The ennobling vision of modernity asserts that the benefits of identifying individual citizens as subjectivity are realized only when each subject is aware of the self as free in decisions and actions. Modernization through industrialization and urbanization has been seen as a means by which society can, through market contractual relationships, allow each citizen to become a self-determining subject. In Korean society this self-awakening has already set in and ought to deepen through dynamic economic growth. However, the authoritarian political (...) power combined by technocracy obstructs the emergence of mature subjectivity. This is what can be called a phenomenon of counter-modernization. Citizenship training through philosophical dialogue may find ways to resolve this impasse by reconceptualizing modernity’s goals and means in terms of enabling the potentiality inherent in subjectivity. (shrink)

ExcerptAnalysis of a possible intellectual affinity between philosopher Michel Foucault and political theorist Hannah Arendt is valuable in its own right, given the insight it offers into the work of these two important thinkers. At the same time, certain aspects of such an affinity are especially important because of what they illustrate about the unique ways in which harm manifests itself within the context of modern societies, and about how the terrain of modernity might be negotiated such that harm (...) is minimized and the practice of freedom is promoted.1 Of particular interest in this regard is the attitude toward modernity…. (shrink)

ArgumentIt would have been easy for a less imaginative historian of mathematics than Herbert Mehrtens to have portrayed the work of Hilbert, Hausdorff, and other modernists as pioneers, and those who did not subscribe to their program as people who failed, were not good enough to make the turn, and were eventually and convincingly left behind. That he did not do so is not only because this would have been a shallow, selective view of the facts: it is incompatible with (...) his Foucauldian approach to the relations between knowledge and power. Instead, he defined what I see as the most intriguing category of actor in his Moderne—Sprache—Mathematik (1990), the Gegenmoderner, or counter-moderns. The three men who characterize this position are Felix Klein, Henri Poincaré, and Luitzen Brouwer, and each merits a section in the book.Of the three, Poincaré is the hardest to contain within that category. The range of his work, the nature of his influence, and the shifting standards by which mathematical significance has been evaluated by mathematicians, historians of mathematics, and society at large, all contribute to the problem. After thirty years, the methodological presumptions and aspirations of historians of mathematics have also changed, and I shall suggest that one way to appreciate the richness of Mehrtens’ book, to gain insight into what is meant by mathematical modernism, and to acknowledge a generation of work by other historians since 1990, is to re-examine aspects of Poincaré’s life and work and scholarship about him. Prodded by remarks by Leo Corry, Moritz Epple, and David Rowe, I shall suggest that the simple but useful dichotomy modern/counter-modern must be seen as a way into a more complicated situation, one in which different aspects of mathematics, specifically applied mathematics and the relationship of mathematics to contemporary physics, require fresh accounts of the role of modern mathematics in society. (shrink)

ArgumentWhat kind of mathematical research activities took place in prisoner of war camps in Germany during the Second World War? And can one inspect such activities in order to re-examine, on the one hand, Herbert Mehrtens’ analysis of the modernism/counter-modernism divide of early twentieth-century mathematics, and on the other, his research on the instrumentalization of mathematics during the war? Closely examining the work carried out in the field of algebraic geometry by the French mathematician Bernard d’Orgeval, who was held (...) in three of such camps between 1940 and 1945, the paper aims not only to unfold this unique episode in the history of mathematics, presenting it as an ephemeral configuration, but also to show the limitations of Mehrtens’ approach and the narrative of modern and counter-modern mathematics. (shrink)

Other-than-rational modes of engaging with risk, such as hope, faith, ideology, and magic, are not irrational but socially reasonable ways of extending one’s horizon when calculative rationality reaches its limits. Drawing on empirical studies across health, youth transitions, migration, and gambling, the chapter shows how these modes play distinct roles when knowledge is scarce, resources are limited, or futures are precarious. They function both as coping strategies and as motivational forces that sustain agency under uncertainty, enabling individuals to persevere, imagine (...) alternatives, and act despite limited control over the future. The chapter further demonstrates how hope and magic are embedded in broader institutional contexts, from lotteries to religious practices, and how they mobilize subjective resources for survival, improvement, or transformation. Together, these modes illustrate the enduring importance of non-empirical imaginaries in navigating uncertain futures. (shrink)

While much attention has been paid to the various strains of modernity’s development from its emphasis on instrumental rationality to its construction of the advent-guard, what I want to do here is examine the intersection of modernity, affectation, and acceleration. This essay contends nostalgia ameliorates identity disruption from social acceleration in late modernity. Existential threats evoke nostalgia, reconstituting familiar “homeworlds” and enabling experiential normalcy. Subjects recoup weak role-identification and unstable archetypes – byproducts of pluralisation, entrepreneurialism, and insecuritization (...) – through nostalgia. As compensatory, nostalgia proffers refuge; yet precipitating consumption, it incarnates cultural dialectics. This essay argues that the prevalence of nostalgia in late modern societies is the result of social acceleration, but the nostalgia born of this acceleration is also a spiritual palliative for its destabilising effects. (shrink)

