In this paper, new evidence is presented for the assumption that the reason-relation reading of indicative conditionals ('if A, then C') reflects a conventional implicature. In four experiments, it is investigated whether relevance effects found for the probability assessment of indicative conditionals (Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, 2016a) can be classified as being produced by a) a conversational implicature, b) a (probabilistic) presupposition failure, or c) a conventional implicature. After considering several alternative hypotheses and the accumulating evidence from other studies as (...) well, we conclude that the evidence is most consistent with the Relevance Effect being the outcome of a conventional implicature. This finding indicates that the reason-relation reading is part of the semantic content of indicative conditionals, albeit not part of their primary truth-conditional content. (shrink)

The properties of negation, in combination with those of other logical operations and structural features of the deductibility relation, serve as gateways among logical systems. Negation therefore plays an important role in selecting logical systems for particular applications. This volume provides a thorough treatment of this concept, based on contributions written by authors from various branches of logic. The resulting 14 research papers address a variety of topics including negation in relevant logics; a defense of dialetheic theory (...) of negation; stable negation in logic programming; antirealism and falsity; and negation, denial, and language change in philosophical logic. Suited to scholars and graduate students in the fields of philosophy, logic mathematics, computer science, and linguistics. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

This paper investigates the negation-free fragment of the bi-connexive logic 2C, called 2CSubscript minus $_-$ −, from the perspective of bilateralist proof-theoretic semantics (PTS). It is argued that eliminating primitive negation has two important conceptual consequences. First, it requires a reconceptualization of contradictory logics: in a bilateralist framework, contradiction need not be understood in terms of negation inconsistency, but rather as the coexistence of proofs and refutations for certain formulas within a non-trivial system. Second, it challenges the (...) standard definition of connexive logics, which typically rely on negation-based schemata. Instead, a rule-based conception of connexivity, grounded in bilateralist PTS, is proposed. This reconception avoids dependence on the validation of specific formula schemata and thereby also dependence on negation. The paper also addresses the issue of proof–refutation duality in the absence of strong negation, which can be formalized and recovered at a meta-level by extending the system with a two-sorted typed lamda $\lambda $ λ-calculus. (shrink)

We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a comprehensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incompatibilities (...) between such points. We defuse a number of objections to this Plan, raised by supporters of the American Plan for negation, in which negation is handled via a many-valued semantics. We show that the Australian Plan has substantial advantages over the American Plan. (shrink)

What conception of negation a dialetheist might have, in holding that a statement and its negation can both be true, has been the subject to considerable debate. Several of the issues in play in this area—such as the unique characterization of negation, and the interplay between contrariety and subcontrariety—are broached here by considering some positions taken on them by Graham Priest and assorted critics. Some of the more intricate points, as well as detailed discussions of commentators on (...) Priest are handled in explicitly labelled Digressions and in two Appendices. (shrink)

A version of strong negation is introduced into Categorial Grammar. The resulting syntactic calculi turn out to be systems of connexive logic.

Constructive logic with Nelson negation is an extension of the intuitionistic logic with a special type of negation expressing some features of constructive falsity and refutation by counterexample. In this paper we generalize this logic weakening maximally the underlying intuitionistic negation. The resulting system, called subminimal logic with Nelson negation, is studied by means of a kind of algebras called generalized N-lattices. We show that generalized N-lattices admit representation formalizing the intuitive idea of refutation by means (...) of counterexamples giving in this way a counterexample semantics of the logic in question and some of its natural extensions. Among the extensions which are near to the intuitionistic logic are the minimal logic with Nelson negation which is an extension of the Johansson's minimal logic with Nelson negation and its in a sense dual version — the co-minimal logic with Nelson negation. Among the extensions near to the classical logic are the well known 3-valued logic of Lukasiewicz, two 12-valued logics and one 48-valued logic. Standard questions for all these logics — decidability, Kripke-style semantics, complete axiomatizability, conservativeness are studied. At the end of the paper extensions based on a new connective of self-dual conjunction and an analog of the Lukasiewicz middle value ½ have also been considered. (shrink)

The concept of negation is the central operator in distinguishing between historical change and natural evolution, which is constitutive of modern thinking. The crisis of this distinction is therefore the »crisis of negation « (Alain Badiou). The text examines this crisis by first considering Hegel’s concept of »determinate negation« and its impact on the modern understanding of revolution and then discusses two possible alternative understandings of negation: abstract negation (Luhmann) and infinite negation (Agamben).

