Everyday Aesthetics was born in the 21 st Century as a sub-discipline of Anglo-American Aesthetics and it has spread in the international debate. However, the contribute of historical perspective has not properly explored yet. Is it possible to trace the history of everyday aesthetics before the official birth of this discipline? I will try and give an affirmative answer by focusing on an exemplary category: that of the decorum. Using the history of ideas, I will analyse the Greek concept (...) of prepon and the similar Latin concepts of decorum which express the idea of ‘convenience’ or ‘fitness to purpose’ in the ethical and rhetorical sphere. Later I will analyse the evolution of the concept of decorum in the theory of Ancient and Renaissance architecture (Vitruvius, Leon Battista Alberti). My goal is to demonstrate that in Ancient and Renaissance culture decorum is a category that refers to the objects and practices of everyday life but also a principle that regulates appropriate behaviour in the sphere of good manners. Consequently, given its pervasiveness in the different areas of everyday life, the concept of decorum can be a paradigmatic example to trace the history of everyday aesthetics. (shrink)

This article explores decorum in medicine, understood not only as a concept related to courtesy and respect, but also as a principle where different types of ethics converge. Through an analysis of its etymology and definitions, as well as its historical roots, it argues for the restoration of decorum, especially in current medical practice where technology is the undisputed protagonist and the doctor-patient relationship suffers due to various factors. Decorum, in this sense, must be rescued from the (...) oblivion of the virtues of the medical profession and constitute a central element in pedagogy and professional practice. As a predom inant ethical element, decorum evokes also resistance to the unthinking dominance of technology, as a lifeline for the profound meaning of medicine and as part of the antidote to the breakdown of the doctor-patient relationship. (shrink)

El artículo aborda una aplicación pedagógica del recurso retórico clásico del decorum en la pedagogía agustiniana. Se ofrece en primer lugar una introducción a la formación retórica agustiniana para posteriormente hacer un recorrido de la obra del Obispo de Hipona, deteniéndose en dos de los así llamados “Diálogos de Casiciaco”, concretamente en el De ordine, y el contra Académicos. El artículo analiza también desde la perspectiva del decorum la ep. 29, destacando cómo el Obispo de Hipona aplica dicho (...) recurso retórico a la solución de conflictos. Se aborda, asimismo, el De catechizandis rudibus, en donde el decorum, desde una perspectiva pedagógica agustiniana significa poner al alumno en la sintonía de la enseñanza, ya que según el Hiponate, es preciso “conectar para enseñar”. Finalmente aborda desde esta misma perspectiva el s. Dolbeau 5, 11 (= s. 114B ). (shrink)

In this essay I ask what it means to judge a work of art as failing to depict its subject in an appropriate way. I refer to such a judgment, when applied to visual art, as one of pictorial decorum, a notion that draws on ancient and early modern ideas of literary or poetic decorum. At play are two kinds of normativity. One intuition, of ancient vintage, is that a work of art may qua art be appropriately subject (...) to general standards of evaluation that we apply to non-art objects, states of affairs, events and persons generally. The other—apparently contrary—intuition is associated with modern conceptions of the fine arts: works of art are appropriately evaluated qua art only with reference to a specific kind of value, that is, artistic value. These intuitions are widely held to be incompatible. What I want to show is that far from being inconsistent, the former intuition can be preserved and defended in a framework supplied by the latter. (shrink)

Este artículo fue publicado por primera vez bajo el título de “Cicero on decorum and the morality rhetoric” en la revista European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 10, No 1, 2011, pp. 92-112. AUTOR: Daniel Kapust, Universidad de Wisconsin-Madison, USA.

This paper explores an important problem in political theory and a central issue in the study of Cicero’s thought: the tension between philosophy and rhetoric. Through an exploration of the virtue of decorum in Cicero’s rhetorical thought (chiefly On the Ideal Orator and Orator) and in his moral philosophy (On Duties), I argue that the virtue of decorum provides an external check on both speech and action rooted in humans’ rational nature. Given the roots of decorum in (...) humans’ rational nature and the natural law, the desire to meet our audience’s approval does not involve Cicero in a sophistic approach to rhetoric. Rather, the desire to observe decorum provides the orator and his audience with standards of judgement that transcend mere taste and reflect underlying moral knowledge. (shrink)

Das D. – das ›Angemessene‹ und ›Schickliche‹, aber auch das ›harmonisch Schöne, Wahre und Gute‹ – ist eine der wirkungsmächtigen Kategorien in der Reflexion über die richtige Verwendung künstlerischer Mittel in Rhetorik, Dichtung und bildender Kunst.

