Monarchy is a form of government that, roughly, dictates that the right to rule is inherited by birth by a single ruler. But monarchy (absolute or constitutional) breaches fundamental moral principles that undergird representative democracy, such as basic moral equality, dignity and desert. Simply put, the monarchs (and their family) are treated as morally superior to ordinary citizens and as a result ordinary citizens are treated in an unfair and undignified manner. For example, monarchs are respected, enjoy dignity, (...) income, opportunity, public office and exalted social status just because of their inherited office, which is due to the mere historical accident of family lineage. Hence, we have good moral reason to abolish monarchy. Finally, I briefly reply to the pragmatic argument for constitutional monarchy, namely, the argument that monarchy can be allowed to play a largely ceremonial role in the context of democracy because it is beneficial for the function of society. As I argue, societies run by presidential democracies can function equally well and, what is more, no matter what the pragmatic reasons for constitutional monarchy are, we still have stronger moral reasons against it. Therefore, it should be abolished. (shrink)

Monarchy is liberalism’s little secret. Given the number of articles and books appearing every year dealing with liberal democracy as the hallmark of contemporary Western societies, it is astonishing that monarchy is rarely ever mentioned despite the fact that monarchy, and not a republic, is the constitutional form of quite a number of Western liberal states. I argue that considering the political reality of the established monarchies in Europe leads into a dilemma: either contemporary liberalism is not (...) the kind of theory it claims to be or it has to reconsider its central tenets. In conclusion, I show that the dilemma cannot be solved or avoided but needs to be embraced by conceiving liberalism not as a applied moral theory but as a political theory that leaves room for various symbolic self-understandings and acknowledges the crooked timber of historical realities. (shrink)

How did the idea of monarchy develop in Giovanni Botero’s thinking? How did he use it in his largest work, Relazioni universali (1st edition 1591)? How did he redefine it at the beginning of the seventeenth century? Botero developed his idea of monarchy by reading the classics and traditional literature on the subject, as well as by travelling and observing different models of government: his diplomatic experience in France (1585) and his three years in Spain as tutor of (...) the princes of Savoy (1603-1606) led to theories on the features of the ‘best form of government’. Starting from Botero’s first thinking on the subject (De regia sapientia, 1583), this chapter will focus on Relazioni universali as a kind of catalogue of comparative monarchy case studies from all over the world and pay particular attention to Discorso dell’eccellenza della monarchia (Discourse about the Excellence of Monarchy) published in Turin in 1607. Discorso has been translated into English in the Appendix. (shrink)

Controversy has long surrounded the complex relationship between King Victor Emmanuel III and the dictator Benito Mussolini in Fascist Italy. It is clear that the king played decisive roles in bringing Mussolini to power in 1922 and in removing him in 1943. In between, the two coexisted as Italy became a ‘dyarchy’, with two foci of power. The presence of the monarchy at once checked Fascist radicalism and persuaded many conservatives to adhere to the regime. Thanks especially to the (...) monarchy, the innovative thrust of Fascism was channelled in certain delimited directions, toward a statist economy, for example. Still, the relationship between the crown and Mussolini was often rocky, though the king’s reluctance did not prevent alliance with Nazi Germany, anti-Semitism, and war. Tensions were largely papered over by rhetoric and myth-making, as if the elements of Fascism fit together neatly. Despite his opposition to certain particulars, Victor Emmanuel identified with the overall Fascist project to some extent, and he worried that outright opposition to the regime would jeopardize the monarchy. But as the Second World War went badly for Italy, the king finally deposed Mussolini. Nevertheless, Italy soon voted to eliminate the monarchy, discredited by its association with fascism. (shrink)

The Belgian Constitution of 1831 marked a decisive step in the continental evolution from Restoration constitutional monarchy, based on the monarchical principle, towards the establishment of parliamentary constitutional monarchy. At the time, the new balance of power desired by the Belgian revolutionaries was captured by the phrase ‘republican monarchy’. It is remarkable that this concept, despite being so central to the founding fathers’ deliberations, has hardly been commented upon by later historians and public lawyers. This article aims (...) to reconstruct the origin, meaning and uses of this concept in the context of the 1830 revolutionary wave. French revolutionary veteran general Lafayette was responsible for popularizing republican monarchy in the July Revolution, although the term’s origins went back to eighteenth-century debates on the reform of absolute monarchy. Lafayette used it to summarize the institutional demands of the republican movement vis-à-vis king Louis Philippe. Its transnational migration to the Belgian context subsequently entailed a shift in meaning which will be charted through an analysis of the Belgian constituent and public debates. Finally, the reasons for the concept’s sudden disappearance from the political stage will be addressed. (shrink)

