Field theory largely treats the cultural dimensions of social fields as an emergent property of their objective structures. In this article, I reconsider the role of culture in fields by studying how the logics that govern their emergence develop. As a study case, I examine the rise of the field of transnational humanitarianism by focusing on the early endeavors of the International Committee of the Red Cross (established 1863). I show that the specific nineteenth-century strand of Calvinist doctrine espoused (...) by the early Red Cross activists motivated and shaped the genesis of the humanitarian field through its convictions about the nature of war, state and society relations, and charity. Activists drew on this doctrine to justify and advocate the establishment of a permanent, independent, and neutral humanitarian field. Based on this analysis, I argue that preexistent belief systems have a key role in differentiating new fields from existing social institutions. (shrink)

In this provocative and timely book, David Kennedy explores what can go awry when we put our humanitarian yearnings into action on a global scale--and what we can do in response. Rooted in Kennedy's own experience in numerous humanitarian efforts, the book examines campaigns for human rights, refugee protection, economic development, and for humanitarian limits to the conduct of war. It takes us from the jails of Uruguay to the corridors of the United Nations, from the founding of a non-governmental (...) organization dedicated to the liberation of East Timor to work aboard an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf. Kennedy shares the satisfactions of international humanitarian engagement--but also the disappointments of a faith betrayed. With humanitarianism's new power comes knowledge that even the most well-intentioned projects can create as many problems as they solve. Kennedy develops a checklist of the unforeseen consequences, blind spots, and biases of humanitarian work--from focusing too much on rules and too little on results to the ambiguities of waging war in the name of human rights. He explores the mix of altruism, self-doubt, self-congratulation, and simple disorientation that accompany efforts to bring humanitarian commitments to foreign settings. Writing for all those who wish that "globalization" could be more humane, Kennedy urges us to think and work more pragmatically. A work of unusual verve, honesty, and insight, this insider's account urges us to embrace the freedom and the responsibility that come with a deeper awareness of the dark sides of humanitarian governance. (shrink)

This article examines narratives, images, and stories that give insight to everyday experimentation and ethical self‐formation. I use the case of World Vision and its early leaders to unpack genealogies of American evangelical humanitarianism. Rather than seeking to identify American evangelicalism’s normative ethical stance, I aim to expand the discussion in anthropology of ethics on ethical self‐formation through examining the tensions, reflections, and processes of becoming among evangelical humanitarians. In doing so, I examine two focal areas of ethical self‐formation (...) among early World Vision leaders. The first is oscillation between and mixing of passion and compassion frameworks in the American evangelical imagination. Second, I identify a range of temporal frames that evangelicals draw on to make sense of and formulate ethical responses to human needs encountered abroad. (shrink)

This paper examines how Western humanitarianism has attempted to work through its simultaneous commitment to individualized moral universalism and ambivalence about substantive global egalitarianism via what is identified as humanitarian sentimentalism, namely an ensemble of narrative and visual mechanisms designed to cultivate charitable moral sentiments among Euro-American publics toward victims of humanitarian crises in the global South. After briefly discussing how the aforementioned ambivalence is rooted in the founding philosophical principles of humanitarianism, the paper examines the visual economy (...) of humanitarian sentimentalism, constituted through four iconographic tropes found in the history of Western representation of humanitarian emergencies and injustices (personification, massification, rescue, and care), each of which aims to trigger sentimentalizing responses on the part of viewers. Hence, it is argued that if the Western humanitarian movement's dependence on visually based sentimentalism has been effective in generating a sense of concern for distant others, such concern has not been converted into a more radical and egalitarian set of political practices of global solidarity, which would aim structurally to transform the current world order in an egalitarian manner to tackle the systemic sources of humanitarian crises. (shrink)

This book considers who should undertake humanitarian intervention in response to an ongoing or impending humanitarian crisis. It develops a normative account of legitimacy to assess not only current interveners, but also the desirability of potential reforms to the mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention.

Humanitarian intervention refers to organizations or states (or a coalition of organizations and states) taking action to alleviate human suffering within the borders of a sovereign state.