This essay revisits Karl Marx’s understanding of consumption, in an effort to rescue it from the overshadowing legacy of critical theory which has construed Marx as inveighing against false needs. It is argued that Marx regarded the expansion of needs entailed by capitalism in a generally favourable way, but saw capitalism as a system yoking use-value to the imperatives of profit accumulation, hence limiting and subjugating the consumption of the masses. While Marx’s position was radically different from conventional anti-consumerism it (...) is equally incompatible with complacent affirmations of ‘the consumer society’ in that Marx at all times aimed at a revolutionary change which will transform consumption both quantitatively and qualitatively. Marx’s views are first discussed as expressed in the perennially-cited text, the 1844Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. The second part moves on to examine the further evolution of Marx’s ideas as found in later texts, particularly theGrundrisse. (shrink)

Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new (...) response to the antirealist argument: keep 1 and 2, avoiding 4 by rejecting 3. My aim in this paper is to see how much work in the fight against anti-realism this new response can really do. I argue that there is a powerful objection to the response: 2 is in tension with the claim that denied sentences can be premisses and conclusions in inferences. But I show that, even given this objection, the new response has an important role to play. (shrink)

In this paper, I will first draw attention to the central fact that Freud describes in his article on “Negation”; i.e., “recognition of the unconscious on the part of the ego is expressed in a negative formula.” Technically, such a negative formula is called denial. Second, I will ask whether such denials are accidental or necessary in the life of consciousness. To answer this question I will use the philosophical system of Hegel. I will make use of his ideas (...) at two levels of generality. At the first level of generality, I will analyze one of Hegel’s most famous and influential passages: “Lordship and Bondage.” Hegel presents this passage as a necessary moment in the development of consciousness. If we find in that passage a necessary denial, then we can argue that denial is not just a fact but is, at least in any philosophical anthropology akin to Hegel’s, a necessity. At the second level of generality, we will then quote two statements by Hegel, one about the nature of the will and one about the path to truth for consciousness. Both statements will be clarified by Hegel’s analysis of “Lordship and Bondage.” Both statements will be used to demonstrate that Hegel affirmed explicitly the necessity of negativity in the life of consciousness. (shrink)

Historical Aspects of Standard Negation in Semitic. By Ambjörn Sjörs. Studies in Semitic Languages and Linguistics, vol. 91. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Pp. xv + 478. $140.

The notion of negation is basic to any formal or informal logical system. When any such system is presented to us, it is presented either as a system without negation or as a system with some form of negation. In both cases, we are supposed to know intuitively whether there is no negation in the system or whether the form of negation presented in the system is indeed as claimed. To be more specific, suppose Robinson (...) Crusoe writes a logical system with Hilbert-type axioms and rules, which includes a unary connective ∗A\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$*A$$\end{document}. He puts the document in a bottle and lets it lose at sea. We find it and take a look. We ask: is the connective “∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$*$$\end{document}” a negation in the system? Yet the notion of what is negation in a formal system is not clear. When we see a unary connective ∗A\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$*A$$\end{document}, together with some other axioms for some additional connectives, how can we tell whether ∗A\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$*A$$\end{document} is indeed a form of negation of A? Are there some axioms which the connective “∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$*$$\end{document}” must satisfy in order to qualify ∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$*$$\end{document} as a negation? (shrink)

Üblicherweise wird die Negation als logisch-grammatische Denkoperation verstanden, die den faktischen Geltungsanspruch von Vorstellungen und Aussagen aufheben soll. Das Buch geht über dieses etwas verkürzte Verständnis des Phänomens hinaus und nimmt primär die anthropologischen, erkenntnistheoretischen, semiotischen und sinnbildenden Funktionen von Negationsformen in den Blick, die bisher selten Gegenstand der Analyse waren.

We study the sequent system mentioned in the author's work as CyInFL with ‘intuitionistic’ sequents. We explore the connection between this system and symmetric constructive logic of Zaslavsky and develop an algebraic semantics for both of them. In contrast to the previous work, we prove the strong completeness theorem for CyInFL with ‘intuitionistic’ sequents and all of its basic variants, including variants with contraction. We also show how the defined classes of structures are related to cyclic involutive FL‐algebras and Nelson (...) FLew‐algebras. In particular, we prove the definitional equivalence of symmetric constructive FLewc‐algebras (algebraic models of symmetric constructive logic) and Nelson FLew‐algebras (algebras introduced by Spinks and Veroff, as the termwise equivalent definition of Nelson algebras). Because of the strong completeness theorem that covers all basic variants of CyInFL with ‘intuitionistic’ sequents, we rename this sequent system to symmetric constructive full Lambek calculus (). We verify the decidability of this system and its basic variants, as we did in the case of their distributive cousins. As a consequence we obtain that the corresponding theories of (distributive and nondistributive) symmetric constructive FL‐algebras are decidable. (shrink)

My goal in what follows is to trace the role of avant-garde music in the rise and development of the Italian counter-culture from the early 1960s until its destruction at the end of the 1970s. Instead of approaching this issue along quantitative, sociological lines, I will focus on one figure whose simultaneous engagement with musical innovation and sociopolitical revolution was exemplary in its intent : the avant-garde composer Luigi Nono, whose career parallels the rise of the Italian counter-culture during the (...) 1960s and early 1970s. I will also briefly examine how the forcible destruction of the Italian counter-culture in 1979 is reflected in the last phase of Nono’s musical career. (shrink)

By rephrasing quantifier-free axioms as rules of derivation in sequent calculus, we show that the generalized Steiner–Lehmus theorem admits a direct proof in classical logic. This provides a partial answer to a question raised by Sylvester in 1852. We also present some comments on possible intuitionistic approaches.

