I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.

Whether or not intrinsic value is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsic value. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of states of affairs (...) whose intrinsic value cannot be outweighed by any number of states of certain other, less valuable, kinds. Such``non-trade-off'' cannot reasonably be explained in terms of organic unities, and it can be reconciled with the additivity thesis only if we are prepared to give up some traditional claims about the nature of intrinsic value. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Nietzsche’s claim that suffering is closely related to the realization of certain perfectionist values, such as artistic excellence. According to Bernard Reginster, creative achievement consists in overcoming suffering, and therefore, suffering is an essential ingredient of creative achievement. Because suffering forms an essential part of a valuable whole in this way, Reginster argues that we must in turn value suffering ‘for its own sake’. This paper argues that Reginster’s position is open to the following objection: from (...) the fact that suffering is an essential part of a valuable whole, it does not follow that suffering is itself valuable. Rather, by taking advantage of the principle of organic unities, it would have to form an essential part of a valuable whole in a particular way. The author considers two ways the principle might be attributed to Nietzsche’s views on suffering: first, as an ‘enabling condition’, in which suffering allows for a whole that outweighs its disvalue; and second, as ‘a contributor’, in which suffering positively contributes value to the whole. The paper explores how Nietzsche’s ethics turns out to be crucially informed by this conceptual distinction. (shrink)

Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos’s contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos’s defense of G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic value of a state of affairs; the second concerns a kind of evaluative schizophrenia; and the third concerns the concept of evaluative inadequacy. Lemos’s response to the third objection is examined at length, and it is argued (...) that this response may not succeed in defeating the objection, in which case the problem of evil may not be as easy to solve as some theodicists have suggested. (shrink)

Many attempts to respond to the problem of evil appeal to the concept of an organic unity. The first part of Chapter 8 explains Roderick Chisholm’s views on organic unities, the concept of defeat, and how he thinks they bear on the problem of evil. The second part examines three prominent and recent objections to the principle of organic unities. Roughly, the objections are that (1) the principle of organic unities is incoherent, (2) it leads (...) to “evaluative schizophrenia,” and (3) the examples that allegedly support it, do not, in fact, do so. It is argued that these objections give us no good reason to reject the principle of organic unities. (shrink)

In value theory, the notion of an organic unity is usually associated with G. E. Moore. In his Principia Ethica, Moore provided two definitions of an organic unity. In the first section of this chapter, it is argued that both definitions fail to capture Moore’s intentions, as well as being inadequate for measurement-theoretical reasons. Section 15.2 briefly investigates whether the existence of organic unities, as conceived by Moore, entails that intrinsic or final value cannot be (...) additively measured. In section 15.3, a number of definitions of an organic unity proposed by later authors are surveyed, and some criteria for organicity are discerned. In section 15.4, it is argued that one suggested criterion presupposes that some instances of final value are not instances of intrinsic value, in Moore’s sense. The fifth and final section contains a brief discussion of whether the existence of organic unities can plausibly be denied. (shrink)

In this essay, I defend the Moorean position on organic unities. I will present some plausible examples of organic unites and consider some objections to them. In particular, I will consider an objection from evaluative inadequacy and an objection from Holism or Conditionalism. I will also examine one line of criticism that claims the Moorean position is incoherent.

The potential of psychiatry as an integrative science has been impeded by an internal schism that derives from the duality of mental and physical. Organic unity theory is proposed as a conceptual framework that brings together the terms of the mind-body duality in one coherent perspective. Organic unity theory is braided of three strands: identity, which describes the relationship between mentally described events and corresponding physically described events; continuity, which describes the linguistic-conceptual system that contains both (...) mental and physical terms; and dialectic, which describes the relationship between the empirical way of knowing that is associated with the physical domain of the linguistic-conceptual system and the hermeneutic way of knowing that is associated with the mental domain. Each strand represents an integrative formulation that resolves an aspect of mental-physical dualism into an underlying unity. After the theory is presented, its implications for psychiatry are briefly considered. (shrink)

A short encyclopedia entry on the issue of whether the value of a whole is equal to the sum of the values of its parts.