In Modern Chinese Counter-Enlightenment: Affect, Reason, and the Transcultural Lexicon, Peng Hsiao-yen argues that a trend of Counter-Enlightenment had grown from the late Qing to the May Fourth era in the 1910s to the 1920s and continued to the 1940s. She demonstrates how Counter-Enlightenment was manifested with case studies such as Lu Xun’s writings in the late 1900s, the Aesthetic Education movement from the 1910s to 1920s, and the Science and Lifeview debate in the 1920s. During the (...) period, the life philosophy movement, highlighting the epistemic debate on affect and reason, is connected with its counterparts in Germany, France, and Japan. The movement had widespread and long-term impact on Chinese philosophy and literature. Using the transcultural lexicon as methodology, this book traces how the German term Lebensanschauung (lifeview), a key concept in Rudolf Eucken’s life philosophy, constituted a global tide of Counter-Enlightenment that influenced the thought of leading Chinese intellectuals in the Republican era. Peng contends that Chinese intellectuals’ transcultural connections with others in the philosophical pursuit of knowledge triggered China’s self-transformation. She has successfully reconstructed the missing link in the Chinese theater of the worldwide dialectic of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. “This book can be considered a milestone in modern Chinese and cultural studies. It is also the most ambitious attempt in developing a new kind of interdisciplinary studies—an attempt that bears a philosophic weight and cuts across the disciplines of Sinology, comparative literature, intellectual history, and translation studies. At the same time, it seeks to demonstrate a new theory of ‘Transcultural Lexicon’ which should appeal to all scholars interested in cultural theories.” —Leo Ou-fan Lee, Chinese University of Hong Kong “In the age ruled by the myth of technoscientific triumphalism, this timely and refreshing book unearths a critical strand of thought and sensibility against enlightenment rationality in modern China. Drawing on historical archives and debates, Peng Hsiao-yen stages a compelling critique of industrial modernity and the pursuit of wealth and power at the cost of emotional ties, community, and organic lifeways.” —Ban Wang, Stanford University. (shrink)

This study investigates the counter-homophobic discursive construction of tradition and modernity in China, focusing on Sina Weibo users’ comments on anti-same-sex marriage arguments. The study reveals how proponents of same-sex marriage in China actively imagine and project a China that is inclusive of gay rights by (re)constructing China’s tradition as tolerant of homosexuality and positioning China’s pursuit of development and modernity as entailing gay rights development. Yet, analysis shows that the discursive construction of tradition may potentially romanticize (...) China’s tradition as if it were devoid of homophobia, and the discursive construction of modernity, by representing China’s gay rights development as merely playing catch-up with the purportedly already modernized West, sometimes implicitly produces a homonationalist binary of modernism versus traditionalism. However, from a postcolonial transnational perspective, the paper argues that contrary to the homocolonialist representation of China as essentially homophobic, these discursive practices may work partially to confront and contest Western exceptionalism. (shrink)

A rejoinder to Harri Mäcklin, "A Heideggerian Critique of Immersive Art".

Critics have long treated the most important intellectual movement of modern history--the Enlightenment--as if it took shape in the absence of opposition. In this groundbreaking new study, Darrin McMahon demonstrates that, on the contrary, contemporary resistance to the Enlightenment was a major cultural force, shaping and defining the Enlightenment itself from the moment of inception, while giving rise to an entirely new ideological phenomenon-what we have come to think of as the "Right." McMahon skillfully examines the Counter-Enlightenment, showing that (...) it was an extensive, international, and thoroughly modern affair. (shrink)

Militant modern atheism, whose most eloquent champion is Richard Dawkins, provides an effective and necessary critique of fundamentalist forms of religion and their role in political life, both within states and across national boundaries. Because it is also presented as a more general attack on religion (tout court), it has provoked a severe reaction from scholars who regard its conception of religion as shallow and narrow. My aim is to examine this debate, identifying insights and oversights on both sides.Two distinct (...) conceptions of religion are in play. For Dawkins and his allies (most notably Dan Dennett) religions are grounded in doctrines, propositions about supernatural entities, events and processes which the devout believe. Their beliefs prompt them to actions, which they support or rationalize by reference to the doctrines. Dawkins and Dennett view the acceptance of the doctrines as resting on cognitive misfiring — these are delusions to be outgrown or spells to be broken.By contrast, the religious scholars who criticize the militant atheists often view religion as centered in social practices that inform and enrich human lives. To the extent that there are doctrines that atheists might subject to epistemic evaluation, these are to be viewed as pieces of scaffolding, that are, in principle, dispensable.I argue that militant modern atheism is incomplete (and likely counter-productive) so long as it fails to attend systematically to the roles religion fulfills in human lives. Yet it is important to achieve public clarity about the literal falsehood of the doctrines on which fundamentalists rely. The challenge is to develop a well-articulated and convincing version of secular humanism. Meeting that challenge is, I claim, one of the central problems of philosophy today. (shrink)

This is the first book-length study to explore the relationship between archaeology and modern thought, showing how philosophical ideas that developed in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries still dominate our approach to the material remains of ancient societies. It discusses the modern emphasis on method rather than ethics or meaning, our understanding of change in history and nature, the role of the nation-state in forming our views of the past, and contemporary notions of human individuality, the mind, and materiality. Julian (...) Thomas also addresses the modern preoccupation with depth, which enables archaeology to be used as a metaphor in other disciplines. The book concludes by advocating a "counter-modern" archaeology that refuses to separate material evidence from political, moral, rhetorical, and aesthetic concerns, as well as meaning. (shrink)