Within the context of his epochal distinction between the sphere of law and of morals, of iustum and honestum, Christian Thomasius introduces a further category of conduct rules, which relate to so-called decorum, to good and proper behavior. They teach the individual how to behave socially, and have a stabilizing effect on society. As Thomasius distinguishes between a natural-law oriented, and thus for all individuals equal, natural decorum and a decorum politicum, which is oriented toward actual practices (...) and feudal order, he seems to waver between stabilizing and challenging then current feudalism. This impression weakens if one realizes that although Thomasius, in contrast to Cicero, undertook to demoralize decorum, still he accepted Cicero's theory of social roles. In the context of the actor's own interests, decorum covers those areas of social regulation that are not included within positive law seen as a means of coercive command. It is here that decorum is interesting systematically.Im Kontext seiner historischen Trennung der Sphären des Rechts und der Moral, des Iustum vom Honestum, führt Christian Thomasius noch eine weitere Kategorie von Verhaltensregeln ein, die zum sog. Decorum gehören, zur Wohlanständigkeit, welche die Menschen lehrt, in der Gesellschaft voranzukommen und für die Gesellschaft stabilisierende Wirkung besitzt. Da Thomasius zwischen einem naturrechtsnahen und daher für alle Menschen gleichen natürlichen Decorum und einem an die faktischen Sitten und die ständische Ordnung angelehnten Decorum politicum unterscheidet, scheint er zwischen einer Stabilisierung und einer Infragestellung der Ständegesellschaft zu schwanken. Dieser Eindruck schwächt sich ab, wenn man bedenkt, daß Thomasius gegenüber Cicero zwar eine Entmoralisierung des Decorum vornimmt, jedoch dessen Lehre der sozialen Rollen aufgreift. Das Decorum erfaßt unter Rückgriff auf des Eigeninteresse der Akteure jenen Bereich sozialer Regulierung, der von dem als Zwangsbefehl gedeuteten positiven Recht nicht berücksichtigt wird. Darin liegt sein systematisches Interesse. (shrink)

This article examines Diomedes’ speeches in the Iliad and provides a new reading of the Homeric formula ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ μɛτέɛιπɛ. Scholars have used this formula to support the claim that Diomedes is an inexperienced speaker. However, a closer reading of this formula reveals that Diomedes makes delayed responses in observance of the etiquette of Homeric deliberative speech which dictates that younger and lower-ranking chieftains wait their turn to speak. The article argues that the speech type must also match the (...) speaker’s status. Junior statesmen can only respond to proposals, while elder statesmen can call assemblies, set the agenda and give unilateral commands to the host. (shrink)

Anthropologische Fragen zu stellen, heißt im Allgemeinen danach zu fragen, was den Menschen als Menschen begründet und ihn von anderen Lebewesen unterscheidet.

If we supply a missing connection in the master text of English Renaissance poetic theory, we can bring the dilemma posed by political poetry into sharp relief. Sidney’s Defence of Poesie seeks to confirm the supremacy of the poet’s power over human minds by invoking the celebrated three-way distinction between poetry, philosophy, and history in the Poetics. According to Sidney, the proper question to ask of poetry is not “whether it were better to have a particular act truly or falsely (...) set down” but “whether it be better to have it set down as it should be, … for your own use and learning.” On this criterion, the philosopher shows himself too devoted to “knowledge” that “standeth upon the abstract and general,” to the “precept,” to “what should be.” The historian attends too much to “the particular truth of things and not to the general reason of things,” to the “example,” to “what is.” Only the poet “coupleth the general notion with the particular example” in “the speaking picture of poesy,” thus synthesizing through his “imaginative and judging power” the best that the philosophical and historical domains can offer. “Aristotle himself,” concludes Sidney, “plainly determineth this question, saying that poetry … is more philosophical and more studiously serious than history … because poesy dealeth with … the universal consideration, and the history with … the particular.” Yet in mounting his Defence of Poesie, Sidney fails to give due force to a related and equally important distinction drawn from the Poetics. Aristotle ranks poetry below philosophy—and, by implication, history as well—at the crucial juncture where ontology and epistemology meet. He exclusively credits philosophical universals with rational “necessity.” Poetic universals are recognized as having imaginative “likelihood,” but no more than this.1 Under this second three-way distinction, the domain proper to poetry turns out to be neither the realm of historical fact nor that of philosophical truth but some half-region of the truthlike, the verisimilar, disjoint from the plane of knowledge.[…]Milton coped with the questions intrinsic to political poetry during the decade from 1642 to 1652 when he rose to prominence as a pamphleteer on public issued and concurrently pioneered the writing of political sonnets in English. This essay examines the responses he made, in part in his prose but mainly in the composition of seven sonnets. Political poems in a root sense, these sonnets concern themselves with human agency channeled into the functions of the state, with power manifested through governance. After exploratory and uneven beginnings, the group as a whole goes a fair way toward vindicating the enterprise of political poetry and offering one set of criteria for a good political poem. 1. The core distinctions are drawn by Aristotle in chap. 9, secs. 2-4, of the Poetics; also see chap. 1, sec. 1 of the Topics on the distinction between demonstration, based on reasoning from true knowledge, and dialectic, based on reasoning from what is generally accepted as probable. The quotations in this paragraph are from Sidney: A Defence of Poetry, ed. J. A. Van Dorsten , pp. 35, 32, 33, 35. Janel Mueller is professor of English and humanities at the University of Chicago. She has published mainly on poetry and prose of the earlier English Renaissance, culminating in her book The Native Tongue and the Word: Developments in English Prose Style, 1380-1580. An interest in Milton, however, has drawn her more recently to work in the later part of this period. She is writing a book on nature, culture, and gender in Milton’s major poems. (shrink)

