The problem of evil has traditionally been approached as a moral or theological dilemma concerning divine goodness and the persistence of suffering. This paper advances a structuralist resolution grounded in the ontological necessity of limitation for manifestation. The argument proceeds through three integrated claims: first, any differentiated reality must arise through boundary formation; second, such boundaries entail privation of fullness of being; third, this privation constitutes the ontological foundation of what is experienced as evil. Drawing on classical privation theory (...) (Augustine, Aquinas), Neoplatonic emanation (Plotinus, Proclus), Kabbalistic contraction (Luria, Scholem), process philosophy (Whitehead, Hartshorne), Eastern non-dualism (Advaita Vedanta, Daoism), and modern physical symmetry breaking (Higgs mechanism, thermodynamics), this paper proposes a unified framework in which manifestation necessarily generates the structural conditions for evil. This approach reframes theodicy as addressing not why evil exists within creation but why manifestation itself occurs given its ontological costs. The paper addresses critical objections regarding the gap between boundary and suffering, the degree of evil, and the positive aspects of limitation, concluding with implications for comparative ontology and spiritual practice across traditions. (shrink)

The principle objective of a diagnosis is not to categorise symptoms, or group a combination of signs or clinical symptoms in a coherent way, but to cure a patient or improve their quality of life. Diagnoses that are technically correct, but do not seek this objective may become unnecessary labels which convert healthy people, or those who do not consider themselves to be sick, into patients. We propose a limitation of the diagnostic effort in order to reduce the iatrogenic (...) consequences of these unnecessary labels or diagnoses, a new imperative which, in Kantian terms, can be expressed as: examine and treat your patients in such a way that, at the very least, the effects of your actions always improve the quality of their lives. (shrink)

To many, judgment has seemed a locus of cognitive agency, a kind of cognitive mental act. In one minimal sense, judgment is something one does. I consider whether judgment is more robustly agential: is it a kind of action done with an aim? The most attractive version of this sort of position takes judging that p to affirming that p with an alethic aim, an aim such as affirming truly. I argue that such views have unacceptable consequences. Acts done with (...) aims, in general, can be based only indirectly on evidence that one would attain the aim in so acting. It follows that if alethic aims theories of judgment were correct, a judgment that p could be based only indirectly on evidence for p. This itself would be problematic. But the problems extend further. Given the connection between judgment and belief-formation, it would follow, further, that the beliefs we form through judgment could at best be only indirectly based on evidence for p. On these theories, the direct bases for a judgment that p would have to be either a belief that p or a belief that it’s likely that p. The former cannot support belief-formation and the latter supports at best epistemically inappropriate belief-formation. I conclude that there is a hard limit on how robustly agential judgment can be. (shrink)

The effects that artificial intelligence (AI) technologies will have on society in the short- and long-term are inherently uncertain. For this reason, many governments are avoiding strict command and control regulations for this technology and instead rely on softer ethics-based approaches. The Russian approach to regulating AI is characterized by the prevalence of unenforceable ethical principles implemented via industry self-regulation. We analyze the emergence of the regulatory regime for AI in Russia to illustrate the limitations of this approach. The article (...) is based on 50 interviews with policymakers, representatives of AI companies, and academics in the country. The findings show that this regulatory regime was formed under the strong influence of Russian big tech companies, which saw an opportunity to avoid regulatory oversight by washing out concrete regulatory measures from the policy. This approach is part of a broader protectionist sanction-proofing strategy for the local IT sector designed by the government, which can be characterized by lifting regulatory barriers for local companies. Unenforceable ethics-based self-regulation is a _regulatory gift_ from the Russian government to the industry. This _gift_ was intentionally designed because the government thought that prioritizing local innovation over consumer protection would benefit the public. However, the _gift_ can also unintentionally undermine the public interest by providing an opportunity for _ethics washing_. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is accepted that treatment of previously competent, now incompetent patients can be limited if that is what the patient would desire, if she were now competent. Expressed past preferences or an advance directive are often taken to constitute sufficient evidence of what a patient would now desire. I distinguish between desires and rational desires. I argue that for a desire to be an expression of a person's autonomy, it must be or satisfy that person's rational desires. A person (...) rationally desires a course of action if that person desires it while being in possession of all available relevant facts, without committing relevant error of logic, and “vividly imagining” what its consequences would be like for her. I argue that some competent, expressed desires obstruct autonomy. I show that several psychological mechanisms operate to prevent a person rationally evaluating what future life in a disabled state would be like. Rational evaluation is difficult. However, treatment limitation, if it is to respect autonomy, must be in accord with a patient's rational desires, and not merely her expressed desires. I illustrate the implications of these arguments for the use of advance directives and for the treatment of competent patients. (shrink)

: As Heidegger acknowledges, our understanding is essentially situated and so limited by the context and tradition into which it is thrown. But this ‘situatedness’ does not exhaust Heidegger's concept of ‘thrownness’. By examining this concept and its grammar, I develop a more complete interpretation. I identify several different kinds of finitude or limitation in our understanding, and touch on ways in which we confront and carry different dimensions of our past.

