Background Cyberattacks on hospitals directly threaten continuity of care and patient safety. This article synthesizes the empirical evidence on cyber incidents in healthcare and maps core legal obligations, in particular under the German IT Security Act and the associated ordinance regarding critical infrastructure (BSIG/BSI-KritisV), § 75c of the Fifth Book of the German Social Code (SGB V), and the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Arguments The article examines liability with a focus on objective breach of duty, the causal (...) nexus between inadequate cybersecurity and patient harm, and legal attribution. From a governance angle, anticipated expert standards (B3S/ISMS, “state of the art”) are analyzed as instruments to operationalize and concretize the duty of care for hospital operators and management. The ethical analysis consolidates core dilemmas—especially ransom payments and resource allocation trade-offs between cybersecurity and immediate clinical care—using the frameworks of principlism and an ethics of responsibility. Conclusion Cybersecurity is patient safety. Preventive documentation, risk-adequate technical and organizational safeguards, and rehearsed contingency procedures are not only legal requirements but also ethical imperatives. The article concludes with concise recommendations for hospital owners, supervisory bodies, and ethics boards on how to strengthen digital resilience without compromising the core mandate of patient care. (shrink)

Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the (...) types of actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non-violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty-based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence-based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response. (shrink)

Cyberwar is a new form of conflict. Contemporary nation-states and, for that matter, nonstate actors such as corporations, now suffer and inflict ongoing cyberattacks on a large scale. Whether these attacks constitute war rather than conflict short of war or mere breaches of security (criminal or otherwise) is not always entirely clear. This chapter distinguishes between cyberwar, cyberterrorism, cybercrime, cyberespionage, and what the chapter refers to as “covert political cyberaction”—a species of covert political action. The chapter argues that many, (...) if not most, cyberattacks perpetrated by nation-states on other nation-states for political reasons are best understood neither as acts of war nor as crimes but rather as a new form of covert political action—that of covert political cyberaction. The chapter argues that much covert political cyberaction is best understood as a species of dirty hands action; harmful and unlawful action undertaken to achieve an (alleged) greater good. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to outline how destructive communication exemplified by ransomware cyberattacks destroys the process of organization, causes a “state of exception,” and thus constitutes organization. The authors build on Agamben's state of exception and translate it into communicative constitution of organization (CCO) theory. Design/methodology/approach A significant increase of cyberattacks have impacted organizations in recent times and laid organizations under siege. This conceptual research builds on illustrative cases chosen by positive deviance case selection (PDCS) of ransomware attacks. (...) Findings CCO theory focuses mainly on ordering characteristics of communication. The authors aim to complement this view with a perspective on destructive communication that destroys the process of organization. Based on illustrative cases, the authors conceptualize a process model of destructive CCO. Practical implications The authors expand thoughts about a digital “corporate immune system” to question current offensive cybersecurity strategies of deterrence and promote resilience approaches instead. Originality/value Informed by destructive communication of cyberattacks, this theory advancement supports arguments to include notions of disorder into CCO theory. Furthermore, the paper explains where disruptions like cyberattacks may trigger sensemaking and change to preserve stability. Finally, a novel definition of ‘destructive CCO’ is provided: Destructive Communication Constitutes Organization by disrupting and destroying its site and surface while triggering sensemaking and becoming part of sensemaking itself. (shrink)

Social engineering cyberattacks are a major threat because they often prelude sophisticated and devastating cyberattacks. Social engineering cyberattacks are a kind of psychological attack that exploits weaknesses in human cognitive functions. Adequate defense against social engineering cyberattacks requires a deeper understanding of what aspects of human cognition are exploited by these cyberattacks, why humans are susceptible to these cyberattacks, and how we can minimize or at least mitigate their damage. These questions have received some (...) amount of attention, but the state-of-the-art understanding is superficial and scattered in the literature. In this paper, we review human cognition through the lens of social engineering cyberattacks. Then, we propose an extended framework of human cognitive functions to accommodate social engineering cyberattacks. We cast existing studies on various aspects of social engineering cyberattacks into the extended framework, while drawing a number of insights that represent the current understanding and shed light on future research directions. The extended framework might inspire future research endeavor toward a new sub-field that can be called Cybersecurity Cognitive Psychology, which tailors or adapts principles of Cognitive Psychology to the cybersecurity domain while embracing new notions and concepts that are unique to the cybersecurity domain. (shrink)

