In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of (...) Simplicius’ own philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis. (shrink)

Ethical loneliness is the experience of being abandoned by humanity, compounded by the cruelty of wrongs not being heard. It is the result of multiple lapses on the part of human beings and political institutions that, in failing to listen well to survivors, deny them redress by negating their testimony and thwarting their claims for justice. Jill Stauffer examines the root causes of ethical loneliness and how those in power revise history to serve their own ends rather than (...) the needs of the abandoned. Out of this discussion, difficult truths about the desire and potential for political forgiveness, transitional justice, and political reconciliation emerge. Moving beyond a singular focus on truth commissions and legal trials, she considers more closely what is lost in the wake of oppression and violence, how selves and worlds are built and demolished, and who is responsible for re-creating lives after they are destroyed. Stauffer boldly argues that rebuilding worlds and just institutions after violence is a broad obligation and that those who care about justice must first confront their own assumptions about autonomy, liberty, and responsibility before an effective response to violence can take place. In building her claims, Stauffer draws on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Jean Améry, Eve Sedgwick, and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as concrete cases of justice and injustice across the world. (shrink)

In Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, philosopher Debra Satz takes a penetrating look at those commodity exchanges that strike most of us as problematic. What considerations, she asks, ought to guide the debates about such markets? What is it about a market involving prostitution or the sale of kidneys that makes it morally objectionable? How is a market in weapons or pollution different than a market in soybeans or automobiles? Are laws and social policies banning the more (...) noxious markets necessarily the best responses to them? Satz contends that categories previously used by philosophers and economists are of limited utility in addressing such questions because they have assumed markets to be homogenous. Accordingly, she offers a broader and more nuanced view of markets--one that goes beyond the usual discussions of efficiency and distributional equality--to show how markets shape our culture, foster or thwart human development, and create and support structures of power. (shrink)

Milner’s great study, first published in 1950, discusses the nature of creativity and those forces which prevent its expression. In focusing on her own beginner’s efforts to draw and paint, she analyses not the mysterious and elusive ability of the genius but – as the title suggests – the all too common and distressing situation of ‘not being able’ to create. With a new introduction by Janet Sayers, this edition of _On Not Being Able to Paint_ brings the (...) text to the present generation of readers in the fields of psychoanalysis, education and all those, specialist and general audiences alike, with an interest or involvement in the creative process and those impulses impeding it in many fields. (shrink)

The task of being oneself lies at the heart of human existence and entails the possibility of not being oneself. In the case of schizophrenia, this possibility may come to the fore in a disturbing way. Patients often report that they feel alienated from themselves. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that schizophrenia sometimes has been described with the heideggerian notion of inauthenticity. The aim of this paper is to explore if this description is adequate. We discuss two phenomenological (...) accounts of schizophrenia: Binswanger’s account of schizophrenia as a form of inauthenticity and Blankenburg’s account of schizophrenia as a loss of common sense, which seems construable as a loss of inauthenticity. We argue that the accounts are highlighting aspects of the same underlying phenomenon, viz. schizophrenic autism. Moreover, we argue that Binswanger’s description of schizophrenia as a form of inauthenticity is inadequate and we discuss experiences of self-alienation in schizophrenia. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitariansm distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: it fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. Second, luck egalitarianism (...) is sometimes too restrictive: it fails to justly compensate people who make a social contribution when that contribution arose from “brute luck”. Third, luck egalitarianism is too limited in scope: it cannot diagnose economic injustice arising independently of comparative levels of justice. The lesson of this paper is that luck egalitarians should consider supplementing their theory with desert considerations. Or, even better, consider desertism as a superior alternative to their theory. (shrink)

As Robert Brandom has argued, in order to possess and exercise rational agency – to make judgments and to assess the judgments of others – one must be recognised as a rational agent by other rational agents who, in turn, one recognises as competent to assess one’s rational agency. Moreover, the process of assessing the judgments of other agents is one in which participants must accept moral responsibility for – must ‘stand behind’ – their claims. Unfortunately, machines are not yet (...) – and are unlikely ever to be – moral agents. Consequently, they are unable to recognise us and/or evaluate our claims. The more other people interact with machines, the less they can serve to establish our own status as rational agents. Human interactions with AI systems therefore constitute a profound and, as yet, mostly unrecognised threat to human agency. If we do not want our relationship to machines to reduce us to robots, we will need to rethink both the future of human–computer interaction and our account of what it means to be human. (shrink)

