The concept of precision medicine aims to tailor treatment based on data unique to the patient. An example is the use of genetic data from malignant tumours to select the most appropriate oncological treatment. The competing interests of utilitarianism and egoism create dilemmas for decisions regarding investment in precision medicine. The need to balance the perceived rights and needs of individuals against those of society as a whole is an on-going challenge in the distribution of limited health service resources. There (...) is need for proper planning, organisation and investment into precision medicine to cope with the consequences of both direct-to-consumer and healthcare-directed genetic testing for genetic counselling, therapeutics and diagnostic networks. Consideration needs to be given to providing adequate time and training to allow for meaningful shared decision-making with patients and there is a strong case in support of a hub-and-spoke model to provide rapid, solid tumour genetic mutational analysis to prevent patients missing out on beneficial treatments. (shrink)

Intelligence metrics based on benchmark performance or population norms are useful for measuring comparative ability within defined test environments, but they do not directly evaluate the structural coherence of an agent’s trajectory across time, domains, and perturbations. This article introduces Reflexive Signature Intelligence (RSI) as a bounded theoretical framework for addressing that different problem. RSI is developed within a causal-symmetric informational perspective in which intelligence is understood as the capacity of a system to maintain and restore alignment with a structurally (...) constrained invariant without collapsing the open gradient of development. On this basis, the paper formulates the Principle of Bounded Subjectivity and the Prohibition of Finality as framework-level principles, arguing that intelligence should be assessed not as arrival at a completed end state but as the quality of an asymptotic trajectory. The framework is then operationalized on two coupled levels: a micro-level proposed as a future measurement program linked heuristically to resilience and prediction-error dynamics, and a macro-level expressed through five dimensions of structural integrity, including reflexive regulation, cross-domain integration, internal consistency, stabilization, and signature-setting. The article concludes by outlining implications for AI evaluation and alignment, with particular relevance for distinguishing full agents, partial systems, and human–AI composite configurations. (shrink)

The Principles of Constitutionalism examines the principles which speak to the construction and interaction of state institutions. This article responds to some criticisms of that book, in particular, those which question the universalizability of the principles, the relationship between state institutions and the people of the state, the place of democracy within constitutionalism, and the role of finality in state decision-making. It is argued that it is the link between the people and institutions, mediated by democracy, that both explains (...) and justifies the state’s claim to act as the final arbiter of the obligations of its people. (shrink)

According to the Free Will Explanation of a traditional view of hell, human freedom explains why some people are in hell. It also explains hell’s punishment and finality: persons in hell have freely developed moral vices that are their own punishment and that make repentance psychologically impossible. So, even though God continues to desire reconciliation with persons in hell, damned persons do not want reconciliation with God. But this moral vice explanation of hell’s finality is implausible. I argue (...) that God can and would make direct or indirect alterations in their character to give them new motivational reasons that re-enable their freedom to repent. Subsequently, I argue that it is probable that each damned person will be saved eventually, because there is a potential infinity of opportunities for free repentance. Thus, if the Free Will Explanation’s descriptions of hell and divine love are correct, it is highly probable that each person in hell escapes to heaven. (shrink)

In this paper, I touch on the holotic structure of the ideas of unity, identity and finality, using the word “holotic” to refer to a theory that includes both partonomic (or mereological) wholes and taxonomic (or diairological) wholes. In the second section, I expound on two classifications of wholes and two classifications of the types of parts I deem relevant to the ideas of unity, identity and finality. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss how these three (...) ideas acquire different significance depending on the type of totalities and parts involved. (shrink)

This article develops a uniform interpretation of "pursuit for the sake of an end", explaining what an "unqualified final" end (sought solely for its own sake) offers that a (merely) final one does not and providing an improved account of what Aristotle means by an "ultimate end". This interpretation sheds light on (1) the regress argument at the outset of "N.E." I.2, (2) the way Aristotle argues for the existence of a highest good, (3) the special contribution of "self-sufficiency" (autarkeia) (...) within that good, and (4) the potential flexibility of Aristotle's view about the content of the highest good. (shrink)

