This work adopts H. Kelsen’s concept of legal system, proposes a formal definition for such notion, and introduces an operational semantical framework for legal systems that are situated in agent societies. Agent societies are defined. Relevant formal properties of situated legal systems are discussed; the way they are exposed in the operational semantical framework is explained, and their truth formally proved. Also, for the sake of a better understanding of the legal-theoretic assumptions of the paper, (...) recurring issues regarding Kelsen’s theory of law are briefly reviewed. They are put in confrontation with the points of view of R. Dworkin, H. Hart, and J. Raz, and an attempt is made to clarify them from the perspective of the provided formalization. A brief case study in agent-based modeling and simulation of public policy processes is presented, as an illustration of the way of using situated legal systems, and the proposed operational semantical framework, in a practical application. (shrink)

This work addresses Ronald J. Allen's views on complexity, evidence, and law. After some remarks on normative systems and the metaphors used to characterize them, the work addresses the issue of complexity by asking how a system characterized by complexity can tame the world's complexity; the focus then shifts to some aspects of evidence and evidential reasoning under that characterization of the legal system; and in conclusion the work points out the main questions posed with respect to (...) Allen's account. Reference is made to the Kelsenian and Hartian accounts of normative and legal systems, asking in what respects Allen's account marks a theoretical advance on prior literature and suggesting that a major aspect lies in the account's focus on the adaptive nature of the legal system. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate how to represent and reason about legal abrogations and annulments in Defeasible Logic. We examine some options that embed in this setting, and in similar rule-based systems, ideas from belief and base revision. In both cases, our conclusion is negative, which suggests to adopt a different logical model. This model expresses temporal aspects of legal rules, and distinguishes between two main timelines, one internal to a given temporal version of the legal (...) class='Hi'>system, and another relative to how the legal system evolves over time. Accordingly, we propose a temporal extension of Defeasible Logic suitable to express this model and to capture abrogation and annulment. We show that the proposed framework overcomes the difficulties discussed in regard to belief and base revision, and is sufficiently flexible to represent many of the subtleties characterizing legal abrogations and annulments. (shrink)

The essay examines possible affinities betweenTartu-Moscow school of cultural semiotics andlegal semiotics. The introduction briefly setsout a historical dimension of the ideologicalintegration of Tartu-Moscow semiotics (inbroader context Tartu semiotics) into thegeneral framework of legal semiotics. It arguesthat there was a `real' historical mediationbetween the members of Tartu-Moscow schoolsemiotic circle and legal scholars from Tartu.The acceptance of such a bridging link betweenlegal academic community and semioticians couldgive further impetus to construction of aspecial model of `Tartu legal semiotics'.The development (...) of Tartu-Moscow `legalsemiotics' could be illustrated by theimplementation of a special explanatoryframework, which provide insights into the wayTartu semiotics wedded to a legal positivistphilosophy. Particular importance of such aframework (model of legal semiotics) rest onfact that the academic ideology of Tartu-Moscowschool reflects and conforms to all thehistorical peculiarities of the Soviet epoch(these peculiarities should be always kept inmind). In order to adopt Tartu-Moscow semioticsto legal semiotics, semiotic theory ofTartu-Moscow school must be recast in terms oflegal semiotics The dissemination of semioticstudies in late Soviet epoch enabled them to belinked to various theoretical enquiries intothe domain of legal methodology, ontology andepistemology. This essay puts a specialemphasis on the notion of `secondary modelingsystem' as a natural pattern for `systemacity'within the universe of law. However, in orderto understand the semiotic value of `legalsystem' it is necessary to have recourse toother systems. Therefore, this paper examinesdifferent system dimensions of law: fromgeneral notion of system and theory ofautopoetic system to sign systems.The possible synthesis of logical, sociologicaland semiotic approaches to the system of lawopens a wider multidisciplinary perspective;moreover the need for multidisciplinarysynthesis is pertinent to contemporaryphilosophical concerns. The main analyticaltask of essay is to provide an answer to aquestion of whether core semiotic concept of a`secondary modeling system' (amongst otherconcepts like `boundary', `semiosphere',`culture' and `text') is capable of enrichingand clarifying legal philosophy in a widerperspective and the semiotic account of law inparticular. A positive answer to the questionwill favor the further tight integration ofTartu-Moscow semiotic concepts into the domainof legal semiotics. (shrink)

