The status of indirect discrimination is ambiguous in the current literature. This paper addresses two contemporary and related debates. First, for some, indirect discrimination is not truly a distinct kind of discrimination, but it is simply a legal construct designed to address distributive inequalities between groups. Second, even if one accepts that indirect discrimination is a distinct type of discrimination, the connection between the two kinds of discrimination, direct and indirect, is debated. For some, (...) they are distinct act-types, while for others, indirect discrimination should be conceived as a side effect of prior cases of direct discrimination. In this paper, I argue that indirect discrimination is a distinct act-type that can take place without being connected to prior instances of direct discrimination. (shrink)

This special issue consists of four articles, contributed by David Owen; Désirée Lim, Sahar Akhtar and (as co-authors) Mollie Gerver, Miranda Simon, Patrick Lown and Dominik Duell. These contributions address issues related to migration policies with the aim of bringing normative theories of migration and discrimination into dialogue. These theories describe the various types of discrimination inherent in the domestic and global migration systems, as well as assess arguments, pro et contra, about whether these forms of discrimination (...) are permissible. (shrink)

Over the years, phenomenology has provided illuminating descriptions of discrimination, with its mechanisms and effects being thematised at the most basic levels of embodiment, (dis)orientation, selfhood, and belonging. What remains somewhat understudied is the lived experience of the discriminator. In this paper I draw on Husserl's phenomenological account of normality to reflect on the ways in which we discriminate at the prereflective levels of perceptual experience and bodily being. By critically reflecting on the intentional structures undergirding discriminatory practices, I (...) argue that discrimination is characteristic of a naïve normalising attitude which is habitually interested in securing a familiar experience of a static normality. I first demonstrate how this attitude problematically tends to reproduce, enforce, and further sediment discriminatory and exclusionary norms. Further, I provide an internal critique which problematises discrimination—without recourse to external normative standards—on three fronts: as epistemically unproductive, experientially obscuring, and normatively non-instantiating. In discriminatory acts we see an abnormal refusal to enrich, revise, and genetically establish new normative commitments, new ways of seeing, and a new normality. (shrink)

According to Niko Kolodny, the commonplace claim that individuals ‘have claims to non-discriminatory social institutions and forms of treatment’ can be fully explained by neither appeals to claims against invasion, nor by an interest in improvement. To adequately explain the claim to non-discrimination we must appeal to the claim against inferiority. However, while the claim against inferiority explains important aspects of this commonplace, other aspects of it cannot be fully explained by the three claims in Kolodny’s triad (i.e. claims (...) to non-invasion, improvement, and non-inferiority). Hence, by Kolodny’s own lights a deeper form of pluralism than the one embodied in his triad is needed to account for claims to non-discrimination. This has implications both for discrimination theory and for how we should regard Kolodny’s overall project in political philosophy. (shrink)

Many legal, social, and medical theorists and practitioners, as well as lay people, seem to be concerned with the harmfulness of discriminative practices. However, the philosophical literature on the moral wrongness of discrimination, with a few exceptions, does not focus on harm. In this paper, I examine, and improve, a recent account of wrongful discrimination, which divides into a definition of group discrimination, and a characterisation of its moral wrong-making feature in terms of harm. The resulting account (...) analyses the wrongness of discrimination in terms of intrapersonal comparisons of the discriminatee’s actual, and relevantly counterfactual, well-being levels. I show that the account faces problems from counterfactuals, which can be traced back specifically to the orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, welfarist - concept of harm. I argue that non-counterfactual and non-comparative harm concepts face problems of their own, and don’t fit easily with our best understanding of discrimination; hence they are unsuitable to replace the orthodox concept here. I then propose a non-orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, hybrid - concept of harm, which relies on counterfactual comparisons of ways of being treated. I suggest how such a concept can help us handle the problems from counterfactuals, at least for my account of discrimination. I also show that there are similar proposals in other harm-related debates. An upshot of the paper is thus to corroborate the case for a non-orthodox, hybrid concept of harm, which seems better able to fulfil its functional roles in a variety of contexts. (shrink)