Represented as the face of Venice, the houses of the Grand Canal were used during the Renaissance to support the portrayal of the Venetian Republic's unique structure of governance. Paolo Paruta's dialogue, Della perfettione della vita politica, a work of political theory on the Venetian Republic, is one such text used here to examine how in a changing context of modernization, architecture has been presented as a representation of state. Paruta's use of architecture as a representation of state was conceptually (...) different from those earlier writers such as Gasparo Contarini who presented the uniqueness of Venice's social qualities through its orderly governance and law. Fundamental to Paruta's incorporation of architecture to the conceptualization of Venice was Daniele Barbaro's interpretation of Vitruvius’ representation of the body-of-state, being reflected in the architectural makeup of the city. However, Vitruvius’ text, De architectura, described the monarch's body reflected in the architecture and urban strategies of the late Roman Republic. Paruta's use of the text and of Daniele Barbaro aimed to transfer these values to the Venetian Republic and its social formations. Subtly forging links between the radicalism of Doge Andrea Gritti's renovatio programmes and the power struggles of the young patricians, Paruta's aim for architecture was to support the preservation of Venetian values as distinct from those of Rome. Indications are that Paruta's message was understood. To examine the comprehensibility of Paruta's political propositions, his terms and arguments are analysed in the context of three different architectural composition types used in Venetian houses of the mid-sixteenth century. (shrink)

This volume moves beyond ethics as problem-solving or ethics as etiquette to offer a look at ethics in primary care—as opposed to life-or-death—medical care. Professional Ethics and Primary Care Medicine deals with the ethics of routine, day-to-day encounters between doctors and patients. It probes beneath the hard decisions to look at the moral frameworks, habits of thought, and customs of practice that underlie choices. Harmon Smith and Larry Churchill argue that primary care, far from being merely a setting for the (...) rendering of care, provides a new understanding of both physician and patient, and thereby offers a fresh basis for medical ethics. (shrink)

This chapter is a careful look at the different aspects of laughter in the history of Epicurean philosophy, from its very beginning (Epicurus and his fellow philosophers) to the Imperial period (Diogenes of Oenoanda). More precisely, the following facets of Epicurean laughter are examined: (1) its philosophical foundation (laughter is connected with truth in Epicurus and Polystratus, with true freedom in Metrodorus); (2) its objects (widespread opinions and empty ideals, famous statesmen and generals, philosophical opponents); (3) its function (Epicurean laughter (...) is usually polemical laughter; e.g., Colotes and Metrodorus); (4) its nature (especially in the earlier generations of the Garden, we find a clever but sharp, polemical laughter [cf. 3]; in later times, the Epicurean laughter is milder and tamed, as it were, by social _decorum_ [e.g., in Diogenes of Oenoanda]); (5) its results (laughing together in Epicurean communities, but sharp and “serious” reactions in anti-Epicurean literature). (shrink)

Critics have accorded More a place in the development of English prose, praised various aspects of both his English and Latin, and discussed his abilities as a translator. However, they have paid less heed to his many comments on language and translation scattered throughout his works. These concern such varied topics as grammar, common usage, stylistics, etymology, and translation practices, all of which must be governed by the principle of decorum. More’s treatment of these questions stands squarely in the (...) tradition of Cicero, Horace, Quintilian and St Jerome but it also represents both the humanists’ interpretations of these authors and their own comments on language and translation. (shrink)

La responsabilidad ética de las acciones de un hombre que pudiera tornarse invisible reabre en Cicerón el debate entre lo honestum y lo utile y con él la necesidad de presentar un modelo de ciudadano que vincule elementos políticos, éticos y jurídicos en orden a la conservación de una serie de valores necesarios para la convivencia. Dicho modelo se presenta en De officiis como una traducción de la filosofía de Panecio en la que el complejo término decorum adquiere una (...) dimensión central. El artículo analiza dicho concepto y la posición que ocupa en el pensamiento político ciceroniano la imitación de los exempla virtutis como forma de garantizar la estabilidad política en un momento de grave crisis de los valores republicanos. (shrink)

The myth of an economy where nobody could have a predominant position, has lost its credibility. The presentiment of a high risk of social explosion makes companies undertake tentative moral legitimation. Thus, a new paradigm develops according to which the firm has to care for the satisfaction of public interest if it wants to try to win forgiveness for misbehavior towards the decorum rules of the atomicity of competition. Thus, there is a wave of business ethics industry building up. (...) However, the stock exchange performances considered as ethical, are not different from others! The market does not seem to be able to say why it might be interesting to invest in stock considered as ethical. Moreover, opinion polls reveal a very significant discrepancy between the characterization of the responsible company as defined by itself or by notation agencies and, on the other hand, the hierarchy of criteria according to the answers of polled people. When companies and agencies favor sustainable development and good governance, rejecting child labor and so on, polled people consider that the paramount criterion of ethical conduct is personnel management. The problem is right here. Such is the view of a positively critical economist, situated at the point where macroeconomics meets corporate management. (shrink)

This chapter presents a study of Panaetius’s best-known innovation in Stoic ethics—the notion of decorum in both a wider and a narrower sense. In its wider sense, decorum appears on a list of four natural human starting points for virtue. Based on the uniquely human sense of beauty and the analogy between visible beauty and beauty of mind, it is the outer manifestation of virtue that leads humans to recognize virtue as a good and to strive to become (...) virtuous. In the narrower sense, it includes moderation, the traditional fourth cardinal virtue, but also, motivated by the human desire to win the approval of others, socially pleasant behaviour. Decorum in this sense goes beyond morally correct conduct; it may be a social virtue, but not a moral one. (shrink)