This paper presents a symbolic-logical comparison between two democratic constitutional models: democratic monarchy and democratic political leadership (presidential or parliamen￾tary republics). Rather than arguing for either system, the paper formalizes their principal advantages and limitations through propositional logic, highlighting the trade-offs among sta￾bility, accountability, continuity, legitimacy, efficiency, and national unity.

In the first part of this text, the author attempts to demonstrate that sacral kingship might, in anthropological terms, be regarded an Elementary Form of socio-political life; not an autonomous elementary form, but one falling under the category of rulership. The reference to the anthropological notion of Elementary Forms renders virtually irrelevant the rigidity with which categorical distinctions are made between polytheistic and monotheistic kingship, as well as any civilisational divisions that might be imagined between Orient and Occident. The second (...) part of the text provides an illustration of these presuppositions, the author taking several examples from the history of monarchy – both in the Western World and in the Arab World. (shrink)

This article analyzes the plan to reform the monarchy penned by René-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis d’Argenson (1694–1757), in the 1730s. D’Argenson laid out a forceful blueprint for reform that aimed to extend ‘democracy’ within the monarchy as far as possible. His plan would establish equality as a first-order political value, even if as a heuristic goal; dismantle the legacy of feudalism in France and thus reduce the power of the nobility; and institute what he called ‘popular (...) administration under the authority of the sovereign’. The reforms d’Argenson hoped to enact would be animated by political values that were frequently associated with republics in the early modern political imagination, but d’Argenson never advocated the republic as a political form. To enact such far-reaching changes, d’Argenson called on the monarchy to reform itself, to wield its sovereign authority in order to promote equality and improve the lives of the population. D’Argenson’s treatise anticipated important themes and fault lines of modern French political thought, notably the combination of strong central authority with egalitarian reform and democratic engagement. It did so, however, while remaining rooted in the problems of the Old Regime and the political-philosophical arguments of his day. (shrink)

The exile of King Tarquinius Superbus was surprisingly quick and painless. Although the King was the high priest, the other priests did not seek to challenge his exile, only insisting on the need to save his life. Army commanders did not consider it a treason to move to the side of the rebellious City. The senators, whose mission as elders was to uphold the traditions and way of life of the community, not only did not hinder the revolution, but actually (...) led it. All this indicates that although the exile of the king was an unprecedented event in the history of early Rome, it did not destroy the very model of the universe. The Republic in Rome was established relatively easy precisely because the idea of a common cause, which meant a collective interest in the prosperity of this new world, was laid down here from the very beginning. The chosen (of the most worthy) kings were to effectively manage the «Roman business», and as long as they coped with it, as long as they ensured the parity of interests of different groups of society, its stable territorial growth and had the support of the gods, no problems arose. Tarquinius Superbus violated an unspoken «social contract» for which he was removed. But this removal did not lead to the cancellation of the contract itself (concluded between humans and gods), and only to its modification. Getting rid of royal power, which marked a break with the last elements of the traditional world, put on the agenda the question of the need to develop a model that could legitimize the ideal of a common cause. This model is known as «Roman Republic». In its political form, it is opposed to the royal model, but in a worldview, it is a logical development of a Roman idea that has never been associated with either the conception of the divine origin of power or the concept of absolute (and hereditary) monarchy. The continuity between the royal and republican periods of Roman history was expressed in the unity of the original patterns that determine the nature of the Roman idea. Roman society was not formed «for the king» or even «for the gods». The kings and gods served as a means of cementing the community, giving it a sacred nature; the latter, which expressed the concept of the «universal priesthood» as a collective sacred principle, was also the basis of political doctrine. The question of specific forms of government (whether the community will be headed by a lifetime elected king, or magistrates who are elected for a limited time) is secondary. The idea of a collective interest in the success of the common cause was inherent in the Roman project from the very beginning, just a new model allowed it (the project) to be implemented more effectively, facilitating both the coming to power of the most capable members of the community and ensuring the control of the people over the activities of the government. (shrink)