Our article contributes to debates on critical humanitarianism and critical dataset studies by examining the praxis of digital humanitarianism and the entanglement between what we know and how we know human suffering in large-scale disasters. We specifically focus on the “data work” carried out by various professionals in creating and curating datasets used by humanitarian actors to address both current and future crises. In doing so, we explore how these actors make sense of the development, maintenance and (re)use (...) of such datasets. This approach enables us to analyse the underlying principles and practices of data curation and to investigate the challenges that arise when humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors collaborate to produce and sustain these datasets. We also examine how these often tension-filled collaborations influence practitioners' understandings of humanitarian crises and their efforts to reconcile efficiency with humanitarian principles. We argue that while there is no such thing as a “humanitarian dataset”, there are contested processes of datafied humanitarian knowledge production that are situated in specific contexts. We suggest that the construction of these datasets redefines humanitarian knowledge production and is therefore critical to understanding the shifting politics of digital humanitarianism. Our findings highlight three key challenges that characterise the relationships among these groups: the fragmentation of the humanitarian data value chain; the asymmetries in expertise and skills among the diverse professionals involved in dataset curation; and the integration of small and big data in crisis analysis and prediction. These insights carry both epistemic and ethical implications, drawing attention to the problematic relationship between datafication and humanitarian principles. (shrink)

Our article contributes to debates on critical humanitarianism and critical dataset studies by examining the praxis of digital humanitarianism and the entanglement between what we know and how we know human suffering in large-scale disasters. We specifically focus on the “data work” carried out by various professionals in creating and curating datasets used by humanitarian actors to address both current and future crises. In doing so, we explore how these actors make sense of the development, maintenance and (re)use (...) of such datasets. This approach enables us to analyse the underlying principles and practices of data curation and to investigate the challenges that arise when humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors collaborate to produce and sustain these datasets. We also examine how these often tension-filled collaborations influence practitioners' understandings of humanitarian crises and their efforts to reconcile efficiency with humanitarian principles. We argue that while there is no such thing as a “humanitarian dataset”, there are contested processes of datafied humanitarian knowledge production that are situated in specific contexts. We suggest that the construction of these datasets redefines humanitarian knowledge production and is therefore critical to understanding the shifting politics of digital humanitarianism. Our findings highlight three key challenges that characterise the relationships among these groups: the fragmentation of the humanitarian data value chain; the asymmetries in expertise and skills among the diverse professionals involved in dataset curation; and the integration of small and big data in crisis analysis and prediction. These insights carry both epistemic and ethical implications, drawing attention to the problematic relationship between datafication and humanitarian principles. (shrink)

In this provocative and timely book, David Kennedy explores what can go awry when we put our humanitarian yearnings into action on a global scale--and what we can do in response.Rooted in Kennedy's own experience in numerous humanitarian efforts, the book examines campaigns for human rights, refugee protection, economic development, and for humanitarian limits to the conduct of war. It takes us from the jails of Uruguay to the corridors of the United Nations, from the founding of a non-governmental organization (...) dedicated to the liberation of East Timor to work aboard an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf.Kennedy shares the satisfactions of international humanitarian engagement--but also the disappointments of a faith betrayed. With humanitarianism's new power comes knowledge that even the most well-intentioned projects can create as many problems as they solve. Kennedy develops a checklist of the unforeseen consequences, blind spots, and biases of humanitarian work--from focusing too much on rules and too little on results to the ambiguities of waging war in the name of human rights. He explores the mix of altruism, self-doubt, self-congratulation, and simple disorientation that accompany efforts to bring humanitarian commitments to foreign settings.Writing for all those who wish that "globalization" could be more humane, Kennedy urges us to think and work more pragmatically.A work of unusual verve, honesty, and insight, this insider's account urges us to embrace the freedom and the responsibility that come with a deeper awareness of the dark sides of humanitarian governance. (shrink)

Humanitarian aid workers typically reject the accolade of hero as both untrue and undesirable. Untrue when they claim not to be acting beyond the call of duty, and undesirable so far as celebrating heroism risks elevating “heroic” choices over safer, and perhaps wiser ones. However, this leaves unresolved a tension between the denial of heroism and a sense in which certain humanitarian acts really appear heroic. And, the concern that in rejecting the aspiration to heroism an opportunity is lost to (...) inspire more and better humanitarian action. Having set out this problem in more detail in Part I, the argument in Part II will suggest that a virtue ethics approach to humanitarian moral obligations can make good sense of our intuitions concerning the role of heroism in humanitarian action. In Part III I will argue that at least “professional” humanitarians, instead of rejecting heroism, should aim to be heroes, in the sense of displaying a virtue of humanity in high-stakes contexts, because this is consistent with the aim of humanitarian action. Finally, some lingering problems of demandingness and motivation are considered. (shrink)