PORTER S and O’HALLORAN P. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 18–28 The use and limitation of realistic evaluation as a tool for evidence‐based practice: a critical realist perspectiveIn this paper, we assess realistic evaluation’s articulation with evidence‐based practice (EBP) from the perspective of critical realism. We argue that the adoption by realistic evaluation of a realist causal ontology means that it is better placed to explain complex healthcare interventions than the traditional method used by EBP, the randomized controlled trial (RCT). (...) However, we do not conclude from this that the use of RCTs is without merit, arguing that it is possible to use both methods in combination under the rubric of realist theory. More negatively, we contend that the rejection of critical theory and utopianism by realistic evaluation in favour of the pragmatism of piecemeal social engineering means that it is vulnerable to accusations that it promotes technocratic interpretations of human problems. We conclude that, insofar as realistic evaluation adheres to the ontology of critical realism, it provides a sound contribution to EBP, but insofar as it rejects the critical turn of Bhaskar’s realism, it replicates the technocratic tendencies inherent in EBP. (shrink)

This volume presents the philosophical and heuristic framework Cantor developed and explores its lasting effect on modern mathematics. "Establishes a new plateau for historical comprehension of Cantor's monumental contribution to mathematics." --The American Mathematical Monthly.

Although research on ethics and creativity has been fruitful, it has also yielded mixed results and two different perspectives, raising questions about whether ethics hinders orfacilitates creativity. These two perspectives have been fueled by limited consistency in terms of theoretical specification and mechanisms. One potentially important but overlooked factor that may help shed light on this relationship is religion. Building on the theory of intimate co-creation, our study examines the dyadic relationship between individuals and God in the creative process. We (...) conduct an inductive, qualitative study using 49 interviews of entrepreneurial monks and nuns across 25 monasteries in Italy to understand how religion influences the relationship between ethics and creativity. Our findings suggest an ethical process of relational moralization occurs between individuals and God through three stages: relational development, relational identity, and relational obedience. Rather than simply hindering or facilitating creativity, our study finds a more nuanced understanding where relational moralization acts as a double-edge sword that both limits the creative domain and enables creativity within the domain through relationally-bounded-creativity. Our study takes an important step in reconciling competing views of the relationship between ethics and creativity. Our findings have important theoretical implications for the ethics-creativity relationship, ethics and a constructive view of obedience, and intimate co-creation. (shrink)

Dans la Politique, Aristote s’attache à distinguer, pour les articuler et les hiérarchiser, la sphère économique et la sphère politique. Tout en reconnaissant l’autonomie propre des activités économiques, il s’attache à exposer les motifs qui légitiment la limitation de celles-ci par le pouvoir politique. En consacrant l’éminence de la politique par rapport à la sphère marchande, Aristote manifeste l’impérieuse nécessité de subordonner la recherche et l’acquisition des biens et des richesses matérielles – légitimes dans leur ordre – aux activités (...) les plus hautes de l’homme qui, seules, sont susceptibles de lui procurer le bonheur véritable. Recherchées pour elles-mêmes, celles-ci sont l’expression d’une sortie par l’homme d’une logique de l’utilité et témoignent d’une forme authentique de liberté dans laquelle se déploient sa vertu et son excellence. C’est in fine uniquement une éducation à la vie de loisir qui fait advenir, dans la communauté, des individus susceptibles d’assumer la destination morale et politique à laquelle la cité est appelée. Classification JEL : B11. (shrink)

Ever since Elga presented his famous puzzle of Sleeping Beauty, philosophers have debated between the Thirder and the Halfer positions. In his recent article, Daniel Singer proposes a new position, according to which Beauty ought to assign [0, 1/2] to the coin’s landing heads. For this argument, he exploits the similarity between Elga’s original puzzle and Bovens’s modified one. According to Singer, Beauty ought to assign the same credence to H in both versions of Sleeping Beauty. Since Beauty ought to (...) assign [0, 1/2] to H in Bovens’s version, she ought to assign [0, 1/2] to H in Elga’s original version, too. Let us call this “the Impreciser view.” In this paper, I will contend that Singer’s argument fails. First, he depends on false assumptions in defending his Impreciser view. Second, Bovens’s version of Sleeping Beauty turns out to be underdescribed in an important aspect. If we try to provide a fuller description for it, either Beauty does not have to assign [0, 1/2] to H or the thus complemented version of Bovens’s puzzle will fail to be analogous with Elga’s original one. In either case, Singer’s discussion does not establish his Impreciser view. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes as (...) if primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

Guo Xiang (郭象), style name Zi Xuan (子玄), was born in Luoyang, Henan (河南洛阳). He was born in the fourth year of the Jiaping reign of the Wei Dynasty (嘉平四年, 252 A.D.) and died in the sixth year of the Yongjia reign of the Western Jin Dynasty (永嘉六年, 312 A.D.).