„Als Gegner des repräsentativen Systems“, aber „als Befürworter der föderativen Republiken“, schrieb der Göttinger Historiker und politische Theoretiker Arnold Heeren 1807, wäre Rousseau „doppelt für die Guillotine bestimmt gewesen“, wenn er während der Französischen Revolution gelebt hätte. Für Heeren waren jedoch weder sein Eintreten für eine föderale Republik noch seine Ablehnung des repräsentativen Systems die größten Fehler Rousseaus, denn in seinen Augen war das eigentliche Problem Jean-Jacques ein anderes. Es wurde nicht direkt durch Rousseaus Beharren auf der Souveränität des Volkes (...) verursacht, die, wie Heeren anerkannte, „die Hauptmaxime ist, auf der sein System beruht“, sondern war vielmehr eine Auswirkung von „Rousseaus Überzeugung, dass diese Souveränität mit der Monarchie verbunden werden kann“. Dieser Glaube, so Heeren, bedeute, dass „die Grenzlinie zwischen Monarchie und Republikanismus“ damit völlig verwischt und der Weg zu Irrtümern geebnet wurde, „für die Europa bereits teilweise gesühnt hat und noch immer am stärksten büßt“. Es bedeutete, dass „Europa, nachdem es scheinbar den Gefahren der Demokratie entronnen war, kurz davorstand, dass „entweder monarchische Republiken oder Republiken unter dem Namen von Monarchien die wichtigsten Plätze unter seinen Staaten einnehmen“ (Heeren [1807] 1836, 180–82). Für Heeren hatte Rousseaus Verbindung von Monarchie und Volkssouveränität dem plebiszitären Regime Napoleon Bonapartes Tür und Tor geöffnet. (shrink)

From one of the world's most celebrated moral philosophers comes a thorough examination of the current American political crisis and recommendations for how to mend a divided country.

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, best known for his 'Project for Perpetual Peace', in fact left a much larger and more coherent body of political and moral writing, but it has been only partially studied. This book, the first systematic exploration of his entire corpus, offers a complete re-evaluation of this important author's contributions to the Enlightenment. From the first decades of the eighteenth century, Saint-Pierre set forth a pioneering vision of politics as the harmonisation of interests, anticipating Bentham as a (...) utilitarian. He imagines replacing the system of inherited power and clientele networks, which structured Old Regime society and determined the exercise of power under absolutism, with a rationalised, meritocratic and dynamic organisation. He argued for the political values of social utility and public good to take the place of the Christian ideals of perfection and the aristocratic ideals of personal charisma. As a deist seeking to reconcile morality and religion, Saint-Pierre argued that the search for salvation through active piety must also promote social justice and beneficence--and that only the indivisible power of a rationalised monarch, informed by competent elites, could carry out the reforms necessary to yield a government which would produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Saint-Pierre, thus, provided among the first arguments for an imposed welfare state, well before the sources more frequently associated with that idea--political economists, cameralists and the physiocrats."--Pages v-vi. (shrink)

Hans-Hermann Hoppe famously argued that monarchy is superior to democracy insofar as property rights protection is concerned. The present paper calls this claim into question, with much of the heavy lifting being done by methodological ponderings. More specifically, it is demonstrated that instead of _a priori_, praxeological truths, Hoppe’s monarchy theory offers an ideal type of the politician bestowed with an inheritable title to the throne. Against this background, the ideal type in question is shown to be faulty (...) in that it treats monarchs as capitalist landowners of sorts, thereby overlooking strictly political incentives they face, which can predictably push them in directions inimical to free markets. (shrink)

