisciplinar, este volumen pretende contribuir a este mismo objetivo, por un lado incorporando los saberes silenciados de otras culturas y de las mujeres, y por otro lado tratando de responder a desafíos de la contemporaneidad como son la construcción de la paz, las injusticias sociales, la violencia y los estudios postcoloniales. (shrink)

Reseña del libro: Steven Pinker (2012): Los ángeles que llevamos dentro, el declive de la violencia y sus implicaciones, Barcelona, Paidós.

La elaboración de mezcal en Oaxaca está basada en conocimientos heredados durante generaciones relacionados con la experiencia de las personas productoras y la vida comunitaria. En los últimos años, la demanda de esta bebida ancestral, el cumplimiento de normas regulatorias, la certificación y la estandarización para acceder a mercados formales ha transformado las formas de producción, validación y transmisión del conocimiento en la cadena de valor maguey-mezcal. Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar la relación entre las formas de conocimiento en (...) la elaboración de mezcal en las comunidades de los Valles Centrales de Oaxaca, a través de una investigación cualitativa con enfoque etnográfico que incluyó entrevistas a personas productoras y actores clave, observación participante en palenques y revisión documental. Los resultados muestran que un grupo de personas productoras de mezcal operan en mayor medida bajo el aprendizaje colectivo y con arraigo comunitario, propios de las comunidades de práctica; y otro grupo que partiendo de esa base se relaciona con redes de conocimiento técnico, normativo y científico, cercanas a las comunidades epistémicas. En la elaboración de mezcal se articulan distintas formas de aprendizaje que abren posibilidades para innovaciones inclusivas, pero también crean desigualdades en el acceso a mercados, en la certificación o en reconocer la legitimidad del saber. Finalmente, se propone comprender la gobernanza del conocimiento en la cadena de valor maguey-mezcal como un sistema donde convergen múltiples formas de saber, de legitimación y tensiones por la calidad, la autenticidad y la tradición de esta bebida ancestral. (shrink)

La filosofía para hacer las paces de Martínez Guzmán aborda las competencias y las capacidades que los seres humanos tenemos para la transformación de los conflictos por medios pacíficos. Desde esta concepción de la condición humana, la defensa de un más que necesario cambio en la noción de la política local y global y la propuesta del giro epistemológico, Martínez Guzmán indaga la relación entre conflicto y cooperación como dos caras de una misma moneda, y pone el énfasis en la (...) importancia del reconocimiento a través de la justicia y del amor para hacernos las paces, superando, así, las llamadas “luchas por el reconocimiento”.Martinez Guzman’s Philosophy for making peace approaches the competencies and the capabilities that human beings have for the peaceful conflict transformation. From this conception of the human condition, the author explores the relationship between conflict and cooperation as two sides of the same coin, at the same time that he emphasizes the importance of recognition through justice and love to make peace, thus overcoming the so-called "struggles for recognition." This study takes also into account the defense of a more than necessary change in the notion of local and global politics and Martinez Guzman’s proposal of the epistemological turn. (shrink)

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, neurophilosophy appears as a branch of neurosciences. The aim of this article is to review critically some of the epistemological and anthropological debates which neurophilosophy is putting on question again. In this sense the philosophical research conducted by the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace will be used as the main thread of the analysis. To accomplish this critical review, the article has been organized into two parts: the first is of epistemological nature, (...) and the second has an anthropological perspective. This analysis will lead us to question the significance of the contributions of neurophilosophy to a better understanding of the human being. (shrink)

This study aims to present the profile of scientific production on the use of religiosity/spirituality in coping with childhood cancer. It is an integrative review in the bases/libraries Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), Psychology Information (PsycINFO), Pubmed, Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO), and Latin America and the Caribbean Literature on Health Sciences (LILACS) (2009–2019). The guiding question was “How is religiosity/spirituality present in the treatment experiences of children and adolescents with cancer?” By the inclusion/exclusion criteria, 31 (...) studies were retrieved. Most studies are from the United States; 2015 was the greatest publication year, and the participants in these surveys were children, adolescents, family members, and health professionals. Most studies did not specify what the participants’ belief was. Interviews were the most used collection instruments, and the hospital environment was the main place for recruiting the subjects. The data found provide significant information for understanding the profile of scientific production related to the investigation of religiosity/spirituality in the experiences of cancer by children and adolescents and point out possible paths for future investigations in the area. (shrink)

