Many theists believe both (1) that Heaven will be infinitely or maximally good for its residents and (2) that most humans will, eventually, reside in Heaven. Further, most theists believe (3) that human procreation is often all-things-considered morally permissible. I defend three novel arguments for the impermissibility of procreation predicated on the possibility of heavenly overpopulation. First, we shouldn’t be rude to hosts by bringing more people to a party than were invited, which we do if we continue to (...) procreate. Second, justice requires that the goods of Heaven be supremely good for those for whom heavenly existence is (even partially) compensatory, but if Heaven has a fixed and finite number of goods, each successful act (or enough acts) of procreation lowers the expected goodness for those persons and threatens to undermine justice. Third, we should choose the course of action with the least-worst outcome, and it would be worse to overpopulate Heaven than underpopulate it. (shrink)

How many people should there be? Can there be overpopulation: too many people living? I shall present a puzzling argument about these questions, show how this argument can be strengthened, then sketch a possible reply.

A few decades ago, there was a lively debate on the problem of overpopulation. Various proposals to limit population growth and to control fertility were made and debated both in academia and in th...

The issue of overpopulation should also be recognized as confronting new problems of thinking human population, which emerged as a central term in biopolitical discourses. One of the initial challenges can be understood from Jean-Luc Nancy's understanding of the biopolitical as located within ‘ecotechnology’ – technology's engulfing of the human and world in an expansionary logic without limit. Attempting to technically control overpopulation runs the risk of just reiterating ecotechnical manipulation. To avoid the pessimistic response to such globalizing (...) biopolitics, we can, first, examine the itinerary of Foucault's history of ‘population’ as the central figure in the rise of modernity's governmentality; second, focus on a critical ‘hinge’ that connected his understanding of governmental regulation with his insistence that liberalism was essential to the rise of governmentality – the counter-conduct linking individuals to disciplinary practices. Overpopulation can be then approached as an issue framed by existing biopolitical traditions, but open to useful reconceptualization by using counter-conduct as a guide. (shrink)

This book examines the link between population growth and environmental impact and explores the implications of this connection for the ethics of procreation. In light of climate change, species extinctions, and other looming environmental crises, Trevor Hedberg argues that we have a collective moral duty to halt population growth to prevent environmental harms from escalating. This book assesses a variety of policies that could help us meet this moral duty, confronts the conflict between protecting the welfare of future people and (...) upholding procreative freedom, evaluates the ethical dimensions of individual procreative decisions, and sketches the implications of population growth for issues like abortion and immigration. It is not a book of tidy solutions: Hedberg highlights some scenarios where nothing we can do will enable us to avoid treating some people unjustly. In such scenarios, the overall objective is to determine which of our available options will minimize the injustice that occurs. This book will be of great interest to those studying environmental ethics, environmental policy, climate change, sustainability, and population policy. (shrink)

This article is a contribution to overpopulation discourse in environmental ethics. It is based on the hypothesis that, even though the idea and reasoning behind Garret Hardin’s lifeboat metaphor are crucial within the current environmental crisis, from an African perspective, the metaphor raises a number of questions. The article argues that the lifeboat metaphor poses an ethical challenge to most communities particularly in Africa because it runs contrary to their political and cultural worldview. I advance two central claims in (...) the framework of insights from an African worldview. First, the ethics behind the lifeboat metaphor is deeply dependent upon political power differentials, particularly between affluent and poor nations. Second, the metaphor fails to take into consideration the cultural understanding of population in Africa. (shrink)

Despite substantial evidence pointing to a looming Malthusian catastrophe, governmental measures to reduce population have been opposed both by religious conservatives and by many liberals, especially liberal feminists. Liberal critics have claimed that 'utilitarian' population policies violate a 'fundamental right of reproductive liberty'. This essay argues that reproductive liberty should not be considered a fundamental human right, or certainly not an indefeasible right. It should, instead, be strictly regulated by a global agreement designed to reduce population to a sustainable level. (...) Three major points are discussed: 1) the current state of the overpopulation problem; 2) the claim of a fundamental human right of reproductive liberty; 3) an outline of a global agreement to address overpopulation as a 'tragedy of the commons'. (shrink)