This paper has three main goals. Firstly – to draw attention to the phenomenon of the democratic paradigm in the study of modern state systems (especially monarchical ones), characterise it and outline its sources. Also - to question the basis of this phenomenon (by pointing out, among other things, the durability of monarchical systems and the phenomenon of partial ‘re-monarchization’ – real or apparent – of certain contemporary republican systems on the examples of: Montenegro, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and (...) Poland). Secondly, to present the negative consequences of the functioning of the democratic paradigm, also (paradoxically) those affecting the political practice of republics. Thirdly, to propose a way to reduce these negative consequences by changing the optics adopted in comparative studies about monarchies and republics. This change is based on the restoration, in comparative analyses of contemporary state systems (including monarchical ones), of the concepts of ‘mixed system’ and ‘monarchical principle’, which are still used in research on the history of the state and law, and should be disseminated in research on contemporary political systems and constitutional law. An explanation of the terms ‘mixed system’ and ‘monarchical principle’ as I use them here will follow in the final part of the paper. (shrink)

Although 43 countries have a monarch as their head of state, the question of whether monarchies can be morally justified has been neglected by contemporary philosophers. In this article, I argue that it is doubtful whether any existing monarchies can be morally justified. As I show, they all suffer from one or more of the following defects: they flout democratic principles; they are non-meritocratic; and/or they fail to provide at least some royals with an adequate range of lifestyle options. However, (...) I go on to identify a novel type of elective monarchy that escapes these problems, and which, I submit, can be vindicated as long as it serves legitimate public objectives (e.g. by promoting social cohesion among citizens and/or by fostering international trade). (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between shari’a and political power, as conceptualized in the early development of political thought within the Islamic intellectual tradition. Focusing on Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, a pivotal figure in this intellectual landscape, the article delves into his well-known treatise, The Epistle on the Elite, and seeks to grasp the reasons of its unique yet contentious role in the evolution of Islamic political thought. By offering a novel interpretation of this work, the article seeks to illuminate how Ibn (...) al-Muqaffa‘ comes up with an original articulation between the ancient paradigm of imperial monarchy and the notion of divine legislation within a monotheistic framework. According to the author, such an articulation should be considered the starting point for the historical development of Islamic political reason. (shrink)

This article expounds Samuel von Pufendorf’s evolving theory of multiple monarchy, from the publication of his early work on the form of the Holy Roman Empire, through his natural jurisprudence, to his historical accounts of European statesmanship. Although his comments on the irregularity—indeed, the monstrosity—of composite kingdoms are well known, it is less often appreciated that Pufendorf came to be able to accommodate them within a typology of constitutional systems developed against the background of his theory of the moral (...) personality of the state. Pufendorf’s political thought after his early book on the Holy Roman Empire is the record of a consistent attempt to confront the complexities of multiple monarchy rather than capitulate in the face of them. (shrink)

An analysis of the functioning of the Dutch monarchy in the 20th century is hardly possible by lack of documents. For the study of the contacts between the Head of State and the Cabinet-ministers a scholar needs the documents from the Cabinet of the Queen and from the Royal Archives. The archives of the Cabinet of the Queen are now accessible up to the Second World War, but the Royal Archives are closed from 1898.Tbe Dutch people bas a sympathy (...) for the dynasty and by that a deduced sympathy for the monarchy.Tbere was no real criticism on the functioning of the following queens Wilhelmina, Juliana and Beatrix. Tbe Heads of State accomodated themselves to the political and social developments. By that the monarchy lengthened its life.The formation of a new Cabinet is an essential task of the Queen. Wilhelmina did not hide her personal views but respected carefully the constitutional framework and already in the beginning of this century she asked the consulted political leaders to confirm their advices by letter. The possibility to play a role seems to be more limited since 1945. (shrink)

A discussion of the political role of monarchs in contemporary Western Europe is complicated by three uncritical preconceptions : the traditionalist-monarchist view of Kings as transcendent sovereigns, the democratic-emancipatory view which assumes that Kings are by definition nothing but constitutional nonentities, and the media-view of members of a royal family as at one and the same time both superhuman and very human actors.A realistic analysis of the role of monarchs and monarchy focuses on at least five issues : whether (...) countries remained monarchies in the wake of democratisation because of, or notwithstanding being monarchies ; the relationship of monarchs to major social cleavages; the very real importance of Kings within the actions of the nominal Crown notwithstanding the importance of the principle of ministerial responsibility ; the inevitably personal role of Kings in the making, the crisis and the fall of cabinets ; and the unavoidable conflict between the personal rights and actions of monarchs and the limitations which constitutional monarchy implies. (shrink)

The development of the Israelite Monarchy followed the model of a typical Syro-Hittite state and introduced a paganization into the political and social history of Israel with fateful and lasting consequences.

Beginning with a sustained analysis of Seneca's theory of monarchy in the treatise De clementia, in this text Peter Stacey traces the formative impact of ancient Roman political philosophy upon medieval and Renaissance thinking about princely government on the Italian peninsula from the time of Frederick II to the early modern period. Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince offers a systematic reconstruction of the pre-humanist and humanist history of the genre of political reflection known as the mirror-for-princes tradition (...) - a tradition which, as Stacey shows, is indebted to Seneca's speculum above all other classical accounts of the virtuous prince - and culminates with a comprehensive and controversial reading of the greatest work of renaissance political theory, Machiavelli's The Prince. Peter Stacey brings to light a story which has been lost from view in recent accounts of the Renaissance debt to classical antiquity, providing a radically revisionist account of the history of the Renaissance prince. (shrink)

Russian monarchs have long been regarded as majestic and despotic, ruling over mute and servile subjects in a vast empire isolated from the rest of the European continent. Challenging this view, Whittaker uncovers a political dialogue about the nature and limitations of monarchy in eighteenth-century Russia—an interchange that took place between rulers and writers under the influence of western and central European Enlightenment thinking. Roughly 250 authors participated in this public discourse on monarchical power, producing more than 500 publications (...) and official pronouncements on monarchy. Beginning with Peter the Great, Russian rulers shifted the foundation for legitimacy from its religious underpinnings to a secular basis, as notions of a monarch's duty to reform began to replace divine right as the justification for absolute power. During the recurring crises of succession in the eighteenth century, monarchs sought further legitimacy and celebrated their "election" by the "people" (that is, key members of the elite). Writers, in turn, engaged rulers in public discussion via the printed word as they examined monarchical legitimacy and debated its feasibility with sophisticated arguments drawn from the arsenal of classical and current European ideas. Intended for the eyes of both the sovereign and the educated elite, publications in nearly every genre contained didactic passages explaining proper conduct for a monarch. Writers also warned of the dire consequences awaiting the ruler who did not abide by these accepted standards of behavior; and in the course of the century, three monarchs lost the throne. _Russian Monarchy_ shows how this eighteenth-century dialogue between elites and their monarchs revolutionized the concept of rule and gave writers a role in shaping their political environment. (shrink)

Spreading the universal monarchy myth in the early 16th century was closely linked to the magnitude of the territories controlled by Charles V. For the imperial chancellor Mercurino Gattinara, universal and messianic ideas, which were integrated into the symbolism of the Empire, were to legitimate a policy that aimed at giving a more rational structure to Charles’ territories and at securing a prominent influence for the Habsburg family in the whole of Europe. Gattinara imagined a kind of supranational (...) class='Hi'>monarchy, organised in accordance with the mythical model of the Roman Empire, which would be able to guarantee peace under the aegis of Christianity. (shrink)

Since the first years of the fifteenth century, when Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444) explicitly correlated the Italian cities’ reconquest of liberty with the ‘return to light’ of ancient culture, the It...

Tocqueville kam 1805 unter dem ersten Kaiserreich zur Welt und starb 1859 unter dem zweiten Kaiserreich. Sein Studium absolvierte er unter dem restaurierten Königreich der Bourbonen, an dessen Spitze Ludwig XVIII.Louis XVIII (Ludwig XVIII.) und dann Karl X. standen, und bekannt wurde er unter der sogenannten Julimonarchie des Bürgerkönigs Louis-PhilippeLouis-Philippe. Sieht man also von den vier Jahren der zweiten Republik (1848–1852) ab, war Tocquevilles Frankreich monarchisch. Der dynastische Wechsel des Jahres 1830 und die mit ihm einhergehende Forderung, dem neuen Regime (...) die Treue zu schwören, stellte die ein öffentliches Amt bekleidenden Mitglieder der Familie Tocquevilles vor eine entscheidende Wahl. (shrink)