Horror stories, in fiction and especially film, express the content of hypochondria that medicine excludes or denies: the abjectness of the damaged, diseased, dead, and decaying body. The genre of horror allows expression of this unruly aspect of embodiment. Centered on a reading of David Cronenberg's film The Fly as a kind of illness narrative, the chapter suggest that hypochondria is to medicine as horror is to tragedy-and as postmodern horror, in its refusal of catharsis or closure, is to the (...) clinical decorum of modern medicine. (shrink)

This chapter considers the important role that manners and demeanor play in the cultivation of virtue. It explores the emphasis in military training on things that are “outer”—appearances, decorum, deference rituals, and demeanor. The issue is central to the military and its core belief that training in decorum is an integral part of training character. This chapter also discusses Stoic texts and the insights one can glean from Stoic theory on issues of decorum and emotional demeanor. Cicero, (...) in _On Duties_, reports a Stoic view that decorum is inextricably woven into the fabric of virtuous character. Seneca, in _On Favors_ argues for the crucial role of emotional demeanor in acts of kindness and gratitude. Both accounts recognize an individual's propensity for emotional expression and the reasonable expectation of it as part of respectful social exchange. (shrink)

In his discussion of decorum Cicero supposes that most people would agree to the general principle that in our speech, bodily deportment, and actions we should avoid giving offense to others. This is because we possess a sense of shame or verecundia. The particular details are very culture-specific: customs and conventions largely set the parameters of verecundia, and we do well to follow them. Cicero also admits that philosophical figures often flaunt established customs and conventions: he points to Socrates, (...) who is justified in doing so owing to his great and godlike virtue, and the Cynics, who are not justified in doing so at all (1.148). He then sets out a bold thesis: ‘Indeed the reasoning of the Cynics must be rejected absolutely; for it is inimical to a sense of shame (verecundia), without which nothing can be upright (rectum), nothing honourable (honestum)’. For the Cynics, verecundia is not natural; hence we are justified in flaunting customs and conventions. Cicero develops a counter-argument against the Cynics: the source of shame or verecundia is indeed natural. I explore his argument for this thesis (which appears at 1.126ff.) and assess his critique of the Cynics. (shrink)

Compiled by disciples of Confucius in the centuries following his death in 479 B.C.E., _The Analects of Confucius_ is a collection of aphorisms and historical anecdotes embodying the basic values of the Confucian tradition: learning, morality, ritual decorum, and filial piety. Reflecting the model eras of Chinese antiquity, the Analects offers valuable insights into successful governance and the ideal organization of society. Filled with humor and sarcasm, it reads like a casual conversation between teacher and student, emphasizing the role (...) of the individual in the attainment of knowledge and the value of using historical events and people to illuminate moral and political concepts. Confucius's teachings focus on cultural and peaceful pursuits and the characteristics of benevolent and culturally distinguished government. He also discusses ancestor worship and other rites performed for the spirits of the dead. The single most influential philosophical work in all of Chinese history, _The Analects of Confucius_ has shaped the thought and customs of China and neighboring countries for centuries. Burton Watson's concise translation uses the pinyin romanization system and keeps explanatory notes to a minimum, yet his intimate knowledge of the Confucian tradition and precise attention to linguistic detail capture the original text's elegance, cogency, and wit. (shrink)

Li (禮) and yi (義) are two central moral concepts in the Analects. Li has a broad semantic range, referring to formal ceremonial rituals on the one hand, and basic rules of personal decorum on the other. What is similar across the range of referents is that the li comprise strictures of correct behavior. The li are a distinguishing characteristic of Confucian approaches to ethics and socio-political thought, a set of rules and protocols that were thought to constitute the (...) wise practices of ancient moral exemplars filtered down through dynasties of the past. However, even while the li were extensive and meant to be followed diligently, they were also understood as incapable of exhausting the whole range of activity that constitutes human life. There were bound to be situations in life where there would be no obvious recourse to the li for guidance. As part of their reflections on the good life, the Confucians maintained another moral concept that seemed to cover morally upright exemplary behavior in these types of situations. This concept is that of yi or rightness. In this chapter, I begin with a brief historical sketch to provide some context, and will then turn to li and yi in turn. In the end, I will suggest how li and yi were both meant to facilitate the supreme value of social harmony that pervades much of the Analects and serves as its ultimate orientation. (shrink)

This paper asks how bioethics navigates, and should navigate, value pluralism in the increasingly global spaces in which bioethics operates. We juxtapose the ethical approaches suggested by East Asian societies, drawing primarily on Confucian ethics, with approaches more prevalent in Western societies, especially North America and Western Europe. Drawing on the Confucian virtue of _li_ (禮) (ritual propriety and decorum), we argue for greater tolerance, respect, epistemic justice, cultural humility and civility. We show how to translate these values into (...) practice using the examples of international bioethics policies governing abortion practice, artificial intelligence governance and climate change. The ‘Introduction’ section raises the question of how to engage in bioethics across borders. The section, ‘Leading Views of Bioethics are WEIRD’ explores how the field of bioethics currently navigates value pluralism. It characterises leading bioethics approaches as WEIRD—Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic. The section, ‘East Asian and Western Views of Personhood’ illustrates WEIRD approaches, juxtaposing Eastern and Western accounts of personhood in three cases: social robots, prenatal human life, and nature. The section, ‘Epistemic Justice and Value Pluralism’ argues that bioethics’ WEIRDness violates epistemic justice by assigning excess credibility to the West while deflating the credibility of the East. We propose a pluriversal alternative and apply it to bioethics practice by drawing on the Confucian virtue of _li_. The paper concludes that bioethicists should embrace a pluriversal approach to global value diversity. (shrink)