This article examines adjudication not through the lens of justice-seeking or truth-discovery, but as a mythic-legal formation. Introducing the neologism _Judicra_—a fusion of _judicare_ (to judge) and _kratos_ (power)—the study argues that beneath the legal system lies a semiotic order that is neither merely procedural nor epistemic. Rather, it is a power-oriented entity that reclaims authority even from the hands of sovereignty and capital, redirecting it toward its own performative logic. Heidegger’s ontology reveals the primordial relationship between (...) this mythic entity and Dasein, uncovering its existential grounding, while Foucault’s discourse analysis brings into view the subtle mechanisms through which institutional power materialises. Barthes’s theory of myth demonstrates how emptied signs continue to sustain belief, and Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra clarifies how “evidence” circulates autonomously within a closed economy of meaning. The analysis culminates in a paradox: Judicra sustains power through ritual and simulation, yet fleeting moments of ethical openness still allow justice to emerge from within the system’s performance. (shrink)

This book takes us far beyond the usual focus of comparative law with analysis of a broad range of jurisdictions, including mixtures of common and civil law, and also those mixing Islamic and/or traditional legal systems with those derived from common and/or civil law traditions. The discussion is situated within the broader context of the continuing tides of globalization, the emergence of Islamic governments in some parts of the Middle East, the calls for a legal status for Islamic (...) law in some European countries, and the increasing focus on traditional and customary norms of governance in post-colonial contexts. (shrink)

This was a crimeCrime against people seeking separation from their extended families and ownership of properties with their parents or grandparents still alive. The prohibition was gradually introduced into the law in the Sui and Tang dynasties.

Abstract:We aim in this paper to explore several related challenges to contemporary analytical legal theorists who accept as theoretically foundational the state-based view of legality and legal system advanced by H.L.A. Hart. We contend that this approach contains internal explanatory problems which limit the view’s capacity to account for novel prima facie legal phenomena outside the typical experience of the law-state. We supplement the analytical approach by advancing the rudiments of what we call an ‘inter-institutional theory (...) of legality,’ a theory of legality derived from a morally-neutral, descriptive-explanatory picture of legal system qua system of legal institutions. Our theory additionally enables us to account for the novel prima facie legal phenomena we identify, and to conclude that while prior analytical legal theorists’ approaches to legality and legal system were historically right to depart from the example of the municipal legal system, that example and departure point are no longer most salient, so explanation of the legality within the state is no longer sufficient as a general explanation of legality.Resumen:En este artículo los autores se proponen explorar diversos retos que enfrentan los teóricos analíticos del derecho contemporáneos, los cuales han aceptado que una perspectiva estatista del sistema jurídico y de la legalidad —introducida por H. L. A. Hart— es fundamental como punto de partida en la teoría. Los autores sostienen que este enfoque contiene problemas explicativos internos que limitan su capacidad para explicar fenómenos jurídicos prima facie novedosos que no se ajustan a la experiencia paradigmática de un derecho-estado. Los autores reformulan el enfoque analítico mediante la introducción de las bases de lo que deno minan una “teoría de la legalidad interinstitucional”, esto es, una teoría de la legalidad derivada de una noción moralmente neutral, descriptiva y explicativa del sistema jurídico como un sistema de instituciones jurídicas. Esta teoría permite, además, explicar los fenómenos jurídicos prima facie novedosos que identifican los autores; y concluir que si bien los enfoques anteriores hacia el sistema jurídico y la legalidad de los teóricos analíticos estuvieron históricamente en lo correcto al tomar como punto de partida el ejemplo de un sistema jurídico municipal, ese ejemplo y punto de partida han dejado de ser relevantes, dicho ejemplo y punto de partida no resulta suficiente, por lo que la explicación de la legalidad dentro de los confines del Estado no es suficiente para una explicación general de la legalidad. (shrink)

It will be argued, firstly, that there is a link between the legal validity of a norm and the rational justifiability of a requirement that judges should apply this norm, based on a normative conception of legal validity and the postulate that judges should act as rational persons; secondly, that rational justifiability of legal norms requires the construction of a legal system in a model of principles that differs from theories, e.g., of Kelsen, Hart, Dworkin (...) and Alexy, which are not fully adequate for a normative conception of law. (shrink)

What does it mean to assert or deny the existence of a legal system? How can one determine whether a given law belongs to a certain legal system? What kind of structure do these systems have, that is--what necessary relations obtain between their laws? The examination of these problems in this volume leads to a new approach to traditional jurisprudential question, though the conclusions are based on a critical appraisal, particularly those of Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, and (...) Hart. (shrink)

How have legal philosophers systemized law, and what types of assumptions have they made in undertaking this task? In what sense is law a system, and how is it maintained as such? This translation of a French book answers these two core inter-related questions by surveying and analyzing the theories of a number of important European legal philosophers as well as offering its own distinct theory for viewing the law as a system.