Modern Historiography is the essential introduction to the history of historical writing. It explains the broad philosophical background to the different historians and historical schools of the modern era, from James Boswell and Thomas Carlyle through to Lucien Febure and Eric Hobsbawm and surveys: the Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment Romanticism the voice of Science and the process of secularization within Western intellectual thought the influence of, and broadening contact with, the New World the Annales school in France Postmodernism. Modern (...) Historiography provides a clear and concise account of this modern period of historical writing. (shrink)

ArgumentHerbert Mehrtens‘ work and the implications of the historical ideas he advanced went beyond the history of any single discipline. The article therefore addresses three broad issues: (1) Mehrtens‘ reconceptualization of mathematical modernism, in his field-changing book Moderne—Sprache—Mathematik (1990) and other works, as an epistemic and cultural phenomenon in a way that could potentially reach across and also beyond the sciences and also link scientific and cultural modernisms; (2) the extension of his work to the history of modernity itself (...) via the concept of “technocratic modernism”; (3) his seminal contributions to the historiography of the sciences and technology during the National Socialist period, focusing on his critique of claims that mathematics, the natural sciences and technology were morally or politically “neutral” during or after the Nazi era, and on his counter-claim that mathematicians and other scientists had in fact mobilized themselves and their knowledge in support of Nazism’s central political projects. Taken as a guide for understanding science-politics relations in general, Mehrtens‘ work was and remains a counterweight to the political abstinence adopted by many who have followed the “cultural turn” in history of science and technology. In the broadest sense, the article is a plea for the culturally relevant and politically engaged historiography of the sciences and humanities that Mehrtens himself pursued. (shrink)

A counter history of the birth of bioethics, which focuses on the dissenters and whistleblowers who challenged law and institutions rather than simply the development of new technologies.

The writings of Weber and Taylor have some strong affinities. Both start from the anthropological idea that man evaluates his position in the world and constitutes the social world by values. Their analyses of values aim at an understanding of those intersubjective meanings that have constituted western modernity. But, at the same time, their anthropological starting point leads to different interpretations of modernity. Historically, both argue that rationalization (as instrumental rationality) is one of the most influential Kulturbedeutung of (...) modernity. Weber's thesis of rationalization is, however, entangled in a paradox. Overemphasizing the rationalized elements of modernity, he fails scientifically to grasp certain counter-movements in modernity, such as individuation, subjectivity and new life forms. Taylor, investigating the moral sources of expressivism, shows that these life forms are an inherent part of modernity. Yet his method of articulating the sources of modernity is insufficient to transform it towards a causal explanation of behaviour in everyday life. (shrink)

Intellectual historians have tended to focus on the most radical intellectuals of the counter-revolution such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald, but the counter-revolution was an intellectually composite movement with many intellectual currents and ideas. In this article, I shed light on the composite character of the counter-revolution by focusing on one of its most moderate members, the comte de Montlosier. The article presents contextualised analysis of Montlosier’s conception of moderation, his theory of politics, his (...) critique of fellow counter-revolutionaries, and his ideas for a new aristocratic order build on public opinion and separation of powers. I argue that Montlosier’s moderate politics reflected a moderate enlightenment approach to politics, which was neither wholly rationalist nor wholly traditionalist. Rather, it was an attempt to find a middle ground between the two integrating a conservative view of history with a sociological approach to power and politics. I furthermore argue that even if Montlosier was unsuccessful in his endeavours to moderate the counter-revolution, he nonetheless provided a moderate response to it that would become integral to nineteenth-century conservative and liberal ideas. (shrink)

The objective of my comments is to draw attention to the complex relationship between the juridico-political model of sovereignty and disciplinary power in Foucault's work. I suggest that Elden's reading of Foucault and Shakespeare opens up new ways to understand contemporary forms of governmentality through a genealogy of political ceremony and theatricality. More specifically, my comments seek to show that an examination of the ceremoniality of coup d'État in connection with what Foucault calls the “democratization of sovereignty” is potentially fruitful (...) for examining modern forms of the government of civil society and counter-conduct. (shrink)

From the very beginnings of his thought, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was convinced that modern man, and likewise the culturally and politically emancipated Czech nation, was in a deep existential crisis closely linked with the spread of irreligiosity. Masaryk gradually came to believe that this crisis could be positively overcome on two levels. On a theoretical level, he relied on his specific classification and systematization of the sciences. On a practical level, which was directly based on his notion of positive sciences (...) and a strictly rational scientific approach, it was a matter of developing a new direction and method, which he characteristically conceived of as realism. On the eve of the First World War, Masaryk’s position became understandably radicalized. He distanced himself from a more objectivist view of religion and countered theism with a scientific and philosophical anthropism. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a literary-critical reading of Modernity and the Holocaust, arguing that Bauman’s non-Hobbesian ethics is linked to a form of Orphic authorship. I contextualize this reading with a study of three literary authors: W.G. Sebald, Peter Weiss and Janina Bauman, and their respective versions of this post-Holocaust authorship. At stake is the drama of the forbidden gaze, the moment when Orpheus turns to look at Eurydice, killing her a second time. Using Levinas’ ethics and his (...) scenario of recognition, Bauman re-writes this fateful gaze as a loving gaze, implicitly proposing a counter-model to the Schmittian gaze — always ready to recognize the enemy, always ready to kill. (shrink)

Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity analyses Nietzsche's response to the aesthetic tradition, tracing in particular the complex relationship between the work and thought of Nietzsche, Kant and Hegel. Focusing in particular on the critical role of negation and sublimity in Nietzsche's account of art, it explores his confrontation with modernity and his attempt to posit a revitalized artistic practice as the counter-movement to modern nihilism. Drawing on the full range of his published and unpublished writings, together with his (...) comments on figures as diverse as Wagner, Zola, Delacroix and Laurence Sterne, it highlights the extent to which Nietzsche counters the culture of his own time with a dialectical notion of aesthetic interpretation and practice. As such, Nietzsche the dialectician articulates a position that proves to be intimately connected to the negative dialects of Theodor Adorno. (shrink)

"The writer discusses the concept of kitsch. Having reviewed a variety of approaches to kitsch, he posits an historical conception of it, connecting it to modernity and defining it as a coping-mechanism for modernity. He thus suggests that kitsch is best understood as a tool in the struggle against the particular stresses of the modern world and that it uses materials at hand, fashioning from them some sort of stability largely through projecting images of nature, stasis, and continuity. (...) He discusses the relation of kitsch to fine art, arguing that fine art also has as its primary function a counter-movement to modernity. He suggests that the main difference between fine art and kitsch is that fine art, as well as its emotional function, also involves a reception context that allows it to assume an intellectual task. Among the writer's conclusions, he finds that positing a stark or absolute contrast between kitsch and fine art is unjustifiable as both have the same roots and objectives." [WilsonWeb]. (shrink)

This essay reconsiders Foucault’s writings on the Iranian Revolution in the context of his thought during 1977-1979. The essay defends three related claims: (1) Foucault does not turn away from power toward ethics as many scholars have claimed, (2) Careful interpretation of the texts on the Iranian Revolution will help us to better understand Foucault’s essays and lecture courses from this period (in particular, the relationship between political spirituality and counter-conduct), and (3) During this period Foucault is working on (...) conceptualizing modernity as a multivalent set of practices—some that reinforce power relations and some that resist them. (shrink)

Introduction. War occupies a special place in the mankind development because it is an integral part of its history. Thousands of researchers have been engaged in the problem of war from the standpoint of various sciences. The confrontation of nations and individual social groups as a social and political fact has been seen in philosophical thought since the epoch of the first major civilizations. However, at the present stage of society’s development, the problems of war are closely connected with the (...) national security phenomenon because the state protection from internal and external threats actually prevents the risks of damage to manpower, civilian population, infrastructure, and economy. The purpose of the study is to determine to what degree the leading characteristics of the three main war forms influence the national security transformation at the present stage of society development. Methods. To achieve the study purpose and solve the tasks set, the logical method of analysis for structuring materials, the historical method for correct and chronologically consistent presentation of facts, the comparative method for identifying distinctive parameters in the compared judgments and the deductive method for determining conclusions based on the results of the study are used. Scientific novelty of the research. The study provides a detailed analysis of modern wars and their impact on national security. The author has studied the interrelationships between various forms of military conflicts and their consequences for the stability of the state. Special attention is paid to the methodology of analyzing hybrid and asymmetric wars, which allows a deeper understanding of their characteristics and impact on the national security system. This approach helps to better understand the dynamics of modern threats and strategies to counter them. Results. The author gives the definition of national security through the war phenomenon, determines the features of conventional war that influence the formation of the national security of the state and the requirements for transforming security, analyzes the influence of asymmetric warfare methods on national security, determines the features of hybrid warfare in opposition to the fundamentals of national security, and makes the conclusion on the influence of various war forms on national security transformation and stability. Conclusions. At the present stage of the world community development, various war forms require an individual state to transform methods and mechanisms of national security that would not keep up or catch up with the war technologies but prevent threats based on a stable national identity, the coordinated work of all actors of national security, the construction of mechanisms that serve the stability of social and economic activity. (shrink)

Contemporary liberal thought is increasingly baffled by the question of what kinds of moral obligations we ought to attribute to our common civic ties. Liberal patriotism is often seen as an obsolete inheritance, fundamentally in tension with values of liberty, equality, and impartiality. This paper examines the moral theory of David Hume in order to counter this assertion of incompatibility and uncover the roots of a view of modern patriotism that can incorporate impartiality, interest, and partial benevolence.