At Columbia University in 1906, William James gave a highly confrontational speech to the American Philosophical Association (APA). He ignored the technical philosophical questions the audience had gathered to discuss and instead addressed the topic of human energy. Tramping on the rules of academic decorum, James invoked the work of amateurs, read testimonials on the benefits of yoga and alcohol, and concluded by urging his listeners to take up this psychological and physiological problem. What was the goal of this (...) unusual speech? Rather than an oddity, Francesca Bordogna asserts that the APA address was emblematic—it was just one of many gestures that James employed as he plowed through the barriers between academic, popular, and pseudoscience, as well as the newly emergent borders between the study of philosophy, psychology, and the “science of man.” Bordogna reveals that James’s trespassing of boundaries was an essential element of a broader intellectual and social project. By crisscrossing divides, she argues, James imagined a new social configuration of knowledge, a better society, and a new vision of the human self. As the academy moves toward an increasingly interdisciplinary future, William James at the Boundaries reintroduces readers to a seminal influence on the way knowledge is pursued. (shrink)

Prologue: Quintilian and John of Salisbury in the Ciceronian tradition -- Rhetoric, emotional manipulation, and morality: the contemporary relevance of Cicero vis-a-vis Aristotle -- Political morality, conventional morality, and decorum in Cicero -- Rhetoric as a balancing of ends: Cicero and Machiavelli -- Justus Lipsius, morally acceptable deceit, and prudence in the Ciceronian tradition -- The classical orator as political representative: Cicero and the modern concept of representation -- Deliberative democracy and rhetoric: Cicero, oratory, and conversation.

By looking at rhetoric and politics, this book offers a novel account of Juan Luis Vives' intellectual oeuvre. It argues that Vives adjusted rhetorical theory to a monarchical context in which direct speech was not a possibility, demonstrated how Erasmian languages of ethical self-government and political peace were actualized rhetorically and critically in a princely environment and, finally, rethought the cognitive and emotional foundations of humanist rhetoric in his late and famous De anima et vita (1538). Ultimately, towards the end (...) of his life, Vives epitomized a distinctively cognitive view of politics; he maintained that political concord was not a direct outcome of institutional or legal reform or of the spiritual transformation of the Christian world (an optimistic Erasmian interpretation), but that concord could only be upheld once the dynamics of emotions that motivated political action were understood and controlled through responsible rhetoric that respected decorum and civility. (shrink)

Ovidians continue to be puzzled by the 404-line speech put into the mouth of Pythagoras in book 15 of the Metamorphoses. Questions of literary decorum and quality are insistently raised: how does the philosopher's popular science consort with the predominantly mythological matter of the preceding fourteen books? Do Pythagoras' revelations provide some kind of unifying ground, a ‘key’, for the endless variety of the poem? Can one take the Speech as a serious essay in philosophical didactic, or is it (...) all a mighty spoof, as intentionally laughable, perhaps, as the imperial panegyric with which the narrative of book 15 concludes? Or should we beware of imposing modern tastes on Ovid's original audience, and respect the Hellenistic and Roman predilection for scientific poetry? This article seeks to establish further contexts for the evaluation of the Speech of Pythagoras through a study of Ovid's allusive practice within the Greco-Roman tradition of hexameter epos. The figure who provides a foundation for Ovid's construction of his own poetic genealogy turns out to be the Greek philosophical poet Empedocles. The resulting reflections on Ovid's manipulation of generic conventions may be timely in the light of the recent appearance of sophisticated and fresh approaches to the question of whether the Metamorphoses is, or is not, an epic. (shrink)