This text discusses aspects of Human-Machine Interaction from the perspectives of an engineer and a philosopher. Machines are viewed not so much as tools, but more as complex socio-technical systems. On this basis, the relation between production and use of such systems and its influence on the interaction between human and machine is examined. The concept of intentionality serves as a common thread, and its close connection with the concepts of usefulness, purpose, and functionality as well as the more socio-culturally (...) shaped concept of destination is shown. We also discuss the connection of these considerations to current philosophical debates around Floridi’s “Onlife Manifesto”. The core of our argumentation is the significance of the unintended in the interplay between justified expectations, the intended, and experienced results of real-world cooperative action. We extend the meaning of this term up to the negatively intended as harmful effect in order to highlight the prominent position of problem solving in the socio-cultural development of humankind. We focus on information processes in that Human-Machine Interaction and the concept of unintended information. With the advancing digital transformation and the growing possibilities of digital monitoring, the importance of information processes as forms of description is growing, too. We show how the concept of non-intended information is linked to such concepts of control of development, in which the non-intended is marginalised and thus an essential driver of socio-cultural development is deactivated. We compare this with Floridi’s reflections on “fears and risks in a hyperconnected era”. (shrink)

Negative causation occurs when an absence serves as cause, effect, or causal intermediary. Negative causation is genuine causation, or so I shall argue. It involves no physical connection between cause and effect. Thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.

Studies of adult sentence processing have established that the referential context in which sentences are presented plays an immediate role in their interpretation, such that referential features of the context mitigate, and even eliminate, so-called ‘garden-path’ effects. Perceivers experience garden path effects almost exclusively when they are attempting to parse locally ambiguous linguistic structures in the absence of context, or in infelicitous contexts. The finding that the referential context ordinarily obviates garden path effects is compelling evidence for the Referential Theory (...) of parsing, advanced originally by Crain and Steedman, (1985) and extended in Altmann and Steedman (1988). Recent work by Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill and Logrip (1999) suggests, however, that children may not be as sensitive as adults to contextual factors in resolving structural ambiguities. This conclusion is not anticipated by the Referential Theory and, worse still, it runs counter to the Continuity Assumption, which supposes that children and adults access the same cognitive mechanisms in processing language (Crain 1991; 2002; Crain and Wexler 2000; Pinker 1984). The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the observations that have led researchers to conclude that children, unlike adults, may lack sensitivity to referential contexts in comprehension in certain circumstances. Adopting a research strategy which we call the method of subtraction, we present evidence that the performance systems of children and adult differ only minimally; that children are sensitive to the referential context; and that children make use of contextual factors to resolve structural ambiguities in on-line sentence interpretation. (shrink)

What makes it hard to dance? Twentieth-century phenomenologists drew attention to the importance of the lived body, and dance is the art form for which the lived body is literally central. Why then isn’t dance the easiest art form to engage in? Phenomenologists are drawn to situations where a phenomenon breaks down, which can open insights into the phenomenon itself. Here the phenomenon is the ability to dance where one might normally expect to. This paper invokes Marion Milner’s book On (...) Not Being Able to Paint. It discusses views of David Kleinberg-Levin, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Iris Young, and others. Parallel to Heidegger’s notion of the Enframing, what causes the disappearing dimensions of animate formanimate form is the Interring. (shrink)

