Adolescents' community violence exposure has been demonstrated with a range of behavioral and psychological problems, but the processes that explain these correlations are not clear. In our 2017 study, the mediating role of deviant peer affiliation in the relationship between CVE and externalizing problem behaviors has been confirmed. However, the moderating effect of parental factors is still unclear. Therefore, a new group was adopted in this study to further explore the moderating effect of parental knowledge based on also (...) confirming the mediating effect of deviant peer affiliation. Stratified-cluster sampling was used to recruit 1,797 volunteers who completed questionnaires on CVE, deviant peer affiliation, parental knowledge, and externalizing problem behaviors. The results of the structural equation modeling were: on the basis of our previous research, we further analyzed the mediating role of deviant peer affiliation, and the mediated association was moderated by parental knowledge. Especially when the school climate is added as a covariate, the moderating effect of parental knowledge has changed, that is, the positive association between CVE and externalizing problem behaviors was much stronger for adolescents who reported lower levels of parental knowledge than for those who reported higher levels of parental knowledge. The results support the assumptions of social learning theory and have implications for interventions of community violence. (shrink)

Research has consistently documented that the death of a close family member can disrupt a family’s functional equilibrium and has a deleterious effect on adolescents’ adaptation; however, little attention has been paid to behavioral adaptation of adolescents after a loss in a collective setting. Attempting to fill this research gap, the objectives of the current study are: (1) to identify autonomy support profiles based on two centered figures (parents and head teachers) and (2) to examine whether these emerging profiles may (...) moderate the association between the two dimensions of grit (perseverance and consistency) and externalizing problem behavior in Chinese family-bereaved adolescents. A total of 763 family-bereaved adolescents aged from 13 to 18 years (60.3% girls; M age = 15.74; SD = 1.53) were involved in the current study; they were asked to fill a battery of self-report questionnaires. A latent profile analysis revealed three autonomy support profiles: high parental autonomy support–high teacher autonomy support (HPHT; n = 598), high parental autonomy support–low teacher autonomy support (HPLT; n = 34), and low parental autonomy support–low teacher autonomy support (LPLT; n = 131). Moreover, results from linear regression analyses, after controlling for relevant bereavement variables, sociodemographics, and social desirability, showed that perseverance and consistency were negatively related to externalizing problem behavior for adolescents within the HPHL profile; nevertheless, the association between perseverance and externalizing problem behavior turned to be positive for adolescents within the HPLT profile. The current study sheds light on the variability of the association between grit and family-bereaved adolescents’ behavioral adaptation and further enriches the beneficial effect of autonomy support on adaptive functions in a collective cultural setting. The interplay between grit and autonomy support from parents and teachers has a significant influence on buffering externalizing problem behavior among family-bereaved adolescents. (shrink)

The main public health advantages of examining gene by environment interactions in externalizing behavior lie in the realm of personalized interventions. Nevertheless, the incorporation of genetic data in randomized controlled trials is fraught with difficulties and raises ethical questions. This paper has been written from the perspective of developmental psychologists who, as researchers, see themselves confronted with important and in part new kinds of ethical questions arising from G × E research in social sciences. The aim is to (...) explicate and discuss ethical questions, based on the conviction that what is ethically salient in a research setting will also be relevant in that area of public healthcare incorporating research findings. The ethical questions discussed include: whether it is ethically responsible to withhold an effective treatment; to what extent genetic results should be disclosed; whether researchers should be allowed to collect genetic data of both child and parent; and what are costs and benefits of personalized interventions based on screening. We made an attempt to address these questions, but it is up to researchers to determine whether the solutions are suitable for their G × E research in social sciences. (shrink)

The present study examined the role of father sensitivity and couple coparenting quality in the first 2 years of life in relation to the development of externalizing behavior problems in middle childhood, focusing on the unique role of fathers. In this study, 125 mothers, fathers, and their first-born children were followed from 8 months to age 7 years. Paternal sensitivity was rated when infants were 8 and 24 months old. Fathers were videotaped at home playing, feeding, and changing (...) their 8-month-old infants’ clothes. They also were videotaped in a lab playing with their 24-month-olds and solving a variety of challenging tasks. At 24 months, competitive coparenting was assessed via videotaped triadic family interactions at home in which families participated in a variety of tasks. Teachers rated externalizing behavior problems when the children were age 7. Continuity in paternal sensitivity was documented from 8 to 24 months, and paternal sensitivity at 8 months predicted externalizing behavior in middle childhood through father sensitivity at 24 months. Moreover, paternal sensitivity at 8 months predicted competitive coparenting which, in turn, forecast externalizing behavior problems in middle childhood, even after controlling for maternal sensitivity at 8 and 24 months. These findings highlight the unique role of paternal caregiving quality during the first year of life on couple coparenting and children’s subsequent development of externalizing problems and have implications for creating effective interventions to prevent children from developing externalizing disorders. (shrink)

It is important to identify the developmental antecedents of externalizing behavioral problems in early childhood. The current study examined the main effects of maternal personality and its interactive effects with child temperamental reactivity in predicting child externalizing behavioral problems, indicated by impulsivity and aggression. This study was composed of 70 children (Mage= 17.6 months, SD = 3.73) and their mothers. The results showed that maternal agreeableness was negatively associated with child impulsivity. Child temperamental reactivity moderated the effect of (...) maternal conscientiousness on child impulsivity in support of the differential susceptibility model. Specifically, for highly reactive children, maternal conscientiousness was negatively associated with child impulsivity whereas this association was nonsignificant for low reactive children. Child reactivity also moderated the contribution of maternal neuroticism to child impulsivity. That is, maternal neuroticism was negatively associated with impulsivity, only for highly reactive children. (shrink)

Children’s readiness for school is often threatened by the occurrence of both externalizing and internalizing problems. Previous research has shown that Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) is particularly effective for fostering children’s behavioral skills and reducing externalizing problems. However, whether PBIS can enhance children’s emotional skills and reduce internalizing problems is less clear. Therefore, TIME-IN was developed, which extends PBIS by also including emotional support systems. It was tested whether TIME-IN was effective for (a) improving emotion regulation (...) and (b) reducing depressive symptoms. Furthermore, it was tentatively explored whether TIME-IN is accompanied by more than natural fluctuations in both children’s externalizing and internalizing problems. The effectiveness of TIME-IN was evaluated in a non-randomized study, in which an intervention group was compared with a matched control group. Both research questions were addressed in a sample consisting of 81 children between 8 and 12 years of age with special educational needs. Questionnaires for teachers (i.e., TRF), children (i.e., FEEL-KJ and CDI), and their parents (i.e., CBCL) were administered at the beginning (T0) and the end of the school year (T1) using multi-informant assessment. Only indicative evidence was found for the hypothesis that TIME-IN improved children’s emotion regulation. Practical implications, strengths, and limitations were discussed.Clinical Trial Registration:This work was retrospectively registered at International Standard Registered Clinical/soCial sTudy Number (ISRCTN) registry ISRCTN54456609 (Weymeis, 2017). Registered 28 March 2017. (shrink)

Defining moral competence using a virtue approach, this longitudinal study examined the prospective relationships between moral competence and externalizing behavior indexed by delinquency and intention to engage in problem behavior in a large and representative sample of Hong Kong Chinese adolescents. Starting from the 2009–2010 academic year, Grade 7 students in 28 randomly selected secondary schools in Hong Kong were invited to join a longitudinal study, which surveyed participating students annually during the high school years. The (...) current study used data collected in the first three years (Wave 1 to Wave 3) across junior secondary school stage (Grade 7 to Grade 9) with a sample of 3,328 students (Age = 12.59 ±.74 years and 52.1% boys at Wave 1). Cross-lagged panel path analyses were conducted to compare four models involving different hypothesized patterns of relationships between moral competence and externalizing behavior. Results revealed that the reciprocal effects model best fit the data, supporting reciprocal causal relationships between moral competence and externalizing behavior measures. Specifically, a higher level of moral competence significantly predicted a lower level of delinquency and problem behavioral intention over time. At the same time, a higher level of externalizing behavior also significantly predicted a lower level of moral competence one year later. As the magnitudes of the significant findings were not high, replications in different Chinese communities are needed. Nevertheless, the present findings provide important theoretical insights on how moral competence and externalizing behavior in adolescents are associated with each other. Practically speaking, the findings suggest that it is promising to reduce adolescent externalizing behavior by promoting their virtues through moral education programs, and guiding adolescents to behave in a good manner would help promote the development of their virtues. (shrink)