Plato’s references to Empedocles in the myth of the Statesman perform a crucial role in the overarching political argument of the dialogue. Empedocles conceives of the cosmos as structured like a democracy, where the constituent powers ‘rule in turn’, sharing the offices of rulership equally via a cyclical exchange of power. In a complex act of philosophical appropriation, Plato takes up Empedocles’ cosmic cycles of rule in order to ‘correct’ them: instead of a democracy in which rule is shared cyclically (...) amongst equal constituents, Plato’s cosmos undergoes cycles of the presence and absence of a single cosmic monarch who possesses ‘kingly epistēmē’. By means of a revision of Empedocles’ democratic cosmology, Plato’s richly woven myth is designed precisely to reject the appropriateness of democracy as a form of human political association and legitimate monarchy in its stead. (shrink)

The papal monarchy is the subject of Thomas Hobbes's Historical Narration concerning Heresy, much of Behemoth, and his long Latin poem, the Historia Ecclesiastica. Hobbes's was not the only account in his day of the papal monarchy as a history of iniquity, or even as “the ghost of the Roman Empire.” The papal creation of a parallel system of offices in the late Roman and Holy Roman Empires is of immense institutional importance. Hobbes's analysis of the second papal (...) strategy, the co‐optation of Roman Law as canon law, is complicated. Hobbes's account of both the institutional and philosophical consequences of the papal monarchy is surprisingly congruent with some of the most authoritative modern accounts. The fourteenth‐century hierocratic publicists belonged as much to the reception of Averroist Aristotelianism as their contemporary antagonists. None of the parties to the struggle between pope and emperor appears to have been immune to the Aristotelianism of the Arabic commentators. (shrink)

La diffusion du mythe de la monarchie universelle au début du XVIe siècle est strictement liée à l’ampleur des territoires possédés par Charles Quint. Pour le chancelier impérial Mercurino Gattinara, les idées universalistes et messianiques, qui accompagnaient la symbolique de l’Empire, devaient servir à légitimer une politique visant à donner une structure plus rationnelle aux territoires de Charles Quint et à garantir aux Habsbourg une influence prépondérante dans l’ensemble de l’Europe. Gattinara imaginait une sorte de monarchie supranationale organisée selon le (...) modèle mythique de l’Empire romain, capable de garantir la paix sous l’égide du christianisme. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Giovanni Botero's theory of reason of state, while seemingly applicable to any political regime, is distinctly monarchical, as he regards monarchy as the best form of government. Besides, a key principle in his theory is the counterbalance. In international relations, states counterbalance one another to protect their interests, with the Pope positioned as the arbiter. However, in a late work, Botero introduces the idea of universal monarchy, arguing that the governance of a single monarch is the optimal (...) path to achieve global peace. Under this model, counterbalance becomes unnecessary, and is criticized for serving the particular good rather than the universal one. This vision of a universal monarchy stands in contract to his earlier emphasis on national monarchy and the counterbalance. This apparent contradiction reflects his two distinct visions of the political world. On the one hand, Botero presents a realistic perspective of international relations, grounded in national interests and the counterbalance. On the other hand, he envisions a utopian world empire dedicated to the universal good. The tension between these two perspectives reflects his complex thinking in responding to the political turbulence of late 16th and early 17th centuries Europe, navigating between pragmatic political analyses and a universalist ideal. (shrink)

Modern political theory often equates legitimate government with procedural democracy – competitive elections, multiparty systems, and formal rights. This paper argues that Aristotle’s classical typology offers a more fundamental standard: a regime is good when it rules for the common good, regardless of how many hold government power. Drawing on global survey data showing that citizens worldwide define democracy primarily by welfare, fairness, and protection rather than by procedures alone, I propose a structural criterion for legitimacy: the four revealing‑form conditions (...) of visibility, symmetry, contestability, and repair. Any regime – democracy, constitutional monarchy, or one‑party rule – that satisfies these conditions governs with the consent of the governed, because the governed can see consequences, challenge decisions, and expect repair. A concrete example from contemporary China (the “Blue Wind Chime” restorative justice programme) illustrates how a one‑party system can instantiate revealing‑form institutions and generate genuine consent. The paper concludes that Aristotle was right: the purpose of politics is flourishing, not procedure; monarchy (or any regime) is defensible not by heredity or tradition, but by its revealing‑form architecture. (shrink)

This paper addresses the teaching of citizenship in schools and focuses on the monarchy as an example of one issue often ignored within curriculum discourse. We argue that to conflate subjecthood and citizenship in unacknowledged ways may serve to perpetuate the status quo and is potentially unhelpful to the development of young people's critical thinking.