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), specifically Article 18 of the IV Geneva Convention, affords special protection to civilian hospitals. This special protection is waived, however, under certain circumstances specified in Article 19. Such conditions to waive the special protection of hospitals are now being used by Israel to justify the attack on civilian hospitals and healthcare institutions in Gaza. This paper critically evaluates Article 19 and the conditions for the removal of the immunity of hospitals in general and in the specific (...) case of Gaza. The substance and language of Article 19 are found to be flawed in this case. The paper thus argues that Article 19 should be revised to better reflect the special protection hospitals generally and in Gaza specifically should have. This paper is primarily geared at fellow bioethicists who wish to contribute to and lament the injustices occurring in Gaza and elsewhere but are unsure as to how ethical arguments may do so. This paper also addresses international law scholars, inviting further commentary on a novel and ambitious ethical argument to revise long-standing international law. Additionally, the paper is a call to the wider, global public and healthcare providers to actively condemn unjust attacks on healthcare in Gaza and elsewhere in the world. Lastly, the paper is written in a meager attempt at standing in solidarity with the People in Gaza and elsewhere whose healthcare systems are being targeted by unjust governments. (shrink)

"The book offers contrasting views of humanitarian intervention - a war aimed at ending tyranny. Fernando Tesaon.

Humanitarianism has a narrative problem. Far too often, aid to Africa is envisioned through a tale of Western heroes saving African sufferers. While labeling white savior narratives has become a familiar gesture, it doesn't tell us much about the story as story. Humanitarian Fictions aims to understand the workings of humanitarian literature, as they engage with and critique narratives of Africa. Overlapping with but distinct from human rights, humanitarianism centers on a relationship of assistance, focusing less on rights (...) than on needs, less on legal frameworks than moral ones, less on the problem than on the nonstate solution. Tracing the white savior narrative back to religious missionaries of the nineteenth century, Humanitarian Fiction reveals the influence of religious thought on seemingly secular institutions and uncovers a spiritual, collectivist streak in the discourse of humanity. Because the humanitarian model of care transcends the boundaries of the state, and its networks touch much of the globe, Humanitarian Fictions redraws the boundaries of literary classification based on a shared problem space rather than a shared national space. The book maps a transnational vein of Anglophone literature about Africa that features missionaries, humanitarians, and their so-called beneficiaries. Putting humanitarian thought in conversation with postcolonial critique, this book brings together African, British, and U.S. writers typically read within separate traditions. Paustian shows how the novel--with its profound sensitivity to narrative--can enrich the critique of white saviorism while also imagining alternatives that give African agency its due. (shrink)

Abstract The article addresses three aspects of the humanitarian intervention doctrine. It argues, first, that the value of sovereignty rests on the justified social processes of the target state ? the horizontal contract. Foreign interventions, even when otherwise justified, must respect the horizontal contract. In contrast, morally objectionable social processes (such as the subjection of women) are not protected by sovereignty (intervention, of course, may be banned for other reasons). In addition, tyrants have no moral protection against interventions directed at (...) them. Second, the article addresses the internal legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. It concludes that the liberal state may only use voluntary soldiers (either the voluntary army or mercenaries) to conduct humanitarian intervention. Conscription for that purpose is not permissible. The article shows that the long-standing criticism of mercenaries stems from a romantic prejudice and is thus unfair. Third, the article makes a distinction between intention (the determination to perform an action) and motive (a further goal that the agent seeks with that action) and shows that only intention is relevant for humanitarian intervention. A justified humanitarian intervention requires the intention to liberate the victims, but not necessarily a good further motive. It shows how mainstream doctrine has impermissibly confused the two concepts. (shrink)