Este estudo tem como objetivo realizar uma análise crítica acerca da importância e dos desafios enfrentados na disciplina de Filosofia na educação básica brasileira. Por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica, propõe-se uma reflexão sobre como a Filosofia pode ser necessária para uma educação integral na contemporaneidade, bem como identificar alguns dos obstáculos que, historicamente, têm comprometido sua efetivação na educação básica. Buscou-se não somente enfatizar a indiscutível relevância da Filosofia na educação integral dos estudantes, mas expor estratégias para superar os (...) desafios impostos pelo modelo neoliberal em vigência em nosso país. A postura crítica e reflexiva defendida pela disciplina deve orientar perenemente o trabalho docente, a seleção de conteúdos e a integração desses saberes aos de outros componentes em vigência na política educacional contemporânea. Mobilizar, defender e justificar a importância da presença da disciplina de Filosofia na educação básica apresenta-se como um desafio que deve ser assumido coletivamente. (shrink)

The literature has greatly explored the inclusionInclusion of women in managerial positions and how this affects the effectiveness of organizations, but the conclusions are still debatable. In this sense, this chapter investigates the impact of women's participation in corporate governance roles (members of the Board of Directors, members of the TMT, and as CEOs), while considering the importance of credit unions to Brazil’s economy and society. We identified a low presence of women on the executive board, fiscal council, and board (...) of directors of credit unions based on a sample of 607 Brazilian credit unions. For the empirical analysis, we employed logistic regression estimation to investigate the impact of women's representation in management structures on the expansion of cooperatives' revenue. According to our findings, the revenue growth of credit unions with women in corporate governance roles (members of the Board of Directors, Fiscal Council, and Executive Board) is negative. Our study is particularly timely and adds to the previous literature on the effects of female leadership on the growth of credit unions. The regulatory reforms taking place in developing economies, notably Brazil, which call for the inclusionInclusion of more women in business affairs, increase the significance of our findings. (shrink)

O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar a qualidade de vida de alunos de dois cursos de pós-graduação na modalidade a distância, funcionários de uma instituição bancária do setor público. Trata-se de um estudo exploratório e transversal, com método misto. Os 245 participantes responderam a um instrum..

O objetivo deste estudo foi apresentar uma revisão integrativa da literatura científica nacional sobre cuidados paliativos na assistência a portadores de doenças graves, evidenciando, principalmente, o papel das equipes multidisciplinares. Foram recuperadas, a partir de critériosde localização e se..

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

This study evaluates the comprehension of generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) in children with and without autism spectrum disorder (ASD), using a GCI test constructed based on the Levinson model, which distinguishes between three types of implicatures: type Q (or scalar: “what is not referred to does not occur”); type I (“by default, it is not necessary to say what can be assumed”); and type M (“if someone is expressing something in a not very simple or marked way, it is because (...) s/he is describing a situation that is not very typical, frequent, or prototypical”). In addition to the ASD group ( n = 22), two comparison groups were utilized: a group matched on chronological age with the ASD group, but with a higher linguistic age (TCD group, n = 22), and a group matched on linguistic age with the ASD group, but with a lower chronological age (TLD group, n = 22). In all cases, linguistic age was assessed with the Peabody test. The performance of the three groups on the GCI test was compared (overall and on each type of implicature), and performance on the three types of implicature was compared within each group. The ASD group obtained worse performance than the other two groups, both overall and for each implicature type, without also obtaining differences in performance on the three implicature types. The TCD group obtained better performance than the TLD group on overall performance, but not on each implicature type, and both groups obtained lower performance on the type M heuristics than on the type I. Based on these results, the children with ASD in our study presented limitations in the comprehension of the three types of GCI, but it was not possible to obtain evidence for an inferential continuum of the three types of GCI. However, in the two typical development groups, this evidence was obtained, leading us to propose an inferential continuum model based on the different levels of dependence on the context of each of the three types of implicatures, with type M implicatures being more contextually dependent. (shrink)