Tony Harrison’s poetry is rooted in the experience of a man who came out of the working class of Leeds and who, avowedly, became a poet and a stranger to his own community. As Harrison duly noted in one interview, from the moment he began his formal education at Leeds Grammar School, he has never felt fully at home in either the world of literature or the world of his working class background, preferring to continually transgress their boundaries and be (...) subject to perpetual change. The paper examines the relation between poetic identity, whose ongoing construction remains one of the most persistently reoccurring themes of Harrison’s work, and the liminal position occupied by the speaker of Harrison’s verse. In the context of the sociological thought of such scholars as Zygmunt Bauman and Stuart Hall, the following paper discusses the way in which the idea of being in-between operates in “On Not Being Milton,” an initial poem from Harrison’s widely acclaimed sonnet sequence The School of Eloquence, whose unique character stems partly from the fact that it constitutes an ongoing poetic project which has continued from 1978 onwards, reflecting the social and cultural changes of contemporary Britain. (shrink)

Frederick Stoutland; VII*—On Not Being a Realist, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 95–112, https://doi.org/10.109.

This text discusses aspects of Human-Machine Interaction from the perspectives of an engineer and a philosopher. Machines are viewed not so much as tools, but more as complex socio-technical systems. On this basis, the relation between production and use of such systems and its influence on the interaction between human and machine is examined. The concept of intentionality serves as a common thread, and its close connection with the concepts of usefulness, purpose, and functionality as well as the more socio-culturally (...) shaped concept of destination is shown. We also discuss the connection of these considerations to current philosophical debates around Floridi’s “Onlife Manifesto”. The core of our argumentation is the significance of the unintended in the interplay between justified expectations, the intended, and experienced results of real-world cooperative action. We extend the meaning of this term up to the negatively intended as harmful effect in order to highlight the prominent position of problem solving in the socio-cultural development of humankind. We focus on information processes in that Human-Machine Interaction and the concept of unintended information. With the advancing digital transformation and the growing possibilities of digital monitoring, the importance of information processes as forms of description is growing, too. We show how the concept of non-intended information is linked to such concepts of control of development, in which the non-intended is marginalised and thus an essential driver of socio-cultural development is deactivated. We compare this with Floridi’s reflections on “fears and risks in a hyperconnected era”. (shrink)

Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these rights (...) are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals’ functional goods. (shrink)

Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are particulars. I then (...) conclude by examining and rejecting two theories according to which objects can wholly be in two places at the same time. (shrink)

This article interprets Foucault's life-long involvement with transgressive experiences as an art of not being oneself, an effort to escape identity and become other. By bringing together Foucault's own theoretical practices with those drawn from Deleuze and Blanchot, and linking these with biographical material (modes of existence), I show how Foucault's `encounters' with passion and pleasure in film, philosophy, S/M, drugs, the Greeks and suicide amount to an `art of living', an intensification of the power to affect oneself and (...) others in processes of `subjectivation', creating new possibilities of life. This is what Foucault more precisely called an `ethics' - an immanent ethics in which one becomes worthy of what happens to oneself by becoming a work of art. (shrink)

It has been hypothesized that postperformance memory gaps occur in highly skilled individuals because experts generally perform their skills without conscious attention. In contrast, we hypothesize that such memory gaps may occur when performers focus so intently on their unfolding actions that their ongoing attention interferes with long-term memory formation of what was previously attended to, or when performers are highly focused on aspects of their bodily skills that are not readily put into words. In neither case, we argue, does (...) performance proceed automatically yet both situations, we suggest, may lead to an inability to recollect performance. (shrink)

Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these rights (...) are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals’ functional goods. (shrink)

The similarities in the philosophies of Parmenides and Śaṅkara1 need to be better understood than they have been so far. I will argue that the goal they share can be characterized as that of leading their audiences to nondual reality, which is the only trustworthy knowledge or experience one can have. They refer to this nondual reality respectively as being and Brahman. Even if the phrase ‘nondual reality’ or ‘nondual experience’ strikes many readers as controversial if applied to Parmenides’ (...) being, it agrees with the ‘fashionable’ Parmenides interpretations that insist that Parmenides’ laws of thought, such as the impossibility of knowing not-being,2 will enable us to understand what being is; and it makes.. (shrink)

