This volume provides an articulate restatement of many of the themes of Husserlian phenomenology.

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole were philosophers and theologians associated with Port-Royal Abbey, a centre of the Catholic Jansenist movement in seventeenth-century France. Their enormously influential Logic or the Art of Thinking, which went through five editions in their lifetimes, treats topics in logic, language, theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and also articulates the response of 'heretical' Jansenist Catholicism to orthodox Catholic and Protestant views on grace, free will and the sacraments. In attempting to combine the categorical theory (...) of the proposition with a Cartesian account of knowledge, their Logic represents the classical view of judgment which inspired the modern transformation in logic and semantic theory by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and recent philosophers. This edition presents a new translation of the text, together with a historical introduction and suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

马克思主义自19世纪提出以来，对人类社会的政治、经济、生态和精神文明产生了深远影响。然而，其理论与实践在多维度上存在系统性危害：政治上导致极权统治与阶级斗争逻辑，经济上忽视自然与生态循环，生态上造成环 境破坏与资源枯竭，精神文明上压制创新与文化自由。本文通过历史案例分析（苏联、中国、古巴等国），结合“老-杨创世纪宇宙观”的自然生成、循环共生哲学，对马克思主义实践的深层危害进行系统剖析，并提出面向未来 文明的重建路径：政治自由与平衡、经济可持续发展、生态共生、精神文明创新，以及多维度整合的系统性自我调节机制。最终指出，文明的发展必须遵循宇宙法则，顺应自然生成与共生原则，实现社会、文明与自然的长期和谐 。 -/- Abstract Since its inception in the 19th century, Marxism has profoundly influenced human society in political, economic, ecological, and cultural dimensions. However, both its theory and practice have produced systematic harms: politically, it leads to authoritarian rule and class struggle logic; economically, it disregards natural and ecological cycles; ecologically, it results in environmental degradation and resource depletion; culturally and spiritually, it suppresses innovation and freedom. Through historical case studies (e.g., the Soviet Union, China, Cuba) and in the (...) perspective of the Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology, which emphasizes natural generation, cyclicality, and symbiosis, this paper systematically analyzes the deep harms of Marxist practice and proposes pathways for reconstructing future civilization: political freedom and balance, sustainable economic development, ecological symbiosis, cultural and spiritual innovation, and multi-dimensional systemic self-regulation. It ultimately argues that civilization must follow universal cosmic laws, harmonize with natural generation and symbiosis, and achieve long-term societal, civilizational, and ecological equilibrium. -/- . (shrink)

Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically correlated propositions into collective judgments. Different logics can be used in judgment aggregation, for which Dietrich and Mongin have proposed a generalized model based on general logics. Despite its generality, however, all nonmonotonic logics are excluded from this model. This paper argues for using nonmonotonic logic in judgment aggregation. Then it generalizes Dietrich and Mongin’s model to incorporate a large class of nonmonotonic logics. This generalization broadens (...) the theoretical boundaries of judgment aggregation by proving that, even if these nonmonotonic logics are employed, certain typical impossibility results still hold. (shrink)

Those who conceive logic as a science have generally favoured one of two alternative conceptions as to what the subject-matter of this science ought to be. On the one hand is the nowadays somewhat old-fashioned-seeming view of logic as the science of judgment, or of thinking or reasoning activities in general. On the other hand is the view of logic as a science of ideal meanings, 'thoughts', or 'propositions in themselves'. There is, however, a third alternative (...) conception, which enjoyed only a brief flowering in the years leading up to the first World War, but whose lingering presence can be detected in the background of more recent ontologising trends in logic, as for example in the 'situation semantics' of Barwise and Perry. This third conception sees logic as a science of special objects called 'Sachverhalte' or 'states of affairs'. A view of this sort is present in simplified form in the works of Meinong, but it received its definitive formulation in the writings of Adolf Reinach, a student of Husserl who is otherwise noteworthy for having anticipated, in a monograph of 1913, large chunks of what later became known as the theory of speech acts.(1). (shrink)

The paper describes the evolution of russell's theory of judgment between 1910 and 1913, With especial reference to his recently published "theory of knowledge" (1913). Russell abandoned the book and with it the theory of judgment as a result of wittgenstein's criticisms. These criticisms are examined in detail and found to constitute a refutation of russell's theory. Underlying differences between wittgenstein's and russell's views on logic are broached more sketchily.