Intersectionality implies a series of tools to enhance the identification of and interventions against specific forms of discrimination. The article discusses the results of an exploratory study that investigated the extent to which these tools are considered and used by social workers involved in the anti-discrimination sector in some northern areas of Italy. While it is true that intersectionality seems to be a construct still relatively unknown to the professionals surveyed, they recognize how it can represent an added (...) value to their capacity for analysis and intervention. For its full utilization, they highlight the need to overcome the self-referential and fragmented manner in which social services operate in Italy and to rethink the relationship between operators and victims of discrimination, emphasizing the active role of the latter in promoting social inclusion. (shrink)

Hardly anyone disputes that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something discrimination, as well as precisely why (and hence when) acts of discrimination are wrong. Benjamin Eidelson develops systematic answers to those two questions. He claims that discrimination is a form of differential treatment distinguished by its special connection to the differential ascription of some property to different people, and goes on to argue that what makes (...) some cases of discrimination intrinsically wrongful is that they manifest an attitude of disrespect for the personhood of those who are disfavored. He endeavors to specify what this attitude consists in, and to demonstrate how attending to its character can help us to better understand the moral dimensions of different forms of wrongful discrimination. The book concludes with an extended discussion of racial profiling in law enforcement. (shrink)

U.S. Food and Drug Administration policy prohibits blood donation from men who have had sex with men even one time since 1977. Growing moral criticism claims that this policy is discriminatory, a claim rejected by the FDA. An overview of U.S. blood donation, recent donor deferral policy, and the conventional ethical debate introduce the need for a different approach to analyzing discrimination claims. I draw on an institutional understanding of injustice to discern and describe five features of the MSM (...) policy and its FDA context that contribute to its discriminatory effect. I note significant similarities in the 1980s policy of deferring Haitians, suggesting an historical pattern of discrimination in FDA deferral policy. Finally, I point to changes needed to move toward a nondiscriminatory deferral policy. (shrink)

Comment on Beeghly, Erin. 2021. “Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory.” Social Epistemology 35 (6): 547–63. -/- Beeghly’s “Stereotyping as Discrimination” is—characteristically—clear, thorough, and persuasive, rich with incisive arguments and thought-provoking case studies. In defending the view that stereotyping often constitutes discrimination, she makes a powerful case that, “Living ethically means cultivating a certain kind of ‘inner’ life and avoiding pernicious habits of thought, no matter how culturally pervasive” (Beeghly 2021b, 13). Support for such claims (...) is traced back not just to Aristotle and the Ten Commandments (Beeghly 2021b, 10), but also to critical social traditions. “As feminists and theorists of race have long noted, the most intimate aspects of our selves, including our ways of thinking, agency, and modes of embodiment, are among the mechanisms of group oppression” (Beeghly 2021b, 13). I offer, first, a tiny friendly amendment to one brief passage, followed by invitations to explore some of the further potential implications of Beeghly’s central theses. (shrink)

As men take on more family responsibilities over time, with women still shouldering considerably more childcare and housework, an important ethical matter facing organizations is that of providing a supportive environment to foster employee well-being and balance between work and family. Using conservation of resources theory, this multi-source study examines the association between perceived family responsibility discrimination and work–life conflict as mediated by emotional exhaustion. Employee gender and power distance values are tested as moderators of the perceived family responsibility (...) discrimination to emotional exhaustion relationship. Results suggest that male employees who perceive family responsibility discrimination from their supervisor and hold high power distance values experience increased emotional exhaustion and work–life conflict. Female workers who perceive family responsibility discrimination from their supervisor experience increased emotional exhaustion and work–life conflict regardless of whether they have high or low power distance. Findings are consistent with theory-based predictions from conservation of resources theory: resources that are valued and not provided in the work context deplete emotional energies and ultimately trigger work–life conflict. Findings build on the work–life literature by introducing gender and power distance as factors that shape when employees feel the draining effects of family responsibility discrimination. (shrink)