This paper distinguishes two interpretations of G. E. Moore''s principle of organic unities, which says that the intrinsic value of a whole need not equal the sum of the intrinsic values its parts would have outside it. A holistic interpretation, which was Moore''s own, says that parts retain their values when they enter a whole but that there can be an additional value in the whole as a whole that must be added to them. The conditionality interpretation, which has (...) been defended by Korsgaard, says that parts can change their values when they enter wholes, so no additional value is needed. The paper shows that the two interpretations, which differ on such apparently important issues as the nature of intrinsic value, can always yield the same conclusions about the overall value in a state of affairs, so there is in that sense nothing to choose between them. At the same time, though, the differences between the interpretations make sometimes one and sometimes the other more appropriate for expressing a given evaluative view. In this last connection the paper considers views about beauty, posthumous achievement, vices of disproportion, deserved and compassionate pain, and undeserved and malicious pleasure. (shrink)

Many agree that, to be sound, judgements of value must take account of context. Yet there are distinct models for how this can be done. According to G. E. Moore, one can properly take account of context only by admitting organic unities—wholes whose value is not the sum of the value of their parts. According to Jonathan Dancy, one can properly take account of context only by recognizing holism about value; the value of a part can vary depending upon (...) its surrounding context. In the present paper, we ask whether the doctrine of organic unities and holism about value are best seen as rival or compatible and we conclude that the views are compatible. This paper argues that holism is compatible with the doctrine of organic unities, and that there may well be values that behave both holistically and as organic unities. (shrink)

Moore argued that his principle of organic unities, according to which the value of a whole is to be distinguished from the value of the sum of its parts, is consistent with a retributivist view of punishment: both crime and punishment are intrinsic evils but the combination of the crime with the punishment of its perpetrator is less bad in itself than the crime unpunished. Moore’s principle excludes any form of retributivism that regards the punishment of a guilty person (...) as an intrinsic good. Jonathan Dancy offers a different account of such unities on which, pace Moore, value does not necessarily stay the same from one context to another. This alternative account is defended, but still seems to create difficulties for various forms of retributivism. Key Words: Bentham • Dancy • Moore • organic unities • retribution. (shrink)

Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.

Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable (...) wholes and it is suggested that we should distinguish between two kinds of wholes, collections and complex unities, where the latter can involve values that do not pass on their value to the greater whole in which they are included. Given this distinction we are then able to distinguish between two kinds of organic unity phenomena, the first involving a form of goodness that emerges on the level of the whole, the second involving a form of goodness that is embedded on the level of parts. In order to properly understand the latter form of goodness, there is also a need to distinguish final value from inherent value. (shrink)

In this paper, I trace a ‘leading thread’ from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to Goethe that involves a shift from a conceptual framework, in which a priori concepts furnish necessity and thereby science, to a framework in which sensible experience plays a far more significant and determining role in the formation of knowledge. Although this shift was not enacted by Kant himself, his elaboration of organic unity or organisms paved the way for this transformation. By considering both the (...) methodological difficulties that Kant encounters in his attempt to articulate the structure of organisms and Goethe’s response to these difficulties, my goal is to locate a specific trajectory in the history of nineteenth century philosophy, in which empirical experience and sensibility play a far more significant role than otherwise acknowledged. (shrink)

The article presents a comparative analysis of the philosophical and aesthetic perspectives of English poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky on the issues of the theory of art and cognition. The study highlights the synergies and differences in their conceptions of art, music, imagination, and the interconnectedness of phenomena in the world, demonstrating how the philosophy of art serves as a key component in achieving a holistic understanding of human nature. The article explores Coleridge’s (...) concept of the organic unity of art as a living, evolving entity that transcends individual artistic disciplines. It delves into the poet’s views on the creative process and the role of imagination in shaping artistic expression, emphasizing the significance of his ideas for understanding the role of art in the human experience. Focusing on the unique aspects of Lossky’s philosophical ideas on art, the article argues that Lossky’s views on music are intrinsically linked to his philosophical doctrine of intuitivism. Intuitivism enables direct perception of an object by the knowing subject in its original form, rather than through a copy, symbol, or construction. Lossky’s doctrine distinguishes three modes of intuition (sensual, intellectual, and mystical) and acknowledges two realms: the world and the Superworld (the Kingdom of God). Sensual and intellectual intuition function within the world, while mystical intuition paves the way for a breakthrough into the Superworld (the Kingdom of God). The article demonstrates that music, as a fundamental component of Lossky’s philosophical doctrine, plays a crucial role in enabling a clearer vision of the object by the cognizing subject in its original form, as well as in the complete fulfillment of the missions designated for all three types of intuition. Music is a fundamental element of Lossky’s philosophical doctrine, where the indivisible unity of a musical tone’s properties serves as a symbol of the organic integrity of phenomena in the world. In conclusion, the article emphasizes that a deeper understanding of Coleridge’s and Lossky’s philosophical and aesthetic concepts can provide a transformative outlook on the philosophy of art, fostering interconnectedness among various realms of human creativity and strengthening the continuity of human culture while counteracting destructive forces in the world. (shrink)

This is a work of historical critical exegesis. It aims to establish the influence of the Science of Logic (SL) of G.W.F. Hegel on the Grundrisse of Karl Marx. It is the first work in the history of Marx Studies to demonstrate that the Hegelian logic guided Marx's doctrinal development, and that the ordering of the logical categories in the SL is reflected in the ordering of economic categories in the Grundrisse.