The main purpose of the study is to determine the key aspects of the mechanisms of state management of the exchange of information about cyberattacks, cyber incidents, and information security incidents. The methodology includes a set of theoretical methods. Modern government, on the one hand, must take into account the emergence of such a new weapon as cyber, which can break various information systems, can be used in hybrid wars, influence political events, pose a threat to the national security (...) of any state. As a result of the study, key elements of the mechanisms of state management of the exchange of information about cyberattacks, cyber incidents, and information security incidents were identified. (shrink)

Does it seem that with each reported state cyberattack, there comes an announcement of discovery, an attribution to one of a handful of usual suspects, some threatening language suggesting imminent retribution, and then nothing more? Increased incidence of cyberattack makes its occurrence seem simultaneously rampant in terms of publicity and minimal in terms of threat of war. If rampant, how can repeated deployment by the same actors carry no punitive consequences? How is such audaciousness tolerated? For some, a cyberattack by (...) a state is an act of war. Its prevalence suggests there must be a void somewhere that facilitates its use without consequence. Others think state cyberattack is like other internet novelties: digital malfeasance, amounting to a nuisance that naturally follows from a digital‐based existence, particularly since non‐state actors are typically involved. Yet, state‐on‐state hostilities are historically perilous on a vast scale, and there is a multilateral system for regulating the use of force in the context of war. Acts of war, even when seeming minimal in impact, are not by‐products of a digital fad, and cyberattack is now described as far more than ‘nuisance’. If anywhere, the place for clarity on hostile state cyberoperations use should be accounted for in International Humanitarian Law. Yet, in its present form, it is ambiguous if not silent on the subject, suggesting that cyberattack currently presents an advantage to perpetrating states. Does this void or these ambiguities make cyberattacks more legally advantageous to states than traditional, kinetic weaponry? I examine whether existing IHL is sufficiently adaptable to state cyberoperations through a mixed legal and theoretical approach and conclude that they do. (shrink)

This article offers a reading of internet-based activism or ‘hacktivism’ as a phenomenon that cannot be confined to the instrumental use of information technologies. It focuses on a subset of hacktivism – the distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack for political ends – that aims at making an internet host unavailable to its intended users. Since the early 2000s these attacks have been increasingly conducted by means of botnets – networks of infected computers that send bogus requests to a target website without the (...) consent of their users. The capacity of botnets to engender a more-than-human politics is analyzed from two distinct theoretical angles. First, drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, the hacktivist DDoS is discussed as an assemblage of signifying and a-signifying components, voluntary and involuntary actions. Second, Gilbert Simondon’s notions of transindividuation and transduction allow for a conceptualization of hacktivism as a sociotechnical assemblage with a high degree of indetermination. (shrink)

Building a framework of laws around acts of war or aggression is not easy, especially in the world of international relations, where anarchy characterizes the fundamental nature of world affairs. W...

Unlike kinetic weapons, cyberweapons purport to target facilities (rather than individuals) and, to date, have caused no immediate injuries. While some theorists focus upon the direct nature of a cyberattack, the chapter focuses on the harm a cyberattack causes. Although many believe that cyberattacks do not cause sufficient harm to violate noncombatant immunity, we dispute this. The chapter examines the effects of long-term destruction brought about in the course of regular warfare to draw conclusions about the probable knock-on effects (...) of cyberterrorism. To evaluate the psychological effects of cyberterrorism the chapter draws on existing studies of cyberbullying and identity theft. Additionally, the chapter offers our own data drawn from simulated cyberattacks that include invasion of privacy, unauthorized dissemination of personal information, stolen data, and threats. The chapter's analysis suggests that cyberterrorism causes significant anxiety and substantially influences rational political thinking, so much so that cyberterrorism violates the principle of noncombatant immunity even when it does not cause physical harm. (shrink)