One of the main objections to life extension is that life extension will cause severe overpopulation. This objection presents both moral and demographic issues. To explore the demographic issue, we present an updated and improved version of the formula in chapter six of New Methuselahs for projecting the demographic impact of life extension. The new version includes additional demographical factors such as non-aging related causes of death. According to projections generated with this revised formula, moderate life extension (a life (...) expectancy of 120 years) will not significantly increase population at the fertility rates current in the developed world, but radical life expectancy (halting aging completely, leading to an average life expectancy of 1000 years) can lead to severe overpopulation even at very low fertility rates. This formula also enables us to ascertain what fertility rate and birth spacing will prevent life extension from causing severe overpopulation. The moral issues arise if radical life extension causes overpopulation severe enough to outweigh the benefits it brings. New Methuselahs proposed a reproductive policy for avoiding severe overpopulation by limiting reproduction for those who use life extension. We then consider a moral objection to this policy that was not discussed in New Methuselahs: it is not likely that society will succeed in imposing limits to reproduction, therefore, it is likely that radical life extension is morally wrong. We respond to this objection and defend our response against two further objections. (shrink)

It is an open question when procreation is justified. Antinatalists argue that bringing a new individual into the world is morally wrong, whereas pronatalists say that creating new life is morally good. In between these positions lie attempts to provide conditions for when taking an anti or pronatal stance is appropriate. This paper is concerned with developing one of these attempts, which can be called qualified pronatalism. Qualified pronatalism typically claims that while procreation can be morally permissible, there are constraints (...) on when it is justified. These constraints often concern whether an individual is motivated to procreate for the right reasons. For instance, if someone is not sufficiently concerned with the child’s future welfare, the qualified pronatalist will say that procreation is not justified. Moreover, David Wasserman says that this concern forms a role-based duty. That is, prospective parents have special duties to be concerned for the child’s future welfare by virtue of the role they occupy. In this paper, I argue that a proper examination of a prospective parent’s role-based duties entails that more is needed to justify procreation. Bringing a new person into the world leaves fewer resources for people who already need them, and the current size of the human population is unsustainable from a planetary point of view. Therefore, even if there is nothing wrong with procreation per se, the external condition of overpopulation, and its ensuing public health issues, plausibly gives rise to a role-based duty that prospective parents must account for when deciding whether to procreate. (shrink)

Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role (...) in the etiology and explanation of mental actions. Contra Ruben, I defend the orthodox view that intentions play an indispensable causal and explanatory role with respect to mental actions. (shrink)

What should the world's population be? Here I want to examine an answer to the population question offered by consequentialism: we should aim for a population level that maximizes the good—where the 'the good' refers to whatever it is that makes lives good. Derek Parfit coined the term 'the repugnant conclusion' for an argument that appears to pose a significant challenge to consequentialism. I hope to show that the population question is not merely of theoretical interest but also of some (...) practical urgency. This urgency is prompted, as least in part, by emerging technologies that may make it possible to radically extend the average human lifespan, and so potentially radically increase the world's population. My aim here is to show that the repugnant conclusion provides no obstacle to adopting consequentialism as a tool to answer the population question. (shrink)

During the eighteenth century, the discovery of sexual reproduction in insect species prompted the demise of spontaneous generation and new developments in natural history, theology, and political economy. The sexual lives of insects prompted debates on whether insects were governed by desire, free will, and even marital tendency. Fuelled by the democratisation of microscopy, early modern entomology took a new turn and breadth: the study of insects and of their sexual lives provided unexpected new insights into human sexuality, reproduction, and (...) Malthusian fears of overpopulation. This article surveys the intellectual culture of entomology and natural history during the crucial decades when entomologists worked to quantify the reproductive capacities of insect species. Assessing the influences these entomological works had within political economy and theology, we argue that the sexual lives of insects − once analysed and delineated − influenced familiar ideological features of the intellectual landscape of the late Enlightenment, particularly in the theological philosophies of northern Europe and in the political economy of population in Britain. (shrink)

Some of the objections to life-extension stem from a concern with overpopulation. I will show that whether or not the overpopulation threat is realistic, arguments from overpopulation cannot ethically demand halting the quest for, nor access to, life-extension. The reason for this is that we have a right to life, which entitles us not to have meaningful life denied to us against our will and which does not allow discrimination solely on the grounds of age. If the (...) threat of overpopulation creates a rights conflict between the right to come into existence, the right to reproduce, the right to more opportunities and space, and the right to life, the latter ought to be given precedence. (shrink)