In a famous article published in 1900, Cardinal Mercier drew up a philosophical balance sheet of the previous century. While still showing respect for modern developments, he severely criticized anything that strayed too far from the neo-Thomistic horizon. It is very characteristic that the first object of his criticism is De Bonald’s traditionalism. Mercier says that this type of philosophy is so greatly influenced by the impotence of reason that it hurls itself into the arms of faith. But, “an act (...) of faith cannot be the primordial act of human reason. An individual could not believe unless he first saw that it was reasonable to believe.”It is philosophy that must articulate this rationality. Philosophy must then be a real science; it must pursue rational insight into reality. Unfortunately, some do not believe that philosophy is a science. Instead, they think its task lies elsewhere; it must try to speak where science remains silent. In that case, it is no longer part of science, but belongs to the domain of imagination, faith or dreams. Mercier argues that whoever accepts this, supports Comte’s positivistic prejudice that only the observed positive fact can lie at the basis of a rational and scientific discussion.Mercier stands at the end of a century of unlimited optimism. From a military point of view, the century had been calm. The new sciences that had so intrigued Mercier were marking their first big successes. The century’s optimism is recognizable in the 1889 charter establishing the Thomistic Higher Institute of Philosophy, which Mercier served as president: “far from bringing dogmas in danger, scientific insights stimulate a wondrous growth in enlightened insight; for they both come from the same God, origin of both revelation and universe.” Mercier’s tonality lies not far distant from Renan’s L’avenir de la science, where he complains that there are people who choose bon ton, superstition and frivolity above meticulous research, but predicts that their success is ephemeral and that the time of rationality will dawn.The next century, however, took an unexpected turn. Who would have thought in 1900 that history, which had been set so firmly on the track of reason, would derail so terribly? No great philosopher predicted the coming catastrophes. The only warnings came from a few nineteenth-century traditionalist Cassandras who went to extremes in linking modernity and decay: Donoso Cortes, Joseph de Maistre and Louis De Bonald. Who predicted the arrival of enlightenment criticism in intellectual history? Who predicted that we would not see history becoming reasonable, but reason historical? Who could have predicted twentieth-century contextualism and its claim that reason is not the criterion of culture but only one element within culture indebted to an entire sociocultural context? All this can be found in De Bonald’s traditionalism that has proven paradoxically more up-to-date than the naïve trust in rationality found in Mercier and Renan.Yet, De Bonald did not intend to preach a form of irrationalism. His purpose was to accent reason’s dependence, and by extension, humankind’s intellectual solidarity: thought is impossible without language, language does not exist without a listener, there is no listener without education, there is no education without social life. Using this reasoning, De Bonald ultimately wants to prove that reason intrinsically refers to revelation, since in this chain, the first word cannot come from humankind.He supports this with an epistemological argument that contextualizes reason in a way that is almost contemporary: “A person has to think his word before saying it. Therefore, he cannot find without thinking, and cannot think without signs. He is compelled to have recourse to something other than the human.” Leuven’s variant of this traditionalism emphasizes that reason develops only in and through language, thus by being included in a community. By comparison, Mercier’s realistic concept of rationality sounds old-fashioned. It is traditionalism that best fits with the contemporary accent on reason’s historicity and culture-related status.The development of ethics also runs counter to Mercier’s expectations. There has been no growth in rationality but a growing insight into the historicity of reason. In the article already cited, Mercier criticizes Kant for not being sufficiently foundational, since he does not rely on a speculative-metaphysical foundation: “What kind of ethic is it that cannot be theoretically justified?” In our time, the roles are reversed. Many ethicists condemn Kant because he tries to find this foundation! How are we to understand this turn-about in ethics? (shrink)

The term “modernity” is used to refer to the cultural component of modernization, which encompasses also the political component (state formation) and economic component (capitalism). Historical analysis shows that in the phases of merchant and Dutch capitalism the dominant culture provided a religious justification and stimulus to capitalism, the Scottish philosophers provided an ethical framework based on human sentiments, especially empathy. With the secularization and turbulence of the 19th century a series of cultural critiques of the capitalist system emerged (...) in the form of “modernism”, “postmodernism” and finally “global civil society”. Presently, we experience a hiatus between certain counter-cultural movements and the capitalist system as well as an ideological divide and a political impasse between social policy concerns and capitalist priorities. A human-centered cultural framework is proposed to serve as a tool for “civil society” to formulate societally agreed guidelines of political economy. (shrink)

This article explores the crisis of Kuwait’s modernity by way of postcards from the post-oil period, the 1950s to the 1970s. It argues that the disjuncture between the imagery depicted in the postcards and remembering, on the one hand, and current images of “reality” and collective forgetting, on the other, can initiate a productive crisis of understanding toward a critical reconsideration of this period of Kuwait’s history. I examine how these postcards construct a phantasmic national narrative of Kuwait ignored (...) today. This early phantasm of the nation corresponds to the socio-political agenda during the post-oil period generally recognized as Kuwait’s modernity. Next, I consider some of the conditions that have facilitated the forgetting of this phantasm, including the crisis of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990; the demolition of the urban environment; the decline in education standards; and conservative regional pressures. Further, I consider the function served today by forgetting the way these early postcards pushed the limits of the national imagination. Forgetting the phantasm makes it possible to construct a historical narrative that elides the national image of Kuwait as open, modern, efficient, democratic, and “Westernized” (problematic as such descriptors might be). In so doing, it restricts national imagery to religious, tribalist, and traditionalist representations currently circulating as historical “truth.” As unnuanced and Orientalist as such Manichean oppositions are, they bring the overlooked stakes of forgetting into high relief, potentially to the point of a productive critical crisis (or crisis-as-critique). I conclude that such a divergent – not to say nostalgic – counter-memory of the past, triggered by the forgotten phantasm in postcards, might make it possible for Kuwaitis to better register the ongoing failures of the state and the threats such repeated failures may pose to its survival – and thereby to envision more humane and sustainable alternatives. (shrink)