International criminal law (ICL) is an achievement, but at the same time a challenge to the traditional conception of the principle of legality (_lex praevia_, _scripta_, and _stricta_ – Sect. 1). International criminal tribunals have often based conviction for international crimes on unwritten norms the existence and scope of which they have failed to substantiate. In so doing, they have evaded the objection that they were applying _ex post facto_ criminal laws. This approach, the relaxation of the concept of law (...) by including norms whose existence is doubtful, has apparently served to maintain a concept of strict legality, but it is unsatisfying (Sect. 2). In my opinion, the strict principle of legality that has linked its absolute validity to the positivity of law is not the correct premise. It makes sense to state that positivity and validity do not necessarily go hand in hand (Sect. 3). Applied to ICL, this means that it is neither necessary nor convincing to “conceal” supra-positive law as positive law, as some decisions of the international criminal tribunals do. For this reason, I consider that Radbruch’s formula, consisting in admitting that there are supra-positive limits which positive law must respect in order to be valid, is well-founded (Sect. 4). The path taken by this significant philosopher of law is methodologically convincing, and it squarely faces the problem of the value of positive law. Nevertheless, if we admit Radbruch’s formula and thereby the limited value of positive law (if we claim that the validity of the law depends on it respecting supra-positive minimums of justice), we must also face the problem of the definition of supra-positive values, the epistemological difficulties of having access to them (Sect. 5), and the question of the scope and enforceability of supra-positive law (Sect. 6). In summary, this article aims to explain why Radbruch’s formula offers a convincing conceptual basis for international criminal legality and, in doing so, aims to contribute to the discussion about the foundations of ICL. (shrink)

We explore the view that subjective experiences, termed epistemic feelings in the literature, accompany reasoning, intuition and other cognitive processes. These epistemic feelings are considered to have a wide range of functions, providing us with information about many aspects of our cognitive content. For instance, they can tell us whether something we know is certain, uncertain, interesting, boring, doubtful, ambiguous, correct, plausible, informative, relevant, coherent or related to other cognitive content. To understand how epistemic feelings work is therefore essential in (...) comprehending any kind of thinking process, including any kind of reasoning process. In this work, we first analyze epistemic feelings with the aim of describing their nature and functions. Secondly, we explore the analogies and differences between somatic, emotional and epistemic feelings and try to show that epistemic feelings are not the same as epistemic emotions and that although somatic, emotional and epistemic feelings all make use of the same kinds of signals, they are triggered by different monitoring systems. Finally, we show that epistemic feelings guide us to choose specific kinds of reasoning processes and determine whether we rely on intuitions rather than on analytic reasoning. Finally, although epistemic feelings do not necessarily lead us to make the best choice in every context, they can be trained to provide us with better guidance. (shrink)

Histories of ocean science have emphasized the ways that state-sponsored deep-sea expeditions ushered in a new age of oceanic understanding during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This essay, on the other hand, examines the ways that shallow waters played host to less formal but nevertheless important efforts to create oceanic natural knowledge, often centuries earlier. By documenting the legends and experiences of people who worked on and lived by the ocean—divers, sailors, and fishermen, among others—and corroborating their stories (...) with firsthand observation, seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century natural historians built a nascent science of the sea. In its close focus on “sea beans” and “barnacle geese,” subjects of wide conjecture and earnest curiosity, the essay shows how shallow waters welcomed new actors onto the scientific stage and decentered the geographies of knowledge production, thereby advancing contemporary knowledge of oceanic circulation as well as the taxonomies and ecologies of coastal creatures. (shrink)