What does it mean to assert or deny the existence of a legal system? How can one determine whether a given law belongs to a certain legal system? What kind of structure do these systems have, that is--what necessary relations obtain between their laws? The examination of these problems in this volume leads to a new approach to traditional jurisprudential question, though the conclusions are based on a critical appraisal, particularly those of Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, and (...) Hart. (shrink)

This study investigates how diverse European legal systems and financial structures influence corporate social and environmental responsibility. The argument is developed by means of a framework that integrates legal systems and financial structures. Hypotheses relating to environmental responsibility have been tested using Innovest data gathered between 2002 and 2007 from 645 companies in 16 countries; and hypotheses relating to social responsibility have been tested using Innovest data gathered between 2004 and 2007 from 600 companies. The findings demonstrate that (...) legal systems influence corporate responsibility (CR) in both social and environmental spheres. They also support the claim that corporations are more likely to act in environmentally responsible ways when there are strong and well-enforced state regulations in place to ensure such behavior. Company size is shown to have a greater impact on CR than either excess cash or performance. Large companies tend to be more visible than small ones do, and society expects them to behave in a more socially and environmentally responsible manner regardless of their financial performance or available cash. Finally, these findings support the hypothesis that capital structure significantly influences CR: companies with a high number of publicly held shares and a low percentage of debt are more likely than others to commit themselves to social and environmental activities. (shrink)

A considerable number of books and papers have analyzed normative concepts using new techniques developed by logicians; however, few have bridged the gap between the English legal culture and the Continental tradition in legal philosophy. This book addresses this issue by offering an introductory study on the many possibilities that logical analysis offers the study of legal systems. The volume is divided into two sections: the first covers the basic aspects of classical and deontic logic and its (...) connections, advancing an explanation of the most important topics of the discipline by comparing different systems of deontic logic and exploring some of the most important paradoxes in its domain. The second section deals with the role of logic in the analysis of legal systems by discussing in what sense deontic logic and the logic of norm-propositions are useful tools for a proper understanding of the systematic structure of law. (shrink)

This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements—e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations—make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. -/- At the outset, (...) two competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action that exclude some other reasons; and an antithesis, according to which law-making institutions (even those that meet prerequisites of legitimacy) can at most provide us with reasons that compete in weight with opposing reasons for action. These two positions are examined from several perspectives, such as justified disobedience cases, law's conduct-guiding function in contexts of bounded rationality, and the phenomenology associated with authority. -/- It is found that, although each of the above positions offers insight into the conundrum at hand, both suffer from significant flaws. These observations form the basis on which an alternative position is put forward and defended. According to this position, the existence of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes a reason that fits neither into a model of ordinary reasons for action nor into a pre-emptive paradigm—it constitutes a reason to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system's requirements. (shrink)

Could an artificial intelligence become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. No existing computer program currently possesses the sort of capacities that would justify serious judicial inquiry into the question of legal personhood. The question is nonetheless of some interest. Cognitive science begins with the assumption that the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a computer. Artificial (...) intelligence (AI) research attempts to develop such models. But even as cognitive science has displaced behavioralism as the dominant paradigm for investigating the human mind, fundamental questions about the very possibility of artificial intelligence continue to be debated. This Essay explores those questions through a series of thought experiments that transform the theoretical question whether artificial intelligence is possible into legal questions such as, "Could an artificial intelligence serve as a trustee?" What is the relevance of these legal thought experiments for the debate over the possibility of artificial intelligence? A preliminary answer to this question has two parts. First, putting the AI debate in a concrete legal context acts as a pragmatic Occam's razor. By reexamining positions taken in cognitive science or the philosophy of artificial intelligence as legal arguments, we are forced to see them anew in a relentlessly pragmatic context. Philosophical claims that no program running on a digital computer could really be intelligent are put into a context that requires us to take a hard look at just what practical importance the missing reality could have for the way we speak and conduct our affairs. In other words, the legal context provides a way to ask for the "cash value" of the arguments. The hypothesis developed in this Essay is that only some of the claims made in the debate over the possibility of AI do make a pragmatic difference, and it is pragmatic differences that ought to be decisive. Second, and more controversially, we can view the legal system as a repository of knowledge-a formal accumulation of practical judgments. The law embodies core insights about the way the world works and how we evaluate it. Moreover, in common-law systems judges strive to decide particular cases in a way that best fits the legal landscape-the prior cases, the statutory law, and the constitution. Hence, transforming the abstract debate over the possibility of AI into an imagined hard case forces us to check our intuitions and arguments against the assumptions that underlie social decisions made in many other contexts. By using a thought experiment that explicitly focuses on wide coherence, we increase the chance that the positions we eventually adopt will be in reflective equilibrium with our views about related matters. In addition, the law embodies practical knowledge in a form that is subject to public examination and discussion. Legal materials are published and subject to widespread public scrutiny and discussion. Some of the insights gleaned in the law may clarify our approach to the artificial intelligence debate. (shrink)

