Fallacies and Argument Appraisal presents an introduction to the nature, identification, and causes of fallacious reasoning, along with key questions for evaluation. Drawing from the latest work on fallacies as well as some of the standard ideas that have remained relevant since Aristotle, Christopher Tindale investigates central cases of major fallacies in order to understand what has gone wrong and how this has occurred. Dispensing with the approach that simply assigns labels and brief descriptions of fallacies, Tindale provides fuller treatments (...) that recognize the dialectical and rhetorical contexts in which fallacies arise. This volume analyzes major fallacies through accessible, everyday examples. Critical questions are developed for each fallacy to help the student identify them and provide considered evaluations. (shrink)

Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...) wrong to be envious. These two senses of ‘appropriate’ have much less in common than philosophers have supposed. Indeed, the distinction between propriety and correctness is crucial to understanding the distinctive role of the emotions in ethics. We argue here that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel, and that various philosophical arguments are guilty of a systematic error which we term the moralistic fallacy. (shrink)

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which (...) encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons. (shrink)

This section aims to summarize and conclude Part I in the form of a taxonomy of legitimate and illegitimate corporate moral responsibility attributions. I believe we can categorise four types of corporate moral responsibility attributions two of which are legitimate and two which are illegitimate with regard to our concept of moral agency and our moral intuition of fairness.

A major purpose of this book is to make the post-Hamblin work on fallacies available to a wider audience in a single, convenient volume.

This paper offers a solution to the problem of understanding how a fallacious argument can be deceptive by “seeming to be valid”, or (better) appearing to be a better argument of its kind than it really is. The explanation of how fallacies are deceptive is based on heuristics and paraschemes. Heuristics are fast and frugal shortcuts to a solution to a problem that sometimes jump to a conclusion that is not justified. In fallacious instances, according to the theory proposed, this (...) jump overlooks prerequisites of the defeasible argumentation scheme for the type of argument in question. Three informal fallacies, argumentum ad verecundiam , argumentum ad ignorantiam and fear appeal argument, are used to illustrate and explain the theory. (shrink)

The basic question of this monograph is: how should we go about judging arguments to be reasonable or unreasonable? Our concern will be with argument in a broad sense, with realistic arguments in natural language. The basic object will be to engage in a normative study of determining what factors, standards, or procedures should be adopted or appealed to in evaluating an argument as "good," "not-so-good," "open to criticism," "fallacious," and so forth. Hence our primary concern will be with the (...) problems of how to criticize an argument, and when a criticism is reasonably justified. (shrink)

Disagreement about how best to think of the relation between theories and the realities they represent has a long-standing and venerable history. We take up this debate in relation to active inference models based on the free energy principle (FEP)—a contemporary framework in computational neuroscience, theoretical biology, and the philosophy of cognitive science. Active inference under the FEP is a very ambitious form of model-based science, being applied to explain everything from neurobiological structure and function to the biology of self-organization. (...) In this context, some find apparent discrepancies between the map (active inference models based on the FEP) and the territory (target systems) to be a compelling reason to defend instrumentalism about such models. We take this to be misguided. We identify an important fallacy made by those defending instrumentalism about active inference models. We call it the literalist fallacy: this is the fallacy of accepting or affirming instrumentalism based on the claim that the properties of active inference models based on the FEP do not literally map onto real-world target systems. We conclude that a version of scientific realism about active inference models under the FEP is a live and tenable option. (shrink)

We are happy to present to the reader the first book of our Applied Logic Series. Walton's book on the fallacies of ambiguity is firmly at the heart of practical reasoning, an important part of applied logic. There is an increasing interest in artifIcial intelligence, philosophy, psychol ogy, software engineering and linguistics, in the analysis and possible mechanisation of human practical reasoning. Continuing the ancient quest that began with Aristotle, computer scientists, logicians, philosophers and linguists are vigorously seeking to deepen (...) our understanding of human reasoning and argumentation. Significant communities of researchers are actively engaged in developing new approaches to logic and argumentation, which are better suited to the urgent needs of today's applications. The author of this book has, over many years, made significant contributions to the detailed analysis of practical reasoning case studies, thus providing solid foundations for new and more applicable formal logical systems. We welcome Doug Walton's new book to our series. (shrink)