What is counter-finality? Who, or what, is the agent of counter-finality? In the Critique of Dialectical Reason , Sartre employs a complicated and multivalent notion of counter-finality, the reversal of the finality intended by an agent in different contexts and at different levels of complexity. Sartre's concept of counter-finality is read here as an attempt to rethink and broaden the traditional Marxist notion of commodity fetishism as a tragic dialectic of human history whose final act (...) has yet to play out. The article analyses and explicates Sartre's complex concept of counter-finality, focusing on material antipraxis. (shrink)

A materialist construction of semiosis requires system embodiment at particular locales, in order to function as systems of interpretance. I propose that we can use a systemic model of scientific measurement to construct a systems view of semiosis. I further suggest that the categories required to understand that process can be used as templates when generalizing to biosemiosis and beyond. The viewpoint I advance here is that of natural philosophy—which, once granted, incurs no principled block to further generalization all the (...) way to pansemiotics—nearer to Peirce’s own very general perspective. This project requires a hylozooic framework, which I present in the form of a specification hierarchy, whereby physical dynamics subsume all other transactions at more highly developed integrative levels. The upshot of the paper is a proposal that meanings can be assimilated most generally to final causes. (shrink)

Brain death, or death by neurological criteria (BD/DNC) is the permanent loss of brain function as defined by an unresponsive coma, loss of brainstem reflexes, and the ability to breathe without me...

Modus vivendi theories are caught in an uneasy relationship with a substantive, normative pluralism of toleration and a conceptual and structural awareness of the unavoidability of sociopolitical diversity and contestation. The chapter explores the semantic space occupied by modus vivendi and the kind of political thinking it represents, in particular as a variant of the quest for order and the inevitability of ranking priorities. The implicit boundary drawn by ‘modus vivendi’ theorists between solid blocs of ideas and practices is questioned. (...) When larger magnification orders are employed, points of contact and intertwining may reveal a messiness with which conventional modus vivendi approaches cannot engage. Modus vivendi would consequently benefit from a micro-analysis of its various components instead of being subject to broad-brush treatment, particularly in view of a morphological approach to political concepts. Modus vivendi is also examined in contrast to consensus theories, compromise theories, and agonism, and some of its different forms—fragmentation, segmentation, and asymmetry—are discussed. Finally, modus vivendi is interrogated as an interpretative rather than a prescriptive thought-practice, relating it to a realism based on the ascertainable core characteristics of the political. (shrink)

This text is an exploration of the metaphysical principle, "Every agent acts for an end." It is split into two parts, the first being primarily pedagogical and general, the second topical. In the first part, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange sets forth the basics of the Aristotelian metaphysics of teleology, defending its place as a central point of metaphysics. After defending its per se nota character, he summarizes a number of main corollaries to the principle, primarily within the perspective established by traditional Thomistic (...) accounts of metaphysics, doing so in a way that is pedagogically sensitive yet speculatively profound. In the second half, he gathers together a number of articles which he had written, each having some connection with themes concerning teleology. Thematically, the texts consider the finality and teleology of the human intellect and will, along with the way that the principle of finality sheds light on certain problems associated with the distinction between faith and reason. Finally, the text ends with an important essay on the principle of the mutual interdependence of causes, causae ad invicem sunt causae, sed in diverso genere. (shrink)

D. Z. Phillips thinks that the religious concept of immortality should necessarily be construed as not involving any idea of the self existing after death. In this paper it will be argued that his attempt to support this view on the basis of a descriptive analysis of the self-renouncing character of faith is inadequate. The notion of the finality of death is not essential to, nor inseparable from, a religious conception in which the nothingness of the self is stressed. (...) That this is so is suggested by the existence of religious notions of the nothingness of the self which are religious, in a sense comparable to that implied by Phillips, only in combination with a view of death as not being a termination of the self. (shrink)

El objetivo de mi trabajo estriba en reconocer sucintamente algunos de los puntos principales en que se fundamenta la posición de Nietzsche en relación a la teleología natural. El modo de atajar la cuestión será, en esta oportunidad, oponer la visión de Nietzsche al estado en que dejó Schopenhauer la cuestión. Para ello, abordaré en primer lugar algunos de los elementos que emparentan ambos proyectos y, en segundo lugar, un aspecto clave que parece alejarlos irremediablemente. Además de esclarecer este último (...) aspecto, intentaré un acercamiento a la especificidad y originalidad del proyecto nietzscheano sobre el tema. (shrink)