Knowing, Naming and Negation: A Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrantika. Translated, annotated and introduced by Anne Carolyn Klein, with oral commentary by Geshe Belden Drakba, Denma Lochö Rinbochay, and Kensur Yeshay Tupden. Snow Lion, Ithaca, New York 1991. 266 pp. plus Tibetan texts, Pbk £11.96.

In a series of articles, Kit Fine presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctrine that spatially coincident objects are identical. His objections rely on Leibniz’s Law and linguistic environments that appear to be immune to the standard charge of non-transparency and substitution failure. In this paper, I respond to Fine’s objections on behalf of the monist. Following Benjamin Schnieder, I observe that arguments from Leibniz’s Law are valid only if they involve descriptive, rather than metalinguistic, negation. Then (...) I show that the monist is justified in treating the negation in Fine’s objections as metalinguistic in nature. Along the way I make a few methodological remarks about the interaction between the study of natural language and metaphysics. I also present evidence that some of the linguistic environments which Fine relies on are, contrary to appearances, non-transparent. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Negation".

We investigate the notion of classical negation from a non-classical perspective. In particular, one aim is to determine what classical negation amounts to in a paracomplete and paraconsistent four-valued setting. We first give a general semantic characterization of classical negation and then consider an axiomatic expansion BD+ of four-valued Belnap–Dunn logic by classical negation. We show the expansion complete and maximal. Finally, we compare BD+ to some related systems found in the literature, specifically a four-valued modal (...) logic of Béziau and the logic of classical implication and a paraconsistent de Morgan negation of Zaitsev. (shrink)

Many relevant logics are conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Not all, however. This paper shows an acute form of non-conservativeness, namely that the Boolean-free fragment of the Boolean extension of a relevant logic need not always satisfy the variable-sharing property. In fact, it is shown that such an extension can in fact yield classical logic. For a vast range of relevant logic, however, it is shown that the variable-sharing property, restricted to the Boolean-free fragment, still holds for the Boolean (...) extended logic. (shrink)

The operators of first-order logic, including negation, operate on whole formulae. This makes it unsuitable as a tool for the formal analysis of reasoning with non-sentential forms of negation such as predicate term negation. We extend its language with negation operators whose scope is more narrow than an atomic formula. Exploiting the usefulness of subatomic proof-theoretic considerations for the study of subatomic inferential structure, we define intuitionistic subatomic natural deduction systems which have several subatomic operators and (...) an additional operator for formula negation at their disposal. We establish normalization and subexpression property results for the systems. The normalization results allow us to formulate a proof-theoretic semantics for formulae composed of the subatomic operators. We illustrate the systems with applications to reasoning with combinations of sentential negation, predicate term negation, subject term negation, and antonymy. (shrink)

In this paper, a family of paraconsistent propositional logics with constructive negation, constructive implication, and constructive co-implication is introduced. Although some fragments of these logics are known from the literature and although these logics emerge quite naturally, it seems that none of them has been considered so far. A relational possible worlds semantics as well as sound and complete display sequent calculi for the logics under consideration are presented.

An extension of intuitionism to empirical discourse, a project most seriously taken up by Dummett and Tennant, requires an empirical negation whose strength lies somewhere between classical negation (‘It is unwarranted that... ’) and intuitionistic negation (‘It is refutable that... ’). I put forward one plausible candidate that compares favorably to some others that have been propounded in the literature. A tableau calculus is presented and shown to be strongly complete.

Minimal Negation is defined within the basic positive relevance logic in the relational ternary semantics: B+. Thus, by defining a number of subminimal negations in the B+ context, principles of weak negation are shown to be isolable. Complete ternary semantics are offered for minimal negation in B+. Certain forms of reductio are conjectured to be undefinable (in ternary frames) without extending the positive logic. Complete semantics for such kinds of reductio in a properly extended positive logic are (...) offered. (shrink)

This paper introduces and explores a conservative extension of inquisitive logic. In particular, weak negation is added to the standard propositional language of inquisitive semantics, and it is shown that, although we lose some general semantic properties of the original framework, such an enrichment enables us to model some previously inexpressible speech acts such as weak denial and ‘might’-assertions. As a result, a new modal logic emerges. For this logic, a Fitch-style system of natural deduction is formulated. The main (...) result of this paper is a theorem establishing the completeness of the system with respect to inquisitive semantics with weak negation. At the conclusion of the paper, the possibility of extending the framework to the level of first order logic is briefly discussed. (shrink)