This article proposes a theoretical framework for external representation based problem solving. The Tic‐Tac‐Toe and its isomorphs are used to illustrate the procedures of the framework as a methodology and test the predictions of the framework as a functional model. Experimental results show that the behavior in the Tic‐Tac‐Toe is determined by the directly available information in external and internal representations in terms of perceptual and cognitive biases, regardless of whether the biases are consistent with, inconsistent with, or (...) irrelevant to the task. It is shown that external representations are not merely inputs and stimuli to the internal mind and that they have much more important functions than mere memory aids. A representational determinism is suggested—the form of a representation determines what information can be perceived, what processes can be activated, and what structures can be discovered from the specific representation. (shrink)

Developing social skills is essential to succeed in social relations. Two important social constructs in middle childhood, prosocial behavior and reactive aggression, are often regarded as separate behaviors with opposing developmental outcomes. However, there is increasing evidence for the co-occurrence of prosociality and aggression, as both might indicate responsivity to the social environment. Here, we tested whether a bi-dimensional taxonomy of prosociality and reactive aggression could predict internalizing and externalizing problems over time. We re-analyzed data of two well-validated (...) experimental tasks for prosociality and reactive aggression in a developmental population sample. Results revealed no associations between prosociality and reactive aggression, confirming the independence of those constructs. Interestingly, although prosociality and reactive aggression independently did not predict problem behavior, the interaction of both was negatively predictive of changes in externalizing problems over time. Specifically, only children who scored low on both prosociality and reactive aggression showed an increase in externalizing problems 1 year later, whereas levels of externalizing problems did not change for children who scored high on both types of behavior. Thus, our results suggest that at an individual level, reactive aggression in middle childhood might not always be maladaptive when combined with prosocial behavior, thereby confirming the importance of studying social competence across multiple dimensions. (shrink)

Research on autonomy exhibits a constellation of variegated perspectives, from the problem of the crude deprivation of it to the study of the distinction between personal and moral autonomy, and from the problem of the role of a “self as narrator”, who classifies its own actions as autonomous or not, to the importance of the political side and, finally, to the need of defending and enhancing human autonomy. My precise concern in this article will be the examination of (...) the role of the human cognitive processes that give rise to the most important ways of tracking the external world and human behavior in their relationship to some central aspects of human autonomy, also to the aim of clarifying the link between autonomy and the ownership of our own destinies. I will also focus on the preservation of human autonomy as an important component of human dignity, seeing it as strictly associated with knowledge and, even more significantly, with the constant production of new and pertinent knowledge of various kinds. I will also describe the important _paradox of autonomy_, which resorts to the fact that, on one side, cognitions (from science to morality, from common knowledge to philosophy, etc.) are necessary to be able to perform autonomous actions and decisions because we need believe in rules that justify and identify our choices, but, on the other side, these same rules can become (for example, as a result of contrasting with other internalized and approved moral rules or knowledge contents) oppressive norms that diminish autonomy and can thus, paradoxically, defeat agents’ autonomous capacity “to take ownership”. (shrink)

Prior research has demonstrated that antisocial behavior, substance-use disorders, and personality dimensions of aggression and impulsivity are indicators of a highly heritable underlying dimension of risk, labeled externalizing. Other work has shown that individual trait constructs within this psychopathology spectrum are associated with reduced self-monitoring, as reflected by amplitude of the error-related negativity (ERN) brain response. In this study of undergraduate subjects, reduced ERN amplitude was associated with higher scores on a self-report measure of the broad externalizing (...) construct that links these various indicators. In addition, the ERN was associated with a response-locked increase in anterior theta (4–7 Hz) oscillation; like the ERN, this theta response to errors was reduced among high-externalizing individuals. These findings suggest that neurobiologically based deficits in endogenous action monitoring may underlie generalized risk for an array of impulse-control problems. (shrink)

Using testosterone alone as a measure of dominance presents problems, especially when dominance is loosely defined to include a range of behaviors that may arise from multiple causes. Testosterone should be examined in relation to other hormonal and neurotransmitter factors, such as serotonin. Various hypotheses about the relationship between high and low levels of testosterone with serotonin and with impulse control are suggested for future study.

This article focuses on the early years of children from immigrant families in Germany. Research has documented disparities in young children’s development correlating with their family background, making clear the importance of early intervention. Institutional childcare—as an early intervention for children at risk—plays an important role in Germany, as 34.3% of children below the age of three and 93% of children above that age are in external childcare. This paper focuses on the extent to which children from families with a (...) background of migration differ in their social development when considering their age of entry into early external childcare. Data from the infant cohort study of the German National Educational Panel Study is used to analyze the impact of early institutional childcare before the age of 3 years on children’s social competence at the age of 5 years, controlling for gender, siblings, temperament, home learning activities, and socioeconomic status. Results show the effects of duration of early external childcare on peer problems for children from families with a background of migration, in such a way that children who attend early external childcare for more than 1 year before the age of three show less problem behavior with peers than those who attend for less than a year. These findings have equity implications for children with a migration background living in Germany, especially as the proportion of these children is trending upwards. (shrink)

What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and model-based) certainly illustrates much of what is important in abductive reasoning, especially the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases of explanations occurring in science or in everyday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action (...) provides otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses. Many external things, usually inert from the epistemological point of view, can be transformed into what I call epistemic mediators, which are illustrated in the last part of the paper, together with an analysis of the related notion of external representation . Finally, some examples of computational programs that simulate geometrical reasoning are illustrated. The computational embodiment generates a kind of squared epistemic mediator: geometrical construction, as an example of epistemic mediator, is further mediated. (shrink)

This paper offers a framework for consciousness of internal reality. Recent PET experiments are reviewed, showing partial overlap of cortical activation during self-produced actions and actions observed from other people. This overlap suggests that representations for actions may be shared by several individuals, a situation which creates a potential problem for correctly attributing an action to its agent. The neural conditions for correct agency judgments are thus assigned a key role in self/other distinction and self-consciousness. A series of behavioral (...) experiments that demonstrate, in normal subjects, the poor monitoring of action-related signals and the difficulty in recognizing self-produced actions are described. In patients presenting delusions, this difficulty dramatically increases and actions become systematically misattributed. These results point to schizophrenia and related disorders as a paradigmatic alteration of a ''Who?'' system for self-consciousness. (shrink)

David Chalmers has recently developed a novel strategy of refuting external world skepticism, one he dubs the structuralist solution. In this paper, I make three primary claims: First, structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, even if it is combined with a functionalist approach to the metaphysics of minds. Second, because structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, the structuralist solution vindicates far less worldly knowledge than we would hope for from a solution to skepticism. Third, these results (...) suggest that the problem of external world skepticism should perhaps be construed as two different problems, since the problem might turn out to require two substantively different solutions, one for knowledge of the kind that is not dependent on other minds and one for knowledge that is. (shrink)

A group in intergroup conflict needs to overcome the collective action problem in order to defend itself against an external enemy. This leads to increasing complexity that cannot be adequately covered by just scaling up the model of intragroup conflicts. Research on cultural evolution and evolutionary psychology shows that external conflict has profound effects on group organization.

I extend Stanford’s proposal in two ways by focusing on a possible mechanism of externalization: disgust. First, I argue that externalization also has value for solving coordination problems where interests of different groups coincide. Second, Stanford’s proposal also holds promise for explaining why people “over-comply” with norms through disassociation, or the avoidance of actions that merely appear to violate norms.