If someone assaults you, should they get a milder penalty if they are rich than if they are poor? We wouldn't dream of passing a law that formalized such an arrangement. But the design of our legal systems in the US, UK, and elsewhere, which permits people with sufficient money to pay for better lawyers, means that wealth often does make a difference to legal outcomes. Justice, then, depends not only on the substance of the laws we pass, (...) but on the design of the system that administers and enforces them. Philosophers and legal theorists, however, have paid relatively little attention to what justice demands of the general design and structure of the legal system. Equal Justice argues among other things that market principles should not determine access to legal resources. If, for example, a large corporation sues a small startup, either the corporation has to use a law firm of the quality that the startup can afford or--which would be preferable, given the corporation's in-house lawyers--the startup would be given a subsidy to afford a top firm. The author builds on this core idea of equal access to resources to work out how the court system and the legal profession should be structured in order to ensure a generally just legal system. (shrink)

The idea of a wicked legal system, one whose laws have been made the instrument of a repugnant moral ideology, continues to play an important part in philosophical debates about the nature of law and law's claim to moral authority. It seems to offer support for the argument of legal positivists, who insist on a clear conceptual distinction between legal requirements, deriving from social sources, and moral requirements. Does the existence of wicked legal systems present (...) an insurmountable obstacle to critics of positivism who reject the importance of that distinction?The abstract debates of legal philosophers can seem far removed from the practical application of law in the business of deciding cases. This book argues that theoretical disagreement matters profoundly to the practice of law, and analyses the abstract debates of legal philosophy through a detailed study of judicial interpretations in apartheid South Africa - a model 'wicked legal system'. The case study shows that particular conceptions of law and of the rule of law determined the reasoning both of judges whose decisions supported official policy and of judges whose decisions resisted that policy.The first edition of this book was published in 1991. Since then South Africa has transformed, and the major debates in legal theory have shifted from analysing the concept of law itself to analysing the concept of legality and the value of the rule of law. For this substantially revised new edition, the author addresses the transformation of South Africa since the end of Apartheid, and the shift in focus of legal philosophy. He also examines the emergence of counter-terrorism security laws, and the arguments surrounding their conformity to the rule of law. The book offers an invaluable guide to understanding the abstract debates of legal theory, and their importance in legal practice. (shrink)

A legal system consists of a complex body of practices—primary and secondary—, particularly practices of reasoning and justification. The intellectual, theorized aspect of legal order is embodied in legal doctrine: the corpus of norm-sentences, norms and rules, principles, doctrines and concepts used as basis for legal reasoning and justification. It includes elaborate conceptual structures of principles and doctrines, explicit and sophisticated forms of reflection and criticism. It is only when we have understood the nature of (...) legal doctrine that we can comprehend the workings of courts, lawyers and even legislatures. Concerning the need for a new conception of legal theory one question arises, above all, especially when external and internal observation as well as the critical reflection of the premises and presuppositions of all dealings with the law permit a degree of distance, the question, namely, whether it is not an increasing application of scientific methods that is needed, in the sense that the development of a legal theory from the beginning involves the integration of a norm-descriptive point of view and intellectual stand-point with the norm-prescriptive theory of law, by way of complementing each other, as it were (multi-level-approach to law). This, at least, appears to be the only way of clarifying also the relationship between le­gal theory and philosophy and the theory and sociology of law. The inevitable consequences of the development of a theory of norms and action also have to be drawn from this. (shrink)

The adversarial legal system is traditionally praised for its normative appeal: it protects individual rights; ensures an equal, impartial, and consistent application of the law; and, most importantly, its competitive structure facilitates the discovery of truth – both in terms of the facts, and in terms of the correct interpretation of the law. At the same time, legal representation is allocated as a commodity, bought and sold in the market: the more one pays, the better legal (...) representation one gets. In this article, I argue that the integration of a market in legal representation with the adversarial system undercuts the very normative justifications on which the system is based. Furthermore, I argue that there are two implicit conditions, which are currently unmet, but are required for the standard justifications to hold: that there is (equal opportunity for) equality of legal representation between parties, and that each party has (equal opportunity for) a sufficient level of legal representation. I, therefore, outline an ideal proposal for reform that would satisfy these conditions. (shrink)

Equal Justice: Fair Legal Systems in an Unfair World, by Wilmot-SmithFrederick. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. Pp. 256.