This paper stresses the importance of identifying the nature of an author's conception of logic when using terms from modern logic in order to avoid, as far as possible, injecting our own conception of logic in the author's texts. Sundholm (2012. “‘Inference versus consequence” revisited: Inference, conditional, implication’, Synthese, 187, 943–956) points out that inferences are staged at the epistemic level and are made out of judgments, not propositions. Since it is now standard to read Aristotelian sullogismoi (...) as inferences, I have taken Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentaries to Aristotle's logical treatises as a basis for arguing that the premises and conclusions should be read as judgments rather than as propositions. Under this reading, when Alexander speaks of protaseis, we should not read the modern notion of proposition, but rather what we now call judgments. The point is not just a matter of terminology, it is about the conception of logic this terminology conveys. In this regard, insisting on judgments rather than on propositions helps bring to light Alexander's epistemic conception of logic. (shrink)

Fourteen of the American philosopher's most influential essays appear here, offering profound reflections on many different aspects of knowledge, reality, and epistemology. These papers on experimental logic are rooted in the implication that possession of knowledge implies a judgment, resulting from an inquiry or investigation. The presence of this "inquiry stage" suggests an intermediate and mediating phase between the external world and knowledge, an area conditioned by other factors. Expanding upon this basis, these essays consider the relationship of (...) thought and its subject matter; the antecedents and stimuli of thought, data, and meanings; the objects of thought; control of ideas by facts; and similar topics. Unabridged republication of the classic 1916 edition. (shrink)

Originally published in 1926, this book is an exploration of the essentials of logic: the study of the general conditions of valid inference. The main aim of logic is not to teach people to reason correctly, but to explain what happens when they do reason correctly, and why some reasoning is not correct, and this book contains chapters examining judgment and terms; categorical propositions and their implications; and deduction and syllogism.

Offering a full-scale study of the theory of reality hidden beneath modern logic, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, a lecture course given in 1928, illuminates the transitional phase in Heidegger's thought from the existential analysis of Being and Time to the overcoming of metaphysics in his later philosophy. In a searching exposition of the metaphysical problems underpinning Leibniz's theory of logical judgment, Heidegger establishes that a given theory of logic is rooted in a certain conception of (...) Being. He explores the significance of Western logic as a system-building technical tool and as a cultural phenomenon that is centuries old. (shrink)

Judgment aggregation studies how individual opinions on a given set of propositions can be aggregated to form a consistent group judgment on the same propositions. Despite the simplicity of the problem, seemingly natural aggregation procedures fail to return consistent collective outcomes, leading to what is now known as the doctrinal paradox. The first occurrences of the paradox were discovered in the legal realm. However, the interest of judgment aggregation is much broader and extends to political philosophy, epistemology, (...) social choice theory, and computer science. The aim of this paper is to provide a concise survey of the discipline and to outline some of the most pressing questions and future lines of research. (shrink)

In recent years, the field of AI & Law has increasingly focused on predicting legal judgments, particularly in civil cases. While traditional neural network methods are highly effective at automatically learning patterns from large datasets, they often suffer from a lack of interpretability. To address this limitation, we propose a neuro-symbolic framework for legal judgment prediction, based on large language models (LLMs). This framework combines legal knowledge (e.g., legal rules), represented through first-order logic rules, with deep neural networks (...) (DNNs), using a discrepancy loss to minimize prediction differences between the two components. By integrating the logic module during end-to-end training, knowledge is effectively transferred to the model parameters. Additionally, we develop a Chain-of-Thought prompt that uses LLMs to extract fact elements from legal cases. These elements act as logical variables within the rules, supporting the reasoning process in the logic module and improving overall interpretability. To validate the effectiveness of this framework, we conduct extensive experiments on a large dataset of private lending cases. The results demonstrate that the framework not only improves predictive performance but also enhances the interpretability of judgment predictions. (shrink)

In an attempt to explore the role of argumentation in scientific inquiry, I explore the conception of argument that appears fruitful in the light of the recent trends in the philosophy of science, away from logical empiricism, and toward a greater emphasis on change, disagreement, and history. I begin by contrasting typical instances philosopers’ theories of both empiricism and apriorism, with typical instances of scientists’ uses of these two attitudes, suggesting that such practice shows a judiciousness lacking in epistemological theory. (...) Then I examine at some length three important version of scientific judgement, namely Einstein's opportunism, Boltzmann's pluralism, and Huygens's eclecticism. I go on to discuss some recent work in the philosophy of science, exploring connections between the notion of judgment and Feyerabend's anarchism, Harold Brown's view of rationality, and Dudley Shapere's analysis of scientific change. All of this suggests a notion of argument in the sense of informallogic, and I examine some aspects of Galileo's work in its terms. (shrink)

The Ground of Logic: A Critique of Abstract Necessity and a Defense of Divine Rationality presents a rigorous philosophical analysis of the ontological status of the laws of logic within contemporary analytic philosophy. The paper critically examines the dominant secular Platonist view—represented by thinkers such as Michael Lou Martin—which treats logical laws as necessary, mind-independent abstract truths lacking any deeper metaphysical grounding. While acknowledging the strengths of this position in preserving universality and necessity, the study argues that it (...) fails to account for the normative authority of logic—namely, why rational agents are obligated to follow logical laws. -/- In response, the paper develops and defends a theistic alternative grounded in the philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, proposing that the laws of logic are best understood as expressions of a rational, non-contradictory Divine Mind. This “Divine Mind thesis” is positioned as uniquely capable of explaining the necessity, universality, and normativity of logic. The work further critiques competing metaphysical systems, particularly the dialectical idealism of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, arguing that any framework permitting contradiction at the level of ultimate reality undermines rational coherence. -/- Additionally, the paper traces the historical evolution of the concept of the Good—from Anaximander’s apeiron, through Aristotle’s teleology, to its culmination in Christian theological thought—demonstrating how logic, metaphysics, and teleology converge in a unified philosophical system. Through a structured dialectical method (objection, reply, and judgment), the study ultimately concludes that logic, rationality, and the Good are grounded in a necessary, personal, and non-contradictory source of ultimate reality. (shrink)

