Combining information from two or possibly several blocks of data is gaining increased attention and importance in several areas of science and industry. Typical examples can be found in chemistry, spectroscopy, metabolomics, genomics, systems biology and sensory science. Many methods and procedures have been proposed and used in practice. The area goes under different names: data integration, data fusion, multiblock analyses, multiset analyses and a few more. This book is an attempt to give an up-to-date treatment of the most used (...) and important methods within an important branch of the area; namely methods based on so-called components or latent variables. These methods have already obtained an enormous attention in for instance chemometrics, bioinformatics, machine learning and sensometrics and have proved to be important both for prediction and interpretation. The book is primarily a description of methodologies, but most of the methods will be illustrated by examples from the above-mentioned areas. The book is written such that both users of the methods as well as method developers will hopefully find sections of interest. In the end of the book there is a description of a software package developed particularly for the book. This package is freely available in R and covers many of the methods discussed. To distinguish the different type of methods from each other, the book is divided into five parts. Part I is introduction and preliminary concepts. Part II is the core of the book containing the main unsupervised and supervised methods. Part III deals with more complex structures and, finally, Part IV discusses alternative unsupervised and supervised methods. The book ends with Part V discussing the available software. Our recommendation for reading the book are as follows. A minimum read of the book would involve chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7. Chapters 4, 6 and 8 are more specialized and chapters 9 and 10 contain methods we think are more advanced or less obvious to use. We feel privileged to have so many friendly colleagues who were willing to spend their time on helping us to improve the book by reading separate chapters. We would like to express our thanks to: Rasmus Bro, Margriet Hendriks, Ulf Indahl, Henk Kiers, Ingrid MaÌ⁽ge, Federico Marini, AÌ⁽smund Rinnan, Rosaria Romano, Lars Erik Solberg, Marieke Timmerman, Oliver Tomic, Johan Westerhuis and Barry Wise. Of course, the correctness of the final text is fully our responsibility! (shrink)

The objective list account of wellbeing is usually taken to say that the same set of goods is relevant to wellbeing for any person, regardless of age. Coupled with reasonable assumptions about how goods are distributed over the lifespan, that leads to a picture of wellbeing as higher in midlife and lower in childhood and old age. I argue that a stage-relativized objective list theory is more plausible, after exploring several ways to understand the concept of a life stage. On (...) the stage-relativized view, lists of goods that define wellbeing vary in the sense that there are shifting thresholds and subcategories relevant to different stages of life, but also because there are goods that count at one stage and count less or not at all at others. After exploring the list of goods for old age, I argue that the old age form of wellbeing can be welcomed even if the goods it offers are not superior to midlife goods. (shrink)

Digital and analog: What do these terms mean today? The use and meaning of such terms change through time. The analog, in particular, seems to go through various phases of popularity and disuse, its appeal pegged most frequently to nostalgic longings for nontechnical or romantic modes of art and culture. The definition of the digital vacillates as well, its precise definition often eclipsