To identify novel genomic regions that regulate sex determination, we utilized the powerful C57BL/6J-YPOS model of XY sex reversal where mice with autosomes from the B6 strain and a Y chromosome from a wild-derived strain, Mus domesticus poschiavinus, show complete sex reversal. In B6-YPOS, the presence of a 55-Mb congenic region on chromosome 11 protects from sex reversal in a dose-dependent manner. Using mouse genetic backcross designs and high-density SNP arrays, we narrowed the congenic region to a 1.62-Mb genomic region (...) on chromosome 11 that confers 80% protection from B6-YPOS sex reversal when one copy is present and complete protection when two copies are present. It was previously believed that the protective congenic region originated from the 129S1/SviMJ strain. However, genomic analysis revealed that this region is not derived from 129 and most likely is derived from the semi-inbred strain POSA. We show that the small 1.62-Mb congenic region that protects against B6-YPOS sex reversal is located within the Sox9 promoter and promotes the expression of Sox9, thereby driving testis development within the B6-YPOS background. Through 30 years of backcrossing, this congenic region was maintained, as it promoted male sex determination and fertility despite the female-promoting B6-YPOS genetic background. Our findings demonstrate that long-range enhancer regions are critical to developmental processes and can be used to identify the complex interplay between genome variants, epigenetics, and developmental gene regulation. © 2014 by the Genetics Society of America. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...) cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought. So the latest on the Language of Thought hypothesis, from its progenitor, promises to be a landmark in the study of the mind. LOT 2 offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of Fodor 's distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. Fodor shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is Fodor 's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today. LOT 2 sees Fodor advance undaunted towards the ultimate goal of a theory of the cognitive mind, and in particular a theory of the intentionality of cognition. No one who works on the mind can ignore Fodor 's views, expressed in the coruscating and provocative style which has delighted and disconcerted countless readers over the years. (shrink)

How the new conspiracists are undermining democracy—and what can be done about it Conspiracy theories are as old as politics. But conspiracists today have introduced something new—conspiracy without theory. And the new conspiracism has moved from the fringes to the heart of government with the election of Donald Trump. In A Lot of People Are Saying, Russell Muirhead and Nancy Rosenblum show how the new conspiracism differs from classic conspiracy theory, why so few officials speak truth to conspiracy, and what (...) needs to be done to resist it. Classic conspiracy theory insists that things are not what they seem and gathers evidence—especially facts ominously withheld by official sources—to tease out secret machinations. The new conspiracism is different. There is no demand for evidence, no dots revealed to form a pattern, no close examination of shadowy plotters. Dispensing with the burden of explanation, the new conspiracism imposes its own reality through repetition and bare assertion. The new conspiracism targets democratic foundations—political parties and knowledge-producing institutions. It makes it more difficult to argue, persuade, negotiate, compromise, and even to disagree. Ultimately, it delegitimates democracy. Filled with vivid examples, A Lot of People Are Saying diagnoses a defining and disorienting feature of today's politics and offers a guide to responding to the threat. (shrink)

This chapter talks about the causal theory of mental content (CT), which is incompatible with an elementary fact of perceptual psychology called the nontransducibility of distal properties (NTDP). It focuses on two stages of arguments. The first stage implies that the conjunction of CT and the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) are conflicting with NTDP, while the second stage indicates that the acceptance of CT requires acceptance of LOT. Since distal properties are not transducible and the argument uses only a (...) generic form of CT, CT is considered false in all forms. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that the causal theory of mental content (hereafter CT) is incompatible with an elementary fact of perceptual psychology, namely, that the detection of distal properties generally requires the mediation of a “theory.” I shall call this fact the nontransducibility of distal properties (hereafter NTDP). The argument proceeds in two stages. The burden of stage one is that, taken together, CT and the language of thought hypothesis (hereafter LOT) are incompatible with NTDP. The burden of (...) stage two is that acceptance of CT requires acceptance of LOT as well. It follows that CT is incompatible with NTDP. I organize things in this way in part because it makes the argument easier to understand, and in part because the stage-two thesis—that CT entails LOT—has some independent interest and is therefore worth separating from the rest of the argument. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that van Fraassen's "bad lot objection" against Inference to the Best Explanation [IBE] severely misses its mark. First, I show that the objection holds no special relevance to IBE; if the bad lot objection poses a serious problem for IBE, then it poses a serious problem for any inference form whatever. Second, I argue that, thankfully, it does not pose a serious threat to any inference form. Rather, the objection misguidedly blames a form of inference (...) for not achieving what it never set out to achieve in the first place. (shrink)

According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol.