Hegel describes the ‘true unity’ of the intuitive intellect as ‘organic unity.’ Kant’s idea of organic unity, he says, offers us a model of the ‘identity of the universal and the particular.’ The central aim of this chapter is to determine what Kant’s model of organic unity suggests to Hegel about the ‘true unity’ achieved by the intuitive intellect. It is argued that Hegel is particularly interested in the fact that, for Kant, (...) the parts and whole of an organism stand in a relation of purposive reciprocal determination. Hegel takes this model of organic unity to suggest how human cognition is able to achieve the identity of concept and intuition. We are able to achieve identity, according to Hegel, because concepts and intuitions somehow stand to each other in a relation of reciprocal determination. (shrink)

Dewey’s view of art “as experience” takes the art object proper to be distinct from the physical artifact. The "work of art" is a label for a set of perceptual procedures in relation to a complex "situation" – one that is pregnant with vitality and saturated with “pervasive quality.” This qualitative trait is organic rather than merely mechanical in that the informed percipient’s sensibilities have already been sufficiently “funded” with a repertoire of emotionally imbued responses that culminate in a (...) distinctive “consummatory” experience. This account intends to combine classic notions of intrinsicality and instrumentality into a general story about art, which gets elevated into an honorific trait of human life generally -- all within a naturalistic framework. (shrink)

The most habitual and common use of the term natural corresponds to that which is – or could be – property of our experience, irrespective of whether that experience is mental or physical, viz. whatever can be known, perceived, determined and categorized by human mind, after it has bumped into and passed through the channels of our senses. The cooperation between our intellectual and sensual capabilities in relation to the usurpation of what is considered to be “natural”, is extremely crucial (...) for us to presume something as such, even if we are not familiar with – or sympathetic to – the duality of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge. That is inasmuch as the human mind, to be specific, is characterized by the intrinsic ability to conceive and contemplate on beings or events, which anything but belong to the natural order of things, beings such as Pegasus or the Valkyries, for instance, and counterfactual realities like the Purgatory or the Valhalla. (shrink)

In Capital as Organic Unity, Mark E. Meaney argues “that the doctrinal content of Marx’s Grundrisse is indebted for its logical form to Hegel’s exposition of logical categories as found in the Wissenschaft der Logik”. Meaney builds upon an important work by Hiroshi Uchida which had already explored Marx’s debt in the Grundrisse to Hegel’s Logic. But beyond Uchida’s claims, Meaney maps the entire structure of the Grundrisse onto the parallel movements of Hegel’s larger Science of Logic. Meany’s (...) text contains seven chapters. Besides the introduction and conclusion, one chapter discusses money as being, two discuss capital as essence or the essence of capital, and two more discuss the concept of capital in its objective, conceptual completeness. Capital is for Marx a concrete manifestation of Hegel’s objectification of the concept. (shrink)

This paper argues that Moore’s principle of organic unities is false. Advocates of the principle have failed to take note of the distinction between actual intrinsic value and virtual intrinsic value. Purported cases of organic unities, where the actual intrinsic value of a part of a whole is allegedly defeated by the actual intrinsic value of the whole itself, are more plausibly seen as cases where the part in question has no actual intrinsic value but instead a plurality (...) of merely virtual intrinsic values. (shrink)

Many philosophers have endorsed G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities—according to which the value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts—claiming this principle to be of fundamental importance to ethics. In this paper, I cast doubt on the principle. In section 1, I provide a provisional reformulation of the principle of organic unities and contrast such unities with mere sums of value. In section 2, (...) I do some groundwork in order to arrive at an account of the part–whole relation with which the principle of organic unities is concerned. In so doing, I provide some further reformulations of that principle. In section 3, I discuss the isolation method that Moore proposes for determining the value of something, and then, in section 4, I begin an extended discussion of a particular example of an alleged organic unity, namely, Schadenfreude. I explain why some philosophers claim that such pleasure constitutes an organic unity, but I also present reasons for denying this claim. In section 5, I pursue one of these reasons in particular, a reason that appeals to the concept of what I call evaluative inadequacy, and, in section 6, I seek to motivate this appeal by drawing on the relation between value and fitting attitudes. In so doing, I provide still further reformulations of the principle of organic unities. In section 7, I entertain objections to my account of Schadenfreude, one of which requires one final reformulation of the principle of organic unities, and then, in section 8, I discuss the more general objection that, even if my reasons for denying that Schadenfreude constitutes an organic unity are cogent, these reasons do not extend to other alleged organic unities, such as the related phenomenon of Mitleid. In the final section, I address the significance of the debate about whether the principle of organic unities is true. (shrink)