Fundamentally, intentions do not matter to the permissibility of actions, according to Thomas Scanlon (among others). Yet, discriminatory intentions seem essential to certain kinds of direct discrimination in hiring and firing, and appear to be something by virtue of which, in part at least, these kinds of discrimination are morally impermissible. Scanlon's account of the wrongness of discrimination attempts to accommodate this appearance through the notion of the expressive meaning of discriminatory acts and a certain view about (...) how permissibility relates to the meaning of actions. This paper explores the scope, strengths and weaknesses of this account. Specifically, it challenges the view that discrimination reflecting hierarchical value judgments necessarily involves a wrong that renders such discrimination more objectionable than other forms. (shrink)

Since its first delivery in 1993, J.L. Schellenberg’s atheistic argument from divine hiddenness keeps generating lively debate in various quarters in the philosophy of religion. Over time, the author has responded to many criticisms of his argument, both in its original evidentialist version and in its subsequent conceptualist version. One central problem that has gone undetected in these exchanges to date, we argue, is how Schellenberg’s explicit-recognition criterion for revelation contains discriminatory tendencies against mentally handicapped persons. Viewed from this angle, (...) our present critique imparts Schellenberg’s position with a philosophical dilemma: (1) endorsing divine discrimination to the effect that God does not love ‘cognitive-affective outsiders’ or (2) giving up on explicit recognition. Either way, the hiddenness argument does not succeed. (shrink)

The 3rd Pan-African Ethics Human Rights and Medical Law (3rd EHRML) conference was held in Johannesburg on July 7, 2013, as part of the Africa Health Congress. The conference brought together bioethicists, researchers and scholars from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria working in the field of bioethics as well as students and healthcare workers interested in learning about ethical issues confronting the African continent. The conference which ran with a theme of "Bioethical and legal perspectives in biomedical research and (...) medical practice in Africa with a focus on: Informed consent, HIV-AIDS & Tuberculosis, leadership & organizational ethics, patients and healthcare workers rights," was designed to expand the dialogue on African bioethics beyond the traditional focus on research ethics and the ethical dilemmas surrounding the conduct of biomedical research in developing countries. This introductory article highlights some of areas of focus at the conference including issues of leadership, organizational ethics and patients and healthcare workers rights in Africa. We analyze the importance of free speech, public debate of issues, argumentation and the need to introduce the teaching and learning of ethics to students in Africa in accordance with UNESCO guidelines. This article also focuses on other challenges confronting Africa today from an ethical standpoint, including the issues of poor leadership and organizational ethics which are main contributors to the problems prevalent in African countries, such as poverty, poor education and healthcare delivery systems, terrorism, social inequities, infrastructural deficits and other forms of 'structural violence' confronting vulnerable African communities. We believe that each of the eight articles included in this supplement, which have been rigorously peer-reviewed are a good example of current research on bioethics in Africa, and explore some new directions towards broadening the African bioethics agenda as we move forward to a new dawn for Africa in the 21st century. (shrink)

In her recent book, Faces of Inequality (2020), Moreau aims at developing a normative account of discrimination that is guided by the main features of anti-discrimination law. The critical comment argues against this methodology, indicating that due to indeterminacy relative to their underlying normative principles, central anti-discrimination norms cannot fulfill this guiding role. Further, using the content of such norms to guide ethical discussions is likely to be misleading, as it reflects evidentiary considerations that are unique to (...) the legal context. The critical comment’s claims are developed based on a close examination of indirect discrimination (or disparate impact) norms, and, as such, have wider implications for ongoing moral and political debates that are heavily influenced by the content of these norms. (shrink)