The integration of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and algorithms into development aid and relief efforts has brought datafication processes to the forefront of contemporary humanitarianism. This article contributes to critical studies of (big) data in humanitarianism by introducing insights from the humanitarian literature on distance and proximity. It highlights three ways in which the mobilization of big data to convey “local” perceptions of needs—what we call datafied localization—can perpetuate epistemic injustices and paternalistic logics in humanitarian practice. First, we (...) argue that big data represents a recontextualization rather than a decontextualization of reality, underscoring that data only becomes knowledge through contextualized interpretation. Second, we propose that the question of defining the local becomes even more pertinent in a datafied version of reality as representation takes place at a distance. Third, we argue that the introduction of big data into localization efforts risks reducing local communities to mere data suppliers, thereby reproducing the power imbalances that localization was meant to counter. (shrink)

The integration of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and algorithms into development aid and relief efforts has brought datafication processes to the forefront of contemporary humanitarianism. This article contributes to critical studies of (big) data in humanitarianism by introducing insights from the humanitarian literature on distance and proximity. It highlights three ways in which the mobilization of big data to convey “local” perceptions of needs—what we call datafied localization—can perpetuate epistemic injustices and paternalistic logics in humanitarian practice. First, we (...) argue that big data represents a recontextualization rather than a decontextualization of reality, underscoring that data only becomes knowledge through contextualized interpretation. Second, we propose that the question of defining the local becomes even more pertinent in a datafied version of reality as representation takes place at a distance. Third, we argue that the introduction of big data into localization efforts risks reducing local communities to mere data suppliers, thereby reproducing the power imbalances that localization was meant to counter. (shrink)

I argue here that certain species of war, namely humanitarian military interventions (HMIs), can be obligatory within particular contexts. Specifically, I look at the notion of HMIs through the lens of just war theory and argue that when a minimal account of jus ad bellum implies that an intervention is permissible, it also implies that it is obligatory. I begin by clarifying the jus ad bellum conditions (such as just cause, right intentions, etc.) under which an intervention is permissible. I (...) then turn to the claim that permissibility necessitates obligation, by first showing that whenever an intervention is permissible, it is also minimally decent. Second, I show that minimally decent actions are morally obligatory by arguing that the notion of minimal decency is a conceptual bridge between negative and positive duties. Third, I argue that performing minimally decent actions is necessary for a state to be just. Ultimately, my conclusion arises from the following observation: if a humanitarian crisis is bad enough for one to hold that it is permissible to breach sovereignty of a nation, then it is bad enough to hold that there is an obligation to intervene. (shrink)

Jay Barney explores two theories of profit—positioning theory and resource-based theory—and their implications for the relationship between profit and societal welfare. Positioning theory suggests that profits stem from a firm’s ability to exploit barriers to competition, often at the expense of social welfare. Resource-based theory, on the other hand, ties profits to a firm’s unique capabilities to deliver valued goods, which can align with enhancing societal welfare when consumers prioritize socially beneficial qualities. However, Barney’s analysis appears to assume that profit-driven (...) organizations cannot or should not aim at social welfare independently of profit motives. This chapter challenges this assumption by presenting four counterexamples: the CSR officer leveraging societal contributions for regulatory support, the price-gouging heroin dealer whose monopoly inadvertently reduces societal harm, the humanitarian monopolist who uses profits for altruistic purposes, and the fair-trade branding guru whose competitive advantage is rooted in ethical practices. These examples highlight consumer irrationality and externalities, both conditions that complicate the alignment of profit and societal welfare. Ultimately, the critique argues that profit-seeking organizations can sometimes pursue societal welfare non-instrumentally, particularly in cases of monopolistic power or resource-based advantages. The analysis concludes that business strategy must reconsider its assumptions about the incompatibility of profit and social good, as real-world conditions often permit—and sometimes necessitate—pro-social behavior independent of profit motives. (shrink)