In this paper I present and assess a controversy between Edmund Husserl and Heinrich Rickert on the nature of judgment, in order to bring to light the originality of Husserl's proposal concerning this important issue. In the first section I provide some context for Rickert's theory of judgment by sketching a reconstruction of nineteenth century logical theory and then proceed to introduce Rickert's view. I suggest that nineteenth century logic is characterized by a criticism of the traditional (...) view that sees categorial judgment as the essential form of judgment and the uniting and separating of ideas as sufficient for the constitution of a judgment. Hume inaugurates this criticism, but it finds its most mature expression in the work of Lotze, Brentano, and Rickert. Rickert, in particular, sees simple affirmation and negation of the transcendent value of truth as the essence of judgment. In the second section I present Husserl's criticism of Rickert. Husserl's criticism revolves around the distinction between simple judgments and the higher-order affirmative or negative stance we can adopt with respect to previously articulated simple judgments. Simple judgments register the mereological relation holding among something and one of its properties, and they do not entail an affirmative or negative stance. Their function is to constitute states of affairs drawing on concrete perceptual situations. Higher-order affirmation or negation occurs when we set out to revisit a foregoing simple judgment in order to confirm or disconfirm the veridicality of its proposed state of affairs. In the third part I suggest a diagnosis of the origin of the mistake in earlier theories. Simple judgments are easy to conflate with non-simple, higher-order judgmental stances because they have the same logical value and they cannot be seen without the aid of genuinely phenomenological reflection. In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl's analysis amounts to a vindication of categorial judgment in its traditional form ‘S is P’, which continues to maintain a phenomenological legitimacy even in the wake of Frege's canonical dismissal of subject and predicate. (shrink)

It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of (...) class='Hi'>judgment “propagates” from the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism, scientific realism, and peer disagreement. (shrink)

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on (...) the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition. (shrink)

Decision making is the physician's major activity. Every day, in doctors' offices throughout the world, patients describe their symptoms and com plaints while doctors perform examinations, order tests, and, on the basis of these data, decide what is wrong and what should be done. Although the process may appear routine-even to the physicians in volved-each step in the sequence requires skilled clinical judgment. Physicians must decide: which symptoms are important, whether any laboratory tests should be done, how the various (...) items of clinical data should be combined, and, finally, which of several treatments (including doing nothing) is indicated. Although much of the information used in clinical decision making is objective, the physician's values (a belief that pain relief is more important than potential addiction to pain-killing drugs, for example) and subjectivity are as much a part of the clinical process as the objective findings of laboratory tests. In recent years, both physicians and psychologists have come to realize that patient management decisions are not only subjective but also prob abilistic (although this is not always acknowledged overtly). When doc tors argue that an operation is fairly safe because it has a mortality rate of only 1 %, they are at least implicitly admitting that the outcome of their decision is based on probability. (shrink)

One of the lessons we ought to have learned from the history of philosophy and science is that it is rarely, if ever, useful in dealing with challenges from a new movement or in distinguishing one’s position from a different school of thought, to “draw a line in the sand” and claim that everything on this side is legitimate and that everything on that side is not, and can therefore be dismissed without serious consideration or discussion. On some analyses, Plato (...) sought to dismiss all of natural science in this way, by claiming that since it dealt with change it can yield at best belief, not knowledge. The logical positivists, building on the work of Hume, tried to use the analytic/synthetic distinction and various forms of verificationism to dismiss as nonsense everything but science, logic, mathematics, and the philosophy of science. Neither of these moves succeeded in banishing what was placed on that side of the line to intellectual never-never land. More recently, critics of creationism have dismissed the views they are attacking as “not science at all” and therefore of neither concern nor interest to the scientific communities. These maneuvers tend to be unsuccessful not just because they rely on distinctions which cannot, in the end, be sustained—or can be drawn and maintained only after all the hard work which they are frequently claimed to make unnecessary has been done—but because they refuse to deal with the specific evidence and arguments advanced by the challengers, bad as those might be. (shrink)