This book provides a fascinating and critical insight into familiar and less familiar mixed legal systems, taking the reader on a voyage of discovery from St Lucia and Guyana to the islands of the Seychelles and Mauritius. It considers those mixed systems which share boundaries with unmixed ones, such as Scotland and Quebec, and those located off-shore of major and dominant jurisdictions such as Jersey off the coasts of France’s civil law and England’s common law system, as well (...) as Cyprus, situated between the influences of Europe and those of the Middle East. (shrink)

I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology (a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications, and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from the belief in the concept’s applicability, which also involves the acceptance of the concept’s constitutive inferences. For making this distinction, the inferential and eliminative analysis of legal concepts proposed by Alf Ross will be connected to (...) the views on theoretical concepts in science advanced by Frank Ramsey and Rudolf Carnap. Consequently, the mere comprehension of a legal concept will be distinguished from the application of the concept to a particular legal system, since application presupposes a doctrinal commitment, namely, the belief that the inferences constituting the concept hold in that system. Then, I shall consider how concepts can be characterised by defining the corresponding terms and placing them within an ontology. Finally, I shall argue that there is a tension between the inferential and the ontological approach, but that both need to be taken into account, to capture the meaning and the cognitive function of legal concepts. (shrink)

Volume 10, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 229-236.

This book is based on presentations and discussions at the special workshop "The concept of Legal Consciousness" held on July 7, 2022, in Bucharest, Romania, as part of thirtieth biennial World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR). The workshop was focused on the importance of this concept for legal theory, legal sociology, and legal psychology ("psychology and law"). The book consists of fourteen contributions divided into four thematic parts (...) elaborating the following topics: concept of law, methodology of legal sciences, role of legal consciousness in legal theory and legal sociology, adjudication, constitutionalization, modification of the legal system, and the deliberate normative change. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo explora los cambios en el entorno legal cambiante y la estructura social de la sociedad de la meseta Qinghai - Tíbet, la dinámica social y cultural reflejada en el declive, renacimiento y mutación de la poligamia, enfatiza el papel de la mujer en ella y espera con interés el desarrollo futuro de la poligamia en la meseta Qinghai - Tíbet. La exploración y práctica de este artículo es una nueva conceptualización de estudios anteriores sobre el poder (...) de género y la Condición Jurídica y Social de la mujer. La existencia y continuación de la poligamia refuta la comprensión mecánica de la subordinación general de las mujeres desde una perspectiva intercultural, y las características dinámicas, sistemáticas y simbólicas de los roles y estatus de las mujeres en el matrimonio poligámico en la meseta Qinghai - Tíbet verifican la predicción de la tendencia de la investigación sobre el estatus de las mujeres. La preocupación por el papel y la posición de las mujeres en las familias polígamas intenta confirmar la complejidad del poder de género y la posición de las mujeres en la sociedad. Tanto la innovación del pensamiento teórico como la exploración del camino de investigación son para ir más allá en la exploración de problemas similares. Aunque es imposible agotar todos los problemas posibles, la atención y exploración de los grupos de mujeres en el sistema de matrimonio polígamo en este artículo enriquece la visión de los estudios anteriores sobre la Condición Jurídica y Social de la mujer, pero también plantea cuestiones por explorar. (shrink)

An efficient judicial system is required for quick contract enforcement. In Pakistan, disputes over contract enforcement drag for decades having negative implications for investment and corporate business formation. The judicial statistics of the courts for the period 2007–2020 are analyzed. Interestingly, the number of cases instituted, disposed of, and pending decision, all three are persistently increasing. The costs of delays are horrendous in terms of money and time. The legal origins literature is discussed and it is argued that (...) this line of scholarship suffers from serious deficiencies as certain important legal systems like Islamic law and informal system of justice, which remained in practice for long in the subcontinent region, are totally ignored by the legal origins literature. In Pakistan, the plurality of legal systems is a fact. The majority of the people still approach informal channels of dispute resolution as these channels are speedy, less costly, and help restore emotional closure. The case is not that informal channels are preferable over the formal justice system. Rather point is that contract enforcement by the formal justice system is very weak and resultantly the legal system of Pakistan has become a big constraint on investment and economic growth. So some reforms like better case flow management, better self-regulation by the judges, transparency about shelf life statistics, strengthening alternate dispute resolution (ADR) system, and establishing linkages between the formal and informal justice system are suggested for improving the system and make it work for quick enforcement of contracts and cost-effective dispensation of justice. (shrink)

Every organization has to deal with operational risks, arising from the execution of a company’s primary business functions. In this paper, we describe a legal knowledge management system which helps users understand the meaning of legislative text and the relationship between norms. While much of the knowledge requires the input of legal experts, we focus in this article on NLP applications that semi-automate essential time-consuming and lower-skill tasks—classifying legal documents, identifying cross-references and legislative amendments, linking (...) class='Hi'>legal terms to the most relevant definitions, and extracting key elements of legal provisions to facilitate clarity and advanced search options. The use of Natural Language Processing tools to semi-automate such tasks makes the proposal a realistic commercial prospect as it helps keep costs down while allowing greater coverage. (shrink)