Both economic and population growth are commonly understood as an indefinite, quantitative increase that is both necessary and desirable for human well-being. In contrast, proponents of a steady state economy and of the de-growth movement have advocated for an end to the dominant ideology of growth as a way to tackle environmental problems, but have eschewed a deeper questioning of the meaning of growing. In the final section of the article, I put forth an alternative, qualitative notion of human growth (...) that embraces both our unfolding as a species and a conscious acceptance of our finitude and limits. (shrink)

The world's population is a significant variable that can be altered to help decrease global emissions. Most of the discussion surrounding this variable has concentrated on the moral issues involved: to what extent is a state justified in reducing its population? Are individual procreators morally obligated to have fewer children? However, while these moral concerns are important, little attention has been given to the feasibility of a proposed solution to overpopulation. This article aims to rectify that. By understanding whether (...) (and how) feasibility impacts the truth-value of an ought claim, important progress can be made on deliberating what to do about overpopulation. In Section 2, I outline the public health crisis that overpopulation causes and present Sarah Conly's argument as the most well-thought-out account of how to ethically and rapidly reduce the population. In Section 3, I borrow from Nicholas Southwood to explore when infeasibility makes an ought claim false. In Section 4, I show that rapidly reducing the population is infeasible. Therefore, regardless of any ethical merits, it should be eliminated as an option when deliberating what to do. Instead, we must put our time and resources into finding a feasible solution to overpopulation. (shrink)

Projects of radical life extension have been discussed amongst scientists for years. Some bioethicists express reservations about this endeavor. A common objection appeals to demography: if the human lifespan is dramatically expanded, humanity would face an overpopulation problem. In this essay, the authors reply to this objection. They posit that radical life extension is unlikely to lead to overpopulation because overpopulation is determined more by fertility rates than by longevity, and as a result of the advanced phases (...) of industrialization, fertility rates are likely to be reduced, and therefore, population size would become stable. However, they argue that although overpopulation is not a concern for the foreseeable future, it is still important to acknowledge its potential harms. Finally, they argue that even if overpopulation becomes a problem caused by radical life extension, there are plausible ways to solve it. (shrink)

This appraisal of Carol A. Kates' 'Reproductive Liberty and Overpopulation' challenges her call for world-wide population control measures – using compulsory methods if necessary – to save the world's environment. The most successful part of Kates' paper is her argument that reproductive rights are not indefeasible and nonnegotiable, but that like many rights, they are conditional and open to a balancing of individual freedom against collective community interests. But her advocacy of mandatory state population controls is flawed in several (...) respects. First, she underestimates the force of the emerging consensus for voluntary population reductions through policies that empower women. Second, she walks on difficult ethical grounds. Are compulsory controls on reproduction ethically justified simply because humans are loathe to take the alternative route of curtailing their individualistic' 'materialistic' appetites for more economic growth and consumption? Third, Kates fails to recognise that her search for measures that immediately and directly reverse population growth would necessitate coercing an entire generation of women toward zero reproduction in order for death rates to have their effect. Lastly, problems with the feasibility of her plan and the absence of international support make it unlikely it will ever come to pass. Alternatives to Kates' policies are discussed at the close. (shrink)

Reply to Stanley Warner's response in Environmental Values 13.3 to the article by Carol Kates in Environmerntal Values 13.1.

This paper responds to Theron Pummer’s distinction between Sorites arguments and repugnant conclusion arguments by presenting a Sorites overpopulation argument. Also I present a Sorites argument in favour of myths of genius.

Some of the causes of the 'sexual revolution' during the past few decades are widely known: The development of relatively safe and reliable contraceptives, especially the birth-control pill; the 'morning after' pill; antibiotics to relieve or cure sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhea, herpes, and syphilis; the increased social acceptance of pre-marital sex, homosexuality, and other behaviors that formerly were considered deviant; and the legalization of abortion as the ultimate 'contraceptive'. But little attention has been paid to two rather cerebral (...) factors relevant to these developments – namely, ethical theories, and theories of overpopulation. In this paper I will argue that these two less well-known and more subtle factors have been at least as powerful as the more obvious factors mentioned above, in bringing about sea-changes in sexual mores. More specifically, I will argue that some implicit approaches to ethical theory are more conducive than others to bringing about the present status quo in sexual mores, and that the widespread belief in world overpopulation has not only changed the moral climate regarding sexuality, but has helped to redefine what is moral and what is immoral. (shrink)