Abstract: Kant follows a substantial tradition by defining judgment so that it must involve a relation of concepts, which raises the question of why he thinks that single-term existential judgments should still qualify as judgments. There is a ready explanation if Kant is somehow anticipating a Fregean second-order account of existence, an interpretation that is already widely held for separate reasons. This paper examines Kant's early (1763) critique of Wolffian accounts of existence, finding that it provides the key idea (...) in his mature model of existential judgment, which is in fact sharply opposed to the Fregean strategy. By relating this to Kant's theory of judgment in general—in particular, to his claim for an isomorphism between the assertoric function of judgment and the category of existence—a preliminary case is made that absolute positing, far from being a marginal special case, accomplishes the primary function of judgment. This argument shows the importance of distinguishing between contexts in which Kant is treating judgment as a vehicle for inference (e.g. pure general logic) and contexts in which he is treating it, more robustly, as the cognition of an object. (shrink)

Most ethical studies on gift giving in business are limited to the application of rationalist ethical principles through a “third‐person” judgment to condemn certain practices such as bribes or manipulative actions, or to question the morality of certain commercial gifts or actions in corporate philanthropy. Such ethical analyses are generally based on extrinsic principles that lead to a dichotomous discussion on the morality of gift‐giving in terms of ethically acceptable and unacceptable gifts. Much less attention has been paid to (...) the gift giver's “first‐person” moral judgment. Thus, this paper contributes to this vacuum by drawing from Thomas Aquinas's approach to internal human acts and their moral evaluation. One of Aquinas's crucial points is his distinction between the object chosen (finis operis) and the intention of the agent (finis operantis) as a structural mental unity. From this perspective, the paper proposes a typology of gift giving, which aids reflection when making personal moral judgments in a variety of situations. Accompanied by illustrative examples, eight types of gift‐giving acts are identified and grouped into three categories: ethically unacceptable giving (bribery and manipulative and malevolent gifts), ethically acceptable giving (instrumental and reciprocal gifts), and ethically excellent giving (gratitude, gratuitous, and solidarity gifts). (shrink)

The stated subject of these lecture courses given by Husserlbetween 1910 and 1918is ‘reason, the word for the mental activities and accomplishments that govern knowledge, give it form and supply it with norms.’ They show their author still pursuing the course set out in the Logical Investigations up to the end of the second decade of the century and displaying utter consistency with stands that he began taking on meaning, analyticity, Platonism, manifolds, mathematics, psychologism, etc. in the 1890s. Thus, they (...) undermine many idées reçues about the development of his thought. The centerpiece of this work is an exploration of the realm of meaning. Moreover, they add new dimensions to standard discussions by taking readers back to the place where phenomenology and analytic philosophy diverged. They show that Husserl tangled long and hard with the very ideas that went into the making of the latter and offer a wealth of interesting insights into sense and meaning, theory of judgment, complete and incomplete meanings, states of affairs, extensional logic, the relationship between logic and mathematics, functions and arguments, propositional functions, quantification, existential generalization, the word ‘all,’ number theory, sets, modality, deductive theory, ideas that are still under discussion today. Prepared for oral delivery in the classroom, they are refreshingly lively and spontaneous. They are clearer, more explicit, and readable than the books Husserl published during his lifetime. (shrink)

One of the lessons we ought to have learned from the history of philosophy and science is that it is rarely, if ever, useful in dealing with challenges from a new movement or in distinguishing one’s position from a different school of thought, to “draw a line in the sand” and claim that everything on this side is legitimate and that everything on that side is not, and can therefore be dismissed without serious consideration or discussion. On some analyses, Plato (...) sought to dismiss all of natural science in this way, by claiming that since it dealt with change it can yield at best belief, not knowledge. The logical positivists, building on the work of Hume, tried to use the analytic/synthetic distinction and various forms of verificationism to dismiss as nonsense everything but science, logic, mathematics, and the philosophy of science. Neither of these moves succeeded in banishing what was placed on that side of the line to intellectual never-never land. More recently, critics of creationism have dismissed the views they are attacking as “not science at all” and therefore of neither concern nor interest to the scientific communities. These maneuvers tend to be unsuccessful not just because they rely on distinctions which cannot, in the end, be sustained—or can be drawn and maintained only after all the hard work which they are frequently claimed to make unnecessary has been done—but because they refuse to deal with the specific evidence and arguments advanced by the challengers, bad as those might be. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

The precise relationship between Hobbes's political philosophy and his late history of the English Civil War remains something of a puzzle. Given his well known doubts about the epistemological status of history, Behemoth or the Long Parliament is often treated as little more than a procrustean effort at forcing complex historical events into the bed of abstract theory that he had developed earlier. On this view, even Noam Flinker, who offers one of the few studies devoted to a close reading (...) of Behemoth, argues that Hobbes intended the work to be self repudiating, and that the dialogue form and the apparent confusions of one of the participants were meant to point readers to �the less rhetorical logic of the Leviathan�. Others, more impressed by Hobbes�s pragmatic intentions than his methodological pretensions, note that a primary motive for his political arguments was a horror at first of the prospect and then of the reality of civil war. They thus emphasize the significance of Behemoth for Hobbes and his interpreters. Robert Kraynak, for example, argues that it �is a work of primary importance� in completing the �history of civilization which is the logical beginning point of Hobbes's thought�, and that a complete understanding of his political theory is impossible without his analysis of the way in which �doctrinal politics and disputative science� had created political chaos in England. This interpretation correctly emphasizes the role of ideas, as opposed to economic interests, in his explanation of civil conflict. It also rightly notes didactic continuities between Behemoth and his earlier work. However, I argue below that it overestimates the extent to which Hobbes treats the general idea of opinion as an eliminable product of �artificial� historical relations rather than as a permanent feature of human psychology and action. Thus, it discounts the extent to which his understanding of the relationship between opinion and civil war was a product of his philosophy rather than of a 'history of civilization'. (shrink)

