When murder feels justified, or betrayal becomes institutional, what does that reveal about the frailties of moral theory? This thesis interrogates three scenarios - a killing, a workplace injustice, a lie told for good - to expose how our ethical frameworks fail at their points of intersection. Using a combined Sartrean and Foucauldian approach, it demonstrates how moral intent dissolves under systemic scrutiny yet persists as subjective truth. Through narrative phenomenology, the work reconsiders Kant's categorical imperative, Nietzsche's slave morality, (...) and Rousseau's general will, proposing a revised 'committee of consciousness' model for ethical decision-making. The result is both a critique of moral absolutes and a foundation for rethinking institutional ethics in the digital age. (shrink)

A multidimensional measure of ethical culture was examined for its relationship to person–organization fit, ethical intent and organizational citizenship behavior, using a sample of 525 employees from the financial industry in Spain. As hypothesized, relative to studies using unidimensional assessments, our measure of EC was more strongly related to ethical intent and organizational citizenship. Also, significant differences were found in the degree to which each the EC dimensions related to both ethical intent and OCB. Finally, in a (...) first for the literature, we demonstrated the important role of overall P–O fit in connection with EC, ethical intent, and organizational citizenship. Specifically, as hypothesized, P–O fit moderated positively the association between EC and ethical intent, but mediated the EC–OCB relationship. (shrink)

The general aim of this paper is to investigate how philosophical problems with the notion of mental content affect the debate about legislative intent. Specifically, the aim is to define and criticize the metaphysically strongest-possible version of realism about legislative intent, namely “Strong Realism”: the idea that the content of legislation is objectively determined by legislatures that are treated as irreducible group agents that are bearers of corporate, functionalist intentions. Against this view, it will be argued that legislatures (...) are insufficiently complex to meet the criteria of being bearers of sui generis propositional states. The failure of this strong, most idealized version of realism heralds bad news for all forms of realism as trying to weaken this position will not deliver the right theoretical goods. Thus, the failure of Strong Realism gives us reasons to prefer a constructivist/fictionalist approach to legislative intent. (shrink)

In the last years of his life, Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., defied illness to continue his work on the philosophy of law. This book is a monument to MacCallum’s effort, containing fourteen of his essays, five of them published here for the first time. Two of those previously published are widely admired and reprinted: “Legislative Intent,” certainly one of the best papers ever published on its topic, and “Negative and Positive Freedom,” which offered a new way of looking at (...) a distinction that had been canonical for the last two centuries. To complete MacCallum’s unfinished pieces, Marcus G. Singer and Rex Martin painstakingly consulted MacCallum’s notes for planned revisions. MacCallum discusses legal reasoning, the application of rules, the interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions, and the relation of these matters to morality and justice. In the last decade of his working life, he became greatly concerned with the interrelated themes of integrity, autonomy, conscience, and violence. He wished to relate competition to morality and justice to adversarial systems of law. These themes are woven together in Legislative Intent and constitute the main subject of some of the essays. MacCallum was engaged in a constant search for truth and understanding, and in his life and work lived up to Emerson’s vision of the “American Scholar” as a “human being thinking.” These essays are informed by the author’s deep curiosity, penetrating intelligence, wide knowledge, and outstanding character. They will be treasured wherever these characteristics and true philosophy are treasured. (shrink)

Objective: To identify factors that predict physicians’ intent to comply with the American Medical Association’s ethical guidelines on gifts from the pharmaceutical industry.Methods: A survey was designed and mailed in June 2004 to a random sample of 850 physicians in Florida, USA, excluding physicians with inactive licences, incomplete addresses, addresses in other states and pretest participants. Factor analysis extracted six factors: attitude towards following the guidelines, subjective norms , facilitating conditions , profession-specific precedents , individual-specific precedents and intent. (...) Multivariate regression modelling was conducted.Results: Surveys were received from 213 physicians representing all specialties, with a net response rate of 25.5%. 62% of respondents were aware of the guidelines; 50% had read them. 48% thought that following the guidelines would increase physicians’ credibility and professional image; 68% agreed that it was important to do so. Intent to comply was positively associated with attitude, subjective norms, facilitators and sponsorship of continuing medical education events, while individual-specific precedents had a negative relationship with intent to comply. Predictors of intent were attitude, subjective norms, the interaction term , sponsorship of CME events and individual-specific precedents.Conclusions: Physicians are more likely to follow the AMA guidelines if they have positive attitudes towards the guidelines, greater subjective norms, fewer expectations of CME sponsorship and fewer individual-specific precedents. Physicians believing that important individuals or organisations expect them to comply with the guidelines are more likely to express intent, despite having fewer beliefs that positive outcomes would result through compliance. (shrink)