Van Fraassen's argument from the "bad lot" challenges realist interpretations of inference to the best explanation (IBE). In this paper I begin by discussing the replies suggested by S. Psillos and P. Lipton. I do not find them convincing. However, I think that van Fraassen's argument is flawed. First of all, it is a non sequitur. Secondly, I think that the real target for the scientific realist is the underlying assumption that epistemic justification results from a comparative assessment among rival (...) explanations. I argue that justification for believing an explanation does not depend on comparison, but on the extent that criteria of explanatory goodness are fulfilled. Therefore, in addition to offering more or less intuitive IBE-tailored arguments, realists fond of IBE should have to analyze the implicit standards of explanatory goodness. In the last section I distinguish between contextual and transcontextual criteria concerning explanatory goodness. Concerning the latter, I focus on consilience, simplicity, analogy and conservatism. (shrink)

Abstract:A number of philosophers of language have proposed that people do not have conceptual access to‘bare particulars’, or attribute‐free individuals (e.g. Wiggins, 1980). Individuals can only be picked out under some sortal, a concept which provides principles of individuation and identity. Many advocates of this view have argued thatobjectis not a genuine sortal concept. I will argue in this paper that a narrow sense of‘object’, namely the concept of any bounded, coherent, three‐dimensional physical object that moves as a whole (Spelke, (...) 1990) is a sortal for both infants and adults. Furthermore,objectmay be the infant's first sortal and more specific sortals such ascupanddogmay be acquired later in the first year of life. I will discuss the implications for infant categorization studies, trying to draw a conceptual distinction between a perceptual category and a sortal, and I will speculate on how a child may construct sortal concepts such ascupanddog. (shrink)

This essay argues that the book of Ruth's reopening of Israel's history and national mythology functions in such a way as to redeem, as it were, the plight of the subaltern Moabite—a plight begun with the daughters of Lot in Genesis 19. A parallel is then drawn with the 1619 Project, the recent journalistic project which posits the entire historical sweep of African slavery in North America since 1619 as the defining arc of the United States' founding. As theoretical frames, (...) the essay draws on the work of literary critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (including her concept of “moral love”) and political philosopher Arash Abizadeh. In so doing, the essay illustrates how a “functionalist” approach to biblical ethics that balances the content of the biblical narrative with attention to how the text functions in its broader context can provide guidance for contemporary ethical application. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Certain measurement-related constructions impose a requirement that the measure function used track the part-whole structure of the domain of measurement, so that a given entity or eventuality must have a larger measurement in the chosen dimension than any of its salient proper parts. I provide evidence from English and Chinese that these constructions can be used to measure the intensity of mental states like hatred and love, indicating that in the natural language ontology of such states, intensity correlates with part-whole (...) structure. A natural language metaphysics of psychological intensity meeting this requirement is then developed and integrated into the semantics. Further complications arise when looking at attitudes like want, wish, and regret, which also permit measurements of intensity in the relevant constructions. To account for such attitudes, the ontology and semantics are then enriched in a way that integrates ordering and quantification over possible worlds into the part-whole structure of attitude states, so that even in these more complicated cases, the constructions at hand have a unified compositional semantics. (shrink)