Literature for children and young people is uniquely positioned in terms of intended readership and literary genres such as the young adult dystopian novel to scrutinise intergenerational and human fertility issues associated with overpopulation. However, fictional texts that explore overpopulation have a narrative form that is unstable and unreliable due to prevailing conventions of subjectivity and optimism in children's and young adult literature. Derrida's last interview, Learning to Live, is pertinent to an understanding of motifs of overpopulation (...) in literature for children and young people. Derrida's recognition of the ‘rights’ of future and present generations, and of the temporal intergenerational problems between parent as child, and child as parent, are explored in recent fictional texts for children and young people. (shrink)

Some of the causes of the 'sexual revolution' during the past few decades are widely known: The development of relatively safe and reliable contraceptives, especially the birth-control pill; the 'morning after' pill; antibiotics to relieve or cure sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhea, herpes, and syphilis; the increased social acceptance of pre-marital sex, homosexuality, and other behaviors that formerly were considered deviant; and the legalization of abortion as the ultimate 'contraceptive'. But little attention has been paid to two rather cerebral (...) factors relevant to these developments – namely, ethical theories, and theories of overpopulation. In this paper I will argue that these two less well-known and more subtle factors have been at least as powerful as the more obvious factors mentioned above, in bringing about sea-changes in sexual mores. More specifically, I will argue that some implicit approaches to ethical theory are more conducive than others to bringing about the present status quo in sexual mores, and that the widespread belief in world overpopulation has not only changed the moral climate regarding sexuality, but has helped to redefine what is moral and what is immoral. (shrink)

Travis Rieder's Toward a Small Family Ethic confronts the effects of population growth and addresses what individual procreative obligations might follow from it. In this review, I summarize the main arguments that Rieder deploys to defend his position that those with large ecological footprints morally ought to follow a small family ethic. I express sympathy with some of his claims and praise the book's accessibility, but its short length inevitably means that some important issues are omitted or given only superficial (...) treatment. I highlight a few of those issues at the end of the review. (shrink)

This paper provides an ecocritical reading of Li Huayi (李華弌, born 1948) and Yang Yongliang’s (杨泳梁, born 1980) landscape works that reference centuries-old Chinese shanshui (山水, mountain-water) ink painting. In the paper I will argue that, despite representing two different states of nature as being in harmony and crisis, both artists equally convey the urgency of today’s climate change. I will further argue that the artists help reinvent not only contemporary Chinese shanshui ink art, but also global ecocritical art by (...) showing that local cultural heritage forms and global socio-environmental issues can be critically applied together. Drawing from artist interviews and applicable theories (from ecocritical to decolonial), in the first two sections I give a close visual analysis of the artists’ representative works respectively, namely Li Huayi’s Dragon amidst Mountain Ridge (龙潜山脉, 2006–2009) and Yang Yongliang’s The Night of Perpetual Day (极昼之夜, 2014). In the final third section I proceed to offer a deeper comparative critical reflection on the two artists’ approaches to representing nature and implications of this within the wider field of global contemporary ecocritical studies. Via an extension, I will highlight the diversity of responses to environmental destruction in art from the Sinophone region, and what this means in the current Anthropocene age. (shrink)

In this book, Stephen Cave and John Martin Fischer debate whether or not we should choose to live forever. This ancient question is as topical as ever: while billions of people believe they will live forever in an otherworldly realm, billions of dollars are currently being poured into anti-ageing research in the hope that we will be able to radically extend our lives on earth. But are we wise to wish for immortality? What would it mean for each of us (...) as individuals, for society, and for the planet? -/- In this lively and accessible debate, the authors introduce the main arguments for and against living forever, along with some new ones. They draw on examples from myth and literature as well as new thought experiments in order to bring the arguments to life. Cave contends that the aspiring immortalist is stuck on the horns of a series of dilemmas, such as boredom and meaninglessness, or overpopulation and social injustice. Fischer argues that there is a vision of radically longer lives that is both recognizably human and desirable. This book offers both students and experienced philosophers a provocative new guide to a topic of perennial importance. (shrink)

