The discourse concerning musical expression hinges on a fundamental analogy between music and language. While the extant literature commonly compares music to language, this essay takes the reverse direction, following Wittgenstein’s approach. The discussion contrasts the theoretical underpinnings of the “music as language” simile with those of the “language as music” simile. The emphasis on characterization, performance, mutual tuning-in relationships, the interaction between language and music, and the open-ended effort to reorient ourselves as we draw in significance challenges (...) the “informing paradigm” that has been paramount across contemporary philosophical theories of musical expression. One of the most promising philosophical avenues that emerges as we move beyond the “informing paradigm” is recognizing the inseparable relationship between musical expression and our power to shape our own language. (shrink)

This study examines the philosophical question of how it is possible to appreciate music aesthetically as an expressive art form. First it examines a number of general theories that seek to make sense of expressiveness as a characteristic of music that can be considered relevant to our aesthetic appreciation of the latter. These include accounts that focus on resemblances between music and human behaviour or human feelings, on music's powers of emotional arousal, and on various ways in which music may (...) be imaginatively construed by listeners. It argues that none of these are entirely satisfactory. Then it proposes an alternative account, focusing on what is involved when our appreciation of music as an expressive art is informed by our awareness of it as something that is expressively interpreted in performance. It is claimed that this offers the basis for a better understanding of at least some aspects of expressiveness in music and its relevance to aesthetic appreciation. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine an evolutionary hypothesis about musical expressiveness first proposed by Peter Kivy. I will first present the hypothesis and explain why I take it to be different from ordinary evolutionary explanations of musical expressiveness. I will then argue that Kivy’s hypothesis is of crucial importance for most available resemblancebased accounts of musical expressiveness. For this reason, it is particularly important to assess its plausibility. After having reviewed the existing literature on the topic, (...) I will list five challenges the hypothesis is supposed to meet. Although my list of challenges does not aim at exhaustiveness, I believe that the hypothesis must meet all of the challenges I suggest if it is to work as a cornerstone for a theory of musical expressiveness. (shrink)

This paper examines the causal basis of our ability to attribute emotions to music, developing and synthesizing the existing arousal, resemblance and persona theories of musical expressivity to do so. The principal claim is that music hijacks the simulation mechanism of the brain, a mechanism which has evolved to detect one's own and other people's emotions.

The paper begins with an overview of various well-known accounts of the musical expression of emotion that have been proposed in recent years. But rather than proceeding to assess the merits and faults of these accounts the paper examines whether a radically new theory by Christopher Peacocke is superior to all of them. The theory, which certainly has a number of attractive features, is based on the idea of metaphorical-as perception. The notion of metaphorical-as perception needs to be (...) elucidated and the examination of Peacocke’s theory takes place by playing it off against a rival theory that is based on a different kind of perception, imaginative-as perception. The paper argues that, as the basis of an account of the musical expression of emotion, imaginative-as perception has all the advantages and none of the apparent defects of metaphorical-as perception. (shrink)

This article assesses the current state of the philosophical debate regarding the expression of emotion in music, or expressive properties of music. It defines the question, explores a few false‐starts and then considers the solution that expressive properties are a matter of a certain ‘way of appearing’ of the music. This solution is associated with Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson, whose work is discussed. It is argued that work in this area has reached an impasse, and it is not (...) clear where we should go next. (shrink)

Resemblance theories are a popular way of accounting for music’s capacity to be expressive of emotions. According to such theories, musical expressiveness depends on a perceived resemblance between music and human expressive behavior, both vocal (prosodic features, expressive vocalizations), and bodily (gestures, posture, deportment). This article asks whether the available evidence from the field of music psychology supports resemblance theories over their competitors, and answers the question in the negative. I divide the relevant scientific literature into two areas. The (...) first consists in studies that show structural analogies between musical structures and expressive behavior. The second posits causal mechanism that link our experience of expressive music to the way we experience human expressive behavior. I show that neither kind of evidence should ground a preference for resemblance theories over competing views. In the final part of the article, I ask whether the same evidence could be used to settle an issue internal to the resemblance theory, that is, the relative importance to our experience of expressive music of vocal vs. bodily emotional expressive behavior. I conclude that an answer to this question depends on how exactly we interpret some of the resemblance theory’s commitments. (shrink)