Several of the so-called “fallacies” in Aristotle are not in fact mistaken inference-types, but mistakes or breaches of rules in the questioning games which were practiced in the Academy and in the Lyceum. Hence the entire Aristotelian theory of “fallacies” ought to be studied by reference to the author's interrogative model of inquiry, based on his theory of questions and answers, rather than as a part of the theory of inference. Most of the “fallacies” mentioned by Aristotle can in fact (...) be diagnosed by means of the interrogative model, including petitio principii, multiple questions, “babbling’, etc., and so can Aristotle's alleged anticipation of the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem. The entire Aristotelian conception of inquiry is an interrogative one. Deductive conclusions caught Aristotle's attention in the form of answers that every rational interlocutor must give, assuming only his own earlier answers. Several features of Aristotle's methodology can be understood by means of the interrogative model, including the role of endoxa in it. Theoretically, there is also considerable leeway as to whether “fallacies” are conceived of as mistakes in questioning or as breaches of the rules that govern questioning games. (shrink)

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be (...) magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate among philosophers and psychol- ogists about whether the internal representations of imagery represent in the manner of pictures or in the manner of language. One side, pictorialism,holds that an internal imagery representation of Reagan is like a picture of Reagan. The other side, descriptionalism,holds that an internal imagery representation of Reagan is more like a string of words denoting or describing Reagan. My aim here is to expose a widespread fallacy on the part of (...) the descriptionalists. In the course of so doing, I try to clarify the pictorialist position, and show how it can undercut what appears to be a category of evidence for the other side. (shrink)

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools (...) and so are vices. Hence a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are considered incorrect moves in a discussion for which the goal is successful resolution of a dispute. Ten rules are given for effective conduct at the various stages of such a critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, concluding). Fallacies are discussed as violations of these rules, taking into account all speech acts which are traditionally recognized as fallacies. Special attention is paid to the role played by implicitness in fallacies in everyday language use. It is stressed (...) that identifying and acknowledging fallacies in ordinary discussions always has a conditional character. Differences between the pragma-dialectical perspective, the Standard Treatment, and the formal logic approach to fallacy analysis are discussed. (shrink)

The gambler’s fallacy, a common cognitive bias, is the belief that past independent events can influence future independent events. This fallacy occurs when individuals assume that after a certain event happens frequently within a specific period, it is less likely to occur in the future, and vice versa. For example, when rolling a fair die, the probability of landing a six remains 1/6, regardless of the outcomes of previous rolls. However, the gambler’s fallacy leads individuals to mistakenly (...) believe that streaks influence future outcomes. This paper, using a descriptive-analytical method, drawing on insights from probability theory, cognitive psychology, and philosophy, explores the implications of this fallacy on business decision-making and how the gambler’s fallacy distorts business decision-making; especially in forecasting, investing, and market strategy. In business, the gambler’s fallacy can lead to faulty assumptions, such as believing that a period of high sales will be followed by a decrease. Avoiding this fallacy requires a disciplined, data-driven mindset and a clearer grasp of randomness and statistical independence. (shrink)

In the dominant metaphor for organ transplantation, the organ is the ultimate gift, the dying donor's life‐giving bequest, conveyed and made possible by a heroic transplant team. The metaphor encourages donation and enforces recipients’ compliance with post‐transplant treatment. It is also inaccurate and sometimes deeply damaging for the recipient.

In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are considered incorrect moves in a discussion for which the goal is successful resolution of a dispute. Ten rules are given for effective conduct at the various stages of such a critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, concluding). Fallacies are discussed as violations of these rules, taking into account all speech acts which are traditionally recognized as fallacies. Special attention is paid to the role played by implicitness in fallacies in everyday language use. It is stressed (...) that identifying and acknowledging fallacies in ordinary discussions always has a conditional character. Differences between the pragma-dialectical perspective, the Standard Treatment, and the formal logic approach to fallacy analysis are discussed. (shrink)

The non-identity problem is really a collection of problems having distinct logical features. For that reason, non-identity problems can be typed. This article focuses on just one type of non-identity problem, the problem, which includes Derek Parfit's depletion example and many others. The can't-expect-better problem uses an assessment about the low probability of any particular person's coming into existence to reason that an earlier wrong act does not harm that person. This article argues that that line of reasoning is unusually (...) treacherous in that it makes not just one hard-to-detect error in what is done with the relevant probability assessments but rather alternates between two. We sort out one fallacy only to fall, against all odds (as it were), into a second. By avoiding both errors, we become able to discern harm in cases in which the can't-expect-better problem argues there is none. We will then be in a position to set aside the can't-expect-better problem as an objection against the person-based intuition that acts that are must be at least some existing or future person. (shrink)

