In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the center of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the (...) companion volume, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, also published byOxford University Press in 2006. (shrink)

Kant’s most prominent formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is generally thought to demand that one act only on maxims that one can will as universal laws without this generating a contradiction. Kant's view is standardly summarized as requiring the 'universalizability' of one's maxims and described in terms of the distinction between 'contradictions in conception' and 'contradictions in the will'. Focusing on the underappreciated significance of the simultaneity condition included in the FUL, (...) I argue, by contrast, that the principle is better read as requiring that one be able to will two things simultaneously without self-contradiction, namely, that a maxim be one's own and that it be a universal law. This amounts to a new interpretation of the FUL with significant interpretive and philosophical advantages. (shrink)

This paper introduces the contradiction trap: a dialectical and game-theoretic method for exposing concealed asymmetry in institutional and algorithmic reasoning. By forcing a system to reconcile mutually exclusive commitments, the trap converts inconsistency into evidence — a falsifiable signal of structural bias, motivated deviation, or narrative drift. -/- The framework models contradiction as an epistemic game with informational payoffs, providing a portable diagnostic for systems that claim impartiality but behave otherwise. It bridges philosophical logic, applied audit design, and (...) adversarial reasoning, showing how contradiction can be operationalised as a test of legitimacy rather than a purely logical artefact. -/- This paper constitutes the first work in a planned trilogy on evidential integrity, establishing the epistemic foundations for procedural and institutional models to follow. -/- Keywords: contradiction; epistemic game theory; evidential reasoning; structural bias; motivated asymmetry; governance integrity; algorithmic accountability; dialectical logic; audit design; fairness diagnostics; philosophy of technology; adversarial evaluation. (shrink)

In this analysis of one of the most difficult and neglected topics in Hegelian studies, Songsuk Susan Hahn tackles the status of contradiction in Hegel's ...

One of the most important difficulties facing Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is its apparent inability to show that it is always impermissible to kill others for the sake of convenience. This difficulty has led current Kantian ethicists to de-emphasize the FUL or at least complement it with other Kantian principles when dealing with murder. The difficulty stems from the fact that the maxim of convenience killing fails to generate a ‘contradiction in conception’, producing only a ‘contradiction (...) in the will’ when subjected to the two-fold test associated with the FUL. This result is thought to imply that the FUL allows us sometimes to kill for the sake of convenience. In this essay, I argue that the very diagnosis of the problem rests on a mistake, and that if the maxim of convenience killing generates a contradiction in the will, then acting on it is never permissible. (shrink)

This paper investigates the negation-free fragment of the bi-connexive logic 2C, called 2CSubscript minus $_-$ −, from the perspective of bilateralist proof-theoretic semantics (PTS). It is argued that eliminating primitive negation has two important conceptual consequences. First, it requires a reconceptualization of contradictory logics: in a bilateralist framework, contradiction need not be understood in terms of negation inconsistency, but rather as the coexistence of proofs and refutations for certain formulas within a non-trivial system. Second, it challenges the standard definition (...) of connexive logics, which typically rely on negation-based schemata. Instead, a rule-based conception of connexivity, grounded in bilateralist PTS, is proposed. This reconception avoids dependence on the validation of specific formula schemata and thereby also dependence on negation. The paper also addresses the issue of proof–refutation duality in the absence of strong negation, which can be formalized and recovered at a meta-level by extending the system with a two-sorted typed lamda $\lambda $ λ-calculus. (shrink)

In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of “revenge Liar” arguments, also higher-order combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hyper-contradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest's treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinized and compared with another strategy of generalizing the set of classical truth values and defining an entailment relation on the resulting sets of (...) higher-order values. This method is based on the concept of a multilattice. If the method is applied to the set of truth values of Belnap's “useful four-valued logic”, one obtains a trilattice, and, more generally, structures here called Belnap-trilattices. As in Priest's case, it is shown that the generalized truth values motivated by hyper-contradictions have no effect on the logic. Whereas Priest's construction in terms of designated truth values always results in his Logic of Paradox, the present construction in terms of truth and falsity orderings always results in First Degree Entailment. However, it is observed that applying the multilattice-approach to Priest's initial set of truth values leads to an interesting algebraic structure of a “bi-and-a-half” lattice which determines seven-valued logics different from Priest's Logic of Paradox. (shrink)