Emotion terms such as “sad”, “happy”, and “joyful” apply to a wide range of entities. We use them to refer to mental states of sentient beings, and also to describe features of non‐mental things such as comportment, nature, events, artworks and so on. Drawing on the literature on polysemy, this article provides an in‐depth analysis of emotion descriptions. It argues that emotion terms are polysemous and distinguishes seven related senses. In addition, the article applies the analysis to shed light on (...) a long‐standing debate in philosophy of music concerning emotion descriptions of music. (shrink)

Everybody assumes (1) that musical performances are sonic events and (2) that their expressive properties are sonic properties. This paper discusses recent findings in the psychology of music perception that show that visual information combines with auditory information in the perception of musical expression. The findings show at the very least that arguments are needed for (1) and (2). If music expresses what we think it does, then its expressive properties may be visual as well as sonic; (...) and if its expressive properties are purely sonic, then music expresses less than we think it does. And if the expressive properties of music are visual as well as sonic, then music is not what we think it is—it is not purely sonic. (shrink)

, Derek Matravers defends a new version of the arousal theory of musical expressiveness. In this paper it is argued that for various reasons, including especially what the theory implies about the inappropriateness of certain kinds of response to music, we should reject Matravers's theory in favour of some form of cognitivism.

This essay defends the analysis that music is expressive of an emotion or other mental state insofar as it induces one to hear it as the personal or personlike expression of that mental state. Various competing theories of musical expressiveness, notably those of Malcolm Budd, Stephen Davies, Robert Stecker, and Roger Scruton, are submitted to critical examination.

A philosophical approach to musical expression as not necessary but desirable. Pure music as philosophical and instrumental (F. Schlegel). Philosophy and art fulfilling the same mission—to bring a person face to face with the mystery of transcendence (A. Šliogeris). The “secret” and “public” sides of philosophy described by A. Šliogeris: comparison with the inner form and text of music. The philosophical and everyday view of things; Plato’s allegory of the cave; paideia (A. Šliogeris). The concept of beauty as (...) articulated by Aristotle (kalokagathia), St Augustine (unity, proportionality), I. Kant (purposiveness), J. Maritain (brilliance of form). The ability to apply philosophical ideas can deepen an understanding of the subject of music: the ability to hear the voice of the spirit of the being, that is, the creative work (M. Heiddeger), stimulates the possibility of expression. Knowledge works as a tool of power (A. Mickevičius; F. Nietzsche). (shrink)

Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies developed an influential and convincing account of what features of music cause listeners to hear it as expressive of emotion. Their view (the resemblance theory) holds that music is expressive of some emotion when it resembles human expressive behaviour. Some features of music, they believe, are expressive of emotion because of conventional associations. In recent years, Kivy has rejected the resemblance theory without adopting an alternative. This essay argues that Kivy has been unwise to abandon (...) the resemblance theory. New and compelling psychological evidence supports the theory. The essay also argues that new psychological evidence indicates that convention makes a smaller contribution to musical expressiveness than Kivy and Davies believe. (shrink)