In this article I reconstruct the philosophical conditions for the emergence of the notion of counter-conduct within the framework of Michel Foucault’s study of governmentality, and I explore the reasons for its disappearance after 1978. In particular, I argue that the concept of conduct becomes crucial for Foucault in order to redefine governmental power relations as specific ways to conduct the conduct of individuals: it is initially within this context that, in Security, Territory, Population, he rethinks the problem of (...) resistance in terms of counter-conduct. However, a few months later, in What is Critique?, Foucault (implicitly) replaces the notion of counter-conduct with that of critical attitude, defined as the particular form that counter-conduct takes in modern times. This notion allows him to highlight the role played by the will (to be or not to be governed like that) in resistance to governmental strategies. But since the notion of counter-conduct is conceptually wider than that of critical attitude, I suggest in conclusion that it could be worth reactivating it as a “historical category which, in various forms and with diverse objectives, runs through the whole of Western history.”. (shrink)

Reflecting on the anonymous academic comedy _Blame Not Our Author_ written during the Counter-reformation at the English College in Rome, this short piece addresses some of early modern anxieties about embodiment, specifically the uncomfortably close relationship between forms and their definitions. Featuring mathematical shapes and instruments as its characters, and coinciding with academic debates about Euclidean geometry, the play is ostensibly about a hapless square that wants to attain perfection by becoming a circle, willing to even endure torture in (...) the process. The play’s surprising violence reflects the fears of execution attached to the College’s main mission of reconverting England to Catholicism. Despite resulting in the torture and death of dozens of its alumni, martyrdom was equally celebrated with frescoes depicting violent mutilations. The square’s ultimate failure raises questions about the potency of earthly instruments, of geometry or of torture, and the possibility and consequences of bodily transformation. (shrink)

The Weimar-Republic, and the modernist architecture and planning that was born there, is still a contested place, from whence liberals, reactionaries and Marxists can all trace their lineage. Sabine Hake’s Topographies of Class attempts to clarify this contestation, through an interdisciplinary study of the modernist geography of the interwar-capital, Berlin. The book offers many new insights into the Weimar-era city, countering a tendency on the Left to reject the twentieth-century city in favour of the romanticised ‘capitals of the nineteenth century’, (...) with their insurgent proletariat and their lushly ornamented boulevards. Topographies of Class is a reminder that, irrespective of the era’s rejection of ornament and romanticism, it was a site of class-struggle as intense as that of the Paris of the 1870s. However, Hake’s study is dominated by a conception of class as an ‘identity’, akin to the identity-politics of race or gender, leading to an argument centred on the suppression or expression of ‘class-difference’ rather than class-struggle. In the process, her reading of the city’s modernism becomes overly one-sided, as a period of tension between labour and capital is read, under the influence of Manfredo Tafuri and Italian post-Marxist architectural theory, as being governed almost solely by the logic of Fordist capital. (shrink)

The article takes up J. P. Arnason's basic theoretical assumption that the western trajectory to modernity marks only one possibility of the modern constellation and that modernity has to be pluralized. Arnason's differentiation between a civilizational paradigm and a civilizational horizon allows us to acknowledge the ambivalent perceptions of modernity prevalent in the colonial and postcolonial encounter and gives space for counter-paradigms of modernity. Through a brief discussion of Indian reflections on modernity (P. Chatterjee, (...) J. Alam) I want to argue that the aspect of agency, marginalized in the philosophical and sociological debate on multiple modernities, has to be integrated into the theory. Examples from the Indian Himalayas should show how in everyday life as well as in the course of a social movement for regional autonomy `preferred futures' are negotiated on the basis of a reflexive balancing of `traditional' and `modern' elements which are articulated and joined in a self-made present. The article ends with a plaidoyer for an anthropology of modernity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEarly modern Europe was marked by fundamental changes in its intellectual landscape. In the field of historiography, this led to the development of a new antiquarian current in historiography which marked a fundamental shift in the view on historical writings. While traditionally historiography had been considered a literary genre, the new scholars approached it as a ‘scientific’ discipline. On the basis of a comparative study of a number of northern European national histories, this paper analyses major transformations in two aspects (...) of historical writing. Firstly, antiquarian historians extended the subject range of historiography to include a variety of cultural-historical topics. This innovation also had implications for the structure of their works. Secondly, the new current introduced a novel approach to the question of historical evidence to counter sceptic criticism and meet the new requirements occasioned by the rise of empirical models of research. Antiquarian scholars therefore introduced several new types of source materials: material evidence of the past, comparative studies of languages and customs, and documentary texts were added as sources of historical information. They furthermore subjected all historical sources to rigorous critical assessment. (shrink)