The aim of our paper is to examine John McDowell’s theory of perceptual experience with reference to its inheritance of the early Wittgenstein. We begin by showing that several fundamental tenets of McDowell’s account emerge from an encounter with the Tractatus, most notably the requirement that there be an isomorphism between thought and the world in our claims to perceptual knowledge. We argue that those passages from the early Wittgenstein McDowell exploits already contain an internal criticism of an essential element (...) of the latter’s account, namely, his distinction between perceptual apprehension and perceptual judgment. We show how this distinction in McDowell must be understood as an extension of the Fregean distinction between the force and content of a judgment, and how Wittgenstein’s critique of Frege in the Tractatus is equally applicable to McDowell’s account of perceptual judgment. Following Wittgenstein’s lead, we show how McDowell’s commitment to the force/content distinction threatens to undermine his claim that perceptual experiences non-inferentially justify the judgments in which they figure. To do justice to the idea of perception as a capacity for knowledge, we conclude by proposing an alternative view in which perception alone is capable of constituting a judgment so as to the way things are. (shrink)

Frege and Heidegger appear to appear to have diametrically opposed attitudes towards logic. Frege thinks logic must govern any investigation whatsoever, whereas Heidegger (in "What is Metaphysics?") apparently wants to dismantle logic. But when they try to explicate the nature of judgment, a striking similarity emerges. For while their accounts of judgment are radically different, each finds his account to be, by his own lights, _inexpressible<D>. This paper shows how Heidegger and Frege arrive at their (...) respective accounts of judgment, explains why they regard the status of their accounts as problematic, and explores and evaluates their responses to their parallel predicaments. (shrink)

In this paper, I start from a criticism that John McDowell has made of the account of perception contained in Mind and World. In the essay Avoiding the Myth of the Given, he describes his earlier account as having been flawed by his having equated the idea of the conceptuality of perceptual experience with that of its propositionality. While agreeing with this criticism, I suggest that McDowell’s diagnosis of the earlier problem, as well as his suggestions for its solution, are (...) obscured by his continuing to situate his account of perception within the predominantly epistemological framework of Mind and World. In contrast, and guided by Hegel’s account of the logic of perceptual judgment, I invoke a different function served by Kant’s idea of the “intuitive” content of perceptual experience—its modal function of indicating actual from merely possible states of affairs. Comparing Hegel’s metaphysical position to that of contemporary modal actualists, I argue that by transforming Kant’s concept–intuition distinction into a logical distinction between different types of judgment employing different notions of predication, Hegel was able to capture the modal function played by Kantian intuition without falling into the problematic “Myth of the Given.”. (shrink)

Purports to be a "critical survey of the fundamental problems of logic and epistemology and their metaphysical implications," but is mainly an exposition. It is difficult to discover a unifying thesis explaining why the author chose to compare precisely these two philosophers.--C. M.

This book is a good example of Husserl’s phenomenology at work. It contains three parts, each filled with interesting analyses. Part One examines prepredicative experience and describes how certain aspects come to prominence against others, how similarities arise, how a prepredicative sense of attribution occurs. It discusses the difference between the ego’s being affected and his act of attention, explores prepredicative modalities, and the elementary state of relations in experience. In Part Two Husserl moves to explicit predication as his theme, (...) shows how it differs from the passivity that underlies it, explores relations, predicates and sets, and several dimensions to be found in categorial objectivities: states of affairs, propositions, core-forms, modalities, and affair-complexes. The theme of temporality is often mentioned in Parts One and Two. In Part Three the problem of different kinds of generalities is examined. Husserl distinguishes associative similarities, empirical essences, and pure essences. He describes the different kinds of subsumptions or relations to individuals that such generalities permit. In this book Husserl fills out some of the terse analyses of Formal and Transcendental Logic. It was edited for style by Ludwig Landgrebe, and so is more relaxed in expression than Husserl’s other works. The translation is easy to read and proved accurate in places where I compared it to the German. However on page 208, line 13, "this synthesis" should, I think, be "this unity," and on line 16, "they" should be "it." The emendation made on page 325 seems incorrect. Evidenz is translated by "self-evidence," but perhaps "evidence" would be better if it is understood that Husserl gives a special meaning to the term. In his Afterword, Eley uses themes from Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and Lorenzen to criticize Husserl’s attempt to get beyond language in the description of experience.—R.S. (shrink)