The practice of humanitarian intervention, which involves one state intervening militarily into another state in order to prevent abuses of human rights, raises a plethora of ethical and political issues. How is foreign intervention to be reconciled with state sovereignty? Is intervention a threat to international peace and stability? Are alien values being imposed on the target society? Each of these questions has been thoroughly explored by both philosophers and jurists. But the notion that a state infringes the rights of (...) its own citizens by waging war to defend the human rights of foreigners has received relatively little attention. The only thorough philosophical exploration of this problem to date - Allen Buchanan's “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention” - is the focus of this paper. My aim here is not to offer a resolution to the “internal” problem, but simply to show that Buchanan misrepresents it in several important respects. First, Buchanan understates the strength of this objection: it is much more resilient than he gives it credit for. Secondly, he overstates its scope, or the range of humanitarian interventions to which it applies. And finally, Buchanan is mistaken to think that whether or not an intervening state fulfils the rights of its own citizens can be determined prior to, and therefore independently of, the question of whether its actions are consistent with the rights of the society targeted by the intervention. (shrink)

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian (...) reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Chris Brown’s work can help us negotiate the key dilemmas of humanitarian action. It takes the classic humanitarian principles—neutrality, impartiality, independence and humanity—as entry points for international political theorists to engage with this fascinating practice. Brown’s suspicion of anti-politics casts doubt on the possibility of humanitarian neutrality and independence. His defence of selective humanitarianism helps to de-fetishise the idea of impartiality. His notion of practical judgement fits well with the real politics of humanitarianism, and (...) his understanding of tragedy provides a space for humanitarians to consider the challenges they face in attempting to uphold humanity. Ultimately, Brown’s situated internationalism may be a better vector for humanitarian politics than some variants of cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

Philosophical notions of humanitarianism – duties based in beneficence that apply to humanity generally – are largely focused on personal duty as opposed to official development assistance, or foreign aid, between nations. To rectify this gap in the literature, I argue that, from the point of view of donor nations, their humanitarian obligations are met when they have given enough of their fair share of resources, and from the point of view of recipient nations, they have received enough when (...) they have reached a threshold of capabilities. I conclude that a future theory of humanitarian obligations ought to take into account the disparate, and often conflicting, interests of nations as benefactors or as recipients of aid. (shrink)

This work offers an analysis of all the legal and moral issues surrounding humanitarian intervention: the deaths of innocent persons and the Doctrine of Double Effect Governmental legitimacy - The Doctrine of Effective Political Control; UN Charter and evaluation of the Nicaragua ruling; The Morality of not intervening; US-led invasion of Iraq; Humanitarian intervention authorised by the UN Security Council - Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia among others highlight NATO's intervention in Kosovo; The Nicaragua Decision; and The precedents of (...) Panama, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The book's features include: a new framework based on the doctrine of double effect; basic principles of international ethics; outline of the moral argument for humanitarian intervention; explores the morality and legality of military action to end tyranny or anarchy; arguments in a much more detailed and complete fashion than in previous editions; in-depth examination of philosophy of international law; the relationship between custom and moral theory; new discussion of the question of right authority; and a full analysis of recent interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. book addresses a broad interdisciplinary audience of international lawyers, philosophers, and political scientists. In this new edition, the author responds to critics while updating the discussion in the light of the momentous events that took place at the beginning of the new millennium. (shrink)

Medical professionals providing humanitarian aid in times of crisis face complicated ethical and clinical challenges. Today, humanitarian aid is given in accordance with existing guidelines developed by international humanitarian organizations and defined by international law. This paper considers the ethical aspects and frameworks of an atypical humanitarian project, namely one that provides medical support through an Israeli civilian hospital to Syrian Civil War casualties. We explore new ethical questions in this unique situation that pose a serious challenge for the medical (...) community and conventional ethical norms, a challenge Israeli medical staff meet on a daily basis. Before discussing the ethical challenges, we give a description of the project and its unique status. (shrink)