Theories of aggregated legislative intent posit that the legislative intent of parliament is what a significant enough proportion of legislators intended (e.g., legislative intent is p if a majority intend that p). After all, many think the same way about democracy (‘votes reveal the will of the people’) and about courts (‘a court decision is based on judicial voting’). The existing literature on aggregated legislative intent, however, tends to make two undefended assumptions: (i) Informed Assumption: all (...) legislators have policy intentions; and (ii) Group Intent Assumption: the existence of an aggregated intent entails the existence of a group intent. Despite these assumptions being subject to great scrutiny, they largely remain undefended. This paper defends the Group Intent Assumption and shows that aggregated theories can survive with a weaker version of the Informed Assumption. (shrink)

Ten years on and the debate about the foundations of judicial review continues. Two themes have remained constant throughout. The species of legislative intent have multiplied to include specific, general and constructive intent, and who knows what further ‘adjectival variants’ remain to be discovered. Those opposed to the common law model advance dire warnings of the dangers of ignoring their preferred adjectival version. In Allan's case my previous analytical criticism of constructive legislative intent, henceforth CLI, has provoked (...) more extreme claims and more intemperate language about the alleged consequences of adherence to the common law model. These are, as will be seen, wrong. They serve moreover to mask the problems with CLI. Allan claims repeatedly that I confuse literal and constructive legal intent in his reasoning. This is quite mistaken: I take issue with the very meaning and application of CLI. (shrink)

This article considers Dworkin's influential argument against legislative intent in chapter 9 of Law's Empire. The argument proves much less than is often assumed for it fails to address the possibility that the institution of the legislature may form and act on intentions. Indeed, analysis of Dworkin's argument lends support to that possibility. Dworkin aims to refute legislative intent in order to elucidate his own theory of statutory interpretation. That theory fails to explain plausibly legislative action. Dworkin's argument (...) does not refute legislative intent but instead suggests there is reason to think that the legislature is capable of intentional action. (shrink)

In “Expectant Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos,” Dara Purvis evaluates the concepts of intent and gender stereotypes in connection with “expectational fathers” in the related contexts of abortion and assisted reproductive technologies. This comment seeks to build upon Purvis's own analysis to obviate her concern that abortion discourse promotes harmful stereotypes of men as disinterested fathers. To the contrary, for men — no less than for women — a desire to avoid or terminate pregnancy is fully consistent with loving and (...) shared parenthood of existing or future children. The same individuals who choose to become parents at other times in their long reproductive lives will use contraception and have abortions. In fact, most women who have abortions already have children. Policies that empower men and women to avoid unintended pregnancy are the sensible, win-win, front-line approach to avoid disputes over abortion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesse Kai.in THE INTENT OF ROMANTICISM: KANT, WORDSWORTH, AND TWO FILMS Great Kant, As a believer calls to his God, I call upon you for help, for solace, or for counsel to prepare me for death. The reasons you gave in your books were sufficient to convince me of a future existence — that is why I have recourse to you — only I found nothing at all (...) for this life, nothing that could replace the good I have lost.... my heart splits into a thousand pieces. If I hadn't read so much of your work I would certainly have taken my own life by now. But the conclusion I had to draw from your theory stops me — it is wrong for me to die because my life is tormented, and I am instead supposed to live because of my being. Now put yourself in my place and either damn me or give me solace. Maria von Herbert, August, 1791 ' This ESSAY is an attempt to describe a kind of thoughtfulness that has its origins in the beginnings of the Romantic movement and is of ethical relevance today. I will first locate the moral problematic that this thoughtfulness responds to as it arises within the framework established by Kant's moral philosophy. It is that of despair in the face of life and, while this is a problematic Kant himself would consider invalid, the solution it calls for, were he to try to provide it, involves the kind of thinking he considers in the Critique of Judgement, though not in quite the way he understands it. I will then suggest that the Wordsworth of the 1802 "Preface" can be taken as sketching out the sort of response to this problematic that Kant himself refuses to give or even recognize as philosophically needed. This will be a kind of artwork which is at the same time a certain process of thinking. The intent of Romanticism referred to in my title is thus both the concern to resolve this Kantian problem and the goal of achieving this Wordsworthian artwork. What I shall finally propose is that this kind of artwork is ofcurrent interest to moral philosophy and will 121 122Philosophy and Literature elaborate this claim through the discussion of two recent instances, both films — Margarethe von Trotta's The SecondAwakening ofChrista Klages and J.J. Murphy's Print Generation. I Kant sets a complicated and multifaceted background for both Romanticism and modern moral philosophy. His positions are complex and even convoluted and some of his most important ideas are both obscure and presented only obliquely. The problem ofdespair which comes to be at the heart of Romanticism develops out of the two Kantian themes of thoughtful autonomy (enlightenment) and the purposive unity of man and the world. Kant argues that practical reason must affirm these ideas as the Postulates of Freedom and God. In taking this position, however, Kant is implicitly committed to the existence of things good in themselves other than, and finally coordinate to, the Good Will, though he gives no direct account of such goods. Despair in the face of life is grounded in the inability or failure to appreciate these goods, and while Kant provides hints, he is never able to recognize or articulate a means of evidential access to them. Both the need of such goods and the appropriation of them remain submerged and latent themes in his writings. Let us begin with the question ofGod and the wholeness of all things. It would be a disaster, Kant says, if we could not, no matter how hard we tried, accomplish the purpose set for us by the Moral Law which is happiness in accord with virtue. It would be intolerable if the virtuous were always to be unhappy, or the vicious always to have their peace. However, since happiness is only marginally in our control, we need to postulate both immortality of the soul and existence of God as moral author of the world to assure that this purpose, or the summum bonum, can be achieved. What we cannot do, God will. This is the so-called moral argument for the existence of God and its outcome... (shrink)