We are beings in search of truth. As scientists, philosophers, mathematicians, citizens, parents, and individuals, we seek meaning and the validity of our beliefs. As social animals, our survival depends on our interactions with one another. We choose our relationships based on common grounds such as cultural, ideological, political, and, primarily, emotional connections. The quality and stability of these relationships enable us to lead productive and healthy lives. Dr. Polly Young-Eisendrath, a psychologist, writer, speaker, and Jungian analyst, as well as (...) the founder and Executive Director of the Center for Real Dialogue in Vermont, coined the term "snow globe" to illustrate how we encapsulate our own subjective reality. Each of us perceives the world differently, taking in information and filtering it through our sense perceptions, belief systems, emotional experiences, and memories to determine what we sense as real. Even though we are inside our own snow globes, we can still communicate through them. Our curiosity drives us to exchange ideas and build our world through these interactions. While the concept of a snow globe may seem solid and impenetrable, we can influence the structures inside it based on our inner "meteorology." If the snow globe is shaken and its swirling snow obscures visibility, both from the inside out and outside in, we may find ourselves stuck in a fixed outlook on life. However, when all is calm and light can shine through our spheres of reality, we can glimpse into each other's snow globes and influence one another. To add complexity to this metaphor, I will apply Donald Hoffman’s Interface Theory of Perception, which explains how our species navigates reality. This theory raises questions about whether our relationships are truly an effort to obtain truthful facts or if our evolutionary biology is inadvertently undermining our relationship goals by imposing an unintentional and illusory framework. In our pursuit of honesty, fidelity, friendship, and love, we may be grappling with evolutionary desires that conflict with our goals of achieving mutual understanding. This paper will present arguments for philosophical interpretations concerning the paradox of human nature: beings evolved for fitness, yet are bound by the necessity of coexisting in harmony while sharing a reality that contradicts our perceptions. Finally, I will share my personal views on where we should focus our efforts, a future where we can take control of our evolutionary path by gaining a deeper understanding of our physiology and psychology. This understanding will allow us to align ourselves in harmony with both our true selves and the universe around us. (shrink)

Hamblin held that the conception of 'fallacy' as an argument that seems valid but is not really so was the dominant conception of fallacy in the history of fallacy studies. The present paper explores the extent of support that there is for this view. After presenting a brief analysis of 'the standard definition of fallacy,' a number of the definitions of 'fallacy' in texts from the middle of this century – from the standard treatment – (...) are considered. This is followed by a review of the definitions of 'fallacy' in the earlier history of logic books, including those of Aristotle, Whately, Mill and De Morgan. The essay concludes that there is scarcely any support for Hamblin's view that this particular definition of 'fallacy' was widely held. (shrink)

Business and Economic textbooks warn against committing the Sunk Cost Fallacy: you, rationally, shouldn't let unrecoverable costs influence your current decisions. In this paper, I argue that this isn't, in general, correct. Sometimes it's perfectly reasonable to wish to carry on with a project because of the resources you've already sunk into it. The reason? Given that we're social creatures, it's not unreasonable to care about wanting to act in such a way so that a plausible story can be (...) told about you according to which your diachronic behavior doesn't reveal that you've suffered, what I will call, diachronic misfortune. Acting so as to hide that you've suffered diachronic misfortune involves striving to make yourself easily understood while disguising any shortcomings that might damage your reputation as a desirable teammate. And making yourself easily understood to others while hiding your flaws will, sometimes, put pressure on you to honor sunk costs. (shrink)

Simple extrapolation is the orthodox approach to extrapolating from clinical trials in evidence-based medicine: extrapolate the relative effect size from the trial unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. I argue that this method relies on a myth and a fallacy. The myth of simple extrapolation is the idea that the relative risk is a ‘golden ratio’ that is usually transportable due to some special mathematical or theoretical property. The fallacy of simple extrapolation is an (...) unjustified argument from ignorance: we conclude that the relative effect size is transportable in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In short, simple extrapolation is a deeply problematic solution to the problem of extrapolation. (shrink)

The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate that appeals to coupling-constitution worries are problematic by constructing the fallacious argument against the (...) hypothesis of extended cognition. We consider several objections to our argument and find them insufficient to rebut our conclusion. (shrink)

Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of preserving personal identity.