This article aims to demonstrate how the impact of humanitarian crises on health outcomes is related to social justice issues, even when these crises are brought upon by natural disasters. Pre-existing inequalities between individuals and social groups within a community affect in important and complex ways the health disparities which result from natural disasters. Drawing on the thought-provoking work of Paul Farmer, my main hypothesis is that socio-political factors prior to natural disasters determine ‘structured health risks’ that humanitarian crises will (...) necessarily exacerbate. To adequately respond to these structured health risks, medical humanitarianism cannot abide by an apolitical approach which mainly focuses on emergency relief. A more comprehensive analysis of the socio-political aspects of the health impact of humanitarian crises indicates that a more comprehensive approach to medical humanitarianism is necessary. This has three implications. First, a coherent account of medical humanitarianism needs to assess the international dimension of structural injustice that leads to structured health disparities. Second, this comprehensive approach to medical humanitarianism supports the ‘denaturalization of natural disasters’ argument. Third, medical humanitarianism should be organized around a broader and more complex approach of overlapping sequences which bridge emergency relief, reconstruction and development through a better aligned, orchestrated and coherent international effort. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt spent much of his life arguing against human rights. While this may not come as a surprise, a closer examination of The Concept of the Political reveals that Schmitt’s critique of Liberal humanitarianism is itself rooted in a concept of the humanum as a sphere of substantive moral and political conflict. As an analysis of Schmitt’s concept of the enemy shows, this humanum serves as an argument for the necessity of a juristic distinction between enemy and foe. (...) For, only by distinguishing between the relativized enemy and the absolute foe, Schmitt argues, will we be able to distinguish create a space for particularly political action. Having revealed the framework of mediated moral conflict, in which Schmitt conceives of political action, I then turn to consider Schmitt’s minimalist proposal for a positive definition of a “universal jus commune” and assess its significance for a discussion of human rights. (shrink)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offers a dilemma for international political theory. ICRC's success as a humanitarian actor in international conflict is credited to its neutral stance. However, ICRC neutrality is vulnerable to serious challenges regarding its supposed avoidance of the political. ICRC neutrality is commonly dismissed as either illusory or impossible. The problem is not grounded in the principle of neutrality itself, though, but rather in the lack of critical engagement with what it means to be (...) neutral on a humanitarian register. ICRC misreads the demands of neutrality in such ways as to permit both partiality and irresponsibility to its mission. Drawing from Roland Barthes' address of the neutral, I argue that international humanitarianism is possible as a neutral movement but that this neutrality can only be such through vigorous and fundamentally political movement responsible to the goals of human well-being and dignity as questions. (shrink)

The current proliferation of restitutive claims in response to expropriation in armed conflicts occurs at the interstices of humanitarianism and transitional justice. Restitution indicates the expansion of the humanitarian mandate from providing immediate relief to those who have suffered loss, to engaging in remedial, redressive and restorative practices. That intersection between the humanitarian goals and post-conflict justice is one of the signs of ‘new’ forms and ethos of humanitarianism. This article offers a critical reading of the ‘restitutive desire’ (...) underpinning the humanitarian restitutive politics, which it relates to political fantasies of reversibility and undoing. It locates the genealogy of restitution in Émile Durkheim’s work on the division of labour, individualization and the distinction between repressive and restitutive law. It argues that in the Durkheimian socio-legal tradition restitution figures as a return of ‘matters to their former status’ and of ‘disturbed relationships to their normal form’. It then turns to Sigmund Freud’s essay on Daniel Schreber, which defines restitution not as procedure of undoing, but as a reparative practice that nevertheless affirms the subject’s ‘catastrophic loss of the world’. The Freudian perspective uncouples restitution and undoing and asks about the possibility of restitutive politics haunted by unrectifiable loss. (shrink)

In international law, ‘humanitarian intervention’ refers to the use of military force by one nation or group of nations to stop genocide or other gross human rights violations in another sovereign nation. If humanitarian intervention is conceived as military in nature, it makes sense that only the most horrible, massive, and violent violations of human rights can justify intervention. Yet, that leaves many serious evils beyond the scope of legal intervention. In particular, violations of women's rights and freedoms often go (...) unchecked. To address this problem, I begin from two basic questions: When are violations of human rights sufficiently serious to require an international response of some sort? What should that response be? By re-orienting the aim and justification of international law to focus on individual autonomy rather than on peace between nations, I argue that women's rights violations other than genocide and mass rape can warrant intervention. Military intervention is often counter-productive to the aim of achieving autonomy, however. I suggest a range of responses to human rights violations that includes military intervention as one end of the spectrum, and combine this with a greater understanding of the scope of human rights violations that require international response. (shrink)