When we think of courage, we imagine bravery in war. But is there other courage? A beautiful, attractive woman asks you to make love to her but you refuse: do you lack courage? Let us leave this aside. Is there such a thing as courage in philosophy? A philosopher challenges you and you refuse? Are you lacking courage? This question must have first and last occurred to me when observing Derek Parfit speak. Parfit appeared to challenge me, but I didn’t (...) take him seriously. But is that a lack of courage? I present some excuses for not taking up the challenge. But what if you have none of these? You have to accept that you lack courage then, by the local standards anyway. (shrink)

Bad things often happen, and morally good people ought to be sorry that they happen. People are sometimes morally permitted not to do anything about such bad things, not to have to struggle to prevent them from occurring. But what could be more obvious to a good person than that one ought to be sorry about the occurrence of bad things? Even more so, it would seem, if the bad things occur in one’s vicinity, or one is involved with them. (...) I shall argue that sometimes it is morally permissible not to be sorry when bad things happen. Perhaps it is even permissible to be happy about it. (shrink)

We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of (...) William H. Bragg’s early 20th century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward. (shrink)

By playing a crucial role in settling open issues in the philosophical debate about logical consequence, logical evidence has become the holy grail of inquirers investigating the domain of logic. However, despite its indispensable role in this endeavor, logical evidence has retained an aura of mystery. Indeed, there seems to be a great disharmony in conceiving the correct nature and scope of logical evidence among philosophers. In this paper, I examine four widespread conceptions of logical evidence to argue that all (...) should be reconsidered. First, I argue that logical apriorists are more tolerant of logical evidence than empiricists. Second, I argue that evidence for logic should not be read out of natural language. Third, I argue that if logical intuitions are to count as logical evidence, then their evidential content must not be propositional. Finally, I argue that the empiricist proposal of treating experts' judgments as evidence suffers from the same problems as the rationalist conception. (shrink)

James Ladyman has recently proposed a view according to which all that exists on the level of microphysics are structures "all the way down". By means of a comparative reading of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics as proposed by Stewart Shapiro, I shall present what I believe structures could not be. I shall argue that, if Ladyman is indeed proposing something as strong as suggested here, then he is committed to solving problems that proponents of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics (...) such as Shapiro are trying to solve. Attempting to do so, however, brings out a tacit tension in Ladyman's position. I shall argue that the upshot of this is that the ontological import that Ladyman attributes to structures is rather epistemological import properly understood. (shrink)

The paper focuses on Democritus’ void (κενόν) as not-being and tackles two interrelated puzzles: (a) whether the two starting-points of the atomic theory, atoms and void, should be considered as equivalent and (b) how nothing can be something. It offers a close examination of the passages concerning emptiness in tandem with the corresponding views of Parmenides and Melissus, and then it reassesses Aristotle’s idea of a link between the notions of void and place.