I will situate the fallacies approach to reasoning with the aim of making it more relevant to contemporary life and thus intellectually significant and valuable as a method for teaching reasoning. This entails a revision that will relegate some of the traditional fallacies to the realm of history and introduce more recently recognized problems in reasoning. Some newly recognized problems that demand attention are revealed by contemporary science studies, which reveal at least two tenacious problems in reasoning that I will (...) explore in this paper. One of these problems is androcentrism, a ubiquitous problem with reasoning that feminists exposed in the twentieth century but that continues to pervade people’s reasoning. The other is biological reductionism in at least two specific forms: genetic determinism and adaptationism. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the straw man fallacy from the perspective of pragmatic inference. Our main claim is that the straw man fallacy is a ‘pragmatic winner’ not primarily because of its persuasive power but rather because it targets the pragmatic cognitive-inferential skills of its victim while enhancing the prestige of its author. We consider that in the context of a straw man fallacy, the issue of the burden of proof, which is ‘reversed’, does not directly (...) bear on the argumentation itself but has essentially to do with the difficulty for the targeted speaker of getting the attention of the audience back. It is difficult because countering this fallacy involves primarily a discussion of the reasons why the inference drawn was unduly derived, a process which is virtually destined to be a failure first of all because of the lack of relevance of justifications in comparison with that of actual points. Notions of retractability and the explicit-implicit divide are central to our approach. (shrink)

The naturalistic fallacy appears to be ubiquitous and irresistible. The avant-garde and the rearguard, the devout and the secular, the learned elite and the lay public all seem to want to enlist nature on their side, everywhere and always. Yet a closer look at the history of the term “naturalistic fallacy” and its associated arguments suggests that this way of understanding appeals to nature’s authority in human affairs is of relatively modern origin. To apply this category cross-historically masks (...) considerable variability and naturalizes our own assumptions about the natural and the human. (shrink)

In this paper, an analysis is given of the straw man fallacy as a misrepresentation of someone's commitments in order to refute that person's argument. With this analysis a distinction can be made between straw man and other closely related fallacies such as ad hominem, secundum quid and ad verecundiam. When alleged cases of the straw man fallacy are evaluated, the speaker's commitment should be conceived normatively in relation to the type of conversation the speaker was supposed to (...) be engaged in. (shrink)

Some argue that emotions represent so-called core relational themes. A core relational theme describes a relation between a particular event and an organism’s well-being. For instance, the core relational theme of anger is ‘a demeaning offense against me and mine’. I argue that a core relational theme is a summary or generalization of a more complex mental content. Defenders of the Simple Core Relational Theme View reject the idea that emotional content is complex. Instead, they argue that the content of (...) emotion simply consists of a core relational theme. I argue that this view commits the linguistic fallacy: it confuses a theory of emotion categorization with a theory of emotional content. (shrink)

This paper examines two symmetrical fallacies that shape much of the discourse on nondual experience. The first does not consist simply in giving nondual experience a metaphysical interpretation. Rather, it consists in treating a transformation of the experiential field—especially the suspension of the subject–object distinction and the weakening of perspectival self-centering—as if it directly disclosed an ontologically independent point, ground, or nucleus, often articulated in terms of supreme or cosmic consciousness. The second fallacy consists in adopting such an ontology (...) and then speaking as if it were grounded in one’s own realization, thereby implicitly occupying an epistemic position for which one’s own experience provides no sufficient warrant. What begins as a metaphysical interpretation of an indeterminate experiential field is reintroduced into discourse as if it carried the authority of realization. Both fallacies arise from a common source: the indeterminate character of nondual experience. Introducing the concept of pre-subjective openness, the paper argues that this experiential field is phenomenologically compelling yet ontologically underdetermined. It can support multiple, mutually incompatible interpretations, none of which is uniquely warranted by the experience itself. The central thesis is that nondual experience does not justify ontological closure, and that maintaining the distinction between experience, interpretation, and epistemic authority is essential if epistemic inflation is to be avoided. A metaphysical interpretation may be meaningful or even existentially powerful, but it remains responsible only insofar as it acknowledges its own interpretive status rather than presenting itself as directly delivered by experience. (shrink)

In this article, we describe a hitherto undocumented fallacy-in the sense of a mistake in reasoning-constituted by a negativity bias in the way that people attribute motives to others. We call this the "worst-motive fallacy," and we conducted two experiments to investigate it. In Experiment 1, participants expected protagonists in a variety of fictional vignettes to pursue courses of action that satisfy the protagonists' worst motive, and furthermore, participants significantly expected the protagonist to pursue a worse course of (...) action than they would prefer themselves. Experiment 2 was a preregistered attempted replication of Experiment 1, including a bigger range of vignettes; the first effect was not replicated for the new vignettes tested but was for the original set. Also, we once again found that participants expected protagonists to be more likely than they were themselves to pursue courses of action that they considered morally bad. We discuss the worst-motive fallacy's relation to other well-known biases as well as its possible evolutionary origins and its ethical consequences. (shrink)