Phenomenology inquires into the essences inherent in phenomena (M. Heidegger, V. Sesemann). A fact is something which is explained by something else, while a phenomenon is understood from itself. Beauty is born when the essence of the structures of the work is revealed by appropriate means: sounds must fulfil the obligations of the eidos (the artistic idea). E. Husserl envisioned phenomenology as a science of essences or eidetic science (D. Stewart, A. Mickunas): the interpretation of music is the grasping of (...) the essence and its expression. The phenomenon of music expresses aesthetic feelings; this is served by its processual nature: it is close to the dynamics of change in the human emotional condition. The truth is the state in which the being of the phenomenon of transcendence is opened up: musical truth is equal to musical being. Intersubjectivity: the “Other” is the basis for the emergence of the “I” (E. Husserl). Art is dialogue: all music calls to an ear not the musician’s own (M. Buber). The author summarises the principles of the phenomenological approach: (1) the phenomenon of music must be analysed on the basis of eidetics and not according to the habit of the interpreter; (2) the eidetic meaning cannot be detached from the specifics of the work, its musical characteristics, however, a phenomenological action requires reduction, i.e., a narrowing of attention to what is essential; (3) musical reduction happens through a transformation (metanoia) of the thinking of the person-perceiver: a leap from “how it seems to me” to “how it really is”; (4) the art of music exists not only in the space of consciousness, but also in the space of culture; (5) a musical phenomenon opens up what makes it specific and precludes one from explaining it by use of clichés. A work of musical art becomes such exclusively through perception (M. Dufrenne). The Swiss conductor E. Ansermet states that music is “the time that has been experienced” and associates an affective experience with culture: in the realm of culture, the act of transcendence inherent in all musical experience happens by itself. (shrink)

Summary A pupil of Köhler and von Hornbostel in Berlin, Arnheim published an article in the Musical Quarterly in 1984, where he applied the principles of visual composition to the musical form. In a painting, for example, the forces of visual composition are essential for aesthetic enjoyment; in music, sounds are essential as they are always occurring in time, and this constitutes the main dynamic vector of music. Starting with the tetrachord of ancient Greek music and analysing the (...) relationships between notes in the major and minor scales, Arnheim identifies what in the Western musical tradition represents the basis on which each note must relate: the tonal centre, the attractive motor that determines the perceptual dynamics of musical expression. Two examples, taken from Schubert and Béla Bartók, show us how the structure of the melodic construction is essential in generating different states of mind; Arnheim, however, does not stop at the simple eliciting of an emotion, but situates the musical structure in a more general framework, which refers to perceptual patterns belonging to any sphere, mental or physical, thanks to which we experience our reality. (shrink)

In sections I-VII of this chapter I outline the theoretical background for a research programme considering whether the expressiveness of a culture's music can be recognised by people from different musical cultures, that is, by people whose music is syntactically and structurally distinct from that of the target culture. In sections VIII-IX, I examine and assess the cross-cultural studies that have been undertaken by psychologists. Most of these studies are compromised by methodological inadequacies.

Chapter 6 explores philosophical discussions about the nature of music expression. Musical works are inanimate artifacts. It has, as a result, been thought to be puzzling that listeners attribute expressive qualities to them. The chapter evaluates two alternative philosophical solutions to this puzzle: contour theory and embodied appraisal theory. Current research in psychology of music suggests that the conjunction of these two alternative theories provides a comprehensive model for how music carries and conveys information about the affective contours (...) of ordinary behaviors. An appeal to facts about sensorimotor processing can in this case, as in the previous chapter, be used to dissolve a longstanding philosophical puzzle about art. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that a particular melody is cheerful rather than melancholic, or that a musical rhythm is anxious and nervous rather than peaceful and calm? Which kind of qualities are these? In this paper we will give an overview of musical expressive qualities, trying on the one hand to describe them as tertiary or valuequalities and, on the other, to understand their expressiveness by means of a phenomenological analysis of rhythm and rhythm perception.

In sections I-VII of this chapter I outline the theoretical background for a research programme considering whether the expressiveness of a culture’s music can be recognised by people from different musical cultures, that is, by people whose music is syntactically and structurally distinct from that of the target culture. In sections VIII-IX, I examine and assess the cross-cultural studies that have been undertaken by psychologists. Most of these studies are compromised by methodological inadequacies.