Democracy means rule by the people, but in practice even the most robust democracies delegate most rule making to a political class The gap between the public and its representatives might seem unbridgeable in the modern world, but Legislature by Lot examines an inspiring solution: a legislature chosen through “sortition”—the random selection of lay citizens. It’s a concept that has come to the attention of democratic reformers across the globe. Proposals for such bodies are being debated in Australia, Belgium, Iceland, (...) the United Kingdom, and many other countries. Sortition promises to reduce corruption and create a truly representative legislature in one fell swoop. In Legislature by Lot, John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright make the case for pairing a sortition body with an elected chamber within a bicameral legislature. Gastil is a leading deliberative democracy scholar, and Wright a distinguished sociologist and editor of the Real Utopias series, of which this is a part. In this volume, they bring together critics and advocates of sortition who have studied ancient Athens, deliberative polling, political theory, social movements, and civic innovation. Without obscuring its limitations, the contributors offer a wide variety of ideas for how to implement sortition and examine its potential for reshaping modern politics. Legislature by Lot includes sixteen essays that respond to Gastil and Wright’s detailed proposal. Essays comparing sortition to contemporary reforms see it as a dramatic extension of deliberative “minipublics,” which gather random samples of citizens to weigh public policy dilemmas without being empowered to enact legislation. Another set of essays explores the democratic principles underlying sortition and elections and considers, for example, how a sortition body holds itself accountable to a public that did not elect it. The third set of essays considers alternative paths to democratic reform, which limit the powers of a sortition chamber or more quickly establish a pure sortition body. With contributions by Arash Abizadeh, Tom Arnold, Terrill Bouricius, Deven Burks, Lyn Carson, Dimitri Courant, Donatella della Porta, David M. Farrell, Andrea Felicetti, James S. Fishkin, Brett Hennig, Vincent Jacquet, Raphaël Kies, Tom Malleson, Jane Mansbridge, Christoph Niessen, David Owen, John Pitseys, Min Reuchamps, Yves Sintomer, Graham Smith, Jane Suiter, and Pierre-Étienne Vandamme. (shrink)

There are two ways to understand any proposed properties of language-of-thoughts (LoTs): As diagnostic or constitutive. We argue that this choice is critical. If candidate properties are diagnostic, their homeostatic clustering requires explanation via an underlying homeostatic mechanism. If constitutive, there is no clustering, only the properties themselves. Whether deep neural networks (DNNs) are alternatives to LoTs or potential implementations turn on this choice.

In a recent study appearing in Neuroethics, I reported observing 11 significant correlations between the “Dark Triad” personality traits – Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy – and “conservative” judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey. Surprisingly, I observed no significant correlations between the Dark Triad and “liberal” judgments. In order to determine whether these results were an artifact of the particular issues I selected, I ran a follow-up study testing the Dark Triad against conservative and liberal judgments on 15 additional moral (...) issues. The new issues examined include illegal immigration, abortion, the teaching of “intelligent design” in public schools, the use of waterboarding and other “enhanced interrogation techniques” in the war on terrorism, laws defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and environmentalism. 1154 participants (680 male, 472 female; median age 29), recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed three surveys: a 15-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), the 28-item Short Dark Triad personality inventory, and a five-item demographic survey. The results strongly reinforce my earlier findings. Twenty-two significant correlations were observed between “conservative” judgments and the Dark Triad (all of which were significant past a Bonferonni-corrected significance threshold of p =.0008), compared to seven significant correlations between Dark Triad and “liberal” judgments (only one of which was significant past p =.0008). This article concludes by developing a novel research proposal for determining whether the results of my two studies are “bad news” for conservatives or liberals. (shrink)

When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with (...) some – but not all – broadly Humean ideas. In short, I will defend the view there are the experiences and mental states we have, and that's it: no additional substances, and no bundles. This does not mean, however, that there is no Self – the Self simply is the experiences. I will try to articulate and defend this view by showing that it can accommodate what I take to be the three main desiderata for any theory of the Self to satisfy: first, that the Self is the subject of experience (a subject of mental states, in general); second, that there is a unity to the Self in the sense that our (conscious, phenomenal) experience is at least partly continuous or 'stream-like'; and third, that we do not die when we go to sleep or when we otherwise don't have any (conscious, phenomenal) experiences. (shrink)