The frequency of cyberattacks has been rapidly increasing in recent times, which is a significant concern. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities present in the software components that constitute the targeted system. Consequently, the number of vulnerabilities within these software components serves as an indicator of the system’s level of security and trustworthiness. This paper compares the accuracy, trainability and stability to configuration parameters of several neural network architectures, namely Long Short-Term Memory, Multilayer Perceptron and Convolutional Neural Network. These architectures are (...) utilized for forecasting the number of software vulnerabilities within a specified timeframe for a specific software product. By evaluating these neural network models, our aim is to provide insights into their performance and effectiveness in vulnerability forecasting. (shrink)

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about (...) which concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the use of ‘black box’ AI in medicine and asks whether the physician needs to disclose to patients that even the best AI comes with the risks of cyberattacks, systematic bias, and a particular type of mismatch between AI’s implicit assumptions and an individual patient’s background situation.Pacecurrent clinical practice, I argue that, under certain circumstances, these risks do need to be disclosed. Otherwise, the physician either vitiates a patient’s informed consent or violates a more general (...) obligation to warn him about potentially harmful consequences. To support this view, I argue, first, that the already widely accepted conditions in the evaluation of risks, i.e. the ‘nature’ and ‘likelihood’ of risks, speak in favour of disclosure and, second, that principled objections against the disclosure of these risks do not withstand scrutiny. Moreover, I also explain that these risks are exacerbated by pandemics like the COVID-19 crisis, which further emphasises their significance. (shrink)

This essay explores the ethical and legal implications of prioritizing the militarization of cyberspace as part of a roundtable on “Competing Visions for Cyberspace.” Our essay uses an ideal type—a world that accepts warfighting as the prime directive for the construction and use of cyberspace—and examines the ethical and legal consequences that follow for (i) who will have authority to regulate cyberspace; (ii) what vehicles they will most likely use to do so; and (iii) what the rules of behavior for (...) states and stakeholders will be. We envision a world where states would take on a greater role in governance but remain constrained by law, includingjus ad bellumandjus in bellocriteria, but also sovereignty, nonintervention, and self-determination. We ask if the net result would mean states causing less harm than they do in kinetic conflicts. Ultimately, our essay takes no position on whether cyberspace should be a militarized domain (let alone one where warfighting is the prime directive). Rather, our goal is to situate a warfighting cyber domain within the reality of a pluralist cyberspace, where ethical imperatives compete or coalesce to support specific governance mechanisms. (shrink)

In this essay, I propose five principles to make U.S. nuclear deterrence policy more just and effective in the future: sever the link between the mass killing of innocent civilians and nuclear deterrence by focusing targeting on adversaries’ military power and senior political leadership, not their population; never use or plan to use a nuclear weapon against any target that could be destroyed or neutralized by conventional weapons; reject “belligerent reprisal” threats against civilians even in response to enemy attacks on (...) one's own or allied civilians; replace nuclear “calculated ambiguity” threats against biological or cyberattacks with “deterrence by denial” strategies; and work in good faith toward eventual nuclear disarmament. (shrink)

This research aims to study and evaluate the mutual impact between digital transformation and risk management in organizations. While digital transformation offers significant benefits in terms of increased efficiency and innovation, it also presents new challenges related to risk management. The main findings of the research indicate the following: Complexity of the risk landscape: Digital transformation leads to a more complex digital environment, increasing the types and number of risks faced by organizations, such as cyberattacks and data breaches. New (...) opportunities for risk management: Conversely, digital technologies provide advanced tools such as artificial intelligence and big data analytics, enabling organizations to detect threats earlier and respond more effectively. Importance of digital culture: Building a strong digital culture within the organization, where all employees are aware of digital risks and how to address them, is crucial. Integration of technology and management: Organizations must integrate technology into their risk management strategies, considering human and organizational factors. The research recommends the following Developing a comprehensive strategy: Organizations should develop a comprehensive strategy for digital risk management that covers all aspects, from technology to organizational culture. (shrink)