The mechanical aspect of things (A. Camus) and technical “accomplishment” as an end in itself (R. Schumann; J. Girnius). The etymology of techne: neither craft nor art, but rather a mode of knowing (M. Heidegger). The depth of the instrumental as the depth of not-yet-knowing-of-how-to-use and irrationality (A. Šliogeris). Simulation occurs when the energy of the meaning of being is lacking (J. Baudrillard), for example, when the performer pretends to understand what they are playing. The loss of personality as the (...) basis of creation (H. Gadamer). Mass consciousness (J. Ortega y Gasset). The hypertrophy of specialisation of musical studies. (shrink)

A central method within analytic philosophy has been to construct thought experiments in order to subject philosophical theories to intuitive evaluation. According to a widely held view, philosophical intuitions provide an evidential basis for arguments against such theories, thus rendering the discussion rational. This method has been the predominant way to approach theories formulated as conditional or biconditional statements. In this paper, we examine selected theories of musical expressivity presented in such logical forms, analyzing the possibilities for constructing thought (...) experiments against them. We will argue that philosophical intuitions are not available for the evaluation of the types of counterarguments that would need to be constructed. Instead, the evaluation of these theories, to the extent that it can succeed at all, will centrally rely on inferential, non-immediate access to our subjective musical experiences. Furthermore, attempted thought experiments lose their methodological function because no proper distinction can be drawn between the persons figuring in the thought-experimental scenario and the evaluator of the scenario. Consequently, some of the central contributions to what is generally understood to be analytic philosophy of art are shown to represent a form of aesthetic criticism, offering much less basis for rational argumentation than is often thought. (shrink)

Charles Avison's Essay on Musical Expression, first published in 1752, is a major contribution to the debate on musical aesthetics which developed in the course of the 18th century. Considered by Charles Burney as the first essay devoted to 'musical criticism' proper, it established the primary importance of 'expression' and reconsidered the relative importance of harmony and melody. Immediately after its publication it was followed by William Hayes's Remarks (1753), to which Avison himself retorted in (...) his Reply. Taken together these three texts offer a fascinating insight into the debate that raged in the 18th century between the promoters of the so-called 'ancient music' (such as Hayes) and the more 'modern' musicians. Beyond matters of taste, what was at stake in Avison's theoretical contribution was the assertion that the individual's response to music ultimately mattered more than the dry rules established by professional musicians. Avison also wrote several prefaces to the published editions of his own musical compositions. This volume reprints these prefaces and advertisements together with his Essay to provide an interesting view of eighteenth-century conceptions of composition and performance, and a complete survey of Avison's theory of music. (shrink)

This study explores the integration of playing and singing within piano performance, viewing this fusion as a profound expression of both musical and spiritual experience. Through the lens of art philosophy, we examine the mutual enrichment of piano performance and vocal expression, considering their roles in enhancing the depth and emotional resonance of musical presentation. This paper articulates the theoretical underpinnings and practical methodologies for merging perceptual and expressive elements in piano performances, structured around three core (...) areas of practical exploration. By melding theory with practice, we delve into the artistic philosophy that underlies the combination of piano playing and singing, highlighting the holistic nature of music as a form of both artistic and spiritual expression. Playing and singing, while distinct forms of musical articulation, together create a compelling dynamic that is central to the transformative power of music. From the perspective of art philosophy, investigating the interplay between instrumental and vocal music is crucial for advancing our understanding of how these elements can coalesce to enhance spiritual and emotional expression within performances. The primary aim of this paper is to elevate the fusion of expressiveness in piano performance and singing, thereby enriching the spiritual and emotive impact of musical expression through a philosophical exploration of these art forms. (shrink)

The fact that we can hear a particular passage of music as expressing a “tranquil gratitude” is a central aspect of the phenomenology of musical experience; without it we would be hard pressed to explain how purely instrumental music could move us in the way that it does. The trouble, here as so often elsewhere in philosophy, is that what seems necessary also seems impossible: for how could a mere series of nonlinguistic sounds, however lovely, express a state of (...) mind? One of the central tasks of the philosophy of music is to remove this mystery.... (shrink)

Everybody assumes (1) that musical performances are sonic events and (2) that their expressive properties are sonic properties. This paper discusses recent findings in the psychology of music perception that show that visual information combines with auditory information in the perception of musical expression. The findings show at the very least that arguments are needed for (1) and (2). If music expresses what we think it does, then its expressive properties may be visual as well as sonic; (...) and if its expressive properties are purely sonic, then music expresses less than we think it does. And if the expressive properties of music are visual as well as sonic, then music is not what we think it is—it is not purely sonic. (shrink)