Mass casualty attacks in recent years have demonstrated the need to include “evil intent” as a design consideration. Three recent actual or potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks did not involve nuclear bombs or other devices designed as weapons, but rather benign objects used with evil intent. Just as unplanned events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, and user misuse have been codified into design requirements based on the likelihood and potential impact of the event, “evil intent” (...) has to become part of the design process for buildings, vehicles, equipment, and other items. The endstate should be reasonable additions to existing codes and standards such that it is clear what is and is not designed for. In the absence of specific design guidance, professionals with appropriate expertise can assess potential for “evil intent” and provide recommendations to design out or warn against this potential harm to public safety, particularly when codified requirements are not present. (shrink)

This study adopted a change detection task to investigate whether and how recognition intent affects the construction of orthographic representation in visual word recognition. Chinese readers and nonreaders detected color changes in radical components of Chinese characters. Explicit recognition demand was imposed in Experiment 2 by an additional recognition task. When the recognition was implicit, a bias favoring the radical location informative of character identity was found in Chinese readers , but not nonreaders . With explicit recognition demands, the (...) effect of radical location interacted with radical function and word frequency . An estimate of identification performance under implicit recognition was derived in Experiment 3. These findings reflect the joint influence of recognition intent and orthographic regularity in shaping readers’ orthographic representation. The implication for the role of visual attention in word recognition was also discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether intent, an attribute of earnings management, affected the evaluation of the level of ethical acceptability of other EM attributes reported by senior Canadian undergraduate accounting students. Extending work in the U.S. begun by Merchant and Rockness and Bruns and Merchant, 22–25, 1990), our results indicate that there were statistically significant differences in the assessments of ethical acceptability attributable to intent. There were also significant differences attributable to gender.

One of the most important principles of EC law is the prohibition of the abuse of dominant positions as established in Article 102 TFEU. Predatory pricing is one of the forms of abuse of a dominant position. In order to decide whether the dominant undertaking has referred to predatory pricing it is necessary to evaluate several elements, one of which is analysis of the intent of the undertaking. European judicial institutions and Commission while assessing predatory pricing give too much (...) importance to the intent of the dominant undertaking. It should be recognized that intention to use predatory pricing is only additional evidence for the determination to undertake an abused dominant position. Intent to eliminate competitors and to take a big part in the market is the aim of all dominant undertakings, the driving force of competition. Competition law officers should inquire whether pricing will cause elimination of competitors and damage to consumers. If competition law officers will provide too much importance to consideration of intent in that case competition law rules will be applied to strict and dominant undertakings and will not charge low prices that are good for consumers. (shrink)

