If personhood is the quality or condition of being an individual person, brainhood could name the quality or condition of being a brain. This ontological quality would define the `cerebral subject' that has, at least in industrialized and highly medicalized societies, gained numerous social inscriptions since the mid-20th century. This article explores the historical development of brainhood. It suggests that the brain is necessarily the location of the `modern self', and that, consequently, the cerebral subject is the anthropological figure (...) inherent to modernity (at least insofar as modernity gives supreme value to the individual as autonomous agent of choice and initiative). It further argues that the ideology of brainhood impelled neuroscientific investigation much more than it resulted from it, and sketches how an expanding constellation of neurocultural discourses and practices embodies and sustains that ideology. (shrink)

This volume is mandatory reading for anyone who wants to understand the philosophic perspective of Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924-1998) and to grasp the coherence of his thought.

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. (...) I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position. (shrink)

Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experience. Her argument is the claim that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond and some other ambiguous figure representationalism (...) fails to offer a unified account of how representational content makes them ambiguous. In this paper, I aim, first, to offer a representationalist account of ambiguous figures and, second, to examine and rebut Macpherson’s arguments. My main point is that in each ambiguous figure Macpherson discusses there are differences in representational content that can explain differences in phenomenal character or content. The representational differences are due to the ways the Cartesian frame of reference in which perceptual content is always cast cuts the figure, underlying different properties of the figure with respect to the axes of the Cartesian frame of reference. (shrink)

I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds (...) in compound sentences. The standard view cannot account for this fact. I sketch out a speech-act theoretic framework that can. But in accepting this alternative framework we are giving up on the whole idea of an autonomous semantics. (shrink)

Art, Language and Figure in Merleau-Ponty: Excursions in Hyper-Dialectic considers Merleau-Ponty's later ontology of language in the light of his "figured philosophy," which places the work of art at the centre of its investigation. Kaushik argues that, since for Merleau-Ponty the work of art actualizes a sensible ontology that would otherwise be invisible to the history of dialectics, it undermines the fundamental difference between being and linguistic structures. Art, Language and Figure in Merleau-Ponty takes up the radical task (...) of the figured philosophy to render sensible and linguistic spaces prior to the thought of their separation. Kaushik situates Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of Saussure's linguistic system, as well as a more general repudiation of the act of inscribing in favour of an abstracted textual meaning, in this context. Following the artists most important to Merleau-Ponty's own writings on art, such as Paul Klee and his fascination with hieroglyphics, and extending these analyses to more recent 21st Century artists such as Cy Twombly, Kaushik takes an excursion into the places where art and language, image and text, drawing and writing, figure and discourse, are interlaced in Merleau-Ponty's last ontology. In view of these intersections, Kaushik ultimately argues, the work of art gives us the spaces where the possibilities of philosophy, both past and future, reside. As the first sustained treatment into the relationship between art and language, this is an important contribution to Meleau-Ponty's philosophy and scholars of aesthetics. (shrink)

The writings by the 'state philosophers' of nineteenth-century France are often seen, either as entirely driven by political or ideological concerns, or reduced to mere history of philosophy. Hence, ironically, those who established the philosophical canon that still now informs philosophy teaching in France were themselves excluded from that canon. Using the heuristic concept of a philosophical figure, this contribution intends to show how, for these philosophers, historiography represented a seemingly inoffensive, but in reality extremely efficient, means of searching (...) out philosophical alternatives to the institutionally dominant philosophy of Victor Cousin (1792-1867). Focalizing on the almost forgotten case of Joseph-Marie Degérando (1772-1842), I show how he used the philosophical figure of Descartes and how he used it to counter Cousin. (shrink)

Provides an overview and examples of what impossible figures are, and explains their interest to many different disciplines including philosophy, psychology, art and mathematics.

Identifying rhetorical figures with marginal to non-existent lexico-syntactic signatures poses significant challenges for computational approaches reliant upon structural definitions or descriptions. One such figure is prolepsis ([Formula: see text]ó[Formula: see text]), which this essay charts out in some detail, addressing the challenges and the benefits of rendering such figures computationally tractable through the use of argument schemes with attention to metadiscursive or macro-discursive norms offered by pragma-dialectical traditions.