This paper critically explores the interrelationship between colonialism, religion, cultural hegemony, and indigenous music within the Zimbabwean context. It examines how missionary-led colonial enterprises not only dismantled African religious systems but also disrupted indigenous musical and cultural traditions, promoting Western values as superior through religious indoctrination and education. Specifically, the analysis demonstrates that colonial and postcolonial institutions suppressed Zimbabwe’s traditional music and performance practices, leading to a marginalisation of cultural identity. Drawing on postcolonial and decolonial theoretical frameworks, the paper (...) advocates for a reimagined music education curriculum that integrates indigenous knowledge systems with Western methodologies. It argues that rather than rejecting modernity, this integrative approach would promote cultural inclusivity, preserve intangible heritage, and affirm epistemic plurality in Zimbabwe’s educational and artistic spheres. (shrink)

One of the most important prerequisites for the formation of the Baroque style of music was the desire to revive the art of ancient rhetoric, which has the following similarities with music: (1) the sonic nature of the realisation (the perception of the expression through hearing); (2) the processual nature (becoming in a particular segment of time); (3) the emotional nature (the aim of arousing affects); (4) common elements of both languages (verbal and musical): tempo, rhythm, accentuation, articulation, (...) pauses, timbre, intonation and so forth. Mention of R. Descartes’ Compendium of Music and Passions of the Soul as works which exercised a great influence on the theory of affects, and presentation of the ideas of A. Angoulvent on Cartesian philosophy. Application of this to the performance of music, so that the affect is the idea, and its understanding provides the key to the means of expression.According to the Lithuanian musicologist G. Daunoravičienė, intellectual and affective communication between the orator/music and listener characteristic of the Baroque aesthetic means that not only the former (the addresser) but also the latter (the addressee) participates in the becoming of the work. Mention of other principles of Baroque aesthetics in music, such as the ability to think through singing (singend denken), which C. P. E. Bach considered synonymous with playing expressively, and the idea of freedom of movement developed by P. Tosi, which eventually became established in the practice of musical performance as the term rubato (rubare il tempo—“stealing time”; the author connects this with J. J. Quantz’s earlier advice to performers to avoid uniformity when sounding the notes). (shrink)

Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson have each offered accounts of how music can express emotions. Davies’s ‘Appearance Emotionalism’ holds that music can be expressive of emotion due to a resemblance between its dynamic properties and those of human behaviour typical of people feeling that emotion, while Levinson’s ‘Hypothetical Emotionalism’ contends that a piece is expressive when it can be heard as the expression of the emotion of a hypothetical agent or imagined persona. These have been framed as opposing positions (...) but I show that, on one understanding of ‘expressing’ which they seem to share, each entails the other and so there is no real debate between them. However, Levinson’s account can be read according to another—and arguably more philosophically interesting—understanding of ‘expressing’ whereas Davies’s account cannot as easily be so read. I argue that this reading of Hypothetical Emotionalism can account for much of our talk about music in terms of emotions but must answer another question—viz., how composers or performers can express emotions through music—to explain this relation between music and emotion. I suggest that this question can be answered by drawing on R. G. Collingwood’s theory of artistic expression. (shrink)

We talk not only of enjoying music, but of understanding it. Music is often taken to have expressive import--and in that sense to have meaning. But what does music mean, and how does it mean? Stephen Davies addresses these questions in this sophisticated and knowledgeable overview of current theories in the philosophy of music. Reviewing and criticizing the aesthetic positions of recent years, he offers a spirited explanation of his own position. Davies considers and rejects in turn the positions that (...) music describes (like language), or depicts (like pictures), or symbolizes (in a distinctive fashion) emotions. Similarly, he resists the idea that music's expressiveness is to be explained solely as the composer's self-expression, or in terms of its power to evoke a response from the audience. Music's ability to describe emotions, he believes, is located within the music itself; it presents the aural appearance of what he calls emotion characteristics. The expressive power of music awakens emotions in the listener, and music is valued for this power although the responses are sometimes ones of sadness. Davies shows that appreciation and understanding may require more than recognition of and reaction to music's expressive character, but need not depend on formal musicological training. (shrink)