This essay aims to shed new light on the theoretical pertinence of classical Indian logic and epistemology in Benedetto Croce's criticism of Western Aristotelian and modern logic. As a matter of fact, Croce gave a positive and extraordinarily enterprising evaluation of “Indian Logic” in his review of Hermann Jacobi's Indische Logik (1905) and in his book Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept (1996 [1909]). Yet Croce's significant and considerable evaluation of “Indian Logic” has (...) remained neglected until today. This essay tries to clear the field of some prejudices that misled scholarly research on Croce and Indian philosophy, and it glosses in detail the “neglected” judgment on “Indian Logic” in Croce's Logic. In doing so, it critically discusses some epistemological questions starting from Croce's philosophy, such as the character of “natural induction,” the relationship between language and thought, and the connection between historical languages and logical forms. (shrink)

This essay aims to sharpen debates on the pros and cons of historical epistemology, which is now understood as a novel approach to the study of knowledge, by comparing it with the history of epistemology as traditionally pursued by philosophers. The many versions of both approaches are not always easily discernable. Yet, a reasoned comparison of certain versions can and should be made. In the first section of this article, I argue that the most interesting difference involves neither the subject (...) matter nor goal, but the methods used by the two approaches. In the second section, I ask which of the two approaches or methods is more promising given that both historical epistemologists and historians of epistemology claim to contribute to epistemology simpliciter. Using traditional problems concerning the epistemic role of perception, I argue that the historical epistemologies of Wartofsky and Daston and Galison fail to show that studying practices of perception is philosophically significant. Standard methods from the history of epistemology are more promising, as I show by means of reconstructing arguments in a debate about the relation between perception and judgment in psychological research on the famous moon illusion. (shrink)

This paper addresses Frege's discussion of illogical thought in the introduction to Basic Laws of Arithmetic. After a brief introduction, I discuss Frege's claims that logic is normative vis-à-vis thought, and not descriptive, and his opposition to the idea that logical laws express psychological necessities. I argue that these two strands of Frege's polemic against psychologism constitute two motivating factors behind his allowing for the possibility of illogical thought. I then explore a line of thought—originally advanced by Joan Weiner—according (...) to which Frege should have rejected illogical thought as not constituting a genuine possibility. I argue that, once developed, this line of thought constitutes an important correction (moreover, one that is consistent with his two aforementioned anti-psychologistic strands) to Frege's own response to the possibility of illogical thought. -/- . (shrink)

We investigate under what conditions a given set of collective judgments can arise from a specific voting procedure. In order to answer this question, we introduce a language similar to modal logic for reasoning about judgment aggregation procedures. In this language, the formula expresses that is collectively accepted, or that is a group judgment based on voting. Different judgment aggregation procedures may be underlying the group decision making. Here we investigate majority voting, where holds if a (...) majority of individuals accepts, consensus voting, where holds if all individuals accept, and dictatorship. We provide complete axiomatizations for judgment sets arising from all three aggregation procedures. (shrink)

This paper presents the first use of a computational model of natural logic—a system of logical inference which operates over natural language—for textual inference. Most current approaches to the PAS- CAL RTE textual inference task achieve robustness by sacrificing semantic precision; while broadly effective, they are easily confounded by ubiquitous inferences involving monotonicity. At the other extreme, systems which rely on first-order logic and theorem proving are precise, but excessively brittle. This work aims at a middle way. Our (...) system finds a low-cost edit sequence which transforms the premise into the hypothesis; learns to classify entailment relations across atomic edits; and composes atomic entailments into a top-level entailment judgment. We provide the first reported results for any system on the FraCaS test suite. We also evaluate on RTE3 data, and show that hybridizing an existing RTE system with our natural logic system yields significant performance gains. (shrink)

In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the ideal of systematicity, represented by the connection of three principles of reason. At the core of the discussion in the Appendix is the distinction between the constitutive use of concepts of understanding and the regulative use of ideas of reason. This article shows that certain passages from the Appendix suggest that Kant’s concept of the “use” (Gebrauch) of a rule could explain an interpretative difficulty (...) that arises in paragraph 70 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. In this passage, the principle of the causality of nature (originally a constitutive–critical principle) seems to be assimilated to the thesis (Satz) of an antinomy composed of merely regulative principles. This article aims to demonstrate that this assimilation is impossible. (shrink)

This essay examines the reasons for Hegel's frequently professed claim that Kant's Critique of Judgment simultaneously reveals the internal limits of critical philosophy and opens the door to his own system of speculative idealism. It evaluates Hegel's contention that the conceptions of aesthetic experience, organic purposiveness, and the intuitive intellect developed in the third Critique together conspire to undermine the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the theories of nature and freedom advanced in the first and second Critiques . Finally (...) it explains how Hegel understands his logic and real philosophy as a realist and quasi-naturalistic alternative to Kant's subjective idealism, one that purports to generate a system of categories adequate not only to dead matter but also to organic life and free self-conscious spirit. (shrink)

This study investigates the relation between the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature and the judgment of taste, as articulated in Kant’s _Critique of the Power of Judgment_. It interprets three of Kant’s theses on this relation: the Identity Thesis, the Possibility Thesis, and the Reciprocity Thesis. (1) The transcendental principle of the power of judgment—namely, the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature, which guides scientific inquiry—comprises two elements: a “matter of fact” component (the specific constitution (...) of the power of judgment) and a “requirement” component. Similarly, the principle of taste—the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general—has a comparable structure. When applied to cognition, this subjective principle manifests as the transcendental principle of the purposiveness of nature. In this respect, the two principles can be regarded as identical. (2) The judgment of taste is made possible by the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature, in that this principle provides the concept of the supersensible substratum of nature. The judgment of taste grounds its claim to universality through its relation to this concept. (3) Kant holds that the formation of beautiful objects in nature can be fully explained through mechanical laws alone. From this perspective, natural beauty cannot indicate a supersensible substratum of external nature. Consequently, it cannot support the principle that external nature conforms to our cognitive faculties. However, beauty—including the beauty of artworks—can, by virtue of the harmonious play of cognitive faculties it demonstrates, point to an internal purposiveness of these faculties in relation to each other. (shrink)

The five English words—sentence, proposition, judgment, statement, and fact—are central to coherent discussion in logic. However, each is ambiguous in that logicians use each with multiple normal meanings. Several of their meanings are vague in the sense of admitting borderline cases. In the course of displaying and describing the phenomena discussed using these words, this paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyzes several senses of these and related words, focusing on a constellation of recommended senses. One of the purposes of (...) this paper is to demonstrate that ordinary English properly used has the resources for intricate and philosophically sound investigation of rather deep issues in logic and philosophy of language. No mathematical, logical, or linguistic symbols are used. Meanings need to be identified and clarified before being expressed in symbols. We hope to establish that clarity is served by deferring the extensive use of formalized or logically perfect languages until a solid “informal” foundation has been established. Questions of “ontological status”—e.g., whether propositions or sentences, or for that matter characters, numbers, truth-values, or instants, are “real entities”, are “idealizations”, or are “theoretical constructs”—plays no role in this paper. As is suggested by the title, this paper is written to be read aloud. I hope that reading this aloud in groups will unite people in the enjoyment of the humanistic spirit of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Roman Suszko said that “Obviously, any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea and, in fact, Łukasiewicz did not actualize it.” The aim of the present paper is to qualify this ‘obvious’ statement through a number of logical and philosophical writings by Professor Jan Woleński, all focusing on the nature of truth-values and their multiple uses in philosophy. It results in a reconstruction of such an abstract object, doing justice to what Suszko held a ‘mad’ project within a generalized (...) logic of judgments. Four main issues raised by Woleński will be considered to test the insightfulness of such generalized truth-values, namely: the principle of bivalence, the logic of scepticism, the coherence theory of truth, and nothingness. (shrink)

The act of judging how matters stand was a subject of investigation for Husserl throughout his career. The recurrence of this theme in his work indicates the great importance which Husserlian phenomenology attributed to the task of uncovering the nature of judgment. Scholarly commentary on Husserl has, until now, lacked one of the essential elements for a complete account of Husserl on judgment, because there was no full-length investigation into the important theme of "vague judgment" in his (...) writings. ;This dissertation is a critical interpretation of Husserl's principle texts on vague judgment. In addition to using the general norms of scholarly analysis, it takes great care to understand Husserl from within the transcendental reduction, lest his statements be misinterpreted as paradoxes dissolving into incoherence. The dissertation also seeks to identify the relation of the elements of the description of vague judgment to the more fundamental principles of phenomenology: parts/whole, identity/difference, empty/filled, presence/absence. This investigation starts with Husserl's fullest treatment of categorical vagueness, from Formal and Transcendental Logic , and then considers the theme in Ideas I and Logical Investigations , with a consideration of the use which Husserl makes of this description to analyze cultural sediments in The Origin of Geometry . ;The study concludes that vague judging is an empty act in which from the whole which possesses an attribute there does not emerge that attribute as a distinct part to be then identified with its whole. Because of this failure to think articulatedly, the fact, even in its perceptual presence, is absent as it itself. This description also brings to light essential notes of vague judgment and its foundation, viz., time. Finally this dissertation shows that Husserl's description of vague judgment unfolded organically, without basic reversal, over the course of his life's work. (shrink)

This article challenges the common view that improvements in critical thinking are best pursued by investigations in informal logic. From the perspective of research in psychology and neuroscience, hu-man inference is a process that is multimodal, parallel, and often emo-tional, which makes it unlike the linguistic, serial, and narrowly cog-nitive structure of arguments. At-tempts to improve inferential prac-tice need to consider psychological error tendencies, which are patterns of thinking that are natural for peo-ple but frequently lead to mistakes in (...) judgment. This article discusses two important but neglected error ten-dencies: motivated inference and fear-driven inference. (shrink)

Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic is so different from a standard logic, most commentators have not treated the portion of that work devoted to logical forms as relevant to this claim. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view (...) that the metaphysical concepts discussed in Books I and II of the Science of Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in Book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction," according to which the categories can be derived from the table of judgments. Though Hegel's metaphysics is often supposed to be influenced by Kant, prevailing interpretations do not show how Hegel's fine-grained treatment of logical forms is relevant to his critical view of metaphysics. The present interpretation provides a model for Hegel's explanation of metaphysical concepts, as well as a new picture of the structure of his Science of Logic that emphasizes the priority of its Doctrine of the Concept. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosopher F. H. Bradley, the most influential member of the nineteenth-century school of British Idealists. It offers a sustained interpretation of Bradley's Principles of Logic, explaining the problem of how it is possible for inferences to be both valid and yet have conclusions that contain new information. The author then describes how this solution provides a basis for Bradley's metaphysical view that reality is one interconnected experience and how (...) this gives rise to a new problem of truth. (shrink)

This paper contrasts a picoeconomic approach to theexplanation of akrasia with Davidson's divided-mind approach and defends theformer in a wider context. The distinctive merits of a picoeconomic model of mindlie in the following aspects: First, it relies on a scientifically well-groundeddiscovery about motivational dynamics of animals for its explanation of preference change,which elucidates or materializes some philosophers' speculations both about thepossible mismatch between valuation and motivation and about the relevance of temporalfactors to akrasia. Second, it grounds the necessity of endogenous (...) higher-order constraints,expressible in forms of judgment, in an intrapersonal dynamic process of interactivefirst-order temporary preferences. Thus the motivational basis for the normativeconstruction of the rationality of `best judgment' can also be illuminated with this model. (shrink)

_Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures_ provides an analysis of an important feature of Brentano's philosophy in the 19th century. Relevant materials in both German and English are also included in the volume.

This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I elucidate Edmund Husserl’s theory of inauthentic judgments from his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic).” It will be shown how inauthentic judgments are distinct from other signitive experiences, in such a manner that when Husserl seeks to account for them, he is forced to revise the general structure of his philosophy of meaning and in doing so, is also able to realize novel insights concerning the nature of signification. Second, these conclusions (...) are revealed to be the foundation of Husserl’s pure logical grammar, found in the 1901 “Fourth Logical Investigation.” In his analysis of inauthentic judgments, Husserl already recognized, albeit in a problematic way and for entirely different reasons, many of the central tenets of the 1901 work concerning categoremata and syncategoremata, matter and form, and the isomorphism between them. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how, by developing apparatus that has roots in Russell's own early work, it is possible to vindicate a version of his notorious "multiple relation" theory of judgment by formally reducing it to a plausible representationalist theory. Various adequacy conditions on such a reductive vindication are introduced and motivated. The theories in question are then axiomatized, and bridge principles are provided to effect the desired reduction. Finally, the reduction is shown to be (...) a vindication in virtue of meeting all of the aforementioned adequacy conditions. (shrink)

이 논문은 후설의 판단 이론의 토대인 『논리연구』의 이론을 『수동적 종합』, C 원고들 등 후기의 작업들의 관점에서 비판하고 대안을 제시한다. 『논리연구』에서 후설은 범주적 직관(kategoriale Anschauung)에 대한 연구를 통해 현상학적 판단 이론에 토대를 놓았다. 그러나 『논리연구』의 판단 이론에는 불충분한 점과 문제가 있었는데, 그것은 바로 파악(Auffassung)에 대한 구체적인 분석이 없었다는 점, 그리고 파악이 마치 제2의 체험(Erlebnis)처럼 취급되었다는 점이었다. 이러한 점들은 우리가 『수동적 종합』, C 원고들 등 후기의 작업들을 살펴봄으로써 분명해진다. 이를 통해 우리는 후설이 나중에 범주적 파악에 대한 『논리연구』의 이론을 포기한다고 말한 이유도 알 (...) 수 있다. 나아가 나는 『논리연구』의 이론을 수정하기 위해 어떤 종류의 감정(Gefühl)이 판단의 핵심적인 부분이라는 가설을 제안한다. 하지만 이에 관한 자세한 서술은 이후의 논문에서 이루어질 것이다. (shrink)

This technical note provides a structural definition of Founding-Spirit as a judgment-generating logic within organizations. Rather than treating Founding-Spirit as a symbolic narrative, motivational origin, or cultural slogan, this paper positions it as an architectural condition that sustains organizational directionality in environments shaped by complexity and AI-mediated decision systems. The document clarifies how individual creative cognition becomes structurally translated into shared decision-making patterns, enabling sustained directionality beyond individual authority. It formalizes Founding-Spirit as a generative principle embedded in governance, (...) brand architecture, and decision frameworks. (shrink)