This article offers a Levinasian hermeneutic of the Tirukkural ’s ethical vision of hospitality, illuminating how Thiruvalluvar’s classic Tamil text resonates with Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy of radical responsibility for the Other. While the Tirukkural traditionally frames hospitality ( virunduōmbal ) as a dharmic obligation rooted in social harmony and spiritual merit, a Levinasian reading reorients it as an unconditioned ethical demand that unsettles transactional or hierarchical frameworks. By foregrounding Levinas’s insistence on infinite responsibility, the study demonstrates that the Kural’s hospitality (...) extends beyond mere decorum or religious duty, evolving into an encounter wherein the host is existentially answerable for the guest. This shift challenges caste-based exclusivities and refines understandings of reciprocity, showing how Thiruvalluvar’s moral universe anticipates Levinasian concepts of asymmetrical ethics. The article further addresses feminist critiques regarding patriarchal underpinnings in both Levinas’s thought and the Kural’s social context, highlighting tensions between unconditional welcome and gendered household norms. Ultimately, this Levinasian hermeneutic reveals hospitality in the Tirukkural as a radical ethical practice that disrupts the autonomy of the host, reconceiving domestic space as a site of moral transformation. In bridging Indic and Levinasian perspectives, the article contributes to broader debates on hospitality, justice and the ethical imperative to welcome the stranger. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity, despite its growing importance in legal texts and declarations in the last decades, is notoriously contested in moral philosophy and legal theory. There is no agreement either on what human dignity is or whether one should care much about it. We will show how these questions could be answered given the assumption that the expression ‘human dignity’ is to be read literally, as dignity of humans, where ‘dignity’ is understood as dignity proper, i.e. dignity as (...) it is usually ascribed outside of legal contexts. Dignity proper has played an important role in the history of mankind. It is sometimes also called ‘social dignity’ because it is bound to social relations, or ‘contingent dignity’, on the assumption that having dignity proper is due to contingencies of life and one's own behaviour (in contrast to human dignity as an essential feature of humankind). Dignity proper therefore depends on being treated with respect by others and on being able to present oneself as being of equal dignity in various practical contexts. Dignity proper is part of an extended conceptual space of evaluative terms which are important in moral life, including, among others, decency, nobility, rank, honour, respect, esteem, grace, decorum, merit, self-respect, coolness, offence, humiliation, degradation, shame. It is obvious, historically, that the concept of dignity proper must have played some role in the development of the concept of human dignity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Practical Wisdom and Moral Imagination in Sense and SensibilityKaren StohrThere is no single virtue more important to Aristotle's ethical theory than the intellectual virtue of phronesis, or practical wisdom. Yet for all its importance, it is not easy to make sense of this virtue, either in Aristotle's own writings or in virtue ethics more generally. Insofar as Aristotle defines it, he does so opaquely, saying it is "a state (...) grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being." 1Practical wisdom is a form of knowledge aimed fundamentally at acting well. It requires both a general understanding of what is worthwhile in human life and the ability to act in ways that reflect that understanding. 2 My goal in this paper is to explore the latter aspect of practical wisdom in its application to ordinary social behavior. The circumstances that will interest me here are often thought to be the domain of manners or decorum, rather than morals proper. Although no one who takes Hume seriously can deny the moral significance of manners, the relationship between one's inner state of character and how that character is expressed in seemingly mundane behavior has received insufficient attention from moral philosophers. 3 In such a task, there can be few better places to begin than with Jane Austen, whose novels reveal the intricacies of ordinary moral behavior with extraordinary acumen.I shall use Austen's Sense and Sensibility to examine the skill associated with knowing how to behave rightly in the sense we associate with propriety or decorum. This skill is essential to pleasant social life, and hence, on the Aristotelian view, to human flourishing. Yet it is often lacking, even among those who have sound moral principles and good hearts. Well-meaning people frequently say or do what is inappropriate. [End Page 378] Consider, for instance, how common it is for kindly disposed people to say to bereaved friends things like, "it's all for the best" or "be thankful for your other healthy children" or "you're young, you'll marry again." The intricacies of offering sympathy are hard to get right, and otherwise good people can unwittingly leave behind disasters in their wakes.The skill of acting well in complex social situations has interesting links to the capacity for moral imagination. Engaging in imaginative identification with others is essential to empathy. 4 Without suggesting that empathy is at the root of all fluid social interactions, I shall argue that certain characteristic failures to act well in that sphere are imaginative failures. In other words, insofar as the exercise of practical wisdom is present in the realm of manners, it requires moral imagination.Failures of moral imagination, however, can take different forms and have different social effects. I shall use two of Austen's characters in Sense and Sensibility—Marianne Dashwood and Mrs. Jennings—to illustrate different ways in which inadequate imaginative capacity can impede the exercise of practical wisdom. The contrast I shall draw is with Elinor Dashwood, to whom I ascribe practical wisdom in full. 5 This contrast is especially interesting because it is not always very sharp: all three characters have fundamentally good moral principles and warm hearts. Yet unlike Elinor, Mrs. Jennings and Marianne routinely fail to act well, and in characteristic ways. Despite the differences in their characters, they have in common an inability to use moral imagination appropriately. The moral errors of Marianne and Mrs. Jennings occur in relatively insignificant circumstances, but the errors themselves point to something deeper about how the virtue of practical wisdom functions in ordinary moral practice.In exploring the link between moral imagination and moral practice, it will help to remember Aristotle's emphasis on the reciprocity between practical wisdom and the moral virtues. Aristotle held that that practical wisdom is necessary for the exercise of the moral virtues and that conversely, the moral virtues are necessary for the exercise of practical wisdom. 6 The justification for the first of these two claims is clearest in the context of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Since what counts as a virtuous action depends on features... (shrink)

Ovidians continue to be puzzled by the 404-line speech put into the mouth of Pythagoras in book 15 of theMetamorphoses.Questions of literary decorum and quality are insistently raised: how does the philosopher's popular science consort with the predominantly mythological matter of the preceding fourteen books? Do Pythagoras' revelations provide some kind of unifying ground, a ‘key’, for the endless variety of the poem? Can one take the Speech as a serious essay in philosophical didactic, or is it all a (...) mighty spoof, as intentionally laughable, perhaps, as the imperial panegyric with which the narrative of book 15 concludes? Or should we beware of imposing modern tastes on Ovid's original audience, and respect the Hellenistic and Roman predilection for scientific poetry? This article seeks to establish further contexts for the evaluation of the Speech of Pythagoras through a study of Ovid's allusive practice within the Greco-Roman tradition of hexameterepos.The figure who provides a foundation for Ovid's construction of his own poetic genealogy turns out to be the Greek philosophical poet Empedocles. The resulting reflections on Ovid's manipulation of generic conventions may be timely in the light of the recent appearance of sophisticated and fresh approaches to the question of whether theMetamorphosesis, or is not, an epic. (shrink)