Websites, as essential digital assets, are highly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of their high traffic volume and the significant impact of breaches. This study aims to enhance the identification of web traffic attacks by leveraging machine learning techniques. A methodology was proposed to extract relevant features from HTTP traces using the CSIC2010 v2 dataset, which simulates e-commerce web traffic. Ensemble methods, such as Random Forest (RF) and Extreme Gradient Boosting, were employed and compared against baseline classifiers, including k-nearest Neighbor, (...) LASSO, and Support Vector Machines. The results demonstrate that the ensemble methods outperform baseline classifiers by approximately 20% in predictive accuracy, achieving an Area Under the ROC Curve of 0.989. Feature selection methods such as Information Gain, LASSO, and RF further enhance the robustness of these models. This study highlights the efficacy of ensemble models in improving attack detection while minimizing performance variability, offering a practical framework for securing web traffic in diverse application contexts. (shrink)

Purpose Employees may feel overwhelmed with information privacy choices and have difficulties understanding what they are committing to in the digital workplace. This paper aims to analyze the role of different thinking styles for effort reduction, such as the use of intuition, when employees make decisions about the credibility and trustworthiness of workplace information privacy issues in Slovakia. While the General Data Protection Regulation sets precise requirements for valid consent, organizations are classified as data controllers and are subject to credibility (...) judgments by their employees. Design/methodology/approach Data was collected from 230 employees in Slovakia using a survey questionnaire. Quantitative analysis using SPSS was conducted to describe employees thinking preferences when judging the credibility of information privacy in their organizations. Findings The survey participants revealed their perceived credibility and trust in personal data protection and thinking preferences. Unconscious thinking is the type of effort reduction often reported by participants, who perceive high credibility and trust in personal data protection. This study can help managers and data controllers in small- and medium-sized enterprises in reflecting about the way in which people use different thinking processes for decision-making about information privacy in their organizations. Research limitations/implications This study set out to explore how decision-making processes at the workplace relate to credibility of data practices. Focusing on the use of different types of intuition, the authors explored whether the preference for a specific decision-making style can explain the perceived credibility of data practices. The part of the workforce in the sample did not have a strict predisposition to use either intuitive or rational thinking. Practical implications The contribution provides scholars with an overview of the field of intuition, a field that is likely to grow given the challenges of digitalization for organizations, such as shitstorms, cyberattacks and whistleblowing. Originality/value The most well-known concepts from intuition research, e.g. the dual process theory, and practice are tested simultaneously, therewith contributing to the applied literature on domain-specific preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision-making. (shrink)

States’ capacity for using modern information and communication technology to inflict grave harm on enemies has been amply demonstrated in recent years, with many countries reporting large-scale cyberattacks against their military defense systems, water supply, and other critical infrastructure. Currently, no agreed-upon international rules or norms exist to govern international conflict in cyberspace. Many governments prefer to keep it that way. They argue that difficulties of verifiability and challenges posed by rapid technological change rule out agreement on an international (...) cyber convention. Instead, they prefer to rely on informal cooperation and strategic deterrence to limit direct conflict. In this article, I seek to rebut some of the main objections to seeking an international convention on the use of cyber weapons. While there are significant obstacles to achieving effective arms control in the cyber domain, historical experience from other areas of international arms control suggests that none of these obstacles are insurmountable. Furthermore, while most critics of cyberarms control assume that cyberspace favors offensive strategies, closer inspection reveals the dominance of cyber-defensive strategies. This in turn improves prospects for striking an effective international agreement on cyberarms control. (shrink)

In the modern digital era, cybersecurity has emerged as a critical concern due to the widespread use of digital technologies, increasing the vulnerability to cyberattacks across various sectors. As the complexity and frequency of these threats rise, robust cybersecurity strategies are vital for safeguarding critical infrastructure, sensitive data, and personal privacy. The global economy, particularly industries reliant on secure digital transactions such as e-commerce, banking, and Fintech, is increasingly susceptible to cybersecurity breaches, which can result in significant financial and (...) reputational damage. National security is also at risk, with cyberattacks targeting essential systems like power grids and transportation networks, prompting governments to implement advanced security measures.The integration of cybersecurity and data privacy is crucial, particularly as organisations collect vast amounts of sensitive personal data. Technologies such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) introduce novel challenges in maintaining security, necessitating continuous investment in threat detection and advanced architectures like Zero Trust. Collaborative efforts between governments, businesses, and international organisations, supported by public–private partnerships, are essential to protect digital infrastructure and address the skills gap in the cybersecurity workforce. Educational initiatives and the development of comprehensive frameworks are key to enhancing resilience against cyberthreats, ensuring a more secure and safer digital future. (shrink)