This essay defends a modified version of Nahum Browns “dialetheist” interpretation of bad faith. On this interpretation, bad faith, as a form of self-deception, constitutes a dialetheia or true contradiction. While in agreement with the dialetheist interpretation, I argue that bad faith is just as much a flight from true contradiction and towards what I call “sham consistency.” I also put forward a multi-step model of bad faith as cyclical, recursive and reflexive. And I respond to the objection (...) that bad faith involves a truth value gap rather than a glut. I finally employ the dialetheist interpretation to explain Sartres contention that bad faith has its origins in the most primitive layer of human experience: the pre-reflective cogito. (shrink)

This book advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that has flown in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle's time. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since the first edition was published in 1987. This text contains the second edition of the book. It expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades.

Certain Buddhist texts contain statements that are prima facie contradictions. The scholarly consensus has been that such statements are meant to serve a rhetorical function that depends on the apparent contradictions being resolvable. But recently it has been claimed that such statements are meant to be taken literally: their authors assert as true statements that are of the form ‘p and not p’. This claim has ramifications for our understanding of the role played by the principle of non-contradiction in (...) Buddhist argumentation. I argue that these make the claim less plausible. (shrink)

In this paper I critically engage with Pauline Kleingeld’s ‘volitional self-contradiction’ interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law. I make three remarks: first, I seek to clarify what it means for a contradiction to be volitional as opposed to logical; second, I suggest that her interpretation might need to be closer to Korsgaard’s ‘practical contradiction’ interpretation than she thinks; and third, I suggest that more work needs to be done to explain how a volitional self-contradiction generates (...) both a ‘contradiction in conception’ and a ‘contradiction in will.’. (shrink)

Contradictions of the Welfare State is the first collection of Offe's essays to appear in a single volume in English, and it contains a selection of his most important recent work on the breakdown of the post-war settlement.

Contradiction is often confused with contrariety. We propose to disentangle contrariety from contradiction using the hexagon of opposition, providing a clear and distinct characterization of three notions: contrariety, contradiction, incompatibility. At the same time, this hexagonal structure describes and explains the relations between them.

Suppose we’re at a horserace, and you turn to me and say, ‘Eclipse is at the finish line!’ But by the time you’ve finished saying this—by the time your utterance is complete—Eclipse is already well past the finish line, and what you’ve said is no longer true. But you did say something true. More generally, we can—and often do—say true things about events that take up less time than our utterances themselves. We can also contradict each other about such events—something (...) that takes even more time. How is all this possible? In the twentieth century, this problem was discussed by Arthur Prior. In the 14th, John Buridan treated an older—probably 12th-century—version of it. Buridan’s treatment is more successful than Prior’s, which runs into Zeno’s paradox of the arrow. Buridan avoids the paradox, but faces further puzzles for his account of contradiction. In untangling these, we’ll uncover important latent features of his pragmatics and temporal logic—features that are supported by more recent research in linguistics. Ultimately, our considerations here will turn up new insight into the Gricean Cooperative Principle. In a slogan: to contradict is to cooperate. (shrink)

in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.) Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peter van Inwagen claims that there are no tables or chairs. He also claims that sentences such as ‘There are chairs here’, which seem to imply their existence, are often true. This combination of views opens van Inwagen to a charge of self-contradiction. I explain the charge, and van Inwagen’s response to it, which involves the claim that sentences like ‘There are tables’ shift their truth-conditions (...) between different contexts of utterance. I present an alternative response which involves the negation of that claim, and argue that it is preferable to van Inwagen’s. (shrink)

This article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hegel's account of the concept "contradiction" in the Science of Logic by arguing that it is concerned with the principle of Hegel's method rather than with the classical law of non-contradiction. I first consider Hegel's Doctrine of Essence in view of Kant's discussion of the concepts of reflection in the first Critique. On this basis, I examine Hegel's account of the logical principles based on the concepts "identity," "opposition," and "contradiction." (...) Finally, I point out how the principle Hegel derives from the concept of contradiction actually informs his own method. (shrink)

A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. Plenty of examples are to be found in the history of science.

Graham Priest; VI*—Contradiction, Belief and Rationality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 99–116, https://doi.or.