It has been over thirty years since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s landmark book The Language of Thought (LOT 1). In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Fodor provides an update on his thoughts concerning a range of topics that have been the focus of his work in the intervening decades. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), the central thesis of LOT 1, remains intact in LOT 2: mental states are relations between organisms and syntactically-structured mental representations, and mental (...) processes are computations defined over such representations. The differences between LOT 1 and LOT 2 are mostly differences of focus. Whereas LOT 1 had a number of targets—e.g. reductionism, behaviorism, empiricism, and operationalism—LOT 2 identifies “pragmatism” as the main enemy of the “Cartesian” kind of mentalism Fodor favors (pp. 11-12). Moreover, unlike LOT 1, a main aim of LOT 2 is to defend a theory of concepts that is atomistic and referentialist: lexical concepts lack structure, and their meaning is determined by their relation to the world and not by their relations to other concepts (pp. 16-20). In addition to new discussions of concepts and content, LOT 2 treats us to Fodor’s latest thoughts on compositionality, computationalism, nativism, nonconceptual content, and the causal theory of reference. Although those familiar with Fodor’s work over the last thirty years will find its main conclusions unsurprising, LOT 2 is nevertheless an exciting, breezily written book that’s full of stimulating arguments and (in standard Fodor style) immensely interesting digressions. In the Introduction, Fodor bundles together a number of distinct doctrines under “pragmatism”—e.g., that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that in the order of intentional explanation” (p. 10), and that “the distinctive function of the mind is guiding action” (p. 13). But it’s clear by Chapter 2 that his main target is “concept pragmatism,” according to which concepts are individuated by their inferential properties. Fodor’s “Cartesianism,” in contrast, has it that none of the epistemic properties of concepts are constitutive.. (shrink)

As it is standardly conceived, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a form of ampliative inference in which one infers a hypothesis because it provides a better potential explanation of one’s evidence than any other available, competing explanatory hypothesis. Bas van Fraassen famously objected to IBE thus formulated that we may have no reason to think that any of the available, competing explanatory hypotheses are true. While revisionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection concede that IBE needs to be (...) reformulated in light of this problem, reactionary responses argue that the Bad Lot Objection is fallacious, incoherent, or misguided. This paper shows that the most influential reactionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection do nothing to undermine the original objection. This strongly suggests that proponents of IBE should focus their efforts on revisionary responses, i.e. on finding a more sophisticated characterization of IBE for which the Bad Lot Objection loses its bite. (shrink)

As Quilty-Dunn et al. observe, the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) has fallen out of favor in philosophy. I will support the arguments made for its rehabilitation by Quilty-Dunn et al. by reviewing old, but still potent arguments for LoTH, and briefly criticizing recent proposed alternatives to LoT, such as Frances Egan's deflationism and Eric Schwitzgebel's dispositionalism, revealing inadequacies in such antirepresentational, antisyntactic theories.

Des recherches récentes ont fait découvrir d’importants fragments en démotique égyptien, en vieux copte et en grec de manuels de divination par tirage au sort. En général, les sorts portent un numéro, et chacun est attribué à une divinité particulière. Cet article présente la documentation connue aujourd’hui, y compris des bandes de feuilles de palmier qui auraient pu servir de sorts réels. Il examine aussi les variations entre les différents manuscrits, ainsi que les éventuels liens spécifiques entre les dieux et (...) les réponses. (shrink)

This paper motivates using explicit methods in linguistics by attempting to estimate the size of a linguistic data set. Such estimations are difficult because redundant data can easily pad the data set. To address this, I offer some explicit operationalizations of the data and their features. But for linguistic data, negative associations don’t indicate true redundancy, and yet for many measures they can be mathematically impossible to ignore. It is proven that this troublesome phenomenon has positive Lebesgue measure, is monotonically (...) increasing, and that these two features hold robustly in four different ways. (shrink)

Michel de Certeau has described our movement about the city as improvisational—as an interaction with a spatial order that not only activates that order’s ensemble of possibilities but transforms and introduces new possibilities for elements comprising that order. However, architecture’s relation to improvisation is not limited to this provision of a fixed context, an offering of material that is the basis of our daily play. A number of writings about architecture and urbanism by Jane Jacobs, Roger Sherman, and Stan Allen (...) identify improvisation in aspects of the design of the city itself. Along with the Available City, a design proposition that explicitly seeks to organize an improvisational production of a new spatial system within the city of Chicago, those writings reveal possibilities for structure that organize improvisational processes as a way of working on the city. (shrink)