Over the past decade, scholars, institutions, and activists have voiced strong concerns about the potential of automated decision systems to indirectly discriminate against vulnerable groups. This article analyses the ethics of algorithmic indirect discrimination, and argues that we can explain what is morally bad about such discrimination by reference to the fact that it causes harm. The article first sketches certain elements of the technical and conceptual background, including definitions of direct and indirect algorithmic differential treatment. It next (...) introduces three prominent accounts of fairness as potential explanations if the badness of algorithmic indirect discrimination, but argues that all three are vulnerable to powerful levelling-down-style objections. Instead, the article demonstrates how proper attention to the way differences in decision-scenarios affect the distribution of harms can help us account for intuitions in prominent cases. Finally, the article considers a potential objection based on the fact that certain forms of algorithmic indirect discrimination appear to distribute rather than cause harm, and notes that we can explain how such distributions cause harm by attending to differences in individual and group vulnerability. (shrink)

Most of us intuitively take discrimination based on gender or ethnicity to be impermissible because we have a right to be treated on the basis of merit and capacity rather than e.g. ethnicity or gender. I call this suggestion the Impermissibility Account. I argue that, despite how the Impermissibility Account seems intuitive to most of us with a humanist outlook, it is indefensible. I show that well-informed discrimination can sometimes be permissible, and even morally required, meaning we cannot (...) have a strict right not to be discriminated against. I then propose an alternative and more plausible account which I call the Fairness and Externalities Account, arguing that acts of discrimination are wrong partly because they are unfair and partly because they create harmful externalities which—analogously to pollution—there is a collective responsibility to minimize. Both of these factors are however defeasible, meaning that if the Fairness and Externalities Account is correct, then discrimination is sometimes permissible. These results are counterintuitive, and suggest that the ethics of discrimination requires further attention. (shrink)

In this introduction, I briefly summarize Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality. I situate her monograph within two highly contemporary bodies of literature — relational egalitarianism and discrimination theory — to show how it provides important insights for understanding both what it means to treat others as equals in society and how to define wrongful discrimination. Moreau's work on discrimination is of great relevance for philosophers and socio-legal theorists alike as the commentaries from the symposium contributors demonstrate, including (...) Dale Smith, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Daniel Viehoff, Jessica Eisen, Alysia Blackham, and Iyiola Solanke. (shrink)

The distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination is a prominent one in the literature and public discourse; intentional discriminatory actions are commonly considered particularly morally objectionable relative to unintentional discriminatory actions. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what the two types amount to, and what generates the moral difference between them. The paper develops philosophically-informed conceptualizations of the two types based on which the moral difference between them may be accounted for. On the suggested account, intentional discrimination is characterized by (...) the agent viewing the content of an underlying discriminatory belief as a consideration that counts in favor of her action. This, it is argued, amounts to endorsing the discriminatory belief, which generates the particular moral severity of intentional discrimination. (shrink)

In this commentary, we critically review the Quebec Court of Appeal’s reference decision to the effect that the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act is unconstitutional. In sum, the court held that the federal government exceeded its criminal law power through the GNDA, as the Act did not have a valid criminal law purpose. The decision was met with opposition, as advocacy groups for Canadians suffering from genetic diseases or genetic predispositions viewed the GNDA as a step in the right direction and (...) were hopeful that it would offer protection from genetic discrimination. In closing, we argue that the consequences of the Court of Appeal’s opinion will be less dire than anticipated by some advocacy groups. In fact, we suggest that this decision brings about a unique opportunity for progress, where stakeholders can engage the public and policymakers in a forward- looking debate on the use of genetic information. (shrink)

Across Europe, countries are reducing CO2 emissions and energy demand by lowering the temperature in public office buildings. These measures affect men and women unequally because the latter prefer and, indeed, perform better under higher temperatures than the standard temperature. Lowering the temperature thus further increases an already existing inequality. We show that the philosophical literature on discrimination provides an interesting theoretical approach to understanding such measures. On prominent understandings of what discrimination is, the policy would be considered (...) direct discrimination against women if it could be shown to reflect a broader inattentiveness to the needs of women in society. Alternatively, and more straightforwardly, the policies can be considered indirect discrimination because of their disparate effects on men and women. The final part of the paper shows that the policies are also wrong for the reasons it is often argued that discrimination is wrong—to wit, that it harms or disrespects those who are discriminated against. The final section suggests a range of measures to offset the discriminatory aspects of the policy. (shrink)