We tend to think that mass atrocities and attempted genocides call for humanitarian intervention by other states. (Nonviolent intervention if possible, military intervention if need be.) In this chapter, I discuss these two related claims in turn. What, if anything, justifies humanitarian intervention in certain states by other states? Ought such interventions, if justified, be pacifist in nature, or is it legitimate in some cases to intervene violently? To discuss these questions, I draw primarily on principles and arguments found in (...) just war theory, pacifism, international relations, and analytic political philosophy more generally. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper explores how specific Mahāyāna ethics, namely the interpretation of the Lotus Sūtra by Zhiyi (536–597), Nichiren (1222–1282) and Sōka Gakkai (1930–), can relate to core principles of international humanitarian law (IHL). In particular, it also assesses and discusses how Sōka Gakkai’s three key doctrines (the dignity of life, the variability of life and the interconnectedness of life) are congruent with some IHL principles. The paper then analyses how Buddhist organisations today can be advocates of IHL and specifically (...) looks at how Sōka Gakkai agrees with – and commits to – IHL in terms of the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSome suggest that the duty of humanitarian intervention should be discharged by states that are historically responsible for the occurrence of violence. A fundamental problem with this suggestion is that historically responsible states might be ill-suited to intervene because they are unlikely to enjoy support from the local population. Cécile Fabre has suggested a way around that problem, arguing that responsible states ought to pay for humanitarian interventions even though they ought not to take part in the military operations. We (...) claim that Fabre’s idea is subject to two concerns. First, the duty to perform might not be appropriately transferrable from the historically responsible state to another state because it would allow the primary duty bearer to escape the worst costs of intervention. Second, an intervention might be as unlikely to generate local support when a historically responsible state pays for an intervention as when it performs it. These problems are enough to cast doubt on Fabr... (shrink)

How has the international community responded to humanitarian crises after the end of the Cold War? While optimistic ideational perspectives on global governance stress the importance of humanitarian norms and argue that humanitarian crises have been increasingly addressed, more skeptical realist accounts point to material interests and maintain that these responses have remained highly selective. In empirical terms, however, we know very little about the actual extent of selectivity since, so far, the international community’s reaction to humanitarian crises has not (...) been systematically examined. This article addresses this gap by empirically examining the extent and the nature of the selectivity of humanitarian crises. To do so, the most severe humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era are identified and examined for whether and how the international community responded. This study considers different modes of crisis response (ranging from inaction to military intervention) and different actors (including states, international institutions, and nonstate actors), yielding a more precise picture of the alleged “selectivity gap” and a number of theoretical implications for contemporary global security governance. (shrink)

This chapter argues that, because humanitarian intervention typically involves the military of one state attempting to overthrow another state ’s government, it gives rise to different moral questions from simple cases of interpersonal defensive violence. State sovereignty not only protects institutions within a society that contribute to the satisfaction of individuals’ interests and that cannot be easily restored once overthrown; it also plays a role in the constitution of those interests, which cannot be assumed to be invariant across different forms (...) of social life. As a result, humanitarian intervention will frequently give rise to incommensurability between the pre-intervention and post-intervention states of affairs. The reasons against violating sovereignty, together with reasons for conservativism in action that arise in circumstances of incommensurable value, mean that the threshold for the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention is high. The chapter concludes by outlining how humanitarian intervention might be internationalized, making it easier to justify. (shrink)

The current mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention are inadequate. As the crisis in Darfur has highlighted, the international community lacks both the willingness to undertake humanitarian intervention and the ability to do so legitimately. This article considers a cosmopolitan solution to these problems: the creation of a standing army for the United Nations. There have been a number of proposals for such a force, including many recently. However, they contain two central flaws: the force proposed would be, firstly, too (...) small and, secondly, too dependent on major states. Accordingly, I argue that, to be a substantial improvement on the current situation, such a force would need to be, firstly, much larger and, secondly, in the hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions. This two-part solution would solve the problems faced by current interveners, but is unlikely to be realised soon. Accordingly, I argue that our immediate efforts should instead be concentrated on improving regional organisations' ability to intervene. (shrink)

The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention has been contested for more than a century, yet pressure for such intervention persists. Normative evolution and institutional design have been closely linked since the first debates over humanitarian intervention more than a century ago. Three norms have competed in shaping state practice and the normative discourse: human rights, peace preservation, and sovereignty. The rebalancing of these norms over time, most recently as the state’s responsibility to protect, has reflected specific international institutional environments. The contemporary (...) legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is based on UN Security Council authorization of the use of force. Although the Security Council is often viewed as representative of great-power influence, international acceptance of its role is based on the role of non-permanent members and their support for the sovereignty norm. The current rebalanced norms supporting humanitarian intervention, institutional bias that protects state sovereignty, and the changing character of mass violence may undermine the tenuous contemporary legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Normative adjustments and new institutional designs are required to insure the legitimacy of international action that protects populations against mass violence. (shrink)