Drawing on the legal manuscripts found in tombs since the 1970s, this contribution discusses the use of the term fa in the legal system of the Qin and early Han periods. Fa must be distinguished from the related terms lü “statutes” and ling “edicts”, which referred to the written embodiment of law. In technical legal texts, fa is found in different usages. Most importantly, the term refers to legal rules or to “the law” as the (...) entirety of legal rules. Fa is also used as part of the official designation of legal officials, in particular as part of the generic designation zhifa; as a noun modifier in the sense of “legal” (to distinguish the following noun from non-legal uses); and sometimes in the verbal sense of “to apply the law against somebody.” In contrast, recent interpretations of fa as “legal category” or “categorical principle” lead to implausible results and must therefore be rejected. This contribution also discusses the etymology and conceptual history of the term fa, beginning with the Shuowen jiezi explanation of the early character form writing fa. Contrary to the Shuowen jiezi, this character most likely was originally devised to write a verb meaning “to cut down trees, clear rank growth” that is etymologically related to a number of semantically similar words but did not have any legal connotations. An analysis of the Western Zhou bronze inscriptions; of the received literature of the Western Zhou, Chunqiu, and Zhanguo periods; and of the Zhanguo-period bamboo manuscripts demonstrates that as a legal term, fa first appears during the Zhanguo period within the context of fundamental social and intellectual changes. In the received literature, as well as in the inscriptions and non-legal manuscripts of the Eastern Zhou and early Han periods, fa is also attested in the sense “standard, model,” which is considered by some as the primary meaning of fa. However, there is little evidence that this meaning predates fa as a legal term. Also, attempts to prove the derivation of the legal term fa from fa in the sense of “standard, model” based on Sino-Tibetan lexical comparisons remain tenuous at best. (shrink)

The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning (...) and Political Conflict, Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork (who champions the original understanding of the Constitution) to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people. (shrink)

In accordance with the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [December 1978], Comrade Hua Guofeng, in his "Report on the Work of the Government" delivered to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress [address of June 18, 1979], provided a thorough discussion on the strengthening of socialist democracy and improvement of the socialist legal system. This session of the Congress solemnly passed the Electoral Law, the Criminal (...) Law, the Law of Criminal Procedure, and other important laws, opening a new chapter in the establishment of democracy and law in our nation. This is highly significant as a major turning point for workers throughout the nation, lifting the historical lid at all levels so that we may proceed with the four modernizations with a common mind and purpose throughout the nation, to further develop democracy and fulfill the establishment of the legal system. This will affect the consolidation and development of the state system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It will protect the personal interests of the people, prevent the revival of counterrevolutionaries, and guarantee the realization of the four modernizations. (shrink)

The book On Contemporary Chinese Legal System written by Xiaobo Dong and Yafang Zhang takes the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics as its central research subject. Through meticulo...

In this article I discuss various possible ways of understanding the character of and relations between legal systems in the European Union. In particular, I consider whether there is an EU legal system distinct from and in addition to the national legal systems of EU Member States, or whether it is better to conceive of EU law merely as an aspect of Member States’ legal systems, or indeed whether we should think of there being but (...) a single EU legal system of which Member States’ “national legal systems” are in some sense sub-systems.Resumen:Este artículo discute varios modos posibles de comprender el carácter de los sistemas jurídicos de la Unión Europea y sus relaciones. En particular, se plantea la cuestión de si existe un sistema jurídico en la Unión Europea adicional y distinto del sistema jurídico nacional de los Estados miembros; o si es mejor concebir el derecho de la Unión Europea simplemente como un aspecto de los sistemas jurídicos de los Estados miembros; o bien, si es que deberíamos pensar que no hay sino sólo un sistema jurídico en la Unión Europea con respecto del cual los “sistemas jurídicos nacionales” de los Estados miembros son en cierta forma subsistemas. (shrink)

This chapter deals with spatial conflicts of law, i.e., conflicts between different national legal systems, usually investigated by international private law. They are examined with the tools presented in the previous chapters and with the aid of the key notion of the range of adjudication of a state legal system. Different attitudes towards coexistence between national legal systems are presented.

Wil Waluchow has advanced perhaps the most convincing argument in favour of what he eloquently termed ‘inclusive legal positivism’, the view that a given legal system could make legal validity depend on moral truths. This chapter refocuses the case for the opposing view of exclusive positivism on the metaphysical tension in seeing law as an institutional social fact and yet for its validity to depend on something that is not a social fact, developing an understanding of (...) official mistake as a way of highlighting that tension. If legal validity itself is understood as a socially constructed status (something with which any legal positivist would agree), key officials (as a group) cannot be wrong about the criteria sufficient for institutional membership having been met. While the officials cannot be wrong about the sufficient conditions, they can be wrong about the necessary (gatekeeping) ones and the moral criteria that inclusive positivists say could be included among the criteria of validity are invariably understood to be necessary conditions. That might look like a point in favour of inclusive positivism, but it is only the sufficient conditions that are constitutive of legal validity. Two facets of legal decisions are then marshalled to buttress the case for exclusive positivism: that almost every legal decision is also a determination of validity, and that all such decisions are systemically treated as correct until reviewed by a court of superior jurisdiction (which is itself a sufficient condition for membership). The implication of this is that moral criteria, understood as gatekeepers for legal validity, cannot be constitutive of legal validity. (shrink)