The article examines current trends in organized cybercrime in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, with an emphasis on information operations and their underestimated danger in Europe. The authors prove that Russia’s cyberattacks are part of its military strategy, combining traditional and digital means of warfare, including information campaigns, disinformation, attacks on critical infrastructure, economic espionage, and the use of cryptocurrencies to finance illegal activities. Cases of attacks on Ukrainian energy networks, examples of the use of deepfake technologies, and (...) the latest manifestations of online fraud related to the war are considered. The legal regulation of cyber operations is analyzed in the context of international humanitarian law (IHL), the Budapest Convention, and the new UN Convention on Cybercrime. Particular attention is paid to the Tallinn Manual as a tool for the legal qualification of cyberattacks as an act of armed aggression. The authors emphasize the need to develop new legal concepts (cyberwar, cyberpropaganda, information operations) and create effective mechanisms to counter organized cybercrime at the international level. Ukraine’s experience in cooperation between the state and civil society in cyberspace is presented as an example of effective counteraction to hybrid threats. The purpose of the article: to show what are the trends in cybercrime during war with a focus on information operations, the danger of which is still underestimated in Europe. To justify the need to regulate orga-nized cybercrime within the framework of cyberwar. (shrink)

Cyberspace relies on information technologies to mediate relations between different people, across different communication networks and is reliant on the supporting technology. These interactions typically occur without physical proximity and those working depending on cybersystems must be able to trust the overall human–technical systems that support cyberspace. As such, detailed discussion of cybersecurity policy would be improved by including trust as a key value to help guide policy discussions. Moreover, effective cybersystems must have resilience designed into them. This paper argues (...) that trustworthy cybersystems are a key element to resilient systems, and thus are core to cybersecurity policy. The paper highlights the importance of trustworthiness for resilient cybersystems. The importance of trustworthiness is shown through a discussion of three events where trustworthiness was the target or casualty of cyberattacks: Stuxnet, hacking of communications and the Edward Snowden revelations. The impact of losing trust is highlighted, to underpin the argument that a resilient cybersystem ought to design in trustworthiness. The paper closes off by presenting a general set of policy implications arising from recognition of the interplay between trust, trustworthiness and resilience for effective cybersecurity. (shrink)

Cloud computing has revolutionized data processing, while it is still quite fairly vulnerable to advanced cyberattacks, including DDoS attacks and zero-day flaws. Regarding changing assault methods, data imbalance, and real-time threat detection, traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) struggle. This paper presents a Generative AI-enhanced Intrusion Detection System (GAI-IDS) to improve threat detection accuracy and resilience by combining Transformer-based anomaly detection with Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks (CGANs). The model balances insufficiently represented threat classes, provides reasonable synthetic attack samples, and uses (...) a multi-head self-attention technique for real- time anomaly detection. With a 96.5% detection accuracy, experimental results on the ToN-IoT dataset much exceed conventional IDS. Moreover, adversarial training builds up the system to resist evasive cyberattacks, providing scalable and flexible cloud security. (shrink)

In this chapter, I take up the question of whether one of the central principles of jus ad bellum – just cause – is relevant in a world in which cyberattacks occur. I argue that this principle is just as relevant as ever, though it needs modification in light of recent developments. In particular, I argue, contrary to many traditional just war theorists, that just cause should not be limited to physical attacks. In the process, I offer an improved (...) definition of cyberattack and show how some other principles of jus ad bellum constrain this widened notion of just cause. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this research paper is to review and synthesize the role of blockchain technology (BCT) in various types of illegal activities, including but not limited to fraud, money laundering, ransomware attacks, firearms, drug tracking, cyberattacks, identity theft and scams. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted a review of studies related to illegal activities using blockchain from 2015 to 2023. Next, a thematic review of the literature was performed to see how these illegal activities were conducted using BCT. Findings (...) Through this study, the authors identify the relevant themes that highlight the major illegal activities performed using BCT, its possible steps for prevention and the opportunities for future developments. Finally, the authors provide suggestions for future research using the theory, context and method framework. Originality/value No other research has synthesized the illegal activities using BCT through a thematic approach to the best of the authors’ knowledge. Hence, this study will act as a starting point for future research for academic and technical practitioners in this area. (shrink)

