The paper first introduces the concept of implicit and explicit temporality, referring to time as pre-reflectively lived vs. consciously experienced. Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the dimensions of present, past and future. It is further shown that temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are closely connected: (...) While implicit temporality is characterised by tacit bodily functioning and by synchronisation with others, explicit temporality arises with states of desynchronisation, that is, of a retardation or acceleration of inner time in relation to external or social processes. These states often bring the body to awareness as an obstacle as well. On this basis, schizophrenia and melancholic depression are investigated as paradigm cases for a psychopathology of temporality. Major symptoms of schizophrenia such as thought disorder, thought insertion, hallucinations or passivity experiences may be regarded as manifesting a disturbance of the constitutive synthesis of time consciousness, closely connected with a weakening of the underlying pre-reflective self-awareness or ipseity. This results in a fragmentation of the intentional arc, a loss of self-coherence and the appearance of major self-disturbances. Depression, on the other hand, is mostly triggered by a desynchronisation from the social environment and further develops into an inhibition of the conative–affective dynamics of life. As will be shown, both mental illnesses bear witness of the close connection of temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that none of three different ways one can cash out the brain time theory provides a satisfactory general theory of how we temporally bind sensory features into perceptions of coherent perceptions of synchrony. In general, brain time theories state that the time at which sensory features are perceived as occurring relative to each other is fully determined by the time at which sensory features finish processing, i.e., reach their perceptual endpoints. I describe three different versions (...) of brain time theories that differ in terms of how perceptual endpoints are defined. One defines perceptual endpoints in terms of local linear processing, another in terms of local linear and non-linear processing, and a third adds the possibility of perceptual endpoints determined by global non-linear processing. I evaluate each of these relative to how well they can account for two problems that I argue any theory of temporal binding must account for. These are the problems of neural delay and desynchronisation. The first problem concerns accounting for how our perceptual system overcomes delays in neural processing, such that we can perceive events in the world in a timely manner to guide judgments and actions. The second problem concerns accounting for how our perceptual system manages to temporally bind features, such that we can perceptually experience the synchrony relations and temporal order of multimodal events when our brain processes different features at different speeds. I argue that no version of the brain time theory provides a satisfying account of both problems. I end by proposing a way forward. (shrink)

This thesis develops a theory of temporal binding, the process by which we temporally integrate sensory features into perceptual experiences. Psychophysical and neurophysiological findings have revealed a remarkable amount of detail into how we engage in temporal binding. However, existing theories in psychology or philosophy do not adequately account for the adaptive and flexible nature of temporal binding, nor do they explain how our capacity to engage in temporal binding connects with our experiences of time more broadly. This thesis addresses (...) these gaps. -/- In Chapter 1, I identify three explanatory problems that a theory of temporal binding must address. It must: (i) account for the many variables that influence temporal binding, (ii) address what I call the problems of neural delay and desynchronisation, and (iii) explicate the relation between the mechanisms underlying temporal binding and our apparent perceptual experiences of time. -/- Chapter 2 argues that so-called brain time theories, which take temporal binding to be the result of synchrony in neural processing, fail to address problems (i) and (ii). -/- In response, I advance my own hybrid theory of temporal binding in Chapter 3. I claim that temporal integration relies on how predictive processing and retrodictive processing are modulated by attention. This theory explains (i) and (ii) by presenting temporal binding as a flexible and adaptive hybrid process that is sensitive to goals, expectations, and actions. I present a range of consequences that follow from this. -/- Chapter 4 addresses how the hybrid theory explains (iii) the explanatory gap between our apparent perceptual experiences of time and the dissociable and fragmented mechanisms that underlie time perception. According to the hybrid theory, our phenomenology that time is perceptually unified is imposed on the world through the attentional modulation of predictive and retrodictive processing. This explanation proposes an alternative to theories that propose the empirically implausible view that the perceived unity is inherited from unity in the mechanisms underlying time perception. While my explanation comes at the ‘cost’ of deflating the phenomenology of our perceived unity of time, these deflations are based on empirically justified arguments. -/- Finally, Chapter 5 presents a framework for empirically testing predictions that the hybrid theory makes about temporal binding. This involves examining three questions about the relation between how the content and our apparent phenomenology of temporal binding depend on attention. I present some hypotheses concerning these questions and new animations that can be used to develop empirical tests of these hypotheses. I end by presenting multiple ways in which we may subjectively inflate the phenomenological richness of our experiences of temporal binding. (shrink)

This paper sets forward a novel theory of temporal binding, a mechanism that integrates the temporal properties of sensory features into coherent perceptual experiences. Specifying a theory of temporal binding remains a widespread problem. The popular ‘brain time theory’ suggests that the temporal content of perceptual experiences is determined by when sensory features complete processing. However, this theory struggles to explain how perceptual experiences can accurately reflect the relative timing of sensory features processed at discrepant times. In contrast, ‘event time (...) theories’ suggest that the temporal content of perceptual experiences reflects the relative event time of external sensory features and that the brain accommodates differential processing times. We can formulate retrodictive and predictive versions of this theory. Retrodictive event time theories propose that we accommodate desynchronised processing retrodictively. Predictive event time theories propose that we accommodate desynchronised processing by predictively modelling the event time of sensory features. I argue that both views have strengths and weaknesses. This paper proposes a new hybrid theory that integrates these theories to accommodate these weaknesses. Firstly, I argue how retrodictions and predictions can interact in mutually beneficial ways to ensure speedy and accurate temporal binding. Secondly, I propose how attention plays a central role in flexibly selecting which contents get to be temporally bound. This theory can explain how prediction and retrodiction differentially affect temporal binding and, in turn, proposes a new way to understand temporal binding and has implications for how we should understand conscious experiences. (shrink)

Chaos theory is a rapidly growing field. As a technical term, chaos refers to deterministic but unpredictable processes being sensitively dependent upon initial conditions. Neurobiological models and experimental results are very complicated and some research groups have tried to pursue the neuronal chaos. Babloyantz's group has studied the fractal dimension (d) of electroencephalograms (EEG) in various physiological and pathological states. From deep sleep (d=4) to full awakening (d>8), a hierarchy of strange attractors paralles the hierarchy of states of consciousness. In (...) epilepsy (petit mal), despite the turbulent aspect of a seizure, the attractor dimension was near to 2. In Creutzfeld-Jacob disease, the regular EEG activity corresponded to an attractor dimension less than the one measured in deep sleep. Is it healthy to be chaotic? An active desynchronisation could be favourable to a physiological system. Rapp's group reported variations of fractal dimension according to particular tasks. During a mental arithmetic task, this dimension increased. In another task, a P300 fractal index decreased when a target was identified. It is clear that the EEG is not representing noise. Its underlying dynamics depends on only a few degrees of freedom despite yet it is difficult to compute accurately the relevant parameters.What is the cognitive role of such a chaotic dynamics? Freeman has studied the olfactory bulb in rabbits and rats for 15 years. Multi-electrode recordings of a few mm2 showed a chaotic hierarchy from deep anaesthesia to alert state. When an animal identified a previously learned odour, the fractal dimension of the dynamics dropped off (near limit cycles). The chaotic activity corresponding to an alert-and-waiting state seems to be a field of all possibilities and a focused activity corresponds to a reduction of the attractor in state space. For a couple of years, Freeman has developed a model of the olfactory bulb-cortex system. The behaviour of the simple model without learning was quite similar to the real behaviour and a model with learning is developed. (shrink)