Whether it be in universities’ curricula or in traditional accounts of the history of philosophy, early modern women philosophers have frequently been treated as secondary, inconsequential characters. Although many valuable efforts are being made to counter this state of affairs, a generalized tendency to focus on well-known male philosophers and to establish them as representative figures of the early modern period still seems to exist. But does this strategy produce an accurate historical account of early modern philosophy? This essay (...) explores diverse causes of the exclusion of early modern women philosophers from the canon, reflecting on the historical and political aspects of this phenomenon. This piece also intends to highlight the importance of the innovative projects that have been recently created in the field of the digital humanities, which aim to mitigate and to counter said exclusion. (shrink)

Did early modern European states make themselves sacred? The historian Paolo Prodi insisted that they did, whereas for the philosopher Giorgio Agamben sacred and secular power were so indistinguishable that the question was moot. This group of articles seeks to explain and explore the approaches of these two accomplished Italian scholars to the problem of early modern sacralisation. This introduction reviews the context in which Prodi and Agamben worked, sketches brief biographies, and describes the arguments that they advanced which are (...) most relevant to early modern history. Their work emerged from the debate on secularisation in the German-speaking lands, the confessionalisation thesis as it was advanced by German historians of Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and Catholic Reform, and twentieth-century Catholic thought about the relationship between religion and totalitarian states. Both Prodi and Agamben belonged to traditions that sat at an angle to the liberalism that underpins historical and philosophical thought in the English-speaking world. (shrink)

Initroduction : From the man of reason to the cynical insider -- Diogenes of Sinope and philosophy as a way of life -- Diogenes the cynic as "counsellor" and malcontent in early modern England -- From rude cynics to "cynical revilers" -- The cynic unveiled : innocence, disenchantment, and rationalization in Rousseau -- Edmund Burke and the counter-enlightenment attack on the "philosopher of vanity" -- Cynicism and dandyism -- Epilogue : How not to talk about cynicism : a conclusion, (...) and request for further discussion. (shrink)

The trope that modern Europe, emerging from its Dark Ages, is indebted to the Islamic Middle Ages is widespread. The article traces this ‘Islamic medievalism’ back to Muslim discourses of the late 19th and early 20th century. Focusing on the Egyptian intellectual Muhammad Lutfi Jum’a’s (1886-1953) portrayal of medieval Islam and its philosophers as well as his mobilization of these within a reformist ideology, it argues the following: Firstly, that Jum’a’s medievalism, perceiving medieval Islamic philosophy as the sine qua non (...) of European modernity, is indebted to readings of European orientalist histories of philosophy, demonstrating how medievalism emerged from a global discursive formation. Secondly, that Jum’a mobilized the medievalist argument and the philosophers to argue for the possibility of an alternative counter-modern Muslim and Eastern modernity where the materialist and disenchanting tendencies of European modernity are negated – a vision he shared with other so-called Easternist thinkers, who conceived of Muslim countries as belonging to a broader East ranging from North Africa to Japan. (shrink)

By now “continental” philosophy has long since ceased to be a geographical term; there are “continental” philosophers in the Midwestern United States. Likewise, “analytical” philosophy is now widely practiced in most areas where academic philosophy is practiced. Moreover, many of the old jabs at each side have lost much of their force. The idea of a pox on both their houses—that analytical philosophers are a bunch of small-minded logic choppers, and continental philosophers are a bunch of wooly minded gasbags—has long (...) since failed to carry the punch it once did. What I want to suggest here is that they are both the same type of philosophy in one crucial, determining aspect: That one of the key experiences of modern philosophy, maybe even the great motivating experience of modern philosophy, is that of a certain type of skepticism, the idea that “we” both collectively and individually are prone to fool ourselves, be misled by conclusions that are attractive but unsupportable, or be misled even by our own experience and ways of thought to come to conclusions that turn out later to be insupportable. Certainly something like this underwrites the motivational power in those parts of contemporary philosophy that can be called “analytic” or are at least inspired by the analytical philosophers of the first two thirds of the twentieth century. Why else the careful attention to argument, the constant recasting of theses so that their implications can be better viewed, the deep ethos of attacking papers given by colleagues with a barrage of counter-examples, and of subjecting our colleagues to ruthless, sometimes unforgiving examination? What often seems perhaps petty to those more irritated than enlightened by analytic philosophy—that it is only tedious logic-chopping or “academic in the worst sense” niggling—is inspired by a brooding sense of skepticism, a sense that without such very intensely rigorous policing of our arguments and our explications, we are simply too prone to slide off into assertions that feel good, that may even seem to some of us like really very deep matters, but which, alas, may on closer inspection or in the light of later hindsight just turn out to be dreadfully false. Better to jump on the arguments now than to be embarrassed by them later. (shrink)