The article analyzes the impacts of artificial intelligence (AI) from an intersectional approach focused on disability. It highlights the algorithmic biases present in technological systems that reproduce social inequalities. The research emphasizes the urgency of integrating inclusive ethical frameworks and the active participation of collectives in AI development. It also questions the colonization of the concept of intersectionality, proposing its recovery as a critical tool. Only through a feminist, decolonial, and human rights-based perspective can we move toward truly fair and (...) inclusive AI. (shrink)

Experiences of discrimination such as everyday racism can negatively affect the mental and physical health of children and adolescents with an immigrant background and impair their integration process in the host societies. Although experiences of racism are part of the everyday life of many minors affected by the process of “Othering” (e.g., those with an immigrant background), an overview of empirical findings is missing for this age group worldwide. A systematic review was conducted to identify and analyze international research (...) on the impact of discrimination on the developmental outcomes and integration of immigrant children and adolescents. Three scientific databases were systematically searched up to June 11, 2021. A total ofk= 4,769 identified publications were reviewed based on inclusion and exclusion criteria in terms of the PICOS format by independent reviewers. Thirty-four primary studies published between 1998 and 2021 met all inclusion criteria. The samples examined were mainly migrant youth (k= 30), with onlyk= 2 studies assessing refugee youth andk= 1 study assessing both migrant and refugee youth. The majority of included studies assessed perceived discrimination, with onlyk= 1 study directly assessing experiences of racism. The association between discrimination or racism and developmental outcomes was assessed by the included studies within the three main topics of (a) mental and physical health-related outcomes (k= 30, e.g., self-esteem, depressive symptoms), (b) school-related outcomes (k= 6, e.g., academic achievement), and (c) other developmental outcomes (k= 13, e.g., misconduct or delinquency). Data collection procedures were implemented, and findings on minors’ developmental outcomes and integration process who experience discrimination and racism were summarized and discussed. The current review suggests experienced (racial) discrimination as a negative predictor of children and adolescents’ (mental) health-related outcomes, while no clear results could be found for the association between discrimination and school-related outcomes. A need for more empirical research focusing on the path and (possibly) indirect link between discrimination and children and adolescents’ school-related outcomes as well as resulting school recommendations and the chosen career path was derived.Systematic Review Registration[https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/display_record.php?RecordID=260291], identifier [CRD42021260291]. (shrink)

This article examines whether the folk concept of DISCRIMINATION is inherently evaluative or purely descriptive. Two corpus analyses reveal a historical shift, with “discrimination” evolving from a neutral to an evaluative term. The results of a cancelability test show that denying the evaluative aspect of “discriminatory” leads to contradictions, indicating the communication of moral judgment by default. In a vignette study, we demonstrate that cases often cited as examples of descriptive discrimination are judged either non-discriminatory or morally (...) wrongful. These results support the Moralized View, challenging the Descriptive View, and propose DISCRIMINATION to be a thick concept blending descriptive and evaluative content. (shrink)

Despite progress, discrimination in public health remains a problem. A significant aspect of this problem relates to how medical resources are allocated. The paradigm of quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) dictates that medical resources should be allocated on the basis of units measured as length of life and quality of life that are expected after the implementation of a treatment. In this article, I discuss some of the ethical shortcomings of QALY, by focusing on some of its flawed moral aspects, as well (...) as the way it relates to discrimination on the basis of age, race, and disability status. I argue that while this approach seeks to maximize efficiency, it does not place sufficient value on the preservation of life itself. Even more concerning is the fact that the use of QALY disproportionately harms minorities. While QALY is a well-intentioned approach to the allocation of scarce healthcare resources, new alternatives must be sought. (shrink)