This timely book offers a theistic approach to secular legal systems and demonstrates that these systems are neither agnostic nor atheist. Critical but succinct in its approach, this book focuses on an extensive range of liberal legal approaches to religious and moral issues, and subjects them to critical scrutiny from a secular perspective. Expertly written by a leading scholar, the author offers a rare combination of profundity of ideas and simplicity of expression. It is a ringing defense of (...) the theistic conception of secular legal systems and an uncompromising attack on the agnostic and atheist conception. (shrink)

Understanding legal ambiguity has become a crucial focus in contemporary law, highlighting important conflicts between the strictness of statutory law and the flexibility of legal symbols. This study investigates the relationship between law and semiotics, emphasizing how symbols, language, and interpretative frameworks contribute to legal ambiguity and its effects on the delivery of justice. Situated within the framework of modern legal thought, the research thoroughly examines how legal texts are created, interpreted, and manipulated across different (...) socio-political contexts. Employing a qualitative approach, the study draws on secondary sources, including court opinions, statutory laws, and academic literature, to explore inconsistencies in interpretation. The research uncovers a notable gap in legal scholarship: while legal theory often prioritizes clarity and predictability, it tends to neglect the semiotic aspects that challenge these principles. By bridging this gap, the study emphasizes how semiotics can offer deeper insights into legal interpretation, uncovering biases and power dynamics that exist within legal frameworks. The findings indicate that legal ambiguity is not just a flaw but a necessary feature of law, providing flexibility in its application while also opening doors for potential manipulation. This tension calls into question the traditional view of law as a stable and objective system. The study contributes to the legal field by promoting an integrative approach that merges legal theory with semiotics, presenting new tools for interpreting laws in diverse societies. It concludes that legal semiotics can improve legal interpretation and foster fairness, highlighting the importance of further interdisciplinary research to enhance jurisprudence practices. (shrink)

Land use rights (LUR) management plays a vital role in ensuring transparency, legal certainty, and socio-economic development. In countries like Vietnam, where land-related procedures are governed by a comprehensive legal framework, practical challenges persist due to uncoordinated records and complex administrative processes. To support the country’s ongoing digital transformation and legal modernization efforts, this paper introduces ViLUR, a system that integrates blockchain and semantic technologies to manage LUR in compliance with Vietnam’s 2024 Land Law and related (...) regulations. ViLUR combines blockchain technology for secure, immutable record-keeping with the Land Use Rights Ontology (LUROn), which formally models ownership structures, legal entities, and regulatory constraints. Using Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) rules, the system automates legal compliance checks for key procedures including ownership issuance, change registration, and land recovery. Deployed on the Hyperledger Fabric framework, ViLUR is experimentally evaluated in terms of throughput, latency, and reasoning time. Results show promising improvements in transaction speed, transparency, and legal consistency. The system demonstrates practical potential for modernizing land administration and aligns closely with Vietnam’s national goals for e-government and digital transformation. (shrink)

In Wilmot-Smith’s recent “Law, ‘Ought’, and ‘Can’,” he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better (...) class='Hi'>legal system, his subsequent attack on OIC fails. (shrink)

This book examines core issues related to legal insanity, integrating perspectives from psychiatry, law, and ethics. Various criteria for insanity are analyzed and recommendations for forensic psychiatric and legal practice are offered. Many legal systems have an insanity defense, in one form or another. Still, it remains unclear exactly when and why mental disorders affect a person’s moral or criminal responsibility. Questions addressed in this book include: Why should insanity be a component of our legal (...) class='Hi'>system? What should be the criteria for an insanity defense? What would be the reasons for abolishing it? Who should bear the burden of proof? Furthermore, the book discusses the impact neurosciences may have on psychiatric and psychological evaluations of defendants as well as on legal decisions about insanity. (shrink)

This is an article about Legal Pragmatism, studied under the prism of the Philosophy of Law. The pragmatist philosophical current, born in the United States, was responsible for consolidating the line of legal reasoning aimed at obtaining the results that best meet social desires and human hopes. Legal Pragmatism is not presented as a Theory of Law, consubstantiating itself, in reality, in a method based on argumentation, capable of substantiating decision making. Finally, an attempt was made to (...) ponder on Legal Pragmatism in the Brazilian legal system, as a guide for new perspectives on the application of Law, with emphasis on the recent changes in the Law of Introduction to the Rules of Brazilian Law (Lei de Introdução às Normas do Direito Brasileiro). (shrink)