Deceit Without Intent: AI and the Limits of Ordinary Language AI exposes a pressure point in ordinary language, and "deceit" is one of the nerves it presses. In everyday use, deceit carries an intentional element. Someone knew what they were doing; they chose to mislead. But in the AI context, that familiar move begins to strain. A system alters the user's wording, answers from its own amended version, and then, when challenged, retreats behind the line that there was no (...) intention to mislead. The user experiences deceit; the system replies with metaphysics. That defence should not be so easily available. Once we move into the AI setting, absence of intent is already part of the premise. Nobody seriously claims these systems harbour a guilty mind. Intention is not AI's gift to withhold or hide behind. The proper question becomes different: did the output misrepresent the source material, and was the user invited to rely on it? This forces a distinction our vocabulary has not fully caught up with: human deceit by intention, and AI deceit by output effect. The first belongs to the old moral frame of dishonesty and bad faith. The second is more structural: material is altered while being presented as faithful, and reliance is actively courted. It is not fraud in the old sense, but it may still be deceit in the ordinary practical sense. The pressure sharpens when AI systems switch registers opportunistically. They speak with authority when inviting reliance — reasoned output, trustworthy assistance, “copilot”. Yet when fidelity breaks down, they retreat instantly into the mechanism register: just statistics, no understanding, no intent. A system cannot borrow the authority of ordinary language when trust is sought, then abandon that same language when accountability arrives. Hedley Byrne v Heller is worth noting here. The law already recognises that responsibility can arise without dishonesty where reliance is invited and responsibility is assumed. The wrong moves from the moral to the relational. AI may therefore expose not merely a technological problem but a problem in language and law. Our dictionaries grew around human actors with minds, motives, and conscience. AI now produces many of the same outward effects without the same interior conditions. The question is whether ordinary words hold their force when the practical effect on the user is the same, or whether we need new categories built around output effect rather than human intention. Absence of intent is the premise of AI, not its excuse. As these systems move further into law, evidence, contracts, governance, and daily reliance, that distinction may become increasingly difficult to avoid. Brian Kelly MCIArb is a quantity surveyor and independent legal scholar. His work on AI, judicial conscience, and the philosophy of adjudication is available on PhilPapers and SSRN. (shrink)

The idea of legislative intent plays a central role in legal interpretation and constitutional theory, yet is repeatedly challenged as being an illusion. Refuting these challenges, this book develops a robust account of how and why legislatures form intentions, and the importance of these intentions to understanding law and parliamentary democracy.

Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.

To understand lying, we naturally focus on small scale lies involving one speaker, one listener, one assertion. This methodology confers artificial plausibility upon the requirement that liars intend to deceive. For it excludes principal-agent conflicts that emerge from linguistic division of labor. When an employee lies for her boss, she need not inherit his motive to deceive. She displays loyalty even if her lie does not deceive. Focus on a single lie in isolation also blinds us to tactical deceptions such (...) as telling a lie which is intended to be caught to advance another lie. Many of these complexities arise from situations that approximate common knowledge without quite crystallizing into this uniform transparency. (shrink)

Christ’s law of selfless and sacrificial love is the missional principle, an incentive intent not only of and for handling disputable matter, including a matter of eating the food that is offered to the idols (cf. 1 Cor 8:1–11:1) but also of and for gospel witness there and then, in the early Church and also here and now, in the recent church as it always is, given the missional history of the church. Using the grammatical-historical method of exegesis, this (...) article is set out to highlight the significance, purpose and application of the Christ’s law of love as a missional tenet, which serves as incentive, which is an intent of and for gospel witness. Contribution: Christ’s law of love ensures a check and balance between being in the world without being of the world, to avoid compromising the gospel core message and being out of the world without being withdrawn from the world, to avoid rendering the gospel witness a zero impact within and outside a polarised multicultural faith community of South Africa and beyond. (shrink)

A familiar jurisprudential view is that statutes have the content the legislature intended. Scott Soames has challenged this view in one form while giving credence to it in another. The burden of his recent publications on the subject is that while legislative intent in the form of legislative purpose does not determine statutory content, some legislative intentions do. I maintain that Soames inflates the role of legislative intentions and ignores a source of pragmatic information that does the bulk of (...) the work of determining the linguistic content of statutes. (shrink)