The fact that information and communication technologies (ICTs) increasingly shape our online and offline lifeworlds has lead to the emergence of a new societal threat in the form of vulnerabilities in critical ICT systems that may be exploited by malicious actors. Cybersecurity researchers work on finding such vulnerabilities and on identifying new attack vectors, i.e. they systematically step into the role of attackers. Normatively, however, the goal of this research is to strengthen ICTs against cyberattacks and, thus, to reduce (...) the societal threat. However, this implies a dual-use potential: as in any discipline, results in cybersecurity research need to be published at some point and the disclosure of vulnerabilities to software companies and ICT administrators is an integral part of ensuring that ICT vulnerabilities are closed; such a disclosure, however, can be misused by attackers, as well. Thus, instruments for ethical orientation in regard of these dual-use issues seem to be necessary to identify potential issues and to guide researchers in dealing with them. While corresponding resources, such as codes of conduct, already exists for cybersecurity research, we will show that they currently do not adequately address the need for ethical orientation in the academic context. This, we argue, creates the need for a new research ethics culture in cybersecurity research. (shrink)

In today’s digital era, the majority of information have been releasing via digital tools as well as online sites. Media outlets face increasing threats to their digital content and infrastructure from various organizations and communities. These grown threats are related to the risks of cyberattacks, data breaches, and unauthorized access. Protecting digital content is no longer just about securing files; it requires a strategic combination of cybersecurity measures and advanced data analysis. This article is about the main cyber-attacks to (...) media companies and the role of data analysis in protecting local digital content, generally enhancing media security. (shrink)

Which harms and benefits should be viewed as relevant when considering whether to launch cyber-measures? In this article, we consider this question, which matters because it is central to determining whether cyber-measures should be launched. Several just war theorists hold a version of what we call the ‘Restrictive View’, according to which there are restrictions on the sorts of harms and benefits that should be included in proportionality assessments about the justifiability of going to war (whether cyber or kinetic). We (...) discuss two such views – the Just Cause Restrictive View and Rights-based Restrictive View – and find both wanting. By contrast, we defend what we call the ‘Permissive View’. This holds that all potential goods and bads should be included in proportionality decisions about cyber-measures, even those that appear to be trivial, and where the various harms and benefits are given different weights, according to their agent-relative and agent-neutral features. We argue further that accepting the Permissive View has broader implications for the ethical frameworks governing cyberwar, both in terms of whether cyberattack provide just cause for coercive responses, including kinetic warfare and cyber-responses, and whether cyber-measures should be governed by just war theory or a new theory for cyber-operations. (shrink)

Metaphors like a one-direction-only compass or a more opposing-direction scale are employed to capture the complexity of moral dilemmas in the boardroom. Adidas employees criticised their directors, accusing them of having ‘turned off their moral compass’ by ignoring years of harassment by Ye. The CEO of Carlsberg described his dilemma about leaving Russia during the Ukraine war as a ‘Catch-22’. Meanwhile, Maastricht University’s board referred to the challenge of paying ransom after a cyberattack as a ‘Devil’s Dilemma’. However, the reference (...) to the moral compass of directors, or the lack of a moral compass, can be used for dilemmas where directors must choose between ethical and unethical actions, a right-wrong dilemma, because it clearly points in a single direction. One’s moral compass guides decisions towards what is unequivocally ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. However, the metaphor of a moral compass is less suitable for dilemmas that involve two equally positive moral principles that often conflict and are mutually exclusive, a right-right dilemma. Here, a moral compass would not provide clear direction since both choices are ethically justifiable, leaving no ‘true north’ to follow. Instead, the metaphor of a moral scale is more appropriate. A scale requires careful weighing of both options to determine which aligns best with the core values of the individual or organisation. It acknowledges the complexity of prioritising between two valid moral principles and the need for a nuanced approach to balance conflicting positive ideals.. (shrink)