This book attempts to synthesize two apparently contradictory views of psychology: as the science of internal mental mechanisms and as the science of complex external behavior. Most books in the psychology and philosophy of mind reject one approach while championing the other, but Rachlin argues that the two approaches are complementary rather than contradictory. Rejection of either involves disregarding vast sources of information vital to solving pressing human problems--in the areas of addiction, mental illness, education, crime, and decision-making, to (...) name but a few. Where previous books have focused either on psychology as an abstract science of the mind or as a strictly empirical approach to behavioral problems, this is the only book that attempts to show how the best modern theoretical work on mental mechanisms relates to the best modern empirical work on complex behavioral problems. It will be of considerable interest to psychologists and philosophers across many disciplines and perspectives. (shrink)

ObjectivePeer victimization is a substantial early life stressor linked to psychiatric symptoms and poor academic performance. However, the sex-specific cognitive or behavioral outcomes of bullying have not been well-described in preadolescent children.MethodsUsing the baseline dataset of the Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development Study 2.0.1 data repository, we evaluated associations between parent-reported bullying victimization, suicidality, and non-suicidal self-injury, as well as internalizing and externalizing behavioral problems, cognition, and academic performance.ResultsOf the 11,015 9-10-year-old children included in the analyses, 15.3% experienced bullying victimization, (...) as reported by the primary caregiver. Of these, boys were more likely to be bullied than girls. Children who were bullied were more likely to display NSSI or passive suicidality and active suicidality. Bullied children also had lower cognitive scores, greater behavioral problems, and poorer grades. Across all participants, boys had poorer grades and greater behavioral problems than girls; however, bullied boys had greater behavioral problems than girls in several areas. Compared to their non-bullied peers, bullied children with greater non-suicidal self-injury or suicidality also had greater behavioral problems and poorer grades.ConclusionThese findings highlight the sex-specific effects of bullying, and the negative associations of bullying victimization with cognitive performance, behavioral problems, and academic performance. Future longitudinal studies will identify the natural history and neural correlates of these deficits during adolescence. (shrink)

Maternal insightfulness or the capacity to see things from the child’s point of view, is considered to be a crucial construct for therapeutic change. In the present study, we aimed to implement the knowledge gleaned from the studies on attachment theory and maternal insightfulness into clinical practice to create an intervention program for mothers of children-at-risk due to inadequate parental care. We used drama therapy to “practice” maternal insightfulness in more “experiential” ways, because the use of creative expressive means may (...) be accessible and effective for the target population of the study and help improve maternal care. We used a manualized 10-week drama therapy-group intervention, focusing on the core concepts of maternal insightfulness: insightfulness, separateness, complexity, and acceptance. We used various dramatic means to explore and experience these components of maternal insightfulness. Forty mothers of children-at-risk took part in eight groups of parental insightfulness drama therapy. To evaluate the efficacy of the intervention, we used the Insightfulness Assessment interview, which produces 10 scales and a final classification of PI and non-PI. The Child Behavior Check List was used to evaluate a change in children’s behavior problems. The assessment took place at three time points: before the intervention, right after the end of the intervention, and 6 months following the intervention. Results at T2 showed a significant improvement compared to T1 in some of the maternal insightfulness scales, but not in the maternal insightfulness categorical classification. At T3, there was a significant change in the classification of the mothers, from non-insightful to positively insightful. At T3, there was also a significant decline in the children’s externalized and general behavioral problems. The results of this study contribute to an evidence-based practice of using drama therapy in the treatment of mothers and children at risk. (shrink)

Despite the availability of evidence-based treatment models for adolescent behavior problems, little is known about the effectiveness of these programs for adolescents with callous-unemotional traits. Defined by lack of empathy, lack of guilt, flattened affect and lack of caring, CU traits have been linked to long-term anti-social behavior and unfavorable treatment outcomes and might be negatively related to outcomes in evidence-based programs such as Functional Family Therapy. This study used a single-group pre-post evaluation design with a sample of (...) 407 adolescents receiving FFT to investigate whether outcomes in FFT are predicted by CU traits and to what extent reliable changes in CU traits can be observed. The results showed that although CU traits are related to increased problem severity at baseline, they predicted neither treatment dropout nor post-treatment externalizing behavior and family functioning. CU traits were related to diminished improvement ratings, in particular with respect to parental supervision. Reductions in CU traits were observed across the time of treatment, and these were most profound among adolescents with elevated levels of CU traits at baseline. Further research should investigate whether certain evidence-based treatment components are more suited for adolescents with CU, and if the addition of specific intervention elements for reducing CU-traits could further improve outcomes for this high-risk population. (shrink)

Clark & Thornton speculate that intervening in the real world might be a way of transforming type-2 problems into type-1, but they state that they are not aware of any definite cases. It is argued that the active construction of external representations often performs exactly this function, and that recoding via the real world is therefore common, if not ubiquitous.

This study aimed to investigate the longitudinal associations between children’s sleep duration and problems, behavioral adjustment [externalizing behaviors and internalizing behaviors ], and maternal depressive symptoms in preschoolers over a period of 3 years. For this purpose, latent growth modeling was conducted using 2012 to 2014 data from the National Panel Study on Korean Children, while controlling for family contextual factors and child temperament. First, children who slept longer at four were concurrently associated with lower levels of EB, while (...) more SPs were associated with higher levels of EB and IB, concurrently. Second, greater decreases in SPs were associated with greater decline in EB and IB. Higher levels of MDS at four were associated with higher levels of child EB, IB, and SPs, concurrently. However, no longitudinal associations were found between the rates of change in MDS and children’s sleep and adjustment. Finally, the magnitude of the associations among the variables was greater overall in the SPs models than in the SD models. These findings suggest that addressing sleep problems, rather than sleep duration, seem to be more important in predicting and preventing young children’s adjustment problems and also that more attention should be paid to MDS during preschool years as much as during the postpartum period for better child adjustment outcomes. (shrink)

The essays in this book discuss human behavior and the institutions of capitalism. The essays are non-technical and are written so as to be accessible to students of all disciplines and to all other persons interested in capitalism and in economic behavior. They often present unconventional views of the topics they discuss. Those containing unconventional views discuss self-interested behavior, selfish gene theory, the meaning and social function of private ownership, the externality problem, the nature of the (...) firm and the rise of capitalism. The essays are not meant to be a textbook, but they offer a useful supplementary reading source for courses in business, economics and law that deal with human behavior in the marketplace and with capitalism, ownership, markets and firms. (shrink)

Humans can consolidate and carry out habits other animals cannot. This statement is mainly sustained by the fact that humans have a unique cognitive control of their actions: we can let our attention fade away to perform automatic tasks more efficiently, we can detect if there has been an unexpected problem in their implementation, and we can regain conscious control of the action if necessary. We tend to dichotomize this cognitive process into two “systems”, namely goal-directed versus habitual (Dickinson, (...) 1985), conscious versus unconscious (Crick and Koch, 1998), or slow versus fast (Kahneman, 2011). If we just put it in those terms, these two ways of tackling the challenges of a changing environment seem to be present in non-human animals. However, all dichotomies imply a difficulty to deal with: the regulation of the transition between the two systems. Is this carried out by a third element, or regulated by one of the systems? Could it be more convenient to view it as a continuum, rather than a dichotomy? In any case, we believe this transition has a level of complexity in humans that makes it qualitatively different from its analogue in animals. In fact, this ‘cognitive bridge’ might be a major feature to characterize a reliable behavior, since a particular task or problem is more efficiently tackled when the transition between the two systems is more adequate. Moreover, the integrity of this link could be an indicator to detect prodromal psychiatric conditions, as it has been suggested for slips-of-action (Gillan et al., 2011). In order to justify these ideas, we will focus first on Kahneman’s distinction between systems 1 and 2 (Kahneman, 2011). On the one hand, System 1 is responsible for making decisions rapidly. The purpose of this system is to give us an assessment of the environment around us as quickly as possible so that we are able to respond as fast as possible. To perform this task, System 1 follows general rules or guidelines (heuristics). In all, System 1 is intended to help us make decisions more quickly, and is very useful (let’s say ‘just fine’) in most cases. However, one of the characteristics of these decisions is the lack of voluntary control, what is a problem considering this system is responsible of many of the decisions and judgments we make. Given to its “automatic” nature, System 1 also has biases and systematic errors that are likely to happen in some situations.On the other hand, System 2 acts when a problem which System 1 has no solution for arises. System 2, apparently, can take control of the whole process at any time. It is somewhat triggered by some external or internal alarm that draws its attention and makes it take “conscious” control of the situation. One of the problems of this system is that it is lazy and can be easily exhausted. Therefore, it usually accepts the decisions of System 1 without monitoring them. One proof of System 2’s negligence is what Kahneman calls WYSIATI ("What You See Is All There Is"), a general rule that “facilitates the achievement of coherence and of the cognitive ease that causes us to accept a statement as true”. System 1 easily gets that coherence, and System 2 usually allows it to jump to conclusions and act. In different sets of experiments, Kahneman demonstrates that humans are not good at all with statistics or handling mathematics; in his opinion, this is because humans simplify judgments to make them more understandable and deal with them just through heuristics that System 1 can handle. This general view of humans as poor rational decision-makers is also supported by other authors (see, for example, Ariely, 2008).In our opinion, this division of human cognition into two systems fits well with the usual opposition between goal-directed versus habitual systems (Dickinson, 1985). In general, goal-directed actions are viewed as conscious, flexible, and sensitive to outcome devaluation, whereas habits are mainly unconscious, rigid and insensitive to changes in the value of the outcome. The features of goal-directed and habit systems were mainly drawn from studies in animals. The typical experiment about this subject consists on teaching the contingency between an instrumental action (for example, a lever press) and a reward to the animal (Adams and Dickinson, 1981). At the beginning, the animal’s behavior is goal directed, and it performs the action to obtain the reward. However, this behavior becomes “habitual” (in this context, a motor routine) after many repetitions. When that happens, the value of the reward is transferred to the lever press itself: even though the outcome is devalued (gets the animal sick) or the animal is sated, it keeps pressing the lever. This is why habits have been opposed to goal-directed behavior.A quick look suggests that habits and goal-directed actions are intimately related to Systems 1 and 2, respectively. This is also supported by the identification of the goal-directed system with a model-based reinforcement learning scheme, since it can be viewed “in terms of sophisticated, computationally demanding, prospective planning, in which a decision tree of possible future states and actions is built using a learned internal model of the environment” (Dolan and Dayan, 2013). The habitual system, on the other hand, follows a model-free scheme, which “is computationally efficient, since it replaces computation (i.e., the burdensome simulation of future states) with memory (i.e., stored discounted values of expected future reward); however, the forward-looking nature of the prediction error makes it statistically inefficient” (Dolan and Dayan, 2013). Following these analogies between systems, we can assume that some actions that at the beginning fall under the domain of System 2 might be transferred to System 1 through learning, like goal-directed actions become habits through experience.Concerning the neural bases of these systems, the striatum and its cortical afferents and –indirect– target areas in the cortex play a major role. It is widely accepted that the cognitive part of the striatum –caudate nucleus and anterior putamen– are involved in the planning and execution of goal-directed actions, together with the prefrontal cortex (Balleine et al., 2007). On the other hand, the sensorimotor striatal aspects –mainly the posterior putamen– and the supplementary motor area of the cortex are particularly active when the agent is performing a well-learned action (Ashby et al., 2010; Miyachi et al., 2002). Furthermore, the activity of the neurons in these areas follows a “chunked” pattern: they are mainly active at certain stages of the motor routine (for example at the beginning and the end of the sequence, when a particular switch or turn is needed, etc), and this activity is reduced in the rest of the motor sequence (Graybiel, 1998). Although some authors question a sharp neuroanatomical basis of Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2 (Gold and Shadlen, 2007), our train of thought in this manuscript suggests that the more reflective System 2 should be based in the prefrontal cortex –both dorsal and ventral–, and the cognitive regions of the basal ganglia. Likewise, the more automatic System 1 would lie on motor and premotor cortical regions, as well as on the sensorimotor aspects of those subcortical nuclei.This neuroscientific framework identifies the habit system with automaticity, rigidity and unconsciousness; however, we are intending to challenge this view in past and forthcoming contributions (Bernacer et al., 2014; Bernacer and Gimenez-Amaya, 2013). In a nutshell, we propose to view the phenomenon of action from the point of view of the agent as a whole, and not from an isolated movement. Hence, it could be more convenient to understand System 1 –or habits– as a resource of System 2, rather than as opposed systems in competition. Whereas a motor routine (i.e., what is commonly called “habit” in neuroscience) implies the sequential and unconscious performance of movements, they usually pursue the goal set by the agent. In fact, the more engrained the routine is, the easier for the agent to achieve that goal. Furthermore, the agent can consciously stop or correct the movement at any point, since the habit releases the higher cognitive regions of the brain to improve the performance of the action. A very simple example of this is a tennis service, which should be “goal directed” to place the ball wherever the player wants. It involves a set of movements such as throwing the ball upwards, moving the feet, putting the arm back, etc. Only when these motor routines are learned correctly, the player is able to concentrate on other aspects of the service such as the speed, spin, or exploiting the weaknesses of the receiver. This can be also exemplified with other kinds of habits such as driving, playing an instrument, tackling a mathematical problem, and so on. They all suggest that “automatic” routines are governed by higher cognitive functions to better achieve a particular goal.Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2 allow as well this release of consciousness from everyday decisions to focus on more complicated situations. As Kahneman himself and other authors defend (Ariely, 2008), the problem arises when System 2 is rarely used or either system is applied to inadequate situations. However, we believe that the most effective agent does not exclusively rely on System 2, but efficiently uses all resources of ‘each system’ in the right situation and, more importantly, carries out an appropriate transition between them. That is, in our opinion, a ‘rational’ agent. This could be also said about goal-directed and habitual systems. Moreover, we believe that this transition between systems is subject to learning, and it can be performed more effectively through experience.If we understand these fragmentations of cognition as independent systems in competition, we encounter an important problem: is there an additional mechanism in charge of the transition between systems, or is this regulated by one of the systems itself? If the first option were true, we would find the difficulty of defining the nature –both conceptually and anatomically– of a “third system” qualitatively different than the other two. This would lead us to an ad infinitum process –the need of a fourth element to regulate the activity of the third, and so on–, and therefore we believe this hypothesis should be rejected. Considering the second option, it seems that only the highly cognitive System 2 could be in charge of leading the transition between systems, which in turn dissolves a rigorous separation in two systems. The role of System 2 in leading the transition is clear when the agent decides to regain conscious control of a task generally performed in an unconscious manner. In this sense, the interaction of the orbitofrontal cortex with either the cognitive or sensorimotor aspects of the striatum plays a central role in shifting between goal-directed actions and motor routines (Gremel and Costa, 2013). In other situations, an external cue such as an error may set the alarm for System 2 to retake control of the action. Regarding this, the anterior cingulate cortex has been reported to be active in highly-conflictive decision making situations (Goñi et al., 2011); for that reason, some authors relate this cortical area with error monitoring (Carter, 1998; Botvinick et al., 2004). A recent report suggests a new model of reinforcement learning and conflict monitoring, which involves a wide network including different areas of the cortex (posterior parietal, precentral, anterior cingulate and prefrontal) and the basal ganglia (Zendehrouh et al., 2013).To sum up, this opinion article suggests viewing Kahneman’s systems as analogous to the goal-directed/habits dichotomy in order to improve the understanding of some aspects of human cognition. Further, we believe a strict separation between systems in competition is problematic, since System 2 is always in charge of governing the interplay between systems: therefore, System 1 –or habits– should be understood as a resource of System 2. This view could shed some light on the understanding of habits as a source of learning, plasticity and freedom for the agent. Finally, an inappropriate cognitive control of habits could be an indicator of certain psychiatric conditions. (shrink)