The hypothesis that family size limitation by parents enhances the upward mobility chances of their children in (post)industrial populations has a long-standing record in many disciplines, including sociology and economics, as well as evolutionary anthropology and social biology. Yet the empirical record supporting or contradicting the theory is surprisingly limited. The aim of this contribution is to develop a test of the effect of family size limitation on children’s intergenerational mobility. This test is applied to an urban population (...) in Belgium that was in the process of experiencing its demographic transition, including the decline of fertility, at the end of the 19th century. The results indicate that the effect of family size was strong, even after controlling for parental social status as well as birth order. Surprisingly, the effects of birth order and family size appear to be largely independent. (shrink)

In his medical and scientific works John Wesley provided an interpretation of the universe that was structured, though not pre-ordained, by God. The empirical method he adopted was measured in terms of efficacy and judged according to rationalistic standards. Its practical success, however, was used by Wesley to underpin his vocation of practical piety, which developed out of a holistic view of nature inspired by the spiritualism of Primitive Christianity. Accordingly, the providential ordering of Man and nature meant that safeguarding (...) physical health became a spiritual act, though Wesley separated the discourse of religion and terminology of medicine. This distinction was essential because it ensured intellectual integrity whilst leaving a protective space for religious faith. He made this move on the one hand but saw no contradiction in bringing the discourses of religion and medicine together to serve his mission. For Wesley, social and personal improvement did not rely exclusively on enlightened thinking or religious faith. Rather it depended on showing how rationalism and faith could display separate strengths within an overall framework of holism. (shrink)

The method guiding the approach of this research on the symptomatology of schizophrenia is phenomenological, although a technical-scientific study-based approach to the themes and clinical manifestations of schizophrenia should be subjected to an in-depth analysis because the state of research shows some lack of scientific description of the understanding of irony in individuals with schizophrenia.

The human in continuous century envisage the skepticism. When the human envisage the deficiency of his knowledge, will be in trouble of skepticism, when the knowledge of human fundamentally is doubted, all internal or external impressions will be doubted, so the man envisage the unlimited skepticism. But is it possible and logical? The possibility of it is a psychological question too, but my effort is the epistemological surveying of it. We can survey this question in two ways. One way is (...) justifier reasons of skepticism. Are there sufficient for unlimited skepticism? Every deduction is based on preludes and if they’re uncertain the result will be uncertain too. There any deduction can’t justify unlimited skepticism. The other way is the surveying results of this skepticism. We have beliefs thatnever can doubt them like our existence. This inability express that the unlimited skepticism doesn’t agree the logic of our subject. Moreover the unlimited skepticism brings the mixed continuums. If we doubt anything, doubt this doubting too and this involving haven’t extremity, the demoniac hang that can’t be accepted by our. (shrink)

We analyze the Michelson type experiment performed by Brillet and Hall. The order of magnitude of the gravitational effect (a beating frequency between two lasers) is calculated. We prove that Newtonian tidal forces could be observed when they originate from the oblateness of the Earth, from its rotation, from local masses, from the Moon or the Sun but not from the Galaxy (contrary to what has been recently claimed). We conclude that it is important to build a new parametrized theoretical (...) framework for the analysis of high-precision experiments. (shrink)

Strategic fouls can be defined as deliberate rule violations undertaken for tactical advantage in circumstances where sanction is anticipated and treated as a cost of action. They are distinguished from cheating not by moral innocence but by their structural relation to enforcement. Whereas cheating depends upon clandestine evasion, the strategic foul remains intelligible, and can still ‘work’, even when detected and punished, precisely because it presupposes the continuing authority of the rule-system it exploits. This article examines the phenomenon of strategic (...) fouling by offering a critical analysis of its moral, regulatory, and psychoanalytic dimensions. In particular, it explores how such actions are embedded within the logic of competitive play, revealing a tacit legitimacy, despite their formal illegality. Drawing on the work of J.S. Russell, the article situates strategic fouling within a broader category of tolerated transgression, which, enhances, rather than undermines, the experience of play. Coupled with a psychoanalytic perspective, it is argued that strategic fouls exemplify the creative potential of self-limitation. That is, rules and constraints do not inhibit freedom but serve as conditions for inventive action and ethical deliberation. With regard to relevant examples, such as Luis Suárez’s 2010 handball, the article concludes that strategic fouling reveals sport as a site of moral ambiguity and creative agency, where the subject confronts and constitutes itself through the contradictions of rule-bound play. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Horton presents a ‘fatal dilemma’ for these views. Views that land on the First Horn of his dilemma suggest that a previously losing group strengthened by fewer and weaker claims can be more choice-worthy than the previously winning group strengthened by more and stronger claims. Views that land on the Second Horn suggest (...) that combining two losing groups together and two winning groups together can turn the losing groups into the winning groups and the winning groups into the losing groups. This paper demonstrates that the ‘fatal dilemma’ is neither fatal nor a dilemma. The First Horn is devastating but avoidable and the Second Horn is unavoidable but not devastating. Nevertheless, Horton’s argument does help to narrow down the acceptable range of views. (shrink)