The concept of creativity; the importance of giftedness and inner motivation for creativity (Plato). The conditions for the emergence of creativity: openness to cultural experience and a need to pursue the meaningfulness of expression. Creative action is the return of experiences to the world (A. Šliogeris; Plato). Creative activity and creative attitude (E. Fromm). Creativity and self-expression; creative and possessive impulses (B. Russell). The importance for the artist of a rich inner life (S. Šalkauskis). Experience versus experiencing: experience (...) is a semantic construct in which knowledge, abilities and so forth are accumulated in a whole which allows experiencing—that is, what is experienced here and now—to be realised. Aesthetic experiencing (M. C. Beardsley). The incomplete character of the work as a premise for a creative act (A. Maceina). The material as an obstacle (A. Maceina): the performer has to overcome not only the mental but also instrumental, opposition of the form. Freedom as the main condition for creative activity. The latent thinking of the artist as manifestation of the artist’s experience in their creative activity (S. Šalkauskis). The broader concept of freedom: to create one’s own life as an opportunity to project and transcend oneself (E. Mounier). (shrink)

In this paper, I address the question of how emotional qualities can be attributed to musical timbre, an acoustic feature that has proven challenging to explain using traditional accounts of musical emotions. I begin presenting the notion of musical expressiveness, as it has been conceived by cognitivists to account for the emotional quality of various musical elements like melody and rhythm. However, I also point out some limitations in these accounts, which hinder their ability to fully (...) elucidate the emotional expressiveness of timbre, especially when considering it as a result of non-cognitively mediated processes. Consequently, I explore the link between timbre and atmosphere by reviewing anecdotal sources that have characterized timbre in terms of atmosphere. The goal here is to determine if these characterizations should be seen as merely allusive and metaphoric expressions or if they genuinely reveal essential properties of timbre. To achieve this goal, I delve deeper into the notion of atmosphere, and I show that it shares several key traits with the notion of musical emotions as conceived in the cognitivist’s account. Both musical emotions and atmospheres are affectively charged externalities that are apprehended by the subject without cognitive mediation. Drawing from this insight, I conclude that the notion of atmosphere can serve as a valuable tool in explaining the emotional expressivity of timbre without invoking the resemblance-based mechanisms often found in cognitive accounts of expressiveness. (shrink)

In its narrative, dramatic, and representational genres, art regularly depicts contexts for human emotions and their expressions. It is not surprising, then, that these artforms are often about emotional experiences and displays, and that they are also concerned with the expression of emotion. What is more interesting is that abstract art genres may also include examples that are highly expressive of human emotion. Pure music – that is, stand-alone music played on musical instruments excluding the human voice, and (...) without words, literary titles, or associated texts connected to it by its composer – is often characterized as the expressive art par excellence. Yet how could that be possible, given that such music lacks semantic or representational content? Pure music presents the hardest and most vivid philosophical challenge to any account of expressiveness in the arts, which is why it is crucial to consider the musical case for the light it sheds on the underlying principles and issues. In this chapter I consider two accounts of expressiveness in pure music. Both regard expressiveness as an objective property of such music. I argue for the position I call appearance emotionalism and against the alternative, which I label hypothetical emo- tionalism. But before I get to that, there is a different mode of musical expression to be acknowledged. Even instrumental music comes charged with associations. Some of these are private to the listener, but many are widely shared. The latter may be included in a piece by accident but are, more often, deliberately placed for their effects. For instance, when a song is quoted in an instrumental work, its title or words may be brought to mind. Certain melodies (e.g., “Ode to Joy”), styles (e.g., tarantella), idioms (e.g., fanfares), forms (e.g., minuet), modalities (e.g., church modes), and instruments (e.g., fifes and snare drums) recall particular social events, geocultural regions, historical periods, ideas, and sensibilities, and in this way can hook up with affective life-experiences. Though it is music’s associative ties that are likely to be referred to when most people are asked about music’s significance, philosophers say little about them.. (shrink)