Identifying rhetorical figures with marginal to non-existent lexico-syntactic signatures poses significant challenges for computational approaches reliant upon structural definitions or descriptions. One such figure is prolepsis ([Formula: see text]ó[Formula: see text]), which this essay charts out in some detail, addressing the challenges and the benefits of rendering such figures computationally tractable through the use of argument schemes with attention to metadiscursive or macro-discursive norms offered by pragma-dialectical traditions.

How baroque was Spinoza in his treatment of the prophets? I examine this question by comparing the pictorial treatments of Moses from the Netherlands to Spinoza’s treatment of Moses at the beginning of the Theological Political Treatise. I concentrate on two representations of Moses descending from mount Sinai, one by Ferdinand Bol and the other by Rembrandt. Of particular importance is the idea of hierarchy. I will argue that Spinoza takes an ambiguous position in relation to baroque, on the one (...) hand following the baroque’s drastic spatiotemporal condensation that questions hierarchies, but on the other refusing the baroque’s representation of unmediated or unjustified sovereign violence. (shrink)

Laura Berchielli - Color, Space and Figure in Locke: An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 47-65 Color, Space, and Figure in Locke: An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem Laura Berchielli THIS IS HOW LOCKE, in the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, introduces a question that had been suggested to him in a letter from William Molyneux:... I shall here insert a (...) Problem of that very Ingenious and Studious promoter of Knowledge, the Learned and Worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleased to send me in a Letter some Months since; and it is this: Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. Quaere, Whether by his Sight, before he touch'd them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube. In the standard interpretation of the Molyneux problem as presented in Locke, the question is always linked to the general issue of differences in the ideas of figure received by the various senses. This interpretation -- put forward by Berkeley --says that for Locke, the ideas of figure produced by sight are specifically different from.. (shrink)

Interpreting Figurative Meaning critically evaluates the recent empirical work from psycholinguistics and neuroscience examining the successes and difficulties associated with interpreting figurative language. There is now a huge, often contradictory literature on how people understand figures of speech. Gibbs and Colston argue that there may not be a single theory or model that adequately explains both the processes and products of figurative meaning experience. Experimental research may ultimately be unable to simply adjudicate between current models in psychology, linguistics and philosophy (...) of how figurative meaning is interpreted. Alternatively, the authors advance a broad theoretical framework, motivated by ideas from 'dynamical systems theory', that describes the multiple, interacting influences which shape people's experiences of figurative meaning in discourse. This book details past research and theory, offers a critical assessment of this work and sets the stage for a new vision of figurative experience in human life. (shrink)

Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist can offer (...) plausible responses to both counter-examples. My second goal is to show the implications of these responses for the nature of the spatial representational contents of perceptual experiences. (shrink)

Présentation du dossier de la revue Les Etudes Philosophiques en l'honneur de Bernard Pautrat.

Résumé Comment peut-on être occidental? Les Amérindiens ne connaissent pas notre dualisme nature-culture, et ils s’en passent fort bien. Ils pensent et vivent la continuité.

Perhaps the strangest controversy in the history of logic is that over the fourth figure of the syllogism. There was never any argument as to what syllogisms are valid, but merely as to how they should be arranged. Aristotle had divided syllogisms into figures according to whether the middle term was subject of one premiss and predicate of the other, or predicate of both premisses, or subject of both. Theophrastus and Eudemus subdivided the first figure into those moods (...) in which the middle term was subject of the major premiss and those moods in which the middle was predicate of the major premiss. The latter moods were termed indirect. Galen said they constituted a separate figure; and so the controversy started. It has continued to the present with many writers objecting to the fourth figure, generally on grounds that it does not represent a genuine process of thought, and even ascribing this objection to Aristotle. The issue has been joined by writers who believe that it does represent a genuine process of thought. (shrink)