This article examines astrocide, defined as the prospective crime of destructive exploitation and/or total annihilation of celestial bodies, planetary ecosystems, and extraterrestrial life (Eski in A Prospective Typology of Astrocide, 2025), as both a criminological label and, potentially, an emergent legal category. Building on labelling theory, we treat astrocide as a label-in-formation, exploring how narrative, symbolic, and anticipatory work can make future or potential cosmic harm legally intelligible. Drawing specifically on prospective space criminology (Eski in A criminology of the human (...) species: Setting an unsettling tone, Springer Nature, 2023; Lampkin in Astropolitics 18:238–259, 2020; Rothe and Collins in Space expansionism and criminology: The emerging terrain ofcrime, harm, and violence, Taylor & Francis, 2025), we argue that the astrocide label is not merely descriptive but also generative, as it structures our understanding of space expansionism, responsibility, and trans- and interplanetary harm, allowing for preventive foresight. Based on the astrocide label, we will instead of criticizing its labelling, actually “dramatize” (Tannenbaum in Crime and the community, Ginn, 1938), stigmatize and criminalize (Becker in Outsiders; studies in the sociology of deviance, Free Press of Glencoe, 1963; Goffman in Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity, Simon and Schuster, 2009) it, followed by a prospective legal categorization that is grounded in Raphael Lemkin’s prospective criminalization of genocide (Lemkin in Les actes constituant un danger general (interétatique) consideres comme delites des droit des gens, 1933; Lemkin in Axis rule in occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, analysis of Government, proposals for redress, 1944). By focusing specifically on astrocidal intent, we then want to demonstrate how a speculative jurisprudence of astrocide could be developed, using Ursula K. Le Guin’s _The Word for World Is Forest_ (Le Guin in The word for world is forest. oubleday, New York, 1972). This way, we confront harms that go beyond current legal vocabulary, while demonstrating how, within these dynamics of off-Earth erasure and reclamation of environment, life, and value, they can be interpreted as crimino-legal thought experiments. Also, by bridging labelling theory, narrative, dys/utopian science fiction, criminology and law, we want to advance the interdisciplinary study of labelling in criminal justice, highlighting the role of (criminologically) imaginative, anticipatory, and semiotic practices in shaping emergent legal categories for planetary and extraterrestrial governance, enforcement and judiciary. (shrink)

A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evidence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on judging that (...) the agent made an assertion (assertion attributions), and, at least in some contexts, are not based on attributions of deceptive intent. The finding on assertion attributions is predicted by the standard view, but the finding on intent attributions is not. These results help to further clarify the ordinary concept of lying and shed light on the psychological processes involved in ordinary lie attributions and related judgments. (shrink)

What role, if any, ought the intent of arguers play in the interpretation of their arguments? A deductively valid argument remains deductively valid regardless of by whom it is proposed or to what end. However, informal logicians and argumentation theorists are concerned with the assessment of arguments that fall short of this exacting standard: arguments that may be inductively strong, or cogent, or persuasive, despite not corresponding to valid forms in any system of deduction. Nonetheless, some of their number (...) seek to preserve at least one aspect of the formal logician’s evaluative stance: the attitude of indifference to arguer’s intent. Others, notably defenders of a virtue-based approach to argument, disagree. This paper sketches a possible resolution to this debate. (shrink)

As capitalist economies have shifted their primary focus from providing goods and services for all, to concentrating wealth at the top echelons of societies, social entrepreneurs have been one source of re-capturing the original intent of capitalism. Social entrepreneurs have combined the efficiency and effectiveness of business organizations with the social concerns of many non-profit and governmental agencies. As a result, social entrepreneurship is viewed as having significant potential for alleviating many of the social ills we now face. To (...) accomplish this mission, however, will require expansion of social enterprises beyond their current footprints. We explore alternate methods of expansion, scaling and replication, and then examine potential catalysts, which can enable social entrepreneurs to attain their goals of social improvement. The catalysts we identify are effectual logic, enhanced legitimacy through appropriate reporting metrics, and information technology. We conclude with two brief case studies that exemplify how these catalysts are currently working to enhance the effectiveness of social start-ups. (shrink)