However much one may wish for nonviolent solutions to the problems of unjust and unrestrained human violence that Glover explores in Humanity, some of those problems at present require violent responses. One cannot read his account of the Clinton administration’s campaign to sabotage efforts to stop the massacre in Rwanda in 1994 – a campaign motivated by fear that American involvement would cost American lives and therefore votes – without concluding that Glover himself believes that military intervention was morally required (...) in that case. Military intervention in another state that is intended to stop one group within that state from brutally persecuting or violating the human rights of members of another group is now known as “humanitarian intervention.” Those against whom the intervention is directed are almost always the government and its supporters, though this is not a necessary feature of humanitarian intervention. It is, however, a conceptual condition of humanitarian intervention that it does not occur at the request or with the consent of the government. The use of force within another state with the consent of the government counts as assistance rather than intervention. The principal reason that humanitarian intervention is contentious is that it seems to violate the target state’s sovereign right to control its own domestic affairs. Because humanitarian intervention is a response to human rights violations within the target state, it is regarded as altogether different from wars of defense against aggression. Indeed, since aggression is normally understood to be war against a state that.. (shrink)

Tesón's “humanitarian rationales” for the war in Iraq strain the traditional understanding of humanitarian intervention: The first, that the war was fought to overthrow a tyrant. The second, that it was a defense strategy establishing democratic regimes peacefully, but by force if necessary.

We are living in the “era of human rights,” with increasing attention to them following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Humanitarian interventions are mechanisms aimed to protecting human rights and reducing suffering, yet they pose ethical challenges due to the use of lethal force and its resulting harm to civilians. In this paper I am attempting to answer the question: Does humanitarian intervention enhance human rights or violate them in other ways? Could it be a cover for other goals? (...) In an attempt to answer this question, the paper discusses the concept of humanitarian intervention and its relation to human rights, along with some conditions for such intervention and the ethical challenges of using lethal force. Finally, the paper presents a case study: Darfur as an example. (shrink)

When discussing whether or not our elected governments should intervene to end genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in other countries, the humanitarian intervention debate has largely been assuming that liberal democracies bear no responsibility for the injustice at hand: someone else is committing shameful acts; we are merely considering whether or not we have a positive duty to do something about it. Here I argue that there are important instances in which this dominant third party perspective (...) (TPP) is empirically false and normatively misguided. Much before our positive ?responsibility to protect? potential victims from mass atrocities, we violate our negative duty not to harm these victims. Employing work by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar, I argue that this harm currently comes about as our elected governments either buy, or allow our corporations to buy, the world's most precious resources from brutal dictators and warlords, who dominate some of the states that are at the heart of intervention discussions. In these cases, democracies' most immediate duty is not intervention but rather humanitarian disintervention: boycotting severely oppressive regimes, and in particular stopping to recognizing these regimes ? whether dictators or civil warriors ? as possessing legitimate authority to sell their peoples' resources. I begin with a brief survey of the intervention literature, followed by the foundations for the disintervention alternative. I then elaborate the conceptual and practical advantages of disintervention, concluding with thoughts on the reasons for TPP's lasting dominance. (shrink)

The current mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention are inadequate. As the crisis in Darfur has highlighted, the international community lacks both the willingness to undertake humanitarian intervention and the ability to do so legitimately. This article considers a cosmopolitan solution to these problems: the creation of a standing army for the United Nations. There have been a number of proposals for such a force, including many recently. However, they contain two central flaws: the force proposed would be, firstly, too (...) small and, secondly, too dependent on major states. Accordingly, I argue that, to be a substantial improvement on the current situation, such a force would need to be, firstly, much larger and, secondly, in the hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions. This two-part solution would solve the problems faced by current interveners, but is unlikely to be realised soon. Accordingly, I argue that our immediate efforts should instead be concentrated on improving regional organisations' ability to intervene. (shrink)