Biological studies have demonstrated that it is possible to slow the ageing process and extend lifespan in a wide variety of organisms, perhaps including humans. Making use of the findings of these studies, this article examines two problems concerning the effect of life extension on population size and welfare. The first—the problem of overpopulation—is that as a result of life extension too many people will co-exist at the same time, resulting in decreases in average welfare. The second—the problem of (...) underpopulation—is that life extension will result in too few people existing across time, resulting in decreases in total welfare. I argue that overpopulation is highly unlikely to result from technologies that slow ageing. Moreover, I claim that the problem of underpopulation relies on claims about life extension that are false in the case of life extension by slowed ageing. The upshot of these arguments is that the population problems discussed provide scant reason to oppose life extension by slowed ageing. (shrink)

Constitution theorists have argued that due to a difference in persistence conditions, persons are not identical with the animals or the bodies that constitute them. A popular line of objection to the view that persons are not identical with the animals/bodies that constitute them is that the view commits one to undesirable overpopulation, with too many minds and too many thinkers. Constitution theorists are well aware of these overpopulation concerns and have gone a long way toward answering them. (...) However, there is one mental excess worry that remains especially problematic. It is argued here that the worry about too many thoughts, or too many instantiations of mentality in general, remains a serious threat to the constitution view of persons. What exactly the threat is and how it arises is described in detail in Section III. It is then shown that attempts to allay the concern are unsuccessful. I argue, in particular, that appealing to the distinction between derivative and non-derivative instantiation fails to solve the problem. (shrink)

A global ethic needs to be cosmopolitan in a sense which is explained; this excludes certain kinds of communitarian ethic. Contracttheories, Kantianism, basic-rights theories, Ross-type deontology and theories of virtue ethics are reviewed and found to encounter severe problems. Consequentialist theories, however, are found capable of coping with Williams’ objections, and practice-consequentialist theories capable of coping with right-making practices and with Lenman's unpredictability objection. Variants that exclude from consideration unintended consequences, the results of omissions, or impacts on possible people, or (...) which prioritize average over total outcomes, fail to improve on the Total View, which is argued to overcome objections based on population numbers and on good procedures, but which needs to be biocentric in scope. Theories of this kind are capable of coping with global problems, while also favouring alliances between global citizens of diverse normative outlooks. Key Words: alienation • biocentric consequentialism • cosmopolitanism • global citizens • global ethic • global problems • overpopulation • practice-consequentialism • Total View • unpredictability. (shrink)

The paper focuses on recent changes in historiography which have been affected as much by a prevalent global outlook as by an awareness of the demographic and ecological pressures that threaten humankind as a whole. The new trend of world history treats the past in relation to developments on a cross-regional or global scale, building on an already established tradition of interdisciplinary method. The works of W.H. McNeill. A. Crosby. D. Landes and A.G. Frank, among others, especially their treatment of (...) demographic issues in their environmental, economic and social contexts, seem particularly relevant to anyone wishing to view current problems of overpopulation in their historical perspective and complexity. (shrink)

The overpopulation of the earth and the increasing consumption of its life ressources implies new risks and damages for mankind. The awareness of this facts has turned Ethics, formerly conceived of primarily as one among other philosophical disciplines, into a fundamental one. Ethics has become, in some sense, a “first philosophy”.This has opened new object fields for it. In the past Ethics was mainly concerned with the “good” life and the “good” behavior of the single subject. Now it aims (...) to support behavior kinds making possible the survival of mankind under globalized life conditions. “Good” life presupposes surviving.Ethical reflections aimed formerly to guarantee that human beings keep able to live together even if they don’t share the same “values”. Now they have to face the problem of the living together of human beings belonging to different cultures and social forms. The main question is no more what ethical fundamentals would best enable human beings to live together, but what are the conditions for a coexistence of values which enables a good living together of human beings with diverse ethical orientations.Often it is said that Hegel did not develop an Ethics of his own. This paper would like to show that Hegel’s philosophy is, on the contrary, an excellent tool for facing such kinds of questions. His main ethical concept is “recognition”. But he is not concerned with the recognition or rejection of concrete ethical principles. His concept of recognition focuses on the individual in its absolute singularity, in his being absolutely unique in and through himself. His consciousness as self-consciousness gets thus particular in the sense of being definitely individual. Hegel calls the reciprocal recognition of individually conscious subjects the “absolute spirit”.This unusual terminology has made an adequate reception of Hegel’s thinking quite difficult. But there can be no doubt that his very rich and deep elaboration of the phenomenology of such recognition among factual subjects provides extremely productive tools to face eco-ethical reflections in our days. This paper tries to show in presently understandable terms Hegel’s reflections on the very nature of language as the place in which the subjects experience both their absolute individuality and their community, i. e. their singularity and the generality of their institutions, in a simultaneously paradox and coherent way. Recognition becomes in Hegel the inner structure of pardon and reconciliation. Its dependence on languages both diverse and shared makes this concept particularly productive for shaping the living together of human beings belonging to diverse cultures and following diverse ethical orientations. (shrink)