Gianni Vattimo, a leading philosopher of the continental school, has always resisted autobiography. But in this intimate memoir, the voice of Vattimo as thinker, political activist, and human being finds its expression on the page. With Piergiorgio Paterlini, a noted Italian writer and journalist, Vattimo reflects on a lifetime of politics, sexual radicalism, and philosophical exuberance in postwar Italy. Turin, the city where he was born and one of the intellectual capitals of Europe, forms the core of his reminiscences, (...) enhanced by fascinating vignettes of studying under Hans Georg Gadamer, teaching in the United States, serving as a public intellectual and interlocutor of Habermas and Derrida, and working within the European Parliament to unite Europe. Vattimo's status as a left-wing faculty president paradoxically made him a target of the Red Brigades in the 1970s, causing him to flee Turin for his life. Left-wing terrorism did not deter the philosopher from his quest for social progress, however, and in the 1980s, he introduced a daring formulation called "weak thought," which stripped metaphysics, science, religion, and all other absolute systems of their authority. Vattimo then became notorious both for his renewed commitment to the core values of Christianity and for the Vatican's denunciation of his views. Paterlini weaves his interviews with Vattimo into an utterly candid first-person portrait, creating a riveting text that is destined to become one of the most compelling accounts of homosexuality, history, politics, and philosophical invention in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Gianni Vattimo, a leading philosopher of the continental school, has always resisted autobiography. But in this intimate memoir, the voice of Vattimo as thinker, political activist, and human being finds its expression on the page. With Piergiorgio Paterlini, a noted Italian writer and journalist, Vattimo reflects on a lifetime of politics, sexual radicalism, and philosophical exuberance in postwar Italy. Turin, the city where he was born and one of the intellectual capitals of Europe (also the city in which Nietzsche (...) went mad), forms the core of his reminiscences, enhanced by fascinating vignettes of studying under Hans Georg Gadamer, teaching in the United States, serving as a public intellectual and interlocutor of Habermas and Derrida, and working within the European Parliament to unite Europe. Vattimo's status as a left-wing faculty president paradoxically made him a target of the Red Brigades in the 1970s, causing him to flee Turin for his life. Left-wing terrorism did not deter the philosopher from his quest for social progress, however, and in the 1980s, he introduced a daring formulation called "weak thought," which stripped metaphysics, science, religion, and all other absolute systems of their authority. Vattimo then became notorious both for his renewed commitment to the core values of Christianity (he was trained as a Catholic intellectual) and for the Vatican's denunciation of his views. Paterlini weaves his interviews with Vattimo into an utterly candid first-person portrait, creating a riveting text that is destined to become one of the most compelling accounts of homosexuality, history, politics, and philosophical invention in the twentieth century. (shrink)

This paper is about the common thought that anger is “not worth it” because of the bad effects that it has on the angry person. It contends that this common thought is sometimes deeply puzzling, because although it looks to be a thought about anger’s unfittingness, it is hard to see what such bad effects have to do with fittingness. The paper gives an account of the elusive connection between bad effects and fit. In brief, it argues that the thought (...) that anger is “not worth it” has to do with the sense of “importance” that the anger manifests. That anger portrays its object as more important than it actually is shows it to be unfitting, but also shows why seemingly instrumental considerations like bad effects bear on fittingness, insofar as they bear on importance. The paper then shows how this account illuminates a kind of emotional dilemma often faced by oppressed people and closes with a brief discussion of some broader implications. (shrink)

'Christian theology', Vladimir Lossky observes, 'does not know of an abstract divinity'. By this one can read 'no doctrine of God abstracted from the rich sets of traditions that provide a context for the form of such a confession', traditions that shape reason doxologically to witness to the incomprehensible 'plentitude of being'. Sounding like Pascal he declares that 'the God of the philosophers and savants is introduced into the heart of the Living God, taking the place of the Deus (...) absconditus, qui posuit tenebras labitulum suum'. Consequently, what Christian dogmatics speaks of as the 'Holy Spirit' cannot be conceived as the Spirit of such an abstracted God, but of the God who 'descends' in 'the divine person of Christ [who] makes human persons capable of an ascent in the Holy Spirit'. (shrink)

I focus on the monastery life in Europe and its predomination of vita contemplativa upon vita activa. It is not hard to distinguish within Christianity its Manichaean component whose characteristic feature is a grudge against matter, body and sexuality. This complexity of ideas brought about the contempt of vital elements of human existence, so that its animal past, still present in Zivilisationsprozess. An alternative anthropology inspired by an evolutionism should based on the presumption that only through the appreciation of an (...) animal dimension of us—instead of monastic desire of becoming an angel—will it be possible to create new perspectives for renegotiation of the human–animal boundaries. (shrink)

We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of (...) William H. Bragg’s early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward. (shrink)

The German term Unheimlichkeit is usually translated into English as the uncanny, the sinister, or the unsettling, a meaning that has become dominant since Freudian analysis. In the philosophical sphere, its use has remained largely confined to this characterization, limiting it to the affective realm, as a response to the experience of anxiety. This article proposes a reflection on the meaning that Unheimlichkeit acquires in the phenomenology of Dasein developed by Heidegger, in which it is understood not as a derivative (...) phenomenon but as an ontological determination: Dasein’s Being is essentially uncanny. This determination is understood from the state of not-being-athome. This is an interpretation that has been developed mainly from texts corresponding to the period of Heidegger’s work known as the Kehre. The aim of this paper is to show that this idea can already be found in the Marburg period. In this sense, through the review of some texts and lectures from this period, it will be shown that Unheimlichkeit appears as an originary and grounding structure of existential analytics. This will give us the opportunity to reflect, by way of conclusion, on the idea of home. (shrink)