Whether Trinitarianism is coherent depends not only on whether some account of the Trinity is coherent, but on which accounts of the Trinity count as "Trinitarian." After all, Arianism and Modalism are both accounts of the Trinity, but neither counts as Trinitarian (which is why defenses of Arianism or Modalism don’t count as defenses of Trinitarianism). This raises the question, if not just any account of the Trinity counts as Trinitarian, which do? Dale Tuggy is one of very few philosophers (...) to give explicit definitions of Trinitarian (versus Unitarian) theology. But they are no mere formalities. They are essential to his central criticisms of both historical and contemporary forms of Trinitarianism. In this paper, I offer my own definitions of Trinitarian and Unitarian theology, contrast them with Tuggy’s, and argue for the superiority of my definitions to Tuggy’s. If Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are what Tuggy says they are, the outlook for Trinitarianism is bleak indeed. If they are what I say they are, Tuggy’s central objection to Trinitarianism fails. To show what is at stake in these pairs of definitions, I examine a doctrine much neglected in Analytic Theology, but central to Nicene Trinitarianism—the Monarchy of the Father. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Between 1500 and 1513, Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini elaborated in their writings a crossed portrait of the French and Spanish monarchies, based on their first diplomatic missions. It appears from these texts that monarchy was hard to conceptualize and hard to name for the two young Florentines. Their goal was to identify the bases of the power of these Kingdoms, while the traditional prisms of political thought appeared obsolete in front of the brutal changes that had upset the (...) European geopolitical field since the beginning of the Italian wars. These reflections, which occurred at a crucial moment in Machiavelli and Guicciardini’s intellectual training, represented a crucial step in the construction of their political thought and in the advent of modern historiography. But it also led to a new way of looking at and carrying out diplomatic functions. (shrink)

La Monarchie catholique est l’union dynastique éphémère (1580-1640) entre les royaumes d’Espagne et de Portugal. En revenant sur les fondements juridiques, politiques et pragmatiques de cet empire qui ne peut pas s’appeler Empire (car cette dénomination appartient au Saint Empire romain germanique des cousins de Vienne), l’article cherche à mieux saisir le fonctionnement interne de cet ensemble politique hétéroclite, en adoptant deux points de vue décentrés : celui de l’Amérique (comment la notion de Monarchie catholique s’incarne dans les reynos, loin (...) de Madrid et Lisbonne) et celui de Rome (comment le Saint-Siège parvient – ou non – à exister au cœur de cet espace). Il en ressort que le pape et le Roi catholique sont des alliés naturels (autour du christianisme romain) mais pas objectifs (leurs buts ne concordent pas), et qu’autant Rome que Mexico se vivent comme des centres et non des marges de la Monarchie catholique. (shrink)

The origins of the well-known hatred for the nomen regis at Rome are in this way explained by Cicero in the De Republica, written in the late 50s b.c. Tarquinius Superbus, Rome's last king, so traumatised the Roman people that the term rex still had a potent effect almost five hundred years after his downfall. Many modern scholars would accept that the Roman hatred of kings was deep-rooted and intense, and it is often called upon to explain Roman behaviour. This (...) approach finds clear expression in the latest edition of the Cambridge Ancient History, where one scholar in his discussion of the overthrow of Tarquinius writes: ‘Forever after the Romans hated the very idea of a king’. Yet an examination of Latin writings from the Republican period, rather than confirming this, reveals much that is at odds with this interpretation of the Roman attitude towards kings and the concept of kingship. Surprisingly, even their own kings are generally treated favourably. While there is no doubt that there was hostility to kings in the first century b.c., it is necessary to reconsider its origins and nature. I wish to argue that it was neither as long-standing nor as intense as is traditionally assumed. Its origins should be sought not in the distant obscurity of the last years of the regal period, but in Rome's encounters with the hellenistic kings of the East in the second century b.c. (shrink)