David Lewis has argued that impossible worlds are nonsense: if there were such worlds, one would have to distinguish between the truths about their contradictory goings-on and contradictory falsehoods about them; and this--Lewis argues--is preposterous. In this paper I examine a way of resisting this argument by giving up the assumption that ‘in so-and-so world’ is a restricting modifier which passes through the truth-functional connectives The outcome is a sort of subvaluational semantics which makes a contradiction ‘A & ~A’ (...) false even when both ‘A’ and ‘~A’ are true, just as supervaluational semantics makes a tautology ‘A v ~A’ true even when neither ‘A’ nor ‘~A’ are. Connections with discussive logics and complications of the account are discussed, and some general morals are drawn. (shrink)

The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced (...) inquiry into a venerable principle of logic, one that raises questions at the very centre of logic itself. The aim of this volume is to present a comprehensive debate about the Law of Non-Contradiction, from discussions as to how the law is to be understood, to reasons for accepting or re-thinking the law, and to issues that raise challenges to the law, such as the Liar Paradox, and a 'dialetheic' resolution of that paradox. The editors contribute an introduction which surveys the issues and serves to frame the debate, and a useful bibliography offering a guide to further reading. This volume will be of interest to anyone working on philosophical logic, and to anyone who has ever wondered about the status of logical laws and about how one might proceed to mount arguments for or against them. (shrink)

In this article, I reply to Jens Timmermann’s critical discussion of my essay “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”. I first consider Timmermann’s reasons for rejecting my interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law. I argue that the self-contradiction relevant to determining a maxim’s moral status should not be sought in the imagined world in which the maxim is a universal law. I then discuss Timmermann’s suggestion that something like a volitional self-contradiction is found within the (...) will of the immoral agent. I deny this and clarify that the relevant contradiction is diagnosed counterfactually in moral reflection. Finally, I explain the differences between Timmermann’s account, Korsgaard’s Practical Contradiction interpretation, and my own Volitional Self-Contradiction interpretation. (shrink)

There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on (...) the second (distributive) reading it is perfectly plausible to suppose that LNC may, in some rather special and perhaps undesirable circumstances, fail to hold. (shrink)

In this paper we motivate and develop a new approach to predicates of personal taste within the framework of semantic relativism. Our primary goal is to explain faultless disagreement—the phenomenon where two parties disagree, yet both have uttered something true—which is often thought to arise from the use of predicates of personal taste. We combine semantic relativism with an expressivist semantics to yield a novel hybrid theory which we call _Expressive-Relativism_. We motivate the theory by rehearsing a famous objection to (...) Relativism from Frege which we interpret as severing the connection between contradiction and disagreement for relativists. Endorsing the objection, we respond by enriching relativism with an expressivist component which explains disagreement over matters of taste as a refusal to share perspectives rather than as resting on contradiction. (shrink)

In The Vitality of Contradiction, Bruce Gilbert provides an exposition of Hegel's political philosophy to establish not only that societies fail because of their contradictions, but also how the unsurpassable oppositions of social life cultivate freedom. He moves beyond Hegel's works to consider the limits of liberal-capitalism and the contemporary social movements around the world that stretch us beyond the global economic system. Drawing on key Hegel texts such as Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right, Gilbert shows (...) how societies outgrow themselves as they come to recognize key aspects of freedom and justice. He argues that the dialectic requires that we recognize how liberal-capitalism has both cultivated freedom and yet fails to lead us to more sophisticated forms of freedom. Gilbert also highlights organizations including Brazil's Movement of Landless Workers and the Mondragon cooperative in Spain and the sophisticated ways in which they are teaching the world new and better ways to be free. Engaging and perceptive, The Vitality of Contradiction illuminates the basic principles behind Hegel's political thought and indicates the ways in which his work encourages people to strive for a form of socialist democracy. (shrink)

This article investigates the neurophysiological basis of autonomously induced mystical states of consciousness (MSCs), with a focus on speculative mysticism, a tradition that centers on intellectual contemplation rather than emotional or sensuous experience. Drawing from historical sources, the paper explores the role of paradox and contradiction in mystical thought. It argues that the deliberate contemplation of theological contradictions challenges the psychological principle of non-contradiction and the drive for cognitive consistency, as articulated in Cognitive Consistency Theory (CCT) and the (...) Free Energy Principle (FEP). The Entropic Brain Hypothesis (BEN) is introduced to propose that resisting the resolution of logical contradictions may increase brain entropy, potentially inducing MSCs analogous to those achieved through psychedelics. The central hypothesis is that mystical acquiescence, the intentional engagement with divine contradictions without resolving them, can serve as a mechanism for the autonomous induction of high-entropy, altered states of consciousness. This hypothesis offers a testable framework for integrating historical mystical practices into contemporary neuropsychological research. (shrink)