This study examines the normative foundations of early Confucian ethics and suggests that rather than attempting to understand Confucian ethics in the language of ‘morality’ a more productive way would be to appreciate Confucianism as an ethics of propriety that can be articulated in terms of social roles, ritual decorum, and relational dependence. I argue that Western notions of ‘morality’ betray a thicker, more culturally loaded concept that possesses a limited utility in regard to comparative study. We can appeal (...) to a kind of methodological charity where we not only maximize the sense of the text or subject's sayings but also privilege the categories of thought that are native to the text's or speaker's lexicon. With this in mind, we can understand Confucian ethics as an ethics of propriety that departs substantially from Western moral systems, including virtue ethics, and challenges our received views on justice, autonomy, and personal identity. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the role of punishment in theories of civil disobedience through three contributions. First, it shows that accepting punishment, as commonly understood, is neither essential to defining civil disobedience nor key to its success. Philosophical discussions have overlooked the complex path of civil disobedience through the political-legal system, where most cases never reach trial and outcomes depend heavily on state discretion. Second, it introduces “non-evasion,” a sequential set of civility-based demands that arise as disobedient agents confront law enforcement (...) and courts: publicly risking arrest, submitting to arrest, cooperating with jail proceedings, appearing in court when summoned, respecting courtroom decorum, and abiding by judicial decisions. This framework clarifies what civility plausibly requires at each stage of interaction with the state. Third, it identifies conditions under which civility’s moral weight is lifted and defends “evasion”—deliberate departures from non-evasion—as sometimes morally permissible, albeit uncivil. The paper explores both instrumental and intrinsic grounds for evasion, highlighting its epistemic communicative, affective-expressive, and transformative-prefigurative value. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetoric as a Balancing of Ends:Cicero and MachiavelliGary RemerIn his youthful work on rhetoric, De inventione (published about 86 B.C.E.), Cicero lists the ends for deliberative (political) oratory as honestas and utilitas (the good or honorable and the useful or expedient). In more mature writings, like De oratore (55 B.C.E.) and De officiis (44 B.C.E.), Cicero maintains a similar position: that the morally good and the beneficial are reconcilable. (...) For example, Cicero assumes in De officiis the identity of the honestum and the utile. He states there that "there is one rule for all cases;... either the thing that seems beneficial must not be dishonorable, or if it is dishonorable, it must not seem beneficial" (On Duties 3.81).1 In recent years, Victoria Kahn (1994) and J. Jackson Barlow (1999) have offered Machiavelli's "rhetorical politics"—a politics "attuned to the rhetorical concerns of effective political action" (Kahn 1994, 24)—as a more coherent and intellectually honest alternative to Cicero's attempt to reconcile irreconcilables.2 They contend that, unlike Cicero, Machiavelli accepts the impossibility of simultaneously upholding the morally good and the useful. For Machiavelli, the successful political actor must choose the utile over the honestum.Cicero, however, is not alone in his inconsistency. As Kahn demonstrates, Machiavelli's account of virtù is itself inconsistent. For example, he sometimes includes morality as an element of excellence (virtù) and at other times does not. I contend in this article, however, that Kahn's interpretation [End Page 1] of Machiavelli's contradictoriness as only "apparent," a variability, she argues, that is rhetorically inspired rather than logically deficient, applies not only to Machiavelli, as Kahn would have it, but also to Cicero. I argue that both Machiavelli and Cicero eschew "clear-cut or permanent distinctions" within virtù and between the honestum and the utile, respectively, because they wish to signal the political actor's need for flexibility (Kahn 1994, 30). Insofar as Cicero's internal contradictions, like Machiavelli's, are apparent but not real, I hold that Machiavelli does not offer a political approach that is superior to Cicero's, at least not in the sense of greater intellectual coherence.Despite their similarities, however, Cicero and Machiavelli differ from each other in that Cicero, in contrast to Machiavelli, openly affirms that politics is incomplete without a dual commitment to the good and the beneficial. I examine Machiavelli's focus on the useful and public as opposed to Cicero's additional commitment to the honorable and to the private. I analyze, in particular, the pursuit of glory in Machiavelli as it derives from early classical culture, which was preoccupied with appearances and the search for immortality. I argue that Cicero, while not abandoning the quest for glory, also vests this concept (under Stoic influence) with a private, moral character. In doing so, Cicero adheres to the rhetorical principle of decorum, which obliges orators to adapt themselves to context. This principle, I maintain, is not only a matter of expediency for Cicero but also a moral duty. While Cicero accommodates himself to a Roman world in which private morality was already an important part of one's life, Machiavelli violates decorum, attempting to resurrect a heroic ideal that disappeared long ago.Although most recent work on the revival of rhetorical ethics focuses on Aristotle (see Allen 2004, 140–59; Furley and Nehamas 1994; Garver 1994; Rorty 1996), I discuss Cicero in this essay. Not only has Cicero been the dominant influence on the Western tradition of rhetoric, but he also (unlike Aristotle) includes the honorable as one of the ends of deliberative oratory. Thus Cicero states in De inventione that while "Aristotle accepts advantage as the end [of deliberative oratory],... I prefer both honor and advantage" (2.52.156). And while Aristotle's position on deliberative oratory's ends does not mean that he ignores moral considerations, Cicero's decision to promote the good as an explicit rhetorical end forces his readers (and Machiavelli) to confront the relationship between virtue and expediency in a way that Aristotle's readers do not (Cox 1997, 1113). I concentrate, in particular, on Cicero's De officiis because... (shrink)