Crises today occur in manifold variants. Cyberattacks, floods, wars, pandemics – the list of cases is ongoing. Academic literature recognizes them as “transboundary crises” (Ansell et al. 2010) or as “global polycrisis” (Homer-Dixon et al., 2022), referring to their transgressing, cascading and overlapping dynamics in both space and time. In this paper, we discuss how decisions are made at a local level in such dynamic, if not disruptive, environments. By combining DDM and crisis management literature, we illustrate how the (...) decision-making evolves when the crisis shows transboundary characteristics, that is, when cascading dynamics call for even more decisions (hence the “Hydra” metaphor referring to a monster in Greek mythology that multiplies its heads once it is being fought). The paper draws on a qualitative study on decision processes in local authorities and organizations in Germany during the Covid-19 pandemic. It can show (1) how these local actors build inter-organizational networks (e.g. task forces) in order to synchronize their decision processes against the background of changing federal requirements; (2) how, due to the duration of the pandemic, rather permanent decision systems developed; and (3) how these networks learn to sustain dynamic decision-making capacities in order to cope with crises following Covid-19, such as the effects of the war in the Ukraine or recent climate impacts. With these findings we contribute to an “integrative” conception of crisis in current crisis management literature that seeks definition in a dynamic process view rather than using either objective or subjective criteria. A DDM approach allows for a more detailed realization of this conceptual shift by representing the current “cascading disasters” as “cascading decision-making”. This understanding focuses on the active role decision-making plays as well as it reflects on the fact that decision-making in today’s crises always involves _others _making decisions, too. (shrink)

Is war ever ethically justified? And if so, when? This chapter explores these questions by analyzing just war theory and the many assumptions we have about war that can cloud our judgments. The chapter begins by debunking misleading cultural narratives about the causes and consequences of war. These narratives are then replaced by an examination of the variety of factors that can contribute to conflict and the consequences of conflict from the point of view of those who experience it. This (...) more complete understanding of war allows for deeper reflection on both the value and limit of just war theory, especially ideas about just cause, proportionality, and noncombatant immunity. Finally, these ideas are then applied to contemporary challenges like nuclear weapons, cyberattacks, and humanitarian intervention. (shrink)

This study analyzes the domestic political, economic, and social conditions in the Western Balkans that provide fertile ground for hostile and maligned actors to manipulate and exploit governments and societies with hybrid war measures, namely cyberattacks and cyber intrusions and disinformation and fake news. It begins with a review and assessment of the prevailing empirical and theoretical literature on hybrid warfare. It then describes two leading empirical indices that measure degrees of permeability and structural vulnerability that elevate or reduce (...) the risks associated with maligned and hostile interventions. The article also examines leading indicators measuring resilience levels in cybersecurity and media/information literacy, highlighting political, social, and economic vulnerabilities. It concludes by suggesting that domestic conditions in the region encourage maligned and hostile actors, especially Russia and for different reasons and to a lesser extent China and Turkey, to use hybrid measures to exploit the region. The article proposes that in addition to strengthening institutions and trust, membership in NATO and the E.U. are directly related to mitigating structural vulnerability and reducing uncertainty and insecurity in the Western Balkans. (shrink)

What will be the consequences of the criminalization of aggression? In 2010, the International Criminal Court made aggression a crime for which individuals can be prosecuted. But questions around what constitutes aggression, who decides, and, most important, how effective this legal change will be in reducing the incidence of war remain. This essay considers these questions in light of two recent books on the criminalization of aggression: Noah Weisbord'sThe Crime of Aggression: The Quest for Justice in an Age of Drones, (...) Cyberattacks, Insurgents, and Autocratsand Tom Dannenbaum'sThe Crime of Aggression, Humanity, and the Soldier. While the authors argue in favor of the efficacy of the criminalization of aggression as a means to reduce future war, it is also likely that the criminalization of aggression will reshape war in potentially profound ways. (shrink)