People working on the ethics of discrimination have struggled with accounting for a kind of moral wrongdoing that is thought to be present in all instances of wrongful discrimination. So far, any moral wrong claimed to be characteristic of wrongful discrimination in this way has failed to generalize to all cases of wrongful discrimination, moving many to abandon the idea that wrongful discrimination is normatively distinct at all. Motivated by this situation, we propose to abandon (...) the assumption that the common moral wrong of wrongful discrimination must be a first-order moral wrong. Instead, we argue that the common wrong of discrimination is a normative mistake in a more general sense, namely the flaw of being biased. Drawing on Thomas Kelly’s (2022) recent work on bias, we show that this account provides a unified and plausible answer to the question of what makes wrongful discrimination characteristically morally wrong, while being able to accommodate the plurality of moral considerations at play in wrongful discrimination. (shrink)

Ethical decisions are contextualized in the dialectic of a multidimensional system, including situation, setting, culture, and generation. There may be further gaps between the ethical considerations of professionals and folk values. The experience of promoting equal opportunities in Hong Kong illustrates some of these challenges. Whereas the rule of law under a Western legal system advocates human rights, the traditional emphasis on harmony and preference for balancing in conflict resolution underlie the gaps in the interpretation of these ideals. The case (...) of the Hong Kong secondary school places allocation system highlights the conflicting perspectives of law, gender stereotypes, psychological knowledge, as well as ethical principles of justice and fairness in promoting equal opportunities in educational assessment and placement. The cultural perspective highlighted in this case illustrates the complex contexts of ethical decisions. (shrink)

늙어감의 현상은 인간의 삶에 있어 자연스럽게 나타나는 현상이다. 그러나 노년기에 접어든 인간은 신체적, 정신적으로 쇠퇴하였다는 이유로 사회 속에서 쓸모없는 존재로 여겨지게 되고 이와 같은 노인에 대한 부정적인 인식 확산은 노인 차별의 문제로 이어지고 있다. 특히 현재 우리 사회를 심각하게 위협하고 있는 COVID-19는 우리 사회 속에서 보여지는 노인들의 취약성을 더욱 두드러지게 보여주고 있으며, 이로 인해 야기되는 노인 차별문제의 일면을 여실히 드러내고 있다. 이에 본 논문에서는 고령사회에서 노인에게 행해지는 차별의 문제점을 분석하고 노인에게 행해지는 차별 및 소외의 문제를 레비나스의 타자 윤리를 통해 고찰해 (...) 보고자 한다. 레비나스는 자아 안으로 통합시킬 수 없는 절대적인 다름, 절대적 타자성을 가진 타자가 윤리적 관계의 중심이라고 주장하며, 타자와의 관계에 기반한 책임윤리를 말한다. 이러한 측면에서 레비나스의 절대적 다름의 특성을 가진 타자에 대한 이해, 타자와의 관계에 기반한 책임윤리는 절대적 다름의 가치를 인정하지 않고 하나의 기준으로 모든 것을 판단하고자 하는 오늘날의 우리 삶, 즉 다양한 연령이 사회 속에서 가지는 중요함을 인식하지 못하고 노인을 차별하는 현실의 문제점을 비판하고 성찰하는 데 중요한 의미를 가질 것이다. 그리고 이러한 과정을 통해서 우리는 늙어간다는 것은 차별하고 갈등해야 할 문제가 아니라 단지 다름의 문제일 뿐이며, 다름의 인정을 통한 상호간의 소통과 책임은 고령사회에 우리가 인정해야 할 중요한 사회적 가치임을 깨달을 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

According to US law, insurance companies can lawfully differentiate individual health insurance premiums on the basis of non-genetic medical information, but not on the basis of genetic information. The article reviews the case for such genetic exceptionalism. First, I critically assess some standard justifications. Next, I scrutinize an argument appealing to the view that genetically based premium differentiation expresses that persons do not all merit equal concern and respect. In the final section, I argue that even if genetic exceptionalism is (...) unjustified, there is a forceful luck egalitarian argument against basing premiums on genetic risks, to wit, that this tends to make some individuals worse off than others as a result of the bad brute luck involved in having a genetically determined, above-average risk of developing health problems. (shrink)

Avec un taux de 31 % de députées au Bundestag, l’Allemagne est loin de la parité en politique. Cet article vise à éclairer les raisons, tant institutionnelles que discursives, qui participent de cet état de fait. Dans un premier temps, il sera question des mécanismes qui freinent l’accès des femmes à la députation : la femme cantonnée à la sphère privée, l’image de la femme apolitique, les pratiques au sein des partis ainsi que le mode de scrutin. Au niveau institutionnel, (...) des solutions concrètes émergent, à l'image des quotas paritaires mis en place au sein des partis. D’autres solutions sont actuellement discutées, notamment un éventuel changement du mode de scrutin. Dans un second temps, nous verrons que même une fois ce premier pas vers la députation franchi, l’activité des députées demeure liée à des problématiques spécifiques de genre qui se manifestent sur le plan linguistique, par exemple au travers d'interruptions sexistes pendant leurs discours. (shrink)

Victims of discrimination are often disadvantaged. Are they necessarily disadvantaged? Many say so: “in discriminating against someone, one is necessarily acting to the disadvantage of that someone” (Gardner 2018: 67); “discrimination against someone simply is disadvantageous differential treatment” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2013: 15). The connection between discrimination and disadvantage is also supposed to play two significant explanatory roles. That you are disadvantaged by the differential treatment of you and me is meant to explain why it was discrimination against (...) you rather than me; and that discrimination necessarily involves disadvantage is meant to unify direct and indirect discrimination. Drawing on cases from the opioid epidemic, I aim to challenge this received view about the connection between discrimination and disadvantage. (shrink)

Anti-discrimination laws draw a distinction between two kinds of discrimination by non-state actors. Intimate choices are protected even if they are morally wrong. For example, even if it is morally wrong to discriminate on the basis of race in deciding whom to date, marry or befriend, anti-discrimination laws permit these acts. By contrast, commercial decisions are commonly regulated. I argue that the reasons for regulating commercial decisions also extend to an intermediate case, commercial facilitators of marriage choices. (...) In the context of the caste system, I argue that commercial facilitators should be banned from allowing customers to filter by caste. The argument is based on two considerations. First, this could mitigate the harmful effects of such discriminatory marriages choices in the (re)production of the oppressive caste system. Second, even if the ban fails in changing behaviour, it serves as an expressive goal of communicating the state's opposition to the caste system. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the relations between trust, agency and latent forms of discrimination. Its main argument is in social philosophy, and it articulates considerations from moral psychology and the philosophy of language. The aim is to provide a better insight into the deflated level of trustworthiness that members of stigmatized categories are credited with. Identity prejudice determining low levels of credibility for its victims has received substantial philosophical attention in the wake of the epistemic injustice literature. Instead (...) of the standard cognitive concept of trust usually brought in, I apply a moral (or agential) account of trust (drawing on Domenicucci and Holton 2017) to discriminatory issues. We can fail to trust the trustworthy (Jones 2013) in a variety of ways. When it comes to the members of discriminated categories, I argue in the first part, this happens because they are refused a necessary condition of trust: a presumption of agency. This presumption of agency, prima facie attributed to human adults, is precisely what goes wrong for the members of stigmatized groups. Not recognised as individual agents, but as mere quasi-agents, the discriminatees cannot be trusted: their trustworthiness actually becomes unthinkable. The very possibility to give reasons for or against out-group members’ trustworthiness is thus dismissed. Articulating documentality and feminist philosophy of language, the second part shows that members of stigmatized categories have their conduct described and recorded through a non-agential grammar. Once widespread and socially dominant, non-agential descriptions of their action give the discriminatees a peculiar moral status that jeopardizes the very possibility of their being recognised as trustworthy. (shrink)

Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong. This moral judgment is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political philosophy.

In Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, which explains the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, we offer two objections. The conditions objection states that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. The explanation objection states that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of (...) the wrong-making properties of discriminatory acts. We argue that the structure of a satisfactory view cannot be outcome-focused. A more promising family of views focuses on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful (...) discrimination. Regarding harm, it is very plausible to consider the policies harmful but much less reasonable to consider those responsible for their health disadvantages a socially salient group. Drawing on the disrespect literature, where social salience is typically not required for something to be discrimination, the policies are a form of discrimination. They are, however, not disrespectful. The upshot of this first assessment of the discrimination objection to luck egalitarianism in health is, thus, that it fails. (shrink)

We examine whether sex discrimination contributes to the underrepresentation of female executives in large corporations. China’s strong cultural preference for sons has made newborn boys greatly outnumber newborn girls. Using the male-to-female sex ratio at birth as the proxy for discrimination against women, we find that firms headquartered in more discriminatory areas hire fewer female executives. Even conditional on a woman reaching an executive position, she faces a higher likelihood of dismissal and receives lower compensation than her male (...) counterparts. Overall, our findings suggest that sex discrimination plays an important role in preventing women from climbing the corporate ladder. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that it is a moral obligation for companies, firstly, to accept their moral responsibility with respect to non-discrimination, and secondly, to address the issue with a full-fledged programme, including but not limited to the countering of microsocial discrimination processes through specific policies. On the basis of a broad sketch of how some discrimination mechanisms are actually influencing decisions, that is, causing intended as well as unintended bias in Human Resources Management (HRM), (...) I will argue that the well known tools of legislation and ethical codes are necessary although insufficient to cope with the problem. However, based on empirical evidence, we know which set of measures is likely to diminish discrimination. Taking non-discrimination seriously implies complex and longitudinal policies which include assigning responsibility for a non-discrimination policy within the firm, making managers conscious of implicit stereotypes and helping them to cope with prejudices that no one can totally overcome. Insofar as corporate responsibility with respect to non-discrimination is accepted and strategies that are not prohibitively expensive are known, companies are bound to implement them. Not implementing the best set of measures may be considered at least as a moral shortcoming or, depending on the size of the company, mere lip service to the non-discrimination principle. Although the paper refers to empirical material of diverse backgrounds, its intent is clearly normative. It wishes to spell out what companies ought to do if they are committed to responsible behaviour. The discussion of effective remedies against discrimination is based on a case study of a French company. The retailer Auchan was recently surprised to learn that it was discriminating against ethnic minorities despite strong ethical standards, an ethics committee and ethical leadership. The company dropped its naïve beliefs and set up an ambitious policy cope with the issue. The case illustrates what recent empirical research has revealed about the effectiveness of diversity policies: establishing responsibility for diversity results, firm ethical commitment and support from top management make diversity programs effective. (shrink)

Several leading theorists embrace the Simple Desert Account of Discrimination. This account involves two claims: it claims that a mismatch between what people deserve, on the one hand, and what they get, on the other hand, is (a) integral to discrimination, and (b) wrong. I shall query (a). First, I challenge what I see as the principal, positive argument for the Simple Desert Account. Second, in some cases wrongful discrimination brings about a better match between desert and (...) what people get. Situations in which this could be the case include those where: the discriminatee is a serial discriminator herself; the person wrongfully discriminated in favour of deserves greater advantages than she enjoys; by engaging in wrongful discrimination the discriminator reduces her moral deservingness and thereby the gap between her level of deservingness and her otherwise unfittingly low level of advantage. (shrink)

This article argues that, as commonly understood, indirect discrimination is not necessarily unjust: 1) indirect discrimination involves the disadvantaging in relation to a particular benefit and such disadvantages are not unjust if the overall distribution of benefits and burdens is just; 2) indirect discrimination focuses on groups and group averages and ignores the distribution of harms and benefits within groups subjected to discrimination, but distributive justice is concerned with individuals; and 3) if indirect discrimination as (...) such is unjust, strict egalitarianism has to be the correct account of distributive justice, but such egalitarianism appears vulnerable to the leveling down objection (whether decisively or not), and many theorists explicitly reject strict egalitarianism anyway. The last point threatens the position of liberals who oppose indirect discrimination but think significant inequalities can be just. (shrink)