La memoria, com’è noto, costituisce una grande parte della nostra identità (sebbene i criteri di tale “identità” siano controversi). I documenti — intesi come iscrizioni — costituiscono la nostra memoria esterna in un modo peculiare, essendo sia un’ancora stabile sia un punto di riferimento rispetto al modo in cui cambiamo col tempo. Esiste però anche una memoria interna che risiede nel nostro cervello. Questa si basa in parte sulla documentazione esterna; ma ovviamente non è legata unicamente ad essa. Evolve nel (...) tempo, riflettendo in parte problematiche etiche che ci portiamo dentro ed essendo influenzata da fattori emotivi, ad esempio nei nostri tentativi di eliminare memorie spiacevoli. Se, per esempio, la memoria interna di un’offesa personale ricevuta viene cancellata, la motivazione di testimoniare contro chi ci ha offeso è anch’essa eliminata o ridotta in larga misura, anche se i documenti che registrano l’offesa continuano ad esistere. Le nostre motivazioni in questo caso dipendono dal fattore emotivo nelle nostre memorie; nel momento in cui questo venga meno, anche se la memoria episodica autobiografica rimane, il valore e significato dell’evento svanisce, e con esso l’impulso ad agire. Le emozioni sono in larga misura le principali responsabili dei legami che abbiamo con i documenti; sono ciò che fa sì che le nostre memorie interne ed esterne abbiano significato. Affinché le iscrizioni riguardanti eventi nel passato abbiano un significato nelle nostre vite, esse devono in qualche misura possedere risonanza emotiva, generata dalle nostre esperienze di tali eventi e dalle nostre memorie di tali esperienze. I documenti sono sì fondamentali. Ma per noi e per le nostre vite sociali, devono essere accompagnati dalle nostre memorie interne. (shrink)

Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, (...) as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. -/- My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address. (shrink)

Avicenna develops a highly original account of memory as one of the five internal senses. In this paper, I briefly reconstruct this conception and evaluate its influence on the faculty psychology which emerged in the Latin West from the 12th century onwards. Particular attention is paid to Thomas Aquinas’s harsh criticism of Avicenna’s denial of intellectual memory, which touches on several epistemological, anthropological and theological issues.

In this chapter we finish reporting the results of our comprehensive survey study on the interplay of internal and external memory in everyday life and how that is changing in the early twenty-first century (N = 476 Mechanical Turk participants). We report on the themes that emerged from the qualitative data on the interplay between internal and external memory, and we also report correlational analyses. Participants’ responses indicated that internal memory is used more than (...) external memory for episodic and procedural purposes, and its strengths are in rich vivid recollection, phenomenology, personal relevance, creativity, and security; external memory is used more than internal memory for semantic and prospective purposes, and its strengths are in accuracy, precision, fidelity, longevity, and capacity. The overall picture is of a growing symbiosis between internal and external memory; the two complement and depend on each other. (shrink)

(1) Substituting (as Solms does) forebrain for brainstem in the search for a dream “controller” is counterproductive, since a distributed system need have no single controller. (2) Evidence against episodic memory consolidation does not show that REM sleep has no role in other types of memory, contra Vertes & Eastman. (3) A generalization of Revonsuo's “threat simulation” model in reverse is more plausible and is empirically testable. [Hobson et al.; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman].

Drawing on ideas from philosophy (in particular, epistemology), I argue that one of memory’s most important functions is to provide its owner with knowledge of the physical world. This knowledge helps satisfy the organism’s need to confer stability on an ever-changing reality so the objects in which it consists can be identified and reidentified. I then draw a distinction between sources of knowledge (i.e., from physical vs. subjective reality) and argue—based on evolutionary principles—that because memory was designed by (...) natural selection to interface with the physical world, knowledge acquired via sensory/perceptual experiences should be better remembered than internally generated knowledge made available by introspection. A study conducted to test this hypothesis provides support. I conclude that a serious interdisciplinary approach to issues typically considered the purview of psychology best enables researchers to craft well-specified, theoretically based hypotheses that directly target functions of the mind. (shrink)

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive (...) problem, since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. (shrink)

Many philosophers have argued that psychological time is a fundamental, inherent quality of consciousness that provides continuity and sequence to mental events—enabling memory. And, since memory is consciousness, psychological time enables the individual intentionality of consciousness. Levinas (1961), on the other hand, argues that an individual’s past, in the most original sense, is the past of other. The irreducible alterity of one’s past sets the stage for the other who co-determines the meaning of the past. This paper is (...) about the exploration cultural memory within the context of a Caucasian doctoral student entering into an African-American community during an internship, who finds that cultural memories are remarkably more complicated than the propositional description of historic events. The paper further explores how cultural memory is not a record of “what happened” but a sociolinguistic creative meaning making process. Histories can be contested. Memory, on the other hand, never adheres to the strict true or false dichotomy. Memory is like searching for the Divine, it cannot be found, only revealed in mysterious and small details. Memory, is the intruding of the infinite, creating as an effect the idea of a finite (August, 2011), they are not “representations” of the past nor are they a kind of mnemonic system of subjectivism to mediate all of consciousness. (shrink)

The article contributes to the theorisation of collective memory involved in building the international representations of a nation, and examines how strategic responses to the legacy of the totalitarian past have been deployed to shape the image of the nations’ remembering agency via the connections with other actors within the global memory field. Drawing on the Bourdieusian concept of symbolic capital, the article develops a concept of the symbolic capital of mnemonics in order to uncover the role of (...) memory in enhancing international standing and prestige, a crucial preoccupation for semi-peripheral states emerging on the global arena. While recent scholarship on traumatic memory as a category of social analysis underlines the role of memory in bolstering the collective identity of nations, the article demonstrates how memories of the communist past provide a platform for connections between nation-states through shared meta-narratives. Through an empirical case study that uses an ethnographic approach, participant observation and analysis of media accounts, the article examines how the official commemorative practices of Kazakhstan have served to realign the country’s mnemonic agenda with that of the global memory of communism and to redeploy the symbolic capital gained through a shared mnemonics to reassert its legitimacy both abroad and at home. (shrink)

Although O'Regan & Noë (O&N) claim that the world may serve as the viewers' external visual memory, findings from the field of memory research have demonstrated the existence of internal visual representations. These representations are stored in the viewer's brain, contain information regarding visual objects and their relations, guide subsequent exploration of the visual world and promote change detection.

In this chapter we begin reporting the results of our comprehensive survey study on the interplay of internal and external memory in everyday life, and how that is changing in the early twenty-first century (N = 476 Mechanical Turk participants). After first describing data cleaning and scoring, we report the descriptive statistics for questions about attitudes and beliefs regarding internal memory, external memory, and their interplay. The overall pattern, based on participants’ self-reports, is that most (...) think external memory enhances their everyday functioning, but they also think they would do fine without it, and they do not feel uneasy about their reliance on it. External memory is seen as augmenting human capability, not supplanting it. Furthermore, participants generally put considerable value in their external memories. (shrink)

In this chapter, we continue reporting the results of our comprehensive survey study on the interplay of internal and external memory in everyday life and how that is changing in the early twenty-first century (N = 476 Mechanical Turk participants). We report the descriptive statistics for questions about behaviors and experiences with internal memory and external memory. Specific topics include low-tech strategies, taking notes, reasons for external memory retrieval failures, passwords, phone numbers, backup practices, (...) social media, and photos. Overall, results show that, for many, technology plays a large and increasing role in supporting human memory. We also introduce a distinction between episodic external memory and semantic external memory, which we will further address in Chapters 10.1007/978-3-319-99169-6_4 and 10.1007/978-3-319-99169-6_8. (shrink)

In this book Raluca Grosescu uses jurisprudence analysis, lawyer interviews, and ethnography to explain changes in international criminal justice law as experienced in Latin America and Central Eas...

Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of observer memories. On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including (...) class='Hi'>memory experiences. On the other hand, he argues that in observer memories there is no additional explicit representation of oneself experiencing the event: the self-presence is transparent and given by the mode of presentation. Whereas these are two lines of strategic and original argumentation, they are not exempt of problems. In this critical notice, I focus on the problematic aspects of McCarroll’s account. I show that it presents some issues that affect the internal coherence of the overall framework, and that some aspects and central notions would have needed more development to offer a precise picture of the nature of observer memories. (shrink)

A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. (...) This essay rejects the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences. The resulting view stands opposed to prominent discussions of memory and testimony, which either, like the diary model, treat memory by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory. (shrink)

This chapter examines the hypothesis that episodic memory is a mindshaped capacity. Presenting evidence from cognitive, developmental, and cross-cultural psychology, we argue that episodic memory is mindshaped for the purposes of interpersonal and social coordination. We examine how cultural influences, parental reminiscing styles, and the constructive nature of memory contribute to such mindshaping, promoting cognitive and behavioral homogeneity. We propose that epistemic norms of remembering are gradually acquired and internalized in practices of joint reminiscing between children and (...) adult caregivers, a crucial component in an extended process of normative enculturation. We also explore the close relationship between episodic memory and imagination, highlighting the ways in which simulated vicarious experiences function as socio-cognitive tools, transforming us into more easily interpretable cognitive objects. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the need for further research to elucidate the varieties and extent of memory mindshaping, shedding light on the nature of episodic memory and its role in the normative enculturation of human rememberers. (shrink)

According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember (...) that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection. (shrink)

This article analyzes the distinctive forms that collective memories take in the age of globalization. It studies the transition from national to cosmopolitan memory cultures. Cosmopolitanism refers to a process of `internal globalization' through which global concerns become part of local experiences of an increasing number of people. Global media representations, among others, create new cosmopolitan memories, providing new epistemological vantage points and emerging moral-political interdependencies. The article traces the historical roots of this transformation and outlines the theoretical (...) foundations for the emergence of cosmopolitan memories through an examination of how the Holocaust has been remembered in Germany, Israel and the USA in the course of the last fifty years. It is precisely the abstract nature of `good and evil' that symbolizes the Holocaust, which contributes to the extra-territorial quality of cosmopolitan memory. As such, memories of the Holocaust contribute to the creation of a common European cultural memory. (shrink)

This paper argues that fungal mycelial networks exhibit minimal cognition through memory-integrated adaptive regulation. Drawing on cybernetic and enactivist frameworks, I develop a non-representational account of memory as the organism's capacity to modulate behavior based on temporally extended environmental coupling. I propose four operational criteria for minimal cognition: feedback-guided regulation of behavior, maintenance of internal viability conditions, structural modulation based on past environmental interactions, and plasticity across time scales that supports anticipatory adaptivity. Empirical evidence demonstrates that fungi (...) meet all four criteria through distributed memory mechanisms: fungal networks exhibit directional regrowth toward previously encountered resources even after spatial displacement; stress priming persists across multiple cell divisions; Spitzenkörper-mediated directional persistence in constrained environments; and transgenerational memory through spore imprinting. These findings challenge representationalist assumptions in cognitive science by showing that memory and cognition can emerge from morphodynamic, biochemical, and electrophysiological processes without necessary neural substrates or symbolic representations. Fungal cognition demonstrates that the organizational principles underlying cognition – feedback-driven adaptation, norm-preservation, and historical coupling – can be realized in radically different material substrates, expanding our understanding of what counts as a cognitive system. (shrink)

The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) claims that the cognitive processes that materially realise thinking are sometimes partially constituted by entities that are located external to an agent’s body in its local envi- ronment. We show how proponents of HEC need not claim that an agent must have a central nervous system, or physically instantiate processes organised in such a way as to play a causal role equivalent to that of the brain if that agent is to be capable of (...) cognition. Focusing on the case of spatial memory, we make our argument by taking a close look at the striking example of Physarum Polycephalum plasmodium (i.e., slime mould) which uses self- produced non-living extracellular slime trails to navigate its environment. We will argue that the use of exter- nalized spatial memory by basal organisms like Physarum is an example of extended cognition. Moreover, it is a possible evolutionary precursor to the use of internal spatial memory and recall in animals thus demonstrating how extended cognition may have emerged early in evolutionary history. (shrink)

Why are some people better at generating creative ideas than others? This paper focuses on memory as an unexpected source of creative ideas, i.e., ideas that are both novel and useful. According to my account, highly creative people are able to use memory gists to guide their memory search. Memory gists are memory contents that represent more abstract or qualitative features extracted from the specific, surface-level features in memory contents. Using memory gists in (...) memory search involves a mode of attention that is the internal analog of diffuse attention in perception. Just as diffuse attention in perception has been recognized for its distinctive benefits for processing global targets, I argue that its internal analog directed towards contents in memory and cognition also comes with its own distinctive benefits. Using memory gists allows creative individuals to activate disparate contents that share abstract features despite their superficial differences. My account therefore sheds new light on the underlying mechanisms of creative thinking. (shrink)

Memory represents a key psychological process. It allows us to recall things from the past which may have taken place hours, days, months, or even many years ago. Our memories are intrinsically personal, subjective, and internal, yet without the primary capacity of memory, other important activities such as speech, perception, concept formation, and reasoning would be impossible. The range of different aspects of memory is huge, from our vocabulary and knowledge about language and the world to (...) our personal histories, skills such as walking and talking, and the more simple memory capacities found in lower animals. Amongst the diversity of memory processes, the principal focus in this volume is the long-term representation of complex associative human memory. This refers to the permanently stored representation of individual items and events. The books in the Oxford Debates in Psychology series aim to provide students and researchers with a stimulating, self-contained, and balanced summary of the various theoretical and empirical positions that shape the most controversial and contested areas of research. Memory: Systems, Process, or Function? presents a a debate about the cognitive architecture of the human long-term memory system. The individual chapter authors represent some of the leading researchers and theorists in the field. Each chapter concentates upon the central theoretical question of how long-term memory can best be conceptualized. In particular, is long-term memory best regarded as comprising multiple independent systems (each with distict properties and attributes), as a processing framework which can be tapped via different levels of processing, or as a complex fnction which can be used in a flexible and task-appropriate manner? The authors of each chapter present their own answers to this and related research questions. The book concludes with an integrated synopsis and appraisal of the different facets of this fascinating debate. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to understand Heidegger’s conception of technology in light of Stiegler’s critique of that conception, anchored in a discussion of books and libraries as technological artefacts. I argue, following Stiegler, that Heidegger did not adequately take into account the inherent technological character of the means by which Dasein’s heritage is transmitted to subsequent generations. Stiegler’s concept of epiphylogenesis—dead matter externally organized to support living, internal memory and instantiated in books and libraries—is therefore a useful (...) supplement to the Heideggerian account of the transmission of heritage. I examine the points where Heidegger mentions books and/or libraries in three exemplary texts from the beginning, middle, and end of his career, indicating at each point how Stiegler’s thought can supplement that of Heidegger. I conclude with a brief discussion of David Mitchell’s novel Cloud Atlas, considered as a paradigmatic example of Stiegler’s conceptual framework. (shrink)

Why do major historical events such as the Holocaust occupy the forefront of the collective consciousness, while profound moments such as the Armenian genocide, the McCarthy era, and France's role in North Africa stand distantly behind? Is it possible that history "overly remembers" some events at the expense of others? A landmark work in philosophy, Paul Ricoeur's _Memory, History, Forgetting_ examines this reciprocal relationship between remembering and forgetting, showing how it affects both the perception of historical experience and the production (...) of historical narrative. _Memory, History, Forgetting_, like its title, is divided into three major sections. Ricoeur first takes a phenomenological approach to memory and mnemonical devices. The underlying question here is how a memory of present can be of something absent, the past. The second section addresses recent work by historians by reopening the question of the nature and truth of historical knowledge. Ricoeur explores whether historians, who can write a history of memory, can truly break with all dependence on memory, including memories that resist representation. The third and final section is a profound meditation on the necessity of forgetting as a condition for the possibility of remembering, and whether there can be something like happy forgetting in parallel to happy memory. Throughout the book there are careful and close readings of the texts of Aristotle and Plato, of Descartes and Kant, and of Halbwachs and Pierre Nora. A momentous achievement in the career of one of the most significant philosophers of our age, _Memory, History, Forgetting_ provides the crucial link between Ricoeur's _Time and Narrative_ and _Oneself as Another_ and his recent reflections on ethics and the problems of responsibility and representation. “His success in revealing the internal relations between recalling and forgetting, and how this dynamic becomes problematic in light of events once present but now past, will inspire academic dialogue and response but also holds great appeal to educated general readers in search of both method for and insight from considering the ethical ramifications of modern events.... It is indeed a master work, not only in Ricoeur’s own vita but also in contemporary European philosophy.”—_Library Journal _“Ricoeur writes the best kind of philosophy—critical, economical, and clear.”— _New York Times Book Review _. (shrink)

In this chapter we provide a summary of the results of the current study, which we described in detail in Chapters 10.1007/978-3-319-99169-6_1, 10.1007/978-3-319-99169-6_2, 10.1007/978-3-319-99169-6_3 and 10.1007/978-3-319-99169-6_4. We also discuss the limitations of the current study, with an eye toward future research. Most importantly, we present a framework that synthesizes the relative strengths and main purposes of internal and external memory and the directional ways in which they affect each other. This framework should help organize both the interpretation of (...) past research and the development of future research. Finally, we review the most relevant research methods available for the study of external memory. (shrink)

Attention is strongly influenced by both external stimuli and internal goals. However, this useful dichotomy does not readily capture the ubiquitous and often automatic contribution of past experience stored in memory. We review recent evidence about how multiple memory systems control attention, consider how such interactions are manifested in the brain, and highlight how this framework for ‘memory-guided attention’ might help systematize previous findings and guide future research.

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able (...) to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. (shrink)

I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Je´roˆme Dokic, Richard Menary, Jenann Ismael, Sue Campbell, Doris McIlwain, and Mark Rowlands. This paper explains the motivation for an alliance between the sciences of memory and the extended mind hypothesis. It examines in turn the role of worldly, social, and internalized forms of scaffolding to memory and cognition, and also highlights themes relating to affect, agency, and individual differences.

It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how (...) the constructive nature of visual memory can be reconciled with the authenticity constraint. In what respect and to what extent may the content of a visual memory differ from the original perceptual state while still adequately reflecting the subject's original perception? (shrink)

This paper addresses relations between memory and imagery in expert sport in relation to visual or visuospatial perspective. Imagining, remembering, and moving potentially interact via related forms of episodic simulation, whether future- or past-directed. Sometimes I see myself engaged in action: many experts report switching between such external visual perspectives and an internal, 'own-eyes', or field perspective on their past or possible performance. Perspective in retrieval and in imagery may be flexible and multiple. I raise a range of (...) topics for empirical research on perspective and visualization. (shrink)

Memorized performance is widely recognized as a a widely used marker of instrumental expertise because it releases performers’ attention from continuous note retrieval and allows greater focus on structural awareness, technical control, and expressive interpretation. Despite its importance, many students experience unstable memorization: recall may collapse under performance pressure, reliance on the written score remains strong, and practice frequently centers on mechanical repetition rather than deliberate encoding or reflective monitoring. This paper argues that such difficulties are not simply the result (...) of limited memory capacity but emerge from the combined absence of a coherent internal memory structure and an effective regulatory approach to learning. To address this conceptual problem, the present paper examines two influential theoretical perspectives. Chaffin’s Performance Cues (PCs) theory explains how musical memory becomes organized through networks of meaningful reference points that connect semantic understanding, motor coordination, structural awareness, emotional intention, and auditory imagery. In parallel, Zimmerman’s Self-Regulated Learning (SRL) model conceptualizes learning as a cyclical process in which learners set goals, apply strategies, monitor performance, and engage in reflective evaluation supported by motivational beliefs such as self-efficacy and task value. Rather than treating these perspectives as separate lines of inquiry, this paper develops a theoretical analysis of their complementarity as well as their points of tension, including differing assumptions about temporal development, the sequencing of learning strategies, and the role of motivation within practice. Building on this analysis, the paper proposes an integrated conceptual framework in which SRL processes operate as regulatory pathways through which cue-based memory structures are intentionally constructed and stabilized. From this perspective, stable memorized performance emerges from the dynamic interaction between structural encoding and cyclical self-regulation rather than from repetition alone. The framework highlights pedagogical possibilities for guiding learners toward autonomous memorization by combining cue construction with explicit regulatory support, and it outlines directions for future theoretical and empirical work on the co-development of memory structure and learning regulation in instrumental practice. (shrink)

Introduction : cinema, memory, modernity: the return of memory as film -- No escape from time : memory and redemption in the international postwar art film -- The "crisis" of memory : "traumatic identity" in the contemporary memory film -- "Global memory" : cinema as lingua franca and the commodification of the image -- The eye of history : memory, surveillance and ethicality in the contemporary art film -- "Prosthetic memory" and transnational (...) cinema : globalized identity and narrative recursivity in City of God -- Conclusion: remembering to forget: the catachreses of modernity. (shrink)

Recent developments in science and technology point to the need to unify, and extend, the definition of memory. On the one hand, molecular neurobiology has shown that memory is largely a chemical process, which includes conditioning and any form of stored experience. On the other hand, information technology has led many to claim that cognition is also extended, that is, memory may be stored outside of the brain. In this paper, we review these advances and describe the (...) increasingly accepted extended definition of memory. This definition is largely accepted in neuroscience but not explicitly stated. In the extended definition, memory is the capacity to store and/or retrieve information. Does this new definition of memory mean that everything is now a form of memory? We stress that memory still requires incorporation, that is, a corpore. It is a relationship -- where one biological or chemical process is incorporated into another, and changes both in a permanent way. Looking at natural and biological processes of incorporation can help us think of how incorporation of internal and external memory occurs in cognition. We further argue that, if we accept that there is such a thing as the storage of information outside the brain -- and that this organic, dynamic process can also be called “memory” -- then we open the door to a very different world. The mind is not static. The brain, and the memory it uses, is a work in progress; we are not now who we were then. (shrink)

Recent analyses of memory propose necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a memory, which are meant to set memory apart from related mental states like illusory memory and confabulation. Each of the proposed taxonomies includes accuracy as one of the necessary conditions such that only accurate representations are memories. I argue that inclusion of an accuracy condition implies a sort of disjunctivism about seeming to remember. The paper distinguishes several types of (...) disjunctivism that these taxonomies could be committed to. If these taxonomies are meant to be empirically informed, however, then plausibly they should be seen to endorse the principle of psychological internalism. The causal argument, a standard objection to disjunctivism, is then used to show that the sort of disjunctivism that endorses psychological internalism is mistaken. The ultimate goal is to underscore a lack of clarity in the status of recent accounts of memory as either epistemic, nonreductively ontological, or reductively ontological in approach. (shrink)

Richard Sorabji, a noted philosopher in his own right, here offers a new edition of his 1972 translation of "De Memoria" here with commentary, summaries, and three essays comparing Aristotle's accounts of memory and recollection. For this edition, Sorabji has also provided a substantial new introduction taking into account scholarly debates over the intervening thirty years, particularly those over the role of mental images in the imagination. "Sorabji has produced a first-class book on an important topic. All Aristotelians, and (...) anyone with an interest in any aspect of memory, will be in his debt."--Jonathan Barnes, "Isis ""Anyone concerned with Aristotle's psychology, theory of mind, or rhetoric, anyone interested in mnemonic systems, and anyone trying to work out for himself a theory of memory, should read Aristotle's treatise "On Memory," with the comments by Richard Sorabji."--"International Studies in Philosophy" "Sorabji's book is a sample of care, intelligence, and subtlety that the Anglo-Saxon philosophers do not hesitate to invest in such enterprises.... The notes seem to leave no detail, no textual difficulty unilluminated."--"Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale ". (shrink)

This chapter first surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. -/- The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.

This article analyzes the notion of memory in the philosophy of religion. The area of this problematic is defined by Descartes, who, in a thought experiment, postulates an all-powerful, evil demon capable of falsifying human perception. The problem of solipsism raised here also implies doubt about claims based on memory. Descartes’ assumptions are taken up constructively by Alvin Plantinga in his attempt to solve problems in the epistemology of religion by raising the following new question: is belief in (...) God rational, and, if so, is it justified? Peter van Inwagen, for his part, uses memory analysis to construct arguments in support of theodicy. In considering these issues, other key topics within the philosophy of religion, such as the afterlife and the existence of the soul, which are closely related to the analysis of personal identity, inevitably arise. (shrink)

In the 1940s, children in war-torn Japan would hear warning sirens and look skyward with dread, fearing a firebomb attack from enemy aircraft. But for young Jiro Horikoshi in The Wind Rises, airplanes mean ‘beautiful dreams’ and self-actualisation. Animation films like The Wind Rises (The Wind, 2013), In this Corner of the World (This Corner, 2016), The Boy and the Heron (The Boy, 2023) and Grave of the Fireflies (1988) focus on children’s agency in confronting Japan’s conflicts regarding memory, (...) national identity, and pacifism. The Wind explores Japan’s historical paradoxes, juxtaposing pride in innovation with a pacifist critique of militaristic nationalism. This Corner emphasises the plight of quotidian existence during wartime, highlighting collective memory and trauma. The Boy examines grief and healing through fantastical allegories, underscoring the significance of imagination in coping with trauma. This paper applies Igarashi’s theory of ‘absence presence,’ – referring to Japan’s self-protective absence of exploring the war’s haunting memories – Andrew Hoskins’s ecology of memories, and Michael Rothberg’s ‘multidirectional memory’ to contemplate the intricacies of nationalism in Japan. The paper explores these films within the context of national and international reactions to how Japan confronts its wartime past in the context of its postwar pacifist identity. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyse a particularly influential case of memory continuity in Portugal, that of Padrão dos Descobrimentos. Spaces of collective memory (such as public monuments) raise questions about what we celebrate, remember or rescue from oblivion, providing an opportunity to rethink the trauma. As such, care for public spaces is associated with ethical and cultural values. One of the difficulties with certain monuments has to do with the fact that they recall actions that (...) today we see as traumatic acts. Thus, it is important to reflect on a critical use of memory. On August 8, 2021, Padrão dos Descobrimentos was the subject of a graffiti. One of the sides of the monument could read: “Blindly sailing for money, humanity is drowning in a scarlet sea”. A great controversy immediately arose around the meaning of this gesture, as well as the role played by a monument that, after being temporarily built in 1940 for the Portuguese World Exhibition, was, in its current version, inaugurated in 1960, on the occasion of the fifth centenary of the death of Infante D. Henrique. This episode reignited a deeper cleavage around the uses of history and memory, the Portuguese colonial past, and the role of the Padrão dos Descobrimentos as an instrument for the reproduction of nationalism. In this sense, and with the authors proposing a new theoretical frame of reference based on the thought of Arendt and Ricoeur, its critical reading becomes relevant. (shrink)