Is the idea of Europe outdated? The concept of European unity, the animating spirit of the European Union, seems increasingly fragile in the face of far-right populist movements. In Locating Europe, Rodolphe Gasché attempts to answer the question of how to think about Europe. Is it a figure, a concept, or an idea? Is there anything still compelling and urgent about the idea of Europe? By looking at phenomenologist and postphenomenological thinkers in the second half of the 20th century, (...) Gasché reveals that Europe is more than just one geographical and cultural entity. The idea of Europe is based on common foundations: a distinctive conception of reason, of self-criticism, of responsibility, freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy, and it is these foundations that are under threat. In Locating Europe: A Figure, a Concept, an Idea? Gasché engages the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Jaspers, Karl Löwith, and others, focuses on the most significant philosophical representations of Europe, and explores the potential, and especially the limits, of the notion of Europe. (shrink)

We think and speak in figures. This is key to our creativity. We re-imagine one thing as another, pretend ourself to be another, do one thing in order to achieve another, or say one thing to mean another. This comes easily because of our abilities both to work out meaning in context and re-purpose words. Figures of speech are tools for this re-purposing. Whether we use metaphor, simile, irony, hyperbole, and litotes individually, or as compound figures, the uses are all (...) rooted in literal meanings. These uses invite us to explore the context to find new meanings, new purposes, beyond the literal. -/- This special issue of Philosophical Studies brings together eight papers on various aspects and applications of figurative speech including: David Hills, Mitch Green, Liz Camp, Ofra Magidor, Larry Horn, Ken Walton, Stephen Barker, and Mihaela Popa-Wyatt. (shrink)

En ciertas ocasiones, la idiotez parece circunscribirse al pensamiento, se define como su ausencia o negación y se vuelve objeto de un juicio de valor negativo. Pero, ¿puede reducirse la idiotez a un defecto mental? Como figura cultural, la idiotez comprende, además de sus manifestaciones en el lenguaje común y la vida cotidiana, al menos un conjunto de antiguos cuadros clínicos, personajes literarios y de las artes visuales en general, y también personajes y conceptos filosóficos. En este artículo proponemos interrogar (...) la historia de la psiquia- tría, desde sus textos fundacionales hasta la paulatina desaparición de la idiotez como cuadro clínico durante el siglo xx. Nuestro objetivo consiste en mostrar que, incluso en la psiquiatría más clásica, la idiotez no concernía únicamente a la mente, no consistía necesariamente en una falta o privación, y no era siempre objeto de un juicio negativo. (shrink)

In recent years, studies on Berthold of Moosburg have seen a significant growth, which has broadened the understanding of his philosophical thought. The Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, as a comprehensive commentary on the Proclian work, is emerging in its full complexity as the project of glorification of Platonism and of Proclian sapiential perspective over Aristotelian intellectualism. In his philosophical programme, Berthold thus ascribes Avicenna to the party of the Peripatetics, places philosophers such as Avicebron as the main pillars of (...) an autonomous Platonic current, takes up Eriugenian philosophy to solidify the link between Proclus’ paganism and Christian Neoplatonism, and uses Dietrich of Freiberg’s perspectives to clarify Aristotelian doctrines. The influence that these authors had on Berthold’s thought has been the subject of the latest research findings, which have also unveiled the significance of the relation with the authors of the school of Cologne, the impact of Oxford intellectual life - especially Thomas of York - and the relevance of Hermetic philosophy. Moreover, Berthold’s work is by no means lacking in independent reflection, as can be seen from the consideration of the extensive proemial part of the Expositio and from the insights into philosophical solutions which are peculiar to Berthold, such as the doctrine of the unum animae. (shrink)

Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous (...) figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples. (shrink)

No other contemporary writer is invoked as emphatically by the New Right as Botho Strauß and his essay Anschwellender Bocksgesang (1993). This article explores the question of what function Strauß is assigned in the New Right’s literary politics of the 21st century. It can be observed that Strauß and his essay are used (I.) metapolitically, (II.) to secure intellectuality, (III.) for internal wing battles and (IV.) aesthetically. All of this culminates in a ›Haltungsfigur‹ assigned to Strauß, which is of central (...) importance for the self-image of the contemporary New Right. (shrink)