As a promising method with excellent characteristics in terms of resilience and dependability, distributed methods are gradually used in the field of energy management of microgrid. However, these methods have more stringent requirements on the working conditions, which will make the system more sensitive to communication failures and cyberattacks. As a result, it is both theoretical merits and practical values to investigate the malicious effect of cyber attacks on microgrid. This paper studies the distributed economic dispatch problem under denial-of-service (...) attacks for the microgrid, in which each generator can communicate with its neighbors and has the computational capability to implement local operation. Firstly, a DoS attack model is proposed, in which the DoS attacker intentionally jams the communication channel to deteriorate the performance of the microgrid. Then, the evolution mechanism of the dispatch system of the microgrid under different attack scenarios is adequately discussed. On this basis, an optimal attack strategy based on enumerating-search algorithm is presented to allocate the limited attack resources reasonably, so as to maximize the effect of DoS attacks. Finally, the validity of the theoretical studies about the attack effect under different scenarios and the effectiveness of the proposed enumerating-search-based optimal attack strategy are illustrated through the simulation examples on the IEEE 57-bus system and IEEE 39-bus system, respectively. (shrink)

Philosophical and ethical discussions of warfare are often tied to emerging technologies and techniques. Today we are presented with what many believe is a radical shift in the nature of war-the realization of conflict in the cyber-realm, the so-called.

The research examines the pressing issue of combating cyberterrorism and cyber-extremism amid the digital transformation of society. The authors emphasize the growing threat of cyberattacks employed by terrorist and extremist groups to destabilize society, spread destructive ideologies, and organize criminal activities. The use of profiling technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms is proposed as an effective tool to counter these threats. Profiling, based on the analysis of behavior, communication patterns, and digital traces, enables the early detection of potential perpetrators. (...) In turn, AI algorithms can process vast amounts of data, identify anomalies, and predict possible cyberattacks. The research analyzes advanced machine learning methods, such as neural networks and text data analysis, which can be used for the automatic detection of extremist content and suspicious online activity. Special attention is given to the legal aspects of employing these technologies, including issues related to personal data protection and the prevention of abuse. The authors stress the need for a balance between ensuring security and upholding human rights. In conclusion, the authors provide recommendations for integrating profiling and AI technologies into cybersecurity systems, which will enhance the effectiveness of the fight against cyberterrorism and cyber-extremism while minimizing risks to society. The research is of interest to cybersecurity professionals, law enforcement agencies, and researchers engaged in digital transformation and AI. (shrink)

This article assesses how autonomy and machine learning impact the existential risk of nuclear war. It situates the problem of cyber security, which proceeds by stealth, within the larger context of nuclear deterrence, which is effective when it functions with transparency and credibility. Cyber vulnerabilities poses new weaknesses to the strategic stability provided by nuclear deterrence. This article offers best practices for the use of computer and information technologies integrated into nuclear weapons systems. Focusing on nuclear command and control, avoiding (...) autonomy and machine learning is recommended as one means to reduce the existential risk of unintended nuclear conflict. (shrink)

In today’s global and interconnected digital ecosystem, data serves as the backbone of modern economies, driving service delivery, fostering economic growth, and enabling technological innovation. Data fuels decision-making processes, supports targeted service offerings, and creates new opportunities across various sectors. Among the vast amount of data being generated and processed daily, a substantial portion comprises personal data, which includes information that identifies or relates to individuals. Personal data is at the core of digital interactions, underpinning everything from e-commerce and social (...) media platforms to healthcare services and government operations. Its collection and analysis allow for personalized experiences, predictive analytics, and improved efficiency. However, the widespread use and value of personal data also present significant privacy and security concerns, highlighting the need for robust architectures to protect individuals’ rights and ensure the responsible handling of this sensitive information. This chapter discusses the different policy and legal frameworks applicable to personal data in South Africa. Its focus is to discuss how South Africa’s primary law on protection of personal data frames the minimum requirements for lawful processing of personal data, the rights enjoyed by data subjects, and the mechanisms in place to enforce compliance. The protection of personal data within the ambit of consumer protection is also considered and the chapter discusses how the public sector protects personal data, particularly in the provision of e-government services. Finally, the chapter notes the vulnerability of personal data and demonstrates how cybersecurity laws protect personal data from cybercriminals and cyberattacks. (shrink)