'Overpopulation' is often implicated as a major causative factor of poverty and environmental degradation in the developing world. This review of the population-resource debate focusses on Red, Green and neo-Malthusian ideologies to demonstrate how they have ramified into current economic and development theory. A central hypothesis is that key elements of Marxist analysis, tempered by the best of Green thought, still have much to offer the subject. The contributions of capitalism to 'underdevelopment', and its associated environmental crises, are clarified (...) and reasserted in a contemporary context. The concept of valuation vector is also introduced, and a novel closure of Blaikie's 'Chain of Explanation' is proposed. The Circuit of Capital model thus created is applied to specific case-studies of resource-population conflict so as to overturn the simplistic conventional connection held between population growth and ecological devastation. The model highlights sequential causes of poverty arising from important capital-based factors which might otherwise be overlooked. It can accommodate a variety of Red-Green perspectives and its structural form is suited to the unravelling of complex population-resource pressures in the multi-dimensional space of the modern global political economy. (shrink)

Overpopulation, overexploitation of natural resources, overconsumerism, the predictions of environmental experts do not bode well for us.

Australian prisons are overpopulated with people suffering from numerous health problems. COVID-19 presents a significant threat to prisoner health. This article examines the current regulatory responses from Australian state and territory governments to COVID-19 and a recent case which tested the human rights of prisoners during a pandemic.

A compelling argument for the morality of limitations on procreation in lessening the harmful environmental effects of unchecked populationWe live in a world where a burgeoning global population has started to have a major and destructive environmental impact. The results, including climate change and the struggle for limited resources, appear to be inevitable aspects of a difficult future. Mandatory population control might be a possible last resort to combat this problem, but is also a potentially immoral and undesirable violation of (...) human rights. Since so many view procreation as an essential component of the right to personal happiness and autonomy, the dominant view remains that the government does not have the right to impose these restrictions on its own citizens, for the sake of future people who have yet to exist.Sarah Conly is first to make the contentious argument that not only is it wrong to have more than one child in the face of such concerns, we do not even retain the right to do so. In One Child, Conly argues that autonomy and personal rights are not unlimited, especially if one's body may cause harm to anyone, and that the government has a moral obligation to protect both current and future citizens. Conly gives readers a thought-provoking and accessible exposure to the problem of population growth and develops a credible view of what our moral obligations really are, to generations present and future. (shrink)

Transhumanist thought on overpopulation usually invokes the welfare of present human beings and the control over future generation, thus minimizing the need and meaning of new births. Here we devise a framework for a more thorough screening of the relevant literature, to have a better appreciation of the issue of natality. We follow the lead of Hannah Arendt and Brent Waters in this respect. With three overlapping categories of words, headed by “natality,” “birth,” and “intergenerations,” a large sample of (...) books on transhumanism is scrutinized, showing the lack of sustained reflection on the issue. After this preliminary scrutiny, a possible defense of natality in face of modern and transhumanist thought is marshaled, evoking a number of desirable human traits. One specific issue, the impact of modern values on natality, is further explored, reiterating that concerns about overpopulation and enhanced humans should keep in sight the natural cycle of birth and death. (shrink)

This chapter examines issues of antinatalism in the context of global challenges on Earth such as climate change and “overpopulation.” The chapter discusses topics inherent in population ethics and looks at the controversial idea of population reduction, pointing out its contentious dimensions. A critique of these ideals specific to feminist bioethics is presented, as well as a critique of antinatalism, clearly distinguishing discriminatory political antinatalism from philosophical antinatalism. Philosophical issues related to the notion of a life worth living, as (...) well as concern for future people, are discussed. The chapter also draws attention to ecofeminism in both the earthly context and regarding our expansion into space. (shrink)