The article analyzes one aspect of Rodolfo Sacco’s complex and innovative theoretical itinerary as it evolved. While the author’s theoretical perspective is often remembered as the theory of the legal formant and of the mute origin of law within a comparatist perspective, it seems to me that another area of his work remains relevant and needs to be explored further, perhaps beyond the very methodological ways provided by the author. From the work on interpretation to the legal anthropology, the implicit (...) copresence of mute and spoken represents one of the most interesting features of the theory, which appears capable of intercepting many contemporary problems of the evolutions of the law. The paper will move toward a different direction: with the aim to show how there are very different theoretical positions within the philosophy of law that can be approached from the perspective of comparative law in the formulation proposed by Rodolfo Sacco, around the central problem of the radical transformations of the concept of law. Thus, a problem is identified, at once epistemological and semiotic, that appears central to the configuration of legal thought in the age of globalization: the epistemological role of the unknown in the construction of knowledge, as a modular methodological problem and its implicit Vichian ancestry. (shrink)

The history of the human species’ relationship with nature is nothing other than the history of the forms of interaction it has constructed with it. Does this mean that the human species and nature are on the same level? Despite all our efforts to do so, are we capable of destroying nature, or rather our own conditions of existence in nature? The end of the world envisaged by many will only ever be, if it actually happens, the end of human (...) presence in the universe. Even if our planet were to be abolished, the life of the galaxies would nonetheless continue its course. (shrink)

"Malebranche est un penseur étonnant, et d'autant plus qu'en un sens, pour qui n'est pas chrétien, et chrétien convaincu, il semble inutilisable. Mais quant à la sincérité, à la lumière qui baigne toute l'entreprise, au style souple et charmeur, à la conviction audacieuse et toujours sur la brèche de ses stupéfiantes démonstrations, Malebranche est incomparable. On va de merveille en merveille, comme si on visitait une admirable église remplie de petites peintures toutes plus surprenantes les unes que les autres. Lorsque (...) je suis revenu au Traité de la nature et de la grâce, quelque chose comme une grâce m'a en effet touché. J'espère qu'à votre tour, lecteurs, vous en serez touchés", Alain Badiou. (shrink)

Qu'ils soient en ligne ou hors ligne, les mondes virtuels cristallisent nombre d'espoirs, de craintes, de fantasmes liés à l'innovation technologique, à la gestion et aux formes de l'identité contemporaine, et à l'évolution des médias de communication. Les emplois désordonnés de la notion d'avatar et les projections associées témoignent des paradoxes à l'oeuvre dès lors que l'on tente de comprendre des pratiques et des technologies nouvelles. Mais l'avatar ne représentant qu'une partie du mode opératoire d'une personne dans un monde virtuel, (...) il conviendra, dans une approche systémique, de préciser l'étendue de la présence du sujet dans ces mondes pour mieux informer la notion de données personnelles dans ce contexte spécifique.Comment ces identités et données virtuelles sont-elles gérées, traitées, appréhendées individuellement et collectivement, tant par les internautes que par les acteurs techniques et industriels?Virtual worlds, whether multiplayer online games or three-dimensional virtual worlds like Second Life, crystallize a multitude of hopes, fears and fantasies that are linked with technological innovation, with contemporary forms of identity and their management, and with developments in communication media. Today s unregulated uses of the avatar concept and associated projections reveal the paradoxes that arise when we attempt to understand new practices and technologies. However, the avatar only partially represents the way people function in a digital world, and any systemic study therefore needs to specify the extent of the subject's presence in a virtual world, in order to give a clearer idea of what is personal data in this specific context. How are these virtual identities and items of information managed, treated and individually and collectively apprehended, by Web surfers themselves and by the technical and industrial spheres concerned? (shrink)