Este artículo propone acercarse a la jurisprudencia “ecocéntrica” para evaluar el papel que en la misma están jugando la noción de Gaia y la de Pachamama. Para ello, comienza analizando el actual proceso de ecologización del derecho y la noción de justicia socioecológica. Posteriormente, describe dos propuestas dentro de este ámbito: el Derecho de Sistema Tierra y los derechos de naturaleza. Además, expone las dos nociones de naturaleza que las informan: Gaia y Pachamama, analizando la compatibilidad o incompatibilidad conceptual entre (...) ambos. Tomando como base este trabajo conceptual realiza posteriormente un análisis cualitativo de sentencias “ecocéntricas”. En el mismo se evalúa el peso de las nociones de Gaia y Pachamama y si, en el ámbito de las sentencias, estas nociones se presentan como antagónicas. Finalmente, se valora si este supuesto giro “ecocéntrico” en la jurisprudencia está o no suponiendo un cambio político análogo en el razonamiento de las sentencias y si estas se alejan o no del utilitarismo antropocéntrico de nociones como el desarrollo sostenible. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendemos esclarecer a relação entre o governo neoliberal e as diversas formas que o sofrimento psicológico se constitui a partir de estilos de vida, e de trabalho, que aliançados às injustiças sociais, podem levar o indivíduo à perda subjetiva. Para tanto, iremos realizar uma revisão bibliográfica da literatura filosófica e psicológica contemporânea. Os fenômenos do capitalismo contemporâneo como o distanciamento social, o trabalho repetitivo, a lógica competitiva de trabalho, superação e produtividade em todas as áreas da vida estariam (...) associados a sintomas psicopatológicos, e ao uso de medicações psiquiátricas como uma solução rápida para o sofrimento, sem levar em conta outras formas de cuidado e de subjetividade humana. (shrink)

Healthcare professionals often face ethical conflicts and challenges related to decision-making that have necessitated consideration of the use of conscientious objection (CO). No current guidelines exist within Spain’s healthcare system regarding acceptable rationales for CO, the appropriate application of CO, or practical means to support healthcare professionals who wish to become conscientious objectors. As such, a procedural framework is needed that not only assures the appropriate use of CO by healthcare professionals but also demonstrates its ethical validity, legislative compliance through (...) protection of moral freedoms and patients’ rights to receive health care. Our proposal consists of prerequisites of eligibility for CO (individual reference, specific clinical context, ethical justification, assurance of non-discrimination, professional consistency, attitude of mutual respect, assurance of patient rights and safety) and a procedural process (notification and preparation, documentation and confidentiality, evaluation of prerequisites, non-abandonment, transparency, allowance for unforeseen objection, compensatory responsibilities, access to guidance and/or consultative advice, and organizational guarantee of professional substitution). We illustrate the real-world utility of the proposed framework through a case discussion in which our guidelines are applied. (shrink)

En este artículo planteo una crítica a la noción de chora manejada por Julia Kristeva. Para ello, me sirvo de su misma noción de “intertextualidad”, que sitúo en el contexto de su encuentro intelectual con Jacques Derrida y, específicamente, con sus nociones de “différance” y “deconstrucción”. Aceptando que la teoría kristeviana de la chora reproduce una versión binarista de la diferencia sexual al plantear lo simbólico y lo semiótico como espacios diferenciados, defiendo la tesis de que la “intertextualidad” invita a (...) una concepción de lo simbólico que pone en jaque la oposición binarista suscrita por Kristeva. (shrink)

Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities (...) that underpin lexical competence—so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’—and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. (shrink)

In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would (...) be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former—unlike the latter—retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented—i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory—points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual—or more often in propriosensitive perceptual—information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness versus abstractness of words and we show that—used conjointly—they can provide a measure of the internal versus external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only (...) definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. (shrink)