Children who live on the margins of society are disadvantaged in achieving their developmental potential because of the lack of a necessary stable environment and nurturing care. Many early prevention programs aim at mitigating such effects, but often the evaluation of their long-term effect is missing. The aim of the study presented here was to evaluate such long-term effects in two prevention programs for children-at-risk growing up in deprived social environments focusing on child attachment representation as the primary outcome as (...) well as on self-reflective capacities of teachers taking care of these children. The latter was a key component for promoting resilient behavior in children. Five hundred and twenty-six children aged 36 to 60 months at risk due to immigration status, low family socio-economic status and child behavior were examined in a cluster-randomized study comparing two preventions, the psychodynamic, attachment-based holistic approach EARLY STEPS (ES) with the classroom based FAUSTLOS (FA) for their efficacy. Primary outcome was the child attachment representation measured by the Manchester Child Attachment Story Task (MCAST). Secondary outcomes were derived from (a) the Caregiver-Teacher Report Form (C-TRF: problem behaviors, including anxiety/depressive symptoms, emotional-reactive and somatic problems, social withdrawal, aggressive behavior, and attention deficit), from (b) the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ, parent version: resilience and wellbeing) and (c) Self-Reflective Scales for teachers (SRS: self-reflective capacities of teachers). Compared to baseline, attachment and behavioral problems improved in both programs. ES led to more secure and more organized attachment representations (medium effect sizes). Aggressive behavior and externalizing problems were reduced in the FA group compared with ES, particularly in boys (medium effect sizes). Self-reflective capacities of the teachers increased only in the ES group. High correlation between children’s attachment type with the number of social risk factors and the increase of problematic social behavior strongly indicate that an increase in teachers’ self-reflective capacities helps to change children’s attachment patterns which thus strengthens the resilience of these children-at-risk [An ethical vote from LPPKJP 2009-02-25 was obtained and the trial registered; Clinical trial registration information: The trial was registered 14.02.2012 (DRKS00003500;https://www.drks.de)]. (shrink)

The way present-day Western society pollutes the environment, in particular as a result of the heavy use of personal cars, is described as an instance of behavior that is becoming ethically charged, gambling as it does with the life circumstances and opportunities of future generations. Travel, under any set of standard predictions, is expected to keep increasing, which is in conflict with environmentally sound behavior. The relationship to several psychological phenomena is pointed out, for example: perceived present-day societal (...) problems, the social dilemma, self-serving perceptions, the bystander effect, internal and external inducement of behavior, obedience and compliance, and groupthink. The moral background is also discussed. (shrink)

Heterogeneous beliefs and decision processes generate positive externalities for social and economic systems, analogous to biodiversity in biological systems. Although some aspects of biodiversity (e.g., pests, parasites and bacteria) can lead to ecological and economic problems, biodiversity provides flows of beneficial ecological services and is widely regarded as a valuable natural resource and informational asset, whose value increases as we learn more and science progresses (Wilson in Bioscience 35(11):700–706, 1985). Heterogeneous beliefs and decision processes (and heterogeneous behaviors they generate) similarly (...) provide flows of beneficial economic services. Behavioral diversity should therefore be seen as a natural resource and informational asset likely to improve human wellbeing in surprising ways in the future. Paternalistic policies motivated by the goal of “correcting” allegedly suboptimal beliefs and behavior that diverge from expert recommendations jeopardize behavioral diversity at a substantial cost to social welfare. The risk of encroaching on this beneficial behavioral heterogeneity with policies that aim to induce behavioral and belief monocultures should be included explicitly as costs when evaluating nudges and other paternalistic policies. (shrink)

When incorporating the environment into mental processing (cf., cognitive offloading), one creates novel cognitive strategies that have the potential to improve task performance. Improved performance can, for example, mean faster problem solving, more accurate solutions, or even higher grades at university.1 Although cognitive offloading has frequently been associated with improved performance, it is yet unclear how flexible problem solvers are at matching their offloading habits with their current performance goals (can people improve goal‐related instead of generic performance, e.g., (...) when being in a hurry and aiming for a “quick and dirty” solution?). Here, we asked participants to solve a cognitive task, provided them with different goals—maximizing speed (SPD) or accuracy (ACC), respectively—and measured how frequently (Experiment 1) and how proficiently (Experiment 2) they made use of a novel external resource to support their cognitive processing. Experiment 1 showed that offloading behavior varied with goals: Participants offloaded less in the SPD than in the ACC condition. Experiment 2 showed that this differential offloading behavior was associated with high goal‐related performance: fast answers in the SPD, accurate answers in the ACC condition. Simultaneously, goal‐unrelated performance was sacrificed: inaccurate answers in the SPD, slow answers in the ACC condition. The findings support the notion of humans as canny offloaders who are able to successfully incorporate their environment in pursuit of their current cognitive goals. Future efforts should be focused on the finding's generalizability, for example, to settings without feedback or with high mental workload. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.2 (2004) 125-128 [Access article in PDF] Comparing Psychoanalytic and Cognitive-Behavioral Perspectives on Control Bruce N. Waller Keywords freedom, locus of control, psychoanalysis, self-efficacy, volition Cognitive behavioral research on locus of control and self-efficacy has produced an extensive body of empirical results that might prove useful to psychoanalytic researchers endeavoring to strengthen the empirical foundation of psychoanalytic therapy. Cognitive-behaviorists and psychoanalysts share a common interest (...) in the importance of perspectives and belief systems and their impact on individual freedom, and comparative research on therapeutic effectiveness could yield benefits for both therapeutic approaches.Locus of control and self-efficacy are central elements in cognitive-behavioral psychology, and they play an important role in cognitive-behavioral therapy. Although the psychoanalytic approach does not explicitly employ those concepts, psychoanalytic therapists are obviously concerned with problems of effective action and internal obstacles to action. Attention to these two perspectives and their overlapping interests offers potential benefits for both the cognitive-behavioral and the psychodynamic approaches to psychological research and therapy.One potential benefit is the development of useful tools for advancing empirically based research on psychoanalysis. As Lehrer (1999) states, it is advantageous to ground psychoanalysis in "firm empirical evidence whenever possible." Although there have obviously been significant positive steps in that direction (Singer 2003; Weiss 1995, 1988; Weiss and Sampson 1986), psychoanalytic researchers have recognized that one source of difficulty is in finding clearly measurable research objectives and hypotheses (Burgin 2002). Cognitive-behavioral research on locus of control and self-efficacy has produced an extensive body of research using clear measurement standards that could prove useful in the empiricist approach to psychodynamic theories. In particular, those cognitive-behavioral research findings might offer a means of extending empirical investigation of psychodynamic theory in a direction usually regarded as difficult to test empirically: the study of psychoanalytic effectiveness to "change your way of seeing" (Lieberman 1999). Shifting locus of control or efficacy expectations in specific domains (Bandura 1997) [End Page 125] would empirically confirm the effectiveness of psychoanalytic techniques. It might well be that some efficacy expectations are enhanced more effectively by psychodynamic processes than by cognitive-behavioral therapy, or that psychoanalysis is effective in enhancing some specific efficacy expectations but not others. This could potentially extend the empirical examination of psychoanalytic theory as well as provide a base of comparison with cognitive-behavioral therapy techniques.Although self-efficacy enhancement might be a fruitful empirical test for psychodynamic therapy, therapeutic intervention to modify locus of control potentially could be even more productive. Current research indicates that one's orientation toward locus of control is a relatively stable characteristic, although it can be modified (Holyrod et al. 1984; Rotter 1979; Sadow and Hopkins 1993). One reason for locus of control stability may be that the locus of control imposes a perspective on the conceptualization of all one's experiences: from a strong internal locus of control perspective I view failures and successes as largely my own doing, whereas from an external locus perspective even my most effective efforts are seen as events that were outside my control: "I guess it was just my time to do well on a math exam," rather than "My hard work for that exam really paid off." (Lieberman makes this phenomenon quite clear in his excellent discussion of transparency.) Although locus of control is not easily modified, it is important to find effective means of helping subjects to achieve such changes, because research shows that a strong internal locus of control is positively correlated with success in work, sports, studies, marriage, and psychological adjustment (Lefcourt 1981, 1992), as well as with better health care behavior and better health (Bandura 1977; Schorr and Rodin 1982; Schulz 1976; Schulz and Hanusa 1978; Wallston 1993). Those deeply enmeshed in an external locus of control enjoy less real freedom and suffer severe disadvantages.How does one effect a shift in such a basic orientation? Not easily. From a psychoanalytic approach, the key will lie in recognizing and reconceptualizing the beliefs that impede effective action. Cognitive-behaviorists are more likely to... (shrink)

Executive functions (EFs) and impulsivity are dimensions of self-regulation that are both related to psychopathology. However, self-report measures of impulsivity and laboratory EF tasks typically display small correlations, and existing research indicates that impulsivity and EFs may tap separate aspects of self-regulation that independently statistically predict psychopathology in adulthood. However, relationships between EFs, impulsivity, and psychopathology may be different in childhood compared to adulthood. Here, we examine whether these patterns hold in the baseline assessment of the Adolescent Brain and Cognitive (...) Development (ABCD) sample, a national sample of over 11,000 children (including 749 twin pairs) ages 9–10 years. We examine the phenotypic and genetic relationships among latent variables for different components of EFs and multiple facets of impulsivity. Additionally, we assess how EFs and impulsivity relate to composite measures and latent variables of psychopathology derived from parent report. EFs were weakly correlated with impulsivity, and the strength varied by impulsivity facet, emphasizing their separability. We did not identify significant genetic and environmental correlations between EFs and impulsivity. Moreover, controlling for their small relationships with each other, both EFs and some facets of impulsivity statistically predicted an Externalizing factor, attention problems, and social problems, and twin analyses suggested these relationships were genetic in origin. These findings indicate that EFs and impulsivity represent phenotypically and genetically separable aspects of self-regulation that are both transdiagnostic correlates of psychopathology in childhood. (shrink)

Most research on aggression and delinquency concentrates on risk factors. There has been less attention for protective factors and mechanisms, in particular with regard to biosocial influences. Based on theories of autonomous arousal and stress reactance the present study addresses the influence of adrenocortical activity as a risk and/or protective factor in the development of antisocial behavior in children. We also investigated relations to anxiousness and family stressors. In a prospective longitudinal study of 150 German boys, the first measurement (...) took place at preschool age and contained an assessment of cortisol after waking up and 30 min later. Aggressiveness and anxiousness of the children were assessed by the kindergarten teachers with the Social Behavior Questionnaire. After 6 years, the children's behavior was rated by the teachers in middle school. Variable-oriented data analyses revealed a significant correlation between the total amount of cortisol after waking up and 30 min later and anxiousness both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, but not with aggressiveness. A family stress index correlated positively with aggressiveness but neither with cortisol nor with anxiousness. There were significant correlations between aggressiveness and anxiousness at kindergarten age and the respective behavior problems 6 years later. In a linear regression analysis on aggression only family stress had a significant effect but anxiousness not. Moderator analyses on aggressiveness with anxiousness and AUCG or on AUCG with anxiousness and aggressiveness did not show any significant interactions. Longitudinally, only aggression significantly predicted aggression 6 years later in a linear regression. In addition to variable-oriented analyses, we also applied a person-oriented approach to investigate specific patterns of behavior. Children who were high in both aggressiveness and anxiousness had the highest cortisol level and those with low anxiousness and high aggressiveness the lowest. The groups with different patterns of externalizing and internalizing problems at preschool age showed significant differences in aggression 6 years later. Our results underline the need for complex pattern analyses on cortisol, aggression, and anxiousness in children and for a differentiated consideration of emotional reactive aggression and unemotional instrumental aggression. (shrink)

I present a theory of alienation that accounts for the cognitive processes involved with moral thinking and political behavior in modern societies. On my account, alienation can be understood as a particular kind of atrophy of moral concepts and moral thinking that affect the ways individuals cognize and legitimate the social world and their place within it. Central to my argument is the thesis that modern forms of social integration—shaped by highly institutionalized, rationalized and hierarchical forms of social life—serve (...) to constrain the moral- cognitive powers of subjects leading to a condition of alienation as moral atrophy. This state results from the withering of the subject's internal powers of moral reflection and an overriding predisposition to rely on external value schemas to make sense of moral and political problems. I then present an analysis of alienated moral consciousness and its implications for modern social theory. (shrink)

The problem of philosophical skepticism relates to the difficulty involved in underwriting the claim that we know anything of spatio-temporal reality. It is often claimed, in fact, that proper philosophical scrutiny reveals quite the opposite from what common sense suggests. Knowledge of external reality is thought to be even quite obviously denied to us as a result of the alleged fact that we all fail to know that certain skeptical scenarios do not obtain. A skeptical scenario is one in (...) which we have neurological occurrences just like any normal situation in which we actually perceive spatio-temporal objects, but where we are deceived in some sense as a result of the manipulation of our brains from some outside source. In this work I attempt to address the problem of philosophical skepticism by claiming that most of us are able to come to know plenty about external reality, since we can come to realize that a certain philosophical theory of perception is correct. The theory I have in mind is what I call a non-cognitive theory of perception. According to this view, perceptual experience is defined by continuous, sensitive behavioral interaction with spatio-temporal objects of the appropriate size, shape, hardness, speed, etc. Knowing that this theory of perception is correct is equivalent to knowing that we know plenty about external reality. This is ultimately because by knowing that a non-cognitive theory of perception is true, we know that any skeptical scenario must fail to obtain. The structure of the work proceeds by first discussing the significance of the problem of philosophical skepticism in some detail. Chapter 1 lays out how the problem does indeed forcefully arise if it is conceded that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain. Chapter 2 develops the sort of view of our epistemological situation that falls out of accepting without qualification that the problem exists. Chapter 3 examines and criticizes certain popular responses to the skeptical problem. The main goal of these first three preliminary chapters is to indicate that once it is admitted that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain, the problem of philosophical skepticism forcefully presents itself. Chapter 4, however, attacks the idea that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain. In this chapter I argue that this idea is wedded to the position that a certain theory of perception is correct. The theory in question is what I call a conjunctive theory of veridical experience. According to this view, normal experience of spatio-temporal objects occurs when a subject has a certain perceptual experience, and that experience also happens to match up with and/or be satisfied by what is really the case. Only when a theory of this sort is assumed, I argue, is the claim that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain found to be obvious. In chapter 5 I argue that, in fact, a non-cognitive theory, rather than a conjunctive theory, is the correct view to maintain. In the final chapter 6 I develop the epistemological position that falls out of accepting a non-cognitive theory. (shrink)

The Alignment Problem in artificial intelligence concerns how to insure that artificial general intelligence (AGI) conforms to human goals and values and remains under human control. The concept of general intelligence, modelled on human and animal behavior, lacks coherence. The ideal of autonomy inherent in AGI conflicts with the ideal of external control. Truly autonomous agents are necessarily embodied, but embodiment implies more than physical instantiation or sensory input. It means being an autopoietic system (like a natural organism), (...) with its own priorities and values, which may compete and conflict with those of humans. Ambiguous terms and concepts, and problematic notions such as ‘orthogonality’, are critically examined, as well as inconsistencies in thought and expectation concerning AGI. Two paradigmatic approaches to the Alignment Problem are compared: Stuart Russell’s and Eric Drexler’s. Large Language Models are discussed in the context of the Turing Test. It is concluded that task-oriented tools, not autonomous agents, should be the goal of AI research. (shrink)

A central tenet in emotion research is that emotional reactivity involves convergent changes across subjective, behavioral, autonomic, and more recently neural, response systems. This has led to a model where convergence across multiple response systems facilitates an individual's emotional responses to environmental stressors. However, empirical support for this model is mixed and limited work examines whether psychobiological convergence during emotional reactions unfolds differently among children at risk for psychopathology. In this paper, we review data examining whether atypical alignment between autonomic (...) and subjective components of emotional reactivity is evident in youth with internalizing and externalizing problems. We contend that the direction and magnitude of psychobiological convergence may be meaningful for understanding individual differences in the development of psychopathology. We focus on autonomic and self-reported responses, commonly assessed in developmental work, and explore how their alignment may reflect meaningful variation in emotional experience. We propose that understanding the neural basis of this convergence could refine developmental models of emotion and inform early identification of risk. Finally, we outline methodological considerations for studying convergence across emotional systems in youth. (shrink)

Due to the development of the Chinese economy, the consolidation of national power worldwide, and the increasing frequency of economic and cultural exchanges with foreign countries, the number of people from various countries who travel to China to engage in exchanges has increased significantly. Given the development of economic globalization, the acceleration of the process of educational internationalization represents a general trend in higher education development and a common requirement for universities. In addition to education, international students also experience cross-cultural (...) adaptation, that is, behavioral adaptation or changes that occur in people in response to changes in their home country, whether in the form of external or internal cultural adaptation. For international students, the problem of cross-cultural adaptation not only hinders their learning progress but also affects their psychology and living conditions. This article explains the construction of Habermas’s theory of communication action. According to this theory, the purpose of communication is to coordinate the common actions of actors, and this coordination is achieved through mutual communication, which is mediated by language. The article also discusses the cross-cultural adaptation experienced by international students in Chinese universities and highlights the importance of developing educational services for international students in the context of international education. Studies have shown that female students exhibit slightly worse psychological adaptation than male students and female students have a slightly higher rate of depression rate than male students. An interpersonal study of 120 international students traveling to China found that most of these students were able to adapt in terms of their interpersonal relationships. To solve the problems associated with cross-cultural adaptation of international students in China, some countermeasures have been proposed, mainly including active participation in interpersonal communication, an enhanced understanding of the new culture, and the amplification of cultural identity. (shrink)

Sign-theoretical concepts have been used in research into the nature of living systems, not only by biologists, semioticians, and philosophers, but also by scientists who analyze organisms from the perspective of Decision Theory. Decision Theory (DT) describes both the external behavior and the internal information-processing of any kind of agent in terms of problem solving. Such “problem solving” is considered a complex process of: (1) defining a goal in an environment, (2) selecting the means to reach the (...) defined goal, and (3) controlling the effects of said selected means on the environment. The hypothesis that problem-solving agents are, first, physical entities and, second, sign-using systems is one of the most influential ideas in Decision Theory. This idea has been developed under the name of the ‘Physical Symbol System Hypothesis’ (PSSH) since the 1950s, particularly by two American scientists, Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, who did interdisciplinary research in cognitive science, artificial intelligence, economics, and decision theory. This paper first gives a short overview of the basic semiotic theory that underlies Newell’s and Simon’s work, and then offers some ideas on a specifically biosemiotic use of the Physical SymbolSystem Hypothesis. (shrink)

This essay presents a point of view for looking at `free will', with the purpose of interpreting where exactly the freedom lies. For, freedom is what we mean by it. It compares the exercise of free will with the making of inferences, which usually is predominantly inductive in nature. The making of inference and the exercise of free will, both draw upon psychological resources that define our ‘selves’. I examine the constitution of the self of an individual, especially the involvement (...) of personal beliefs, personal memories, affects, emotions, and the hugely important psychological value-system, all of which distinguish the self of one individual from that of another. The foundational position that adopted in this essay is that all psychological processes are correlated with corresponding ones involving large scale neural aggregates in the brain, communicating with one another through wavelike modes of excitation and de-excitation. Of central relevance is the value-network around which the affect system is organized, the latter, in turn, being the axis around which is assembled the self, with all its emotional correlates. The self is a complex system. I include a brief outline of what complexity consists of. In reality all systems are complex, for complexity is ubiquitous, and certain parts of nature appear to us to be ‘simple’ only in certain specific contexts. It is in this background that the issue of determinism is viewed in this essay. Instead of looking at determinism as a grand principle entrenched in nature independent of our interpretation of it, I look at our ability to explain and to predict events and phenomena around us, which is made possible by the existence of causal links running in a complex course that set up correlations between diverse parts of nature, in this way putting the stamp of necessity on these events. However, the complexity of systems limits our ability to explain and to predict to within certain horizons defined by contexts. Our ability to explain and predict in matters relating to acts of free will is similarly limited by the operations of the self that remain hidden from our own awareness. The aspects of necessity and determinism appear to us in the form of reason and rationality that explain and predict only within a limited horizon, while the rest depends on the complex operation of self-linked psychological resources, where the latter appear as contingent in the context of the exercise of free will. The hallmark of complex systems is the existence of amplifying factors that operate as destabilizing ones, along with inhibiting or stabilizing factors as well that generally limit the destabilizing influences to local occurrences, while preserving the global integrity of a system. This complex interplay of destabilizing and stabilizing influences lead to the possibility of an enormous number of distinct modes of behavior that appear as emergent phenomena in complex systems. Looking at the particular case of the self of an individual that guide her actions and thoughts, it is the operation of our emotions, built around the psychological value-system, that provide for the amplifying and inhibiting factors mentioned above. The operation of these self-linked factors stamps our actions and thoughts as contingent ones that do not fit with our concepts of reason and rationality. And this is what provides the basis of our idea of free will. Free will is not ‘free’ in virtue of exemption from causal links running through all our self-based processes - ones that remain hidden from our awareness, but is free of what is perceived to be ‘reason and rationality’ based on knowledge and the common pool of beliefs and principles associated with a shared world-view. When we speak of the choice involved in an act of exercise of free will what we actually refer to is the commonly observed fact that various different individuals of a similar disposition respond differently when placed under similar circumstances. In other words, free will is ‘free’ precisely because it is not subject to constraints of a commonly accepted and shared set of principles, beliefs, and values. While it is possible that, in an exercise of free will, the self-linked psychological resources are brought into action when a number of alternatives are presented to the self by the operation of the ingredients of a commonly shared world-view, it seems likely that, that set of alternatives is not of primary relevance in the final response that the mind produces, since the latter is primarily a product of the operation of the self-based psychological resources. What is of greater relevance here is the operation of emotion-driven processes, guided by the psychological value-system based on the activity of the so-called reward-punishment network in the brain. These processes lead the individual to a response that appears to be free from the shackles of determinism precisely because their mechanisms, which are hidden from us, do not conform to commonly accepted and shared rules and principles. In contrast, inductive inference is a process that is based on the ‘cognitive face’ of self, where the self-based psychological resources play a supportive role to the commonly shared world-view of an individual. There is never any freedom from the all-pervading causal links representing correlations among all objects, entities, and events in nature. In the midst of all this, the closest thing to freedom that we can have in our life comes with self-examination and self-improvement. The possibility of self-examination appears in the form of specific conjunctions between our complex self-processes and the ceaseless changes of scenario in our external world. This actually makes the emergent phenomenon of self-examination a matter of chance, but one that keeps on appearing again and again in our life. Once realized, self examination creates possibilities that would not be there in the absence of it, and these possibilities include the enhancement of further self-enrichment and further diversity in the exercise of our free will. (shrink)

The research examines freedom as a philosophical problem. The philosophical understanding of freedom allows us to consider it as a speculative idea or an ideal construction underlying its numerous manifestations, as well as a life practice within the framework of social and spiritual life, including politics, religion and culture. It seems that the essence of freedom cannot be understood as a simple mechanical set of various and not always related, disparate ideas, points of view, teachings. It is important to (...) keep in mind that multiple and different meanings of freedom are usually interconnected. The question of the nature of freedom is a question of its philosophical understanding. It is noted that freedom as a philosophical problem is not only a special value, spiritual quality, internal necessity, existential state, but also a concept that underlies its historical and metaphysical understanding. It is noted that the nature of human free will reflects both the internal spiritual state of a person and the reaction to the influence of external factors. Freedom as a value for which people go to death, personifies the highest human virtues, that is, freedom turns out to be the goal of human development. The philosophical foundations of freedom as an internal necessity “in the name of freedom” presuppose both a reflection of “responsibility” for freedom and an understanding of it as a special spiritual value. The historical practice of understanding freedom was based on the search for its nature in situations of choice of both overcoming necessity, on the one hand, and overcoming coercion, on the other. In addition, it was important to understand freedom as gaining independence and overcoming unfreedom. Therefore, civil liberties and human rights were of particular importance, as well as systems of governance for development, preserving individual freedoms and ensuring the well-being of society within the framework of a complex interaction between individual rights and group public interests. Social aspects of freedom clarify the role of cultural ideas in encouraging or hindering individual autonomy. Ethical connections between freedom and concepts of morality are noted. The interaction between moral obligations, social norms and individual behavior is considered in reasoning about the ethical consequences of freedom. (shrink)

Cross-cultural management researchers haveobserved that when presented with similarethical dilemmas and problems, managers raisedin different cultural environments exhibitdivergence in their perceptions,interpretations, and eventual solutions. Whydoes this happen? Our framework attempts tointegrate theoretical concepts from theinternational management and organizationalbehavior literature to explain variances inmanagerial information search patterns andattribution processing arising due to nationalcultural differences. Based on the work of Trompenaars,Hampden-Turner, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, wepropose that managers belong to one of twotypes of national cultures. The firstemphasizes Universalism, Specificity, andDominance over nature (USD) (...) while the secondassigns importance to Particularism,Diffuseness, and Subjugation (PDS). When facedwith a situation/dilemma, which may have anethical component, USD and PDS managers differwhen it comes to: The weighting, importance and amount of emphasis placed on the three types of information (Consistency, Consensus, and Distinctiveness) used to make attributions. A tendency to focus heavily on those information types, or alternately, to search for external environmental factors. Thus, the above process guides the manager's attribution process to assign causality of an event to either the primary actor(s) involved OR to factors in the external environment. Managers in different cultures may examine asituation, and through the attribution process,arrive at completely different conclusionsregarding whether an action is unethical, orwhether ethics even have a role. Our frameworkwill enable managers to understand the impactof cultural differences in dealing with ethicalsituations involving multiple cultures. (shrink)

A persistent methodological problem in primate social cognition research has been how to determine experimentally whether primates represent the internal goals of other agents or just the external goals of their actions. This is an instance of Daniel Povinelli’s more general challenge that no experimental protocol currently used in the field is capable of distinguishing genuine mindreading animals from their complementary behavior-reading counterparts. We argue that current methods used to test for internal-goal attribution in primates do not solve (...) Povinelli’s problem. To overcome the problem, a new type of experimental approach is needed, one which is supported by an alternative theoretical account of animal mindreading, called the appearance-reality mindreading (ARM) theory. We provide an outline of the ARM theory and show how it can be used to design a novel way to test for internal-goal attribution in chimpanzees. Unlike protocols currently in use, the experimental design presented here has the power, in principle and in practice, to distinguish genuine mindreading chimpanzees from those who predict others’ behavior solely on the basis of behavioral/environmental cues. Our solution to Povinelli’s problem has important consequences for a similar debate in developmental psychology over when preverbal infants should be credited with the ability to attribute internal goals. If what we argue for here in the case of nonhuman primates is sound, then the clearest tests for internal-goal attribution in infants will be those that test for attributions of discrepant or ‘false’ perceptions. (shrink)

This paper brings the intellectual tools of cognitive science to bear on resolving the “paradox of the active user” [Interfacing Thought: Cognitive Aspects of Human–Computer Interaction, Cambridge, MIT Press, MA, USA]—the persistent use of inefficient procedures in interactive tasks by experienced or even expert users when demonstrably more efficient procedures exist. The goal of this paper is to understand the roots of this paradox by finding regularities in these inefficient procedures. We examine three very different data sets. For each data (...) set, we first satisfy ourselves that the preferred procedures used by some subjects are indeed less efficient than the recommended procedures. We then amass evidence, for each set, and conclude that when a preferred procedure is used instead of a more efficient, recommended procedure, the preferred procedure tends to have two major characteristics: (1) the preferred procedure is a well‐practiced, generic procedure that is applicable either within the same task environment in different contexts or across different task environments, and (2) the preferred procedure is composed of interactive components that bring fast, incremental feedback on the external problem states. The support amassed for these characteristics leads to a new understanding of the paradox. In interactive tasks, people are biased towards the use of general procedures that start with interactive actions. These actions require much less cognitive effort as each action results in an immediate change to the external display that, in turn, cues the next action. Unfortunately for the users, the bias to use interactive unit tasks leads to a path that requires more effort in the long run. Our data suggest that interactive behavior is composed of a series of distributed choices; that is, people seldom make a once‐and‐for‐all decision on procedures. This series of biased selection of interactive unit tasks often leads to a stable suboptimal level of performance. (shrink)

This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being mistaken about one’s (...) mental states. Rather, self-knowledgehas to be seen as only a general constraint or as the default assumption of interpreting somebodyas a rational and intentional agent. This is compatible with the diagnosis of a localized lack of self-transparency. (shrink)

With rising consumption and environmental problems, there is an increasing need for green consumption. From a micro perspective, the influence of environmental cognition on consumers’ green consumption behaviors and the related mechanisms are examined through multilayer linear analysis and 2010 China General Social Survey microdata with the theory of planned behavior as the model framework. The study shows that environmental cognition positively influences attitudes toward green consumption, green consumption subjective norms, and green consumption perceived behavioral control, which leads to (...) increased intentions to engage in green consumption and actual green consumption behaviors. Environmental cognition can either promote the intention toward and lead to green consumption behavior or directly promote green consumption behavior. The more developed a region’s economy is, the stronger people’s attitudes toward green consumption will be; additionally, the greater the perceived external pressure to engage in green consumption becomes, the greater the likelihood that people will develop the intention to engage in green consumption behavior. Regional environmental quality inhibits green consumption intention to a certain extent. The influence of environmental cognition on green consumption shows regional heterogeneity. (shrink)

Guiding core enterprises to participate in supply chain work safety governance is an innovative mode of work safety control, which has an important impact on improving the work safety level of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain. Through in-depth interviews, the grounded theory is adopted to explore the driving factors of work safety management behaviors of core enterprise. It is found that the work safety management behavior of the core enterprise is driven by both internal and external (...) factors. External driving factors are the main category of institutional pressure composed of regulatory pressure, normative pressure, and cognitive pressure. Internal driving factors are divided into the main category of behavioral awareness and the behavioral capability of the core enterprises. The behavioral awareness is composed of responsibility sense, problem cognition and behavioral effect perception. The behavioral capability is composed of safety management strength and safety coordination capability. Institutional pressure, behavioral awareness, and behavioral capability all influence the work safety management behavior of core enterprise in supply chain significantly, but with different ways and paths. On this basis, the driving mechanism model of the above three main categories on the work safety management behavior in core enterprise supply chain is explored. The research can provide targeted policy ideas and implementation paths for the government to formulate effective guiding policies to promote the work safety management behavior of core enterprise. (shrink)

This article argues that the process of development as such explains a great deal of the forms and properties of individual developmental trajectories, without the necessity of having to rely on either external or internal factors or causes. Both the problem of developmental change and invariance can be explained by employing a dynamic systems conceptualization of development. It is shown that dynamic systems models on the one hand and those of the genuine developmental models in psychology on the other, (...) share a set of important general properties that are able to explain both the universal and the idiosyncratic aspects of developmental processes. The concept of mental and behavioral ecology, which may serve as a starting point for specific theories of development of cognition, social behavior, personality and so forth, is discussed. It is concluded that both long-term and short-term developmental patterns will be shown to follow similar abstract dynamical principles. (shrink)