Kant has traditionally been read as an excessively moralistic critic of lying in his ethics and politics. In response, recent scholars have noted that for Kant we have an ethical duty not to be completely candid, but rather we should practice reticence and simulate virtues even when we do not have them. This article argues that Kant extends the value of dissimulation and simulation beyond the interpersonal to society and politics. By examining three examples—politeness and decorum in society, and (...) the veiled relationships between the rich and the poor and between government and the people in politics—this article further challenges the received reading of Kant as a defender of truth at all costs and reveals him to be much more attentive to the need for pretense, reserve, and appearance than is commonly understood. (shrink)

There are few institutions that talk about virtues as much as military organizations. These military virtues are not, however, possessed by individuals in isolation; they are inculcated and influenced by the countless ways in which values are shared, both among military members and between individuals and the military itself. Unfortunately, a normative framework that is extremely well-suited to capture this significant link between individual virtue and shared valuing, namely Confucian virtue theory, is too often underappreciated in militaries in general and (...) in military moral education in particular. Focusing on the normative significance of ritual and decorum, I analyze this shortcoming and consider how more explicitly incorporating Confucian virtue theory into military education could provide a sturdier foundation for the essential link between individual virtue and collective valuing. -/- Analyzing the Confucian the virtue of princispled ritual etiquette (li 禮), I demonstrate that while such attention to ritual might seem questionable when considering the classic rituals often used as examples, once the pervasive presence of military rituals becomes apparent, such attention to principled ritual etiquette begins to seem far less anachronistic. Analyzing principled ritual etiquette in relationship to righteousness (yi 義) and benevolence (ren 仁), I argue that Confucian virtue theory provides a significant and distinct way to analyze modern military virtues, concluding with an analysis of how that framework can highlight the significance of ritualistic behavior on virtue development without promoting excessive and corrosive subservience. -/- . (shrink)

ABSTRACT Beneke’s name has been inextricably linked to the concept of psychologism and, by decorum, to the decisive criticism that the Husserlian Prolegomena directed at this movement. In this text we try to offer a more diferentiated vision of his philosophy, considering aspects of his thought that are now forgotten and placing them within the tradition of the psychological method. In this way, perspectives are opened not only for the understanding of the aforementioned tradition, but also for a consideration (...) of psychologism and Psychologismusstreit more appropriate to the historical-philosophical reality and less unilaterally influenced by the authority of Husserl. (shrink)

This article surveys the usages of the term de 德 in the Zuozhuan《左傳》. It demonstrates the term’s hermeneutical richness: de could refer to charismatic power, to political potency, to proper decorum, to mildness and kindness in domestic or interstate affairs, to individual morality, and so forth. Behind this richness, though, we may discern a clear predominance of political usages of de and paucity of references to de as personal moral virtue. Notably, Zuozhuan never refers to de in the context (...) of moral self-cultivation. The article discusses the reasons for this peculiarity. (shrink)

Thomas Reid’s unpublished note, MS 2131/6/I/29 from the Birkwood Collection at the University of Aberdeen, says that rational actions require motives. Then, it names several synonyms for decorum, and, on the back, a list of ‘Scripture examples’. What could it mean? I suggest reading Reid’s Note On Motive alongside a letter Reid sent to Lord Kames, which says that motives come in two species, ‘force’ and ‘authority’. The virtue of decorum and the Scripture examples, I submit, motivate Reid’s (...) position, contra Kames, that the human will responds to motives besides the force of desire. By recognizing two species of motives, Reid lends theoretical support to a minority view in criminal jurisprudence, Gideon Yaffe’s thesis that addictions can mitigate the blameworthiness of addiction-driven wrongdoings. According to Yaffe, to refrain from wrongdoing comes at significant cost to the addict, who can avoid the wrong only through an earlier surrender of his autonomy. Reid, I argue, can go a step further by explaining why addictions mitigate some wrongdoings even when the addict is not overwhelmed with temptation and without construing the wrong choice as a misjudgment. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the relationship between Hume’s moral philosophy and a key aspect of classical Confucianism—namely, the concept of _lĭ_ (禮), which refers both to the virtue of ritual propriety and to rituals themselves. I argue not only that Hume employs conceptual correlates to each of these two aspects of _lĭ_ (禮), but also that he employs them in ways that have a similar, distinctively normative role in the process of moral formation. I illustrate these points by elucidating (...) Hume’s use of two pairs of concepts. The first is his presentation of decency and decorum. The second is his explanation of customs and manners. In so doing, I develop a line of inquiry that is important, novel, and promising both for Hume scholarship _per se_ and for comparative philosophical work on the relationship between Hume’s moral philosophy and that of classical Confucianism, especially as it is expressed in the works of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. (shrink)