A close allegiance to `critique' differentiates critical legal studies from other approaches to law. By focussing on the underlying `grammar' used to animate critical legal thinking, this paper excavates a prevalent – modern, disciplinary – reliance upon judgement against rationally founded criteria. Yet the epistemological horizons that once housed such a critical grammar no longer command the unassailable privilege they once did. This presents critics with new opportunities to formulate different (post-disciplinary?) approaches to critical analysis. The following discussion develops an (...) alternative, Nietzschean-inspired grammar of critique that relentlessly seeks new ways of existing. It addresses processes of becoming that are not centred on judgement, faultfinding or discovering essences. Reading Nietzsche selectively allows one to reformulate critique beyond founded judgement as an art; that is, as a skilful `way of putting things together' to propel new forms of life. This grammar implies that critical legal studies might too be recast in search of an elusive promise of `justice' beyond current limits, and continuously calculated through critique. Such critique explores the promise of not being thus by creatively assembling new signs of existence in altered semiotic constellations. These practices eternally return the critic to contingent processes of our becoming. (shrink)

(2002). Clinical Research Should Not Be Permitted to Escape the Ethical Orbit of Clinical Care. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 27-28.

The purity test scandal highlights a pervasive double standard: reputations shape the lives of just about everyone, but to be declared a slut is to be publicly denied the right to even basic kinds of respect. This chapter talks about purity test results where Meg Manning finds out that her score of 48 is plastered across her locker, along with the word “slut.” The locker next to hers, however, is marked with a 32 and the words “You're the best!” Either (...) this locker belongs to a girl being mocked for her low score or it belongs to a guy being praised. Veronica Mars doesn't take the test, but a fake score is posted for her anyway—a shamefully low 14. The purity test reminds us that sluts and studs aren't terribly different. The only difference is that studs are applauded for their reputation, while sluts are shamed for theirs. (shrink)

This chapter discusses some contributions that Mexican and Latinx phenomenologists have made to the critical phenomenology of home, i.e., the experience of “being at home in the world”—an experience that has always been both deeply cherished and bitterly contested. Tracing a line of thought that runs from the work of two Mexican phenomenologists in the 1940s and 1950s (Jorge Portilla and Emilio Uranga) to the work of two contemporary Latinx phenomenologists in the U.S. (Gloria Anzaldúa and Mariana Ortega), we (...) find a shared view that the Mexican and Latinx experience has been marked by zozobra, an anxious condition characterized by the inability to be at home in the world. However, these philosophers disagree about the source of this zozobra, and even whether zozobra is something that should overcome or embraced and celebrated. Reading these thinkers together, we learn that home is several things simultaneously: an essential foundation for human existence; an illusory ideal whose pursuit leads us to exclude vulnerable others and vulnerable parts of ourselves; and a site for the negotiation of the circumstances in which one finds oneself, in the tragic and beautiful hope of creating a life to call one’s own. (shrink)

Since the mid-twentieth century, we have passed from a time where sexual frankness was actively obstructed by censorship and industry self-regulation to an age when pornography is circulated freely and is fairly ubiquitous on the Internet. Attitudes to sexually explicit material have accordingly changed a great deal in this time, but more at the level of the grounds on which it is objected to rather than through a general acceptance of it in the public sphere. Critical objections now tend to (...) be political or aesthetic in nature rather than moralistic. Commercial cinema still seems wary of a frank exploration of sexuality, preferring to address it tangentially in genres such as the erotic thriller. In Europe, an art house canon of sexually explicit movies has formed, starting with Bertolucci’s Last Tango in Paris (1972) and the French-produced In the Realm of the Senses (1976). This article looks at the steps taken since the 1970s to challenge out-of-date taboos and yet at the same time differentiate the serious film about sex from both pornography (operating in parallel with mainstream cinema but in its shadow) and the exploitation film. After reviewing the art film’s relationship with both hard and soft core, two recent films, Intimacy (2000) and 9 Songs (2005), are analyzed for their explicit content and for the way they articulate their ideas about sex through graphic depictions of sexual acts. Compulsive and/or claustrophobic unsimulated sexual behaviour is used as a way of asking probing questions of intimacy (and its filmability). This is shown to be a very different thing from the highly visual and staged satisfactions of pornography. (shrink)