I argue that monarchies, in any possible form (absolute or constitutional), should be abolished once and for all. This is because of the deeply immoral presuppositions such a system of government upholds (implicitly or explicitly). Call this _‘the moral argument against monarchy’_. I identify three basic moral principles that monarchy by definition breaches: ‘the basic moral equality principle’, ‘the basic dignity principle’ and ‘the basic moral desert principle’. Finally, I examine and reply to three objections, including the common (...) objection that constitutional monarchy should not be abolished because it is pragmatically useful. (shrink)

The constitutional monarchy of present-day Britain hardly seems the same sort of institution as fourteenth-century feudal kingdoms, but Dante’s Monarchia (c. 1313) and Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution (1872) share fundamental assumptions about what the purpose and strengths of monarchy are. In the Monarchia, Dante lays out the essential attributes of monarchy that endure even today: authority, impartiality, and unity. Dante values and promotes monarchy as final arbiter of conflicts, sole just judge without cupidity, and unifying (...) will. More than 550 years later, Bagehot, despite his distrust concerning the Crown’s actual effectiveness, conceives of monarchy in surprisingly similar terms. The monarch is ‘the regulating wheel of our Constitution’, an authority outside and above partisan politics, and the ‘dignified’, ‘intelligible’, unifying element of government. In both cases, the monarch functions as the government’s source of impartial, unifying authority – whether monarch or Parliament ultimately wields that authority. The broad outlines of monarchy are surprisingly similar for both writers, suggesting a basic continuity in the conceptualization of monarchy from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century (and beyond) and an abiding store of reserve symbolism within the monarchic concept that writers, thinkers, and politicians throughout those centuries are able to tap at will. (shrink)

In a constitutional monarchy, the Sovereign acts according to constitutional rules, rather than arbitrarily. That is so even in a country such as Britain which has no codified constitution. Today the rules of constitutional monarchy whose purpose it is to preserve the political neutrality of the Sovereign, serve to protect her from political involvement. Her powers remain essentially residual - selection of a Prime Minister and refusal of a dissolution under very rare circumstances.The main influence of the Sovereign, (...) however, comes through her exercise of the three rights identified by Bagehot - the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to wam; and through her role as Head of the Commonwealth.The enormous popularity of the monarchy in Britain today arises because it has come to be divorced from partisan politics, and so can act as a focus of national unity. (shrink)

Botero’s Della Ragion di Stato has a monarchical character that has been overlooked or taken for granted. This is due to the successful reception of the reason of state formula, which justifies any kind of political regime, including principalities, republics, and monarchies, regardless of the author’s preferences. However, there is a clear distinction between monarchy and reason of state that requires further discussion. Botero not only uses Machiavellian language when referring to a political community (as res publica) or the (...) prince (as a metaphor for centralized monarchies), but also reappropriates it. In addition, he goes beyond this to explain a non-legal path to absolute sovereignty, which differs from Jean Bodin’s (1530–96) idea of the king as being above the law and Thomas Hobbes’ (1588–1679) theory of authorization and the social contract. This paper argues that Botero’s concept of reason of state can be understood as a complex process of reduction to unity, similar to God’s creation and the functioning of the natural world. Despite its contradictions and limitations, it grants the prince an unusual supremacy and control over society. (shrink)

Tocqueville kam 1805 unter dem ersten Kaiserreich zur Welt und starb 1859 unter dem zweiten Kaiserreich. Sein Studium absolvierte er unter dem restaurierten Königreich der Bourbonen, an dessen Spitze Ludwig XVIII. und dann Karl X. standen, und bekannt wurde er unter der sogenannten Julimonarchie des Bürgerkönigs Louis-Philippe. Sieht man also von den vier Jahren der zweiten Republik ab, war Tocquevilles Frankreich monarchisch. Der dynastische Wechsel des Jahres 1830 und die mit ihm einhergehende Forderung, dem neuen Regime die Treue zu schwören, (...) stellte die ein öffentliches Amt bekleidenden Mitglieder der Familie Tocquevilles vor eine entscheidende Wahl. (shrink)