The increasing expansion of human settlements and encroachment into wildlife territories has led to an increase in human–wildlife conflict. This conflict is complex, and standardizing human–wildlife interactions remains a challenge.In this chapter, we describe four types of interactions: (1) negative for both tapirs and humans, such as collisions with vehicles, which can result in the loss of tapirs as well as serious accidents that pose risks to human safety in addition to economic losses, and crop raiding, which is negative for (...) humans mainly because of the economic loss when it triggers negative human attitudes, usually leading to tapir retaliation; (2) negative for wildlife and positive for humans, such as hunting/poaching, which is detrimental to tapirs; (3) positive for wildlife and negative for humans, such as cases of crop raiding where there is no retaliation; and (4) positive for both wildlife and humans, such as local initiatives to promote human well-being and tapir conservation through ecotourism. We also describe actions that have been called for to mitigate tapir crop raiding in some countries, such as the implementation of preventive measures and compensation programs, which can be effective tools to reduce conflict and promote coexistence. Compensating farmers who have suffered losses due to tapir crop raiding. Finally, the implementation of these measures will not only ensure the protection of tapirs and their habitats, but will also foster a sense of shared responsibility, leading to greater social cohesion and a better future for both people and tapirs. (shrink)

Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chap. 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that—even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world—they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed (...) via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also Chap. 2, Sects. 5 and 6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions—at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. (shrink)

Este artículo busca realizar una contribución específica a la agenda global de “inclusión educativa” a partir de la recuperación y discusión de distintas problematizaciones realizadas en la academia argentina en diálogo con aportes de la filosofía (política), la historiografía y la sociología de la educación. Luego de repasar algunas definiciones postuladas en el discurso académico y político global y de esbozar algunas coordenadas contextuales que sitúan las problematizaciones argentinas proponemos centrar la discusión en torno a tres ejes: 1) la crítica (...) etimológica o radical al concepto de “inclusión educativa”; 2) algunos principios y dilemas de justicia implicados en la agenda de reforma; y 3) las (im)posibilidades de la forma escolar ante el mandato inclusivo. Finalmente sugerimos la importancia de continuar avanzado en problematizaciones alternativas que habiliten la producción de políticas y sistemas educativos más justos. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper examines the American sojourn of the Enlightenment philosopher and theologian George Berkeley. While living in coastal Rhode Island between 1729 and 1731, Berkeley penned his longest philosophical tract, Alciphron: Or, the Minute Philosopher (1732), which criticized “freethinking,” mechanical conceptions of nature in favor of those that emphasized God's providence. To illustrate these two ways of knowing nature, Berkeley, a careful prose stylist, evoked nearby coastal landscapes for contrast. Accordingly, his work broke down dichotomies between ideas and matter and, (...) by extension, culture and nature, which could, this paper argues, inform an environmental ethic for a “hybrid” world. (shrink)

El análisis de nuestra filogenia, basado esencialmente en los registros fósiles y arqueológicos, nos ofrece información crucial sobre la trayectoria evolutiva del género Homo. Sin embargo, el problema radica es la escasez de muestras para un análisis concluyente, ya que la diversidad de especies en muchos casos se infiere a partir de unos pocos individuos o fragmentos óseos distribuidos en amplias zonas geográficas. No obstante, el notable éxito evolutivo de nuestro género no se atribuye únicamente al incremento en la capacidad (...) cerebral -desde Australopithecus, con un volumen cerebral aproximado de 500 cm3 a Homo sapiens entre 1500-1700 cm3- o a las variaciones genómicas. También deben considerarse otros factores, como los culturales, sociales y ecológicos. La interacción entre las distintas especies y su entorno en un ecosistema es fundamental en cualquier proceso evolutivo. Todo ajuste, regulación o interacción en el mismo, como indica Margalef, determinará el equilibrio necesario hacia la supervivencia o el declive del sistema. Para establecer un diálogo interdisciplinar entre la ecología integral y la antropología evolutiva, hemos considerado incluir las teorías cognitivas modernas como la Teoría del Compromiso Material (MET), la ciencia cognitiva (CS) y la biología cognitiva (BC). Estas teorías resaltan la importancia de considerar la cognición no solo como un proceso interno, sino como algo que está profundamente arraigado en el contexto material y social. Este artículo examina cómo el ambiente pudo influir en la evolución del género Homo y viceversa, proponiendo un análisis interdisciplinario que integra ecología ambiental, económica, social y cultural, o lo que el papa Francisco denominó ecología integral, con la antropología evolutiva. (shrink)