In my paper, by drawing on the writings Heidegger developed in the late 1920s, I wish to display what we may refer to as the thorough educational nature of Heideggerian reflection. It is my argument that the analysis of Dasein we find in the early Heidegger displays an extraordinary deep and dense reflection on selfhood and subjectivity, a reflection that is rooted in subject’s freedom and transcending. By paying attention to the interplay between these two features, I argue that in (...) the late 1920s, while challenging the notion of an all-encompassing consciousness as the place where everything should be understood and managed, Heidegger built a conception of selfhood and subjectivity in terms of freedom, responsibility, and ongoing transformation. Such a conception, I argue, is in and of itself educational. (shrink)

We prove that large cardinals need not generally exhibit their large cardinal nature in HOD. For example, a supercompact cardinal κ need not be weakly compact in HOD, and there can be a proper class of supercompact cardinals in V, none of them weakly compact in HOD, with no supercompact cardinals in HOD. Similar results hold for many other types of large cardinals, such as measurable and strong cardinals.

This essay starts from a consideration of Deleuze's theory of time. It begins with the empty form of time. But the essay's aim is to understand Deleuze's reversal of Platonism in his 1968 Difference and Repetition. There is no question that the stakes of the reversal of Platonism are ontological. But I argue that what is really at stake is a movement of demoralisation. The essay proceeds in three steps. First, we determine what sufficient reason or grounding is, for Deleuze. (...) Sufficient reason is struck with an irreducible ambiguity. It is this ambiguity in sufficient reason that allows it to be taken advantage of, to be used by representation and good sense for a moral purpose. The second part of the essay will therefore concern ‘the moralisation of sufficient reason’. Its focus will be good sense. But then, third, we must understand Deleuze's ‘demoralisation of sufficient reason’, which necessarily passes through others. Like sufficient reason, others are ambiguous, at once lending themselves to what cancels differences, and opening the way towards difference and intensity. The third step focuses on what Deleuze calls ‘the ethics of intensive quantities’. In the Conclusion, I examine Deleuze's famous, almost cliché, definition of ethics as not being unworthy of the event and, through the empty form of time, I connect it to Kant's formalistic ethics. (shrink)

It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out (...) by the sharp model but not by any promising incarnation of its imprecise counterpart. After first pointing out that Elga has fallen short of establishing that his principle is indeed uniquely borne out by the sharp model, I cast aspersions on its plausibility. I show that a slight weakening of the principle is satisfied by at least one, but interestingly not all, varieties of the imprecise model and point out that Elga has failed to motivate his stronger commitment. (shrink)

This paper considers Davidson's (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to show that he has failed to provide positive reasons for introducing causation into his analysis of rationalizing explanation. I consider various ways of spelling out his intuition that something is missing from explanation if we consider only the justificatory relation between reasons and action, and I argue that to the extent that there is anything missing, it should not be provided by construing reasons as causes. What (...) is ostensibly missing, and what I think Davidson is after, is some kind of determinate relation between explanans and explanandum. I argue that this is too strong a requirement to place on rationalizing explanation. (shrink)

Neo-Fregeans such as Bob Hale and Crispin Wright seek a foundation of mathematics based on abstraction principles. These are sentences involving a relation called the abstraction relation. It is usually assumed that abstraction relations must be equivalence relations, so reflexive, symmetric and transitive. In this article I argue that abstraction relations need not be reflexive. I furthermore give an application of non-reflexive abstraction relations to restricted abstraction principles.