Een bezoek aan Sint-Petersburg vlak na het einde van de Sovjetunie doet filosoof Allan Janik inzien hoezeer het postmodernisme, met zijn credo van 'alles is toegestaan', leidt tot nihilisme en tot een marginalisering van de filosofie zelf. De Russische filosofen die hij er ontmoet, bewegen zich in een werkelijk postmoderne maatschappij, een chaotisch machtsvacuüm waar niets vanzelfsprekend is. Juist daar blijkt dat een relativistisch-postmoderne houding weliswaar terecht de 'Grote Verhalen' ondermijnt, maar dat ze wegkijkt van de werkelijke problemen. Zo plaatst (...) de filosofie zichzelf in de marge, op een moment waarop ze juist een rol van betekenis kan en moet spelen. (shrink)

This article focuses on the intimate relationship between German aesthetic theory, particularly the philosophies of Kant and Schiller, and the pragmatic tradition of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I argue that many aspects of Kantian aesthetic theory – his development of reflective judgement, genius, and common sense – are reflected in the thinking of C. S. Peirce. I conclude, however, that such a comparison risks selling short the way that German idealism influenced American thinkers and instead suggest that it (...) is more fruitful to concentrate on ‘aesthetic experience’. I argue that attending to the aesthetic dimensions of experience might re-orient contemporary approaches to pragmatism that continue to focus on the way that pragmatism might intervene in debates in epistemology and philosophy of language. (shrink)

How do expert committees sustain credibility while radically expanding their institutional scope? This question animates contemporary food governance, as dietary guidelines, historically focused on nutritional adequacy, increasingly incorporate environmental sustainability and demands for democratic participation. Yet scholarship has largely neglected the ongoing legitimacy work, the strategic framing, methodological commitments, and communication practices through which expert bodies navigate such frame expansion. This study takes the Nordic Nutrition Recommendations 2023 (NNR2023) as a critical case, analysing how experts reconciled scientific authority with environmental (...) values and public participation. Drawing on in-depth expert interviews and an extensive documentary corpus, and bringing framing theory into conversation with a further developed, three-dimensional account of legitimacy, we distinguish epistemic, procedural, and cultural registers, the last of which we elaborate beyond its conventional treatment to foreground civic epistemologies and Nordic food cultures. Our findings show that these dimensions constantly pull against one another: methodological hardening strengthened epistemic authority yet narrowed participation; radical transparency enhanced fairness yet exposed disagreements; cultural accommodation honoured national foodways yet strained universalist claims. Rather than resolving these tensions, experts managed them through what we term “performed legitimacy,” an ongoing, audience-relational accomplishment that may suggest the contours of a more reflexive expert governance for an era of integrative food policy. (shrink)

During excavation of the Prytaneion at Delos in 1987, a well dating to the Classical period was discovered. The well had been completely filled, probably all at once, in the late 3 rdor early 4 thcentury AD, with various materials taken from the site and a large quantity of ceramics. This closed deposit, which includes at least 215 vessels, is almost exclusively composed of fragments of a wide variety of common functional ceramics, cooking vessels and amphorae of 24 different types. (...) The material significantly enriches our understanding of Cycladic ceramics during the Roman imperial period, the documentation of which is still lacking. It also sheds new light on an entire aspect of the – still unknown – economic, commercial and artisanal history of Delos during these “mature” centuries. (shrink)

Ce volume rassemble les interventions qui ont eu lieu pendant un symposium de deux jours (du 12 au 13 novembre 2011) à la Princeton University, consacré au « Sortilege in Late Antiquity » L’ouvrage s’articule en quatorze chapitres thématiquement organisés. Les sujets analysés dans ce volume collectif embrassent cinq points principaux : l’étude des instruments divinatoires (William E. Klingshirn) ; l’analyse des différentes pratiques (la palmomancie, Salvatore Costanza ; la bibliomancie, Kevin...

This paper draws on the resources of computational neuroscience (an account of active inference under the free energy principle) to address Bas van Fraassen's bad lot objection to the inference to the best explanation (IBE). The general assumption of this paper is that IBE is a finessed form of active inferences that self-organising systems perform to maximise the chance of their survival. Under this assumption, the paper aims to establish the following points: first, the capacity to learn to perform explanatory (...) inferences comes with evolutionary privileges; second, adaptive actions guide beliefs and beliefs are action-oriented; and third, IBE is not inconsistent with (approximate) Bayesianism but plays a heuristic role to it. (shrink)