Instantaneous changes may well be thought to give rise to contradiction. If one endorses an explosive logic, where contradictions entail everything, this is entirely unacceptable. However, if one deploys a paraconsistent logic, which keeps contradictions under control, one may give perfectly coherent and precise models of such changes. In In Contradiction the author showed how and he explored the philosophical implications of the model. Here, the author revisits the issue in the light of a recent critique by Greg (...) Littmann. (shrink)

This essay argues that we should find Crimmigration, which is the collapsing of immigration law with criminal law, morally problematic for three reasons. First, it denies those who are facing criminal penalties important constitutional protections. Second, it doubly punishes those who have already served their criminal sentence with an added punishment that should be considered cruel and unusual (i.e., indefinite imprisonment or exile). Third, when the tactics aimed at protecting and serving local communities get usurped by the federal government for (...) immigration enforcement purposes, they often undermine these original aims or get used in ways that conflict with the U.S. Constitution. These concerns should prompt us therefore either to reject the government’s plenary power over immigration or require the federal government to be more consistent about maintaining the separation between criminal law and immigration law. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence, which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form F a ∧ ¬F a, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie is a borderline case of ‘rich’, then ‘Jackie is rich and Jackie isn’t rich’ is a borderline (...) class='Hi'>contradiction. Many theories of vague language have entailments about borderline contradictions; correctly describing the behavior of borderline contradictions is one of the many tasks facing anyone offering a theory of vague language. Here, I first briefly review claims made by various theorists about these borderline contradictions, attempting to draw out some predictions about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Second, I present an experiment intended to gather relevant data about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Finally, I discuss the experimental results in light of several different theories of vagueness, to see what explanations are available. My conclusions are necessarily tentative; I do not attempt to use the present experiment to demonstrate that any single theory is incontrovertibly true. Rather, I try to sketch the auxiliary hypotheses that would need to be conjoined to several extant theories of vague language to predict the present result, and offer some considerations regarding the plausibility of these various hypotheses. In the end, I conclude that two of the theories I consider are better-positioned to account for the observed data than are the others. But the field of logically-informed research on people’s actual responses to vague predicates is young; surely as more data come in we will learn a great deal more about which (if any) of these theories best accounts for the behavior of ordinary speakers. (shrink)

This book explores and expounds upon questions of paradox and contradiction in theology with an emphasis on recent contributions from analytic philosophical theology. It addresses questions such as: What is the place of paradox in theology? Where might different systems of logic (e.g., paraconsistent ones) find a place in theological discourse (e.g., Christology)? What are proper responses to the presence of contradiction(s) in one's theological theories? Are appeals to analogical language enough to make sense of paradox? Bringing together (...) an impressive line-up of theologians and philosophers, the volume offers a range of fresh perspectives on a central topic. It is valuable reading for scholars of theology and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In [9], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of a paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause [1, 2, 3] have raised several arguments against this approach and claimed that —taking into account (...) the square of opposition— quantum superpositions are better understood in terms of contrariety propositions rather than contradictory propositions. In [14] we defended the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions and provided arguments in favor of its development. In the present paper we attempt to analyze the meanings of modality, potentiality and contradiction in QM, and provide further arguments of why the PAQS is better suited, than the Contrariety Approach to Quantum Superpositions proposed by Arenhart and Krause, to face the interpretational questions that quantum technology is forcing us to consider. (shrink)

In In Contradiction, Graham Priest shows, as clearly as anything like this can be shown, that it is coherent to maintain that some sentences can be both true and false at the same time. As a consequence, some contradictions are true, and an appreciation of this possibility advances our understanding of the nature of logic and language.

Goldschmidt’s Contradiction Set Free confronts us with a variety of topics, political and philosophical topoi, in which he traces contradictions of thought and action. This article focuses on Goldschmidt’s omission of the sphere of language as a site of contradiction in Contradiction Set Free. I argue that it is a deliberate choice on the part of Goldschmidt to not project a metalanguage of contradiction, but to probe philosophy’s involvement in the practice of language and thus present (...) a critique of philosophy through the contradictory impulse of language. First, I discuss the status Goldschmidt ascribes to the work of language for philosophy. From here, I engage in a discussion of the meaning of Ergriffenheit (awe) in Contradiction Set Free. Finally, I analyze two of Goldschmidt’s uses of parables and conclude with a reference to a parable by Franz Kafka. (shrink)

The papers in this volume present some of the most recent results of the work about contradictions in philosophical logic and metaphysics; examine the history of contradiction in crucial phases of philosophical thought; consider the relevance of contradictions for political and philosophical actuality. From this consideration a common question emerges: the question of the irreducibility, reality and productive force of (some) contradictions.