A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires (...) that reflects how the cognitive sciences are actually integrating mind and matter. (shrink)

The use of evolutionary explanations to explain phenomena at the individual level has been described by various authors as an explanatory error, the so-called Phylogeny Fallacy. In this paper, this fallacy will be analyzed in the context of teleosemantics, a central project of the philosophy of mind whose main aim is to naturalize intentional systems by appealing to their biological teleofunctions. I will argue that those teleosemantics projects that invoke evolutionary functions generally commit the fallacy. First, I (...) will point to various arguments in the literature that point to this fallacy. However, a more general argument will also be made. To illustrate this puzzling scenario, I will present two desiderata that any teleosemantic project must fulfill. I will argue that naturalizing intentionality based on natural selection creates an explanatory gap between types and tokens. This gap prohibits an adequate explanation of the desiderata. To close the gap, teleosemantics invokes replicator biology, a view of inheritance that has already been identified to commit the fallacy. This leads teleosemantics into a complex situation: to close the gap, it must commit the fallacy. (shrink)

According to the popular fitting attitude analysis of value, to be good is to be the object of a proattitude that it is fitting, in some sense, to have. One version of this analysis can be traced back to Franz Brentano, according to which “good” means “worthy of love.” In a review in Ethics of Brentano's The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, G. E. Moore accuses Brentano of committing a fallacious inference, which I will call “Brentano's (...) class='Hi'>fallacy.” I shall show that Moore's accusation, properly formulated, hits the target and that his argument can be generalized so that it undermines other Brentano-like versions of the fitting attitude analysis. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, etymological fallacy (EF). To understand the EF fully, it is important to break down the word etymology, which is a practice that in itself informs the conversation surrounding the fallacy. EF is a willful use of a former definition of a word that has changed meaning and/or developed new connotations because the change does not benefit the one committing the fallacy. To avoid committing the EF, (...) individuals should approach language as they would a scientific process: they may hypothesize the word means X, but after further research and consideration, realize that indeed a word now means Y. Either way, the changing nature of language must be considered and individuals should be learned enough and flexible enough to communicate within the time and culture they inhabit. Clinging to etymons while ignoring the evolution and everyday use of language is neither logical nor truthful. (shrink)

The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies (...) become to a reasoning that is not only informationally useful but also logically valid. (shrink)

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser view fallacies as “derailments of strategic maneuvering” that go against a norm for critical reasonableness. What is to happen if such a derailment is perceived to have taken place? Krabbe (2003) and Jacobs (2000) have discussed the possibilities for continuing the argumentative exchange in a constructive way. Starting from their proposals, van Eemeren and Houtlosser argue that the party who observes that something has gone wrong should maneuver in such a way that at the same time (...) the derailment is recognized and a “re-railment” takes place that brings the discussion back on track. This means that then a meta-dialogue or sub-discussion develops in which the alleged fallacy is responded to and readjusted appropriately. Although this solution has something in common with both Krabbe’s proposal and Jacobs’ proposal, it differs from Krabbe’s proposal because it does not result in just retracting or maintaining the alleged fallacy and it differs from Jacobs’ proposal because it does not allow for making a move that has the appearance of a counter-fallacy. (shrink)

Recent literature in the scientific realism debate has been concerned with a particular species of statistical fallacy concerning base-rates, and the worry that no matter how predictively successful our contemporary scientific theories may be, this will tell us absolutely nothing about the likelihood of their truth if our overall sample space contains enough empirically adequate theories that are nevertheless false. In response, both realists and anti-realists have switched their focus from general arguments concerning the reliability and historical track-records of (...) our scientific methodology, to a series of specific arguments and case-studies concerning our reasons to believe individual scientific theories to be true. Such a development however sits in tension with the usual understanding of the scientific realism debate as offering a second-order assessment of our first-order scientific practices, and threatens to undermine the possibility of a distinctive philosophical debate over the approximate truth of our scientific theories. I illustrate this concern with three recent attempts to offer a more localised understanding of the scientific realism debate—due to Stathis Psillos, Juha Saatsi, and Kyle Stanford—and argue that none of these alternatives offer a satisfactory response to the problem. (shrink)

Robert Kimball, in “What’s Wrong with Argumentum Ad Baculum?” (Argumentation, 2006) argues that dialogue-based models of rational argumentation do not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of threats encountered in some ad baculum arguments. We review the dialogue-based approach to argumentum ad baculum, and show how it can offer more than Kimball thinks for analyzing such threat arguments and ad baculum fallacies.