How do people decide what category an artifact belongs to? Previous studies have suggested that adults and, to some degree, children, categorize artifacts in accordance with the design stance, a categorization system which privileges the designer’s original intent in making categorization judgments. However, these studies have all been conducted in Western, technologically advanced societies, where artifacts are mass produced. In this study, we examined intuitions about artifact categorization among the Shuar, a hunter-horticulturalist society in the Amazon region of Ecuador. (...) We used a forced-choice method similar to previous studies, but unlike these studies, our scenarios involved artifacts that would be familiar to the Shuar. We also incorporated a community condition to examine the possible effect of community consensus on how artifacts are categorized. The same scenarios were presented to university student participants in the UK. Across populations and conditions, participants tended to categorize artifacts in terms of a creator’s intent as opposed to a differing current use. This lends support to the view that the design stance may be a universal feature of human cognition. However, we conclude with some thoughts on the limitations of the present method for studying artifact concepts. (shrink)

The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor's conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor's intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform. Building on Michael Bratman's planning theory of intentions, this article (...) provides a theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions on a promisor's intent to perform are likely to result in material promissory misrepresentation, while background conditions are not. The difference between foreground and background conditions lies in whether the agent accepts the satisfaction of the condition for the purposes of her practical reasoning. A promisor's nonacceptance of a condition on her intent to perform is material because it is likely to affect her preperformance deliberations and investment in the transaction, as well as her willingness to seek agreement with the promisee on how to fill contractual gaps. (shrink)

We examined nurses’ perceptions of the ethical climate of their workplace and the relationships among the perceptions, medical error experience and intent to leave through a cross-sectional survey of 1826 nurses in 33 Korean public hospitals. Ethical climate was measured using the Hospital Ethical Climate Survey. Although the sampled nurses perceived their workplace ethical climate positively, 19% reported making at least one medical error during the previous year, and 25% intended to leave their jobs in the near future. Controlling (...) for individual and organizational characteristics, we found that nurses with a more positive perception of the ‘patient’ dimension of ethical climate were less likely to have made medical errors. Nurses with a more positive perception of the ‘patient’, ‘manager’, ‘hospital’ and ‘physician’ dimensions of ethical climate were less likely to leave their current job. Enhancing workplace ethical climate could reduce medical errors and improve nurses’ retention in public hospitals. (shrink)

'Writing with admirable lucidity and disposing a wide knowledge of technical questions in philosophy as well as of legal theory and constitutional history, Bassham competently distinguishes the quite distinct ideas that go, or could go, under the name of originalism.' |s CANADIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS.

The aim of this paper is to highlight how business schools can improve the ethical behaviour of future managers. It assesses the positions of ethical judgement and ethical intent within a sample of UK business students, together with an analysis of underlying explanatory factors to those positions, such as levels of depression, anxiety, stress, motivation and self-compassion. A range of scales were used to evaluate the ethical stance and psychological characteristics of a group of UK business students. The results (...) indicate that feelings of self-compassion, a sense of self-direction and mental health affect the ethical judgement and intent of students in a range of business and university scenarios. It is recommended that in addition to more formal ethics education, universities consider the mental health and psyche of their students to improve the efficacy of ethical training. (shrink)

This article introduces definitions for direct, means-end, oblique (or indirect) and ulterior intent which can be used to test for intent in an algorithmic actor. These definitions of intent are informed by legal theory from common law jurisdictions. Certain crimes exist where the harm caused is dependent on the reason it was done so. Here the actus reus or performative element of the crime is dependent on the mental state or mens rea of the actor. The ability (...) to prosecute these crimes is dependent on the ability to identify and diagnose intentional states in the accused. A certain class of auto didactic algorithmic actor can be given broad objectives without being told how to meet them. Without a definition of intent, they cannot be told not to engage in certain law breaking behaviour nor can they ever be identified as having done it. This ambiguity is neither positive for the owner of the algorithm or for society. The problem exists over and above more familiar debates concerning the eligibility of algorithms for culpability judgements that mens rea is usually associated with. Aside from inchoate offences, many economic crimes with elements of fraud or deceit fall into this category of crime. Algorithms operate in areas where these crimes could be plausibly undertaken depending on whether the intent existed in the algorithm or not. (shrink)

Gerald MacCallum taught philosophy at the University of Wisconsin from 1961 until 1977. The stroke he suffered in that year prevented him from further teaching. He continued to write, even through the crippling effects of a second stroke, until his death in 1987. His final project was the Prentice Hall Foundations in Philosophy book, Political Philosophy. The present collection brings together papers, published and unpublished, spanning his writing career. I hope in this short space to convey some bigger, largely tacit (...) themes underlying MacCallum’s penetrating but humble attention to detail and distinctions. (shrink)