This paper focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the (...) philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap. (shrink)

This chapter provides an account of the nature of negation which not only endorses the traditional idea of negation as a contradictory-forming operator, but also allows for the possibility of dialetheism.

The Jaina saptabhaṅgī (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and avaktavya (‘unutterable’). In its most basic structure, the saptabhaṅgī appears as: (i) in a certain sense, P; (ii) in a certain sense, not P; (iii) in a certain sense, P and not P; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of P; (v) in a certain sense, P and inexpressibility of P; (vi) in (...) a certain sense, not P and inexpressibility of P; (vii) in a certain sense, P, not P, and inexpressibility of P. This appearance has led many (e.g., Ganeri and Priest) to claim that the saptabhaṅgī supports non-classical systems of logic, but such a reading is contested by Balcerowicz. Focusing on Vādidevasūri’s (12th c. CE) and Yaśovijaya’s (17th c. CE) accounts of the saptabhaṅgī, this paper puts forward a formalization of the saptabhaṅgī that brings together the non-classical views and Balcerowicz’s view through relating the saptabhaṅgī to the Buddhist unanswerable questions. (shrink)

This book is the first in the field of paraconsistency to offer a comprehensive overview of the subject, including connections to other logics and applications in information processing, linguistics, reasoning and argumentation, and philosophy of science. It is recommended reading for anyone interested in the question of reasoning and argumentation in the presence of contradictions, in semantics, in the paradoxes of set theory and in the puzzling properties of negation in logic programming. Paraconsistent logic comprises a major logical theory and (...) offers the broadest possible perspective on the debate of negation in logic and philosophy. It is a powerful tool for reasoning under contradictoriness as it investigates logic systems in which contradictory information does not lead to arbitrary conclusions. Reasoning under contradictions constitutes one of most important and creative achievements in contemporary logic, with deep roots in philosophical questions involving negation and consistency This book offers an invaluable introduction to a topic of central importance in logic and philosophy. It discusses the history of paraconsistent logic; language, negation, contradiction, consistency and inconsistency; logics of formal inconsistency and the main paraconsistent propositional systems; many-valued companions, possible-translations semantics and non-deterministic semantics; paraconsistent modal logics; first-order paraconsistent logics; applications to information processing, databases and quantum computation; and applications to deontic paradoxes, connections to Eastern thought and to dialogical reasoning. (shrink)

We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contradictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one comprised in the famous Schrödinger's cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist. We analyze (...) that claim by employing the traditional square of opposition. We suggest that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum superpositions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and we present some of them. We finish by arguing that superpositions are better understood as a violation of tertium non datur instead of as a violation of the law of contradiction. © 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved. (shrink)

In the backdrop of rising unethicality in the corporate world and business schools. This study explores the value-behaviour gap among MBA students in ethically significant contexts. Some studies, based on observed unethical behaviours assume that students' moral values are flawed and advocate for ethics education in business schools (Christensen et al., 2007; Ghoshal, 2005). Others adopt a value preference approach, finding that MBA students often prioritize achievement and competitiveness, linking these to self-interest and ethical conflict (Lan et al., 2010; Lameris (...) et al., 2023). However, both perspectives fail to examine whether students’ moral values are genuinely tainted or remain intact.—an issue this study addresses. This qualitative research used narrative and content analysis. Data were collected from 56 MBA students through supervised classroom sessions. The study found a significant misalignment between MBA students' stated values and their actual unethical behaviours across academic, personal, and professional contexts. Some students also redefined moral values like loyalty and helpfulness to justify misconduct, indicating twisted or deviant morality. These behaviours were influenced by moral disengagement, peer dynamics, and socio-cultural norms, rather than an outright absence of moral values. The findings call for deeper reflection on value-behaviour gaps and suggest expanding Bandura’s moral disengagement framework by revealing context-specific disengagement pathways such as trivializing rules, invoking resource scarcity and framing misconduct as part of youthful experimentation. (shrink)