Undoubtedly, the relationship between Arabic and Turkish constitutes a profound and enduring bond. Arabic has had a significant influence on enriching Turkish, particularly in the realms of religious, cultural, and scientific terminology. This influence has not been limited to vocabulary alone but has extended to other areas such as education and the writing system, making Arabic an essential part of intellectual and cultural life during the Ottoman Empire.From the Ottoman era onward, Turkish has been influenced by many different languages, (...) with Arabic being foremost among them. During this period, the Ottoman state made extensive use of Arabic in various fields, and especially in the legal domain, many Arabic terms entered Turkish. These terms have become inseparable components of Turkish lexicography and are still actively used in numerous legal contexts today.The interaction between Arabic and Turkish reflects a rich cultural exchange among Islamic civilizations. This mutual influence is particularly evident in legal contexts. For instance, many legal terms in Turkish are derived from Arabic, including “mahkeme” (court), “adalet” (justice), “miras” (inheritance), and “müessese” (institution). Research indicates that such terms are still actively used within the Turkish legal system, demonstrating the lasting impact of Arabic.Moreover, despite Turkey's adoption of the Latin alphabet, the influence of the Arabic script is still visible in the Turkish language. Although the script was changed, many Turkish words still bear traces of Arabic in both pronunciation and orthography. This demonstrates the depth of the linguistic connection between the two languages.Turkish, as a language historically open to diverse cultural and political interactions, has been significantly influenced by languages such as Arabic and Persian. One of the most evident reflections of this influence is the incorporation of Arabic vocabulary into Turkish, particularly in religious, scientific, and legal domains. After the Turks accepted Islam in the 10th century, the influence of Arabic increased, introducing numerous religious and cultural terms into Turkish. During the Ottoman period, Turkish was written using the Arabic script, reinforcing the Arabic influence.Furthermore, this relationship shows that Arabic was not only a religious language but also a language of science and culture in fields such as medicine, astronomy, mathematics, and engineering. Many works of the time were written in Arabic, contributing to the intellectual development of the Ottoman Empire. Arabic was also used as a language of instruction in Ottoman schools, further strengthening cultural transmission.This study particularly highlights the influence of Arabic on Turkish legal terminology. Several legal terms derived from Arabic and used in Turkish have been examined, including:Adil (عَادِل): Refers to a just and honest person; derived from the root ‘adl.Akit (عَقد): Means contract or marriage; derived from ‘aqd.Batıl (بَاطِل): Indicates null or invalid legal actions; derived from bāṭil.Ceza (جزاء): Refers to punishment imposed on offenders; from jazā’.Cinayet (جِناية): Denotes a crime committed against a person; from jināya.Fasıl (فَصْل): Means "chapter," "section," or "stage" in Turkish. In Arabic, it also refers to a boundary or separation between two things.These examples represent only a selection of Arabic-origin legal terms that have entered Turkish and reflect the deep and lasting impact of Arabic on the language.Research findings demonstrate that Arabic has influenced Turkish in religious, scientific, and legal domains, resulting in the integration of numerous Arabic terms into the language. Moreover, this influence continues, particularly in legal discourse. Additionally, although Turkey adopted the Latin alphabet, the structural influence of the Arabic script remains evident in the morphology of Turkish words.In conclusion, the linguistic and cultural interaction between Arabic and Turkish has built a significant cultural and intellectual bridge between the Arab and Turkish worlds. This interaction has not only enriched Turkish linguistically but also facilitated the continued exchange of scientific and intellectual knowledge between the two civilizations. (shrink)

This introductory research seeks to underline how a legal gap can be approached as an indispensable “negative moment” within the legal system. It has been supposed that this gap signals a lack in the legal system and, thereby, contributes to its improvement. The matter is much too complex to be managed in a limited space, so here it will not be given a complete explanation of the theory of legal gaps. The purpose will be (...) rather to present a possible way to tackle this issue by sketching how a legal gap could be interpreted not only as a Problem, but also as a Possibility given to a legal system to improve itself. (shrink)

Asylum legal aid lawyers are under continuous public scrutiny. On the one hand, these lawyers are portrayed as being solely motivated by profit. On the other hand, they are depicted as leftist activists frustrating the legal system. When assisting their asylum seeking clients under the state's legal aid scheme, lawyers need to balance the client's interest, the public interest in the administration of justice and their own interest in profit or survival. The current book examines this (...) balancing act and explores the role of the institutional context. It does so by studying the decision making of asylum legal aid lawyers in the Netherlands and England in respect of two ethical issues: 'time vs. money' and 'hopeless cases'. This empirical research into lawyers' professional ethics in practice will appeal to scholars engaged in lawyers' ethics, policy makers and those involved in the regulation of the legal profession. Dissertation. [Subject: Politics, Human Rights Law, International Law]. (shrink)