Within Michel Foucault’s own conceptualization of governmentality, there is little room for something like ‘ungovernable life’. The latter seems to hint at a form of social conduct beyond power-relations, which would offend Foucault’s basic philosophical postulates. I argue that this identification between governmentality and power as such demonstrates a one-sided focus on the history of Western power-relations. By opposing Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality to Ivan Illich’s critical history of government, I delineate indigenous struggles against governmentalization as a form of ungovernable (...) counter-conduct. Throughout his books from the 1970s to 1990s, Illich wrote a critical history of government surprisingly similar to Foucault’s, from the pastorate to modern political economy. However, rather than merely describing this history, Illich argued governmentalization alienated human beings from their autonomy. As a former missionary priest, he criticized the Church’s and modern governments’ attempts to subsume populations under a conduct of conducts. He advocated anticolonial resistance to subsumption under Western governmental regimes. In Illich’s appreciation of decolonized life, an ungovernable form of life can be discovered, which I defend with the example of Zapatismo and indigenous self-government through mandar obedeciendo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Judgement and Sense in Modern French Philosophy: A New Reading of Six Thinkers by Henry Somers-HallClayton CrockettSOMERS-HALL, Henry. Judgement and Sense in Modern French Philosophy: A New Reading of Six Thinkers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 264 pp. Cloth, $99.99Henry Somers-Hall's book examines how French philosophers in the twentieth century develop a logic of thinking based on sense that is both influenced by but also counters Kant's paradigm (...) of thinking, which is based on judgment. Beginning with Kant and German idealism, including the German responses to Kant in the work of Hölderlin, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, this book then carefully draws out the ways that Bergson, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze all work against this understanding of thinking as judging by showing how our experience and our thought precede the categories of judgment.In chapter 1, Somers-Hall carefully sets out Kant's model of thinking and shows how the categories of philosophical thought are fundamentally based on how we judge our sensible intuitions. Judgment is at the center of Kant's thought, and this is apparent in the Critique of Pure Reason, including the famous Transcendental Deduction. Our knowledge has a legislative function in relation to objects, and conscious synthesis takes the form of a judgment. Despite their criticisms of Kant, later German idealists do not fundamentally depart from this modality of judgment that takes place at the center of their philosophy. Even though they put Kant's concepts in motion, it remains a structure of judgment that is understood as dynamic.Chapter 2 turns to Bergson, to show how his emphasis on immediate experience precedes categorical judgement. Bergson distinguishes between temporal and spatial multiplicities, and argues that temporal multiplicities that are expressed in terms of duration underlie the spatial ones that contribute to judgment. Duration is a deeper experience of time that is associated with life. Somers-Hall in chapter 3 examines Sartre's writings on imagination to show how consciousness is a pure relation and an affective mode of thinking that underlies the categorial mode of judgment.Most of these French philosophers develop their accounts of noncategorial sense in either explicit or implicit relation to Kant's philosophy. Merleau-Ponty is no exception, and in chapter 4 we see how it is the organization of perception that gives sense to the world, and this precedes and generates "our reflective categories of judgement." Judgment emerges out of perception, although Merleau-Ponty grounds perception in the embodied person. Derrida does not ground sense or [End Page 365] thinking in a body, but looks for noncategorial grounds that make possible "surface structures of thinking." In chapter 5, Somers-Hall elaborates Derrida's famous nonconcept of différance, which underlies and makes possible our concepts of voice and writing that appear to be oppositions but in fact are not because they rely on each other. Différance is not a concept; it is prior to conceptual determination, and it "operates as an 'origin' that has none of the traits of the structure of judgement."Foucault relies on Kant for his three epistemes of resemblance, representation, and the human being, modern man. Chapter 6 shows how Foucault is concerned in both his archaeology and his genealogy with opening up the structures of power that make any juridical ordering possible. Here a productive biopower works beneath what we recognize more explicitly as "juridico-discursive power" in both positive and negative ways that escape the grasp of a philosophy that is solely based on judgment.In chapter 7 Somers-Hall shows how Deleuze's concept of intensity underlies all forms of representational judgment. Intensity operates according to a process of differentiation that produces a logic of sense, which we miss when we grasp onto a "dogmatic image of thought" that "prevents a genuine encounter with the world [that] conditions us to understand it in terms of unified subjects who make sense of the world in terms of judgements." We think in response to a shock or an encounter with something in the world that forces us to think and to make sense. We form judgments retroactively, by reducing differences to... (shrink)

Chinggis Khan’s empire of conquest unified much of the Eurasian ecumene in the thirteenth century. A constitutional reading by sedentary Persian bureaucrats of the Mongol empire is used as the background for contrasting the divergent developmental paths of imperial autocracy in the three early modern Muslim successor empires. This developmental path was historically contingent upon the transformation of ascetic Sufism into a millenarian mass movement against Turko-Mongolian domination among the subject population of its compound societies. The paradoxical impact of popular (...) Sufism on the legitimacy of kingship was also contingent upon either the success of the aspiring millenarian challengers, as was the case with the Safavid case, or the pre-emptive appropriation of the claim to the union between apparent and real monarchy by Turko-Mongolian rulers, as with the Timurids who ruled Mughal India, or, pre-emptive construction of a counter-model, as with the Ottomans. (shrink)

In this thought provoking work Thomas DeGregori presents the uncommon premise that technology is a human endeavour and a positive force that defines our humanity. Examining a number of revolutionary technological advances in this century, especially those in the agricultural areas, the author debunks common conventional wisdom that would dictate otherwise. For instance, the use of chemicals, including DDT and other pesticides, id often maligned as damaging the environment and the quality of life. Dr DeGregori counters this argument with documentation (...) that demonstrates how use of these chemicals has actually increased life span. Agriculture and Modern Technology will prompt readers to re-examine current popular belief in technology. (shrink)