Individuals attribute a higher truth value to repeated compared to novel information, the well-known truth effect. Also, information that contradicts what we have heard earlier is considered falser than both repeated and completely new information, known as the contradiction effect. These two effects are a challenge to the correction of misinformation because one cannot easily correct earlier misleading claims. In the present paper, we show a new and important factor that enhances the effectiveness of corrections, the syntactic placement of (...) the contradiction. We argue that because the subject of a sentence has a stronger psychological importance than the object, a contradiction of the subject (compared to the object) is felt as a stronger contrast to the earlier information and thus experienced as more false. Experiments 1 and 2 provided null results, possibly due to confounding material and task. Crucially, Experiments 3–5 (total N = 628) reliably showed that contradictions of the subject were perceived to be falser than contradictions of the object. (shrink)

I consider whether a contradiction may be deducible from the proposition that God does not exist. First, I expose a candidate counterexample to a key premise in Swinburne’s argument against the deducibility of a contradiction from God’s non-existence. Second, I present two new strategies one might use to deduce a contradiction. Both strategies make use of Tarski's T-schema together with developments in other theistic arguments. One argument is a conceptualist argument from necessary truth for a necessary mind, (...) and the other is a two-stage contingency argument for the same conclusion. The purpose of this article is not to decisively defend these arguments, but to expose new territory relevant to investigating the nature of God's necessity. (shrink)

A number of philosophers deny that contradictions can be believed. Are they correct? In this note, I show that even in quite weak logics, on pain of inconsistency, if there are false beliefs, either there are propositions which are true but unbelievable or contradictions are believable. Since the antecedent clearly holds, I offer some considerations in favor of the latter disjunct. Objections and variants of the main argument are considered.

Kant assents to Leibniz’s claim that purely positive concepts cannot contradict each other. Albeit counter-intuitive, this claim is well-grounded in Kant’s views on contradiction and conceptual content. First, according to Kant, a contradiction only occurs if a predicate is affirmed and negated; second, all concepts except of those that pertain to God covertly contain negative marks. Although I shall argue that Kant’s account fails, it is still interesting in that it tackles an overlooked problem, namely how implicit contradictions (...) are possible. (shrink)

Political leaders, scholars, and left-wing groups from China abroad often interpret, admire, or evaluate Mao Zedong and his ideology through Marxism or modern revolutionary lenses. It is interesting to note that traditional Chinese thought did play a role in the development and overseas dissemination of Mao Zedong thought. Niijima Atsuyoshi 新島淳良 (1928–2002), besides being a renowned Sinologist in Japan, was also a prominent figure of the so-called “pro-Cultural Revolution Faction” in Japan during the Cultural Revolution. Niijima argued that there is (...) a discontinuity between Mao Zedong thought and the thought of the Yijing, providing theoretical analysis for the universalization of Mao Zedong thought and potentially facilitating Japan’s absorption of Mao Zedong thought. Niijima was not an expert in Yijing studies, but his view on the Yijing was somewhat unique. He believed that Mao Zedong thought’s dialectical method completely ruptured from the traditional yinyang dualistic thinking, but only “negatively inheriting” yinyang dualistic thinking in form. He argued that it is precisely this discontinuity that highlights the excellence and uniqueness of Mao Zedong thought. Niijima’s discussion of the relationship between Mao Zedong thought and the Yijing thought reflects how overseas sinologists “negatively” utilize classical Chinese texts, both demonstrating the uniqueness of Mao Zedong thought and promoting its overseas dissemination. (shrink)

Although the magnitude of the shift in the double-slit interference pattern when two electron beams pass outside a long solenoid has been confirmed in beautiful experiments, the direction of the deflection does not seem to appear in the published literature. It is claimed that careful quantum analysis gives a deflection direction opposite from that given by a classical electrodynamic analysis. Here we give a classical analysis of the interaction, and emphasize that the angle of deflection does not involve Planck’s constant. (...) It is again suggested that a classical lag effect of order $$1/c^{2}$$ forms the basis for the observed shift in the particle interference pattern. The effect is claimed to be the analogue of a nonrelativistic electric effect, and the analogous magnetic and electric forces are given for the two different situations. The magnetic interaction is considered in two different inertial frames where different electromagnetic fields are involved. An optical analogy is also mentioned. Finally, we note that electromagnetic fluctuations might wash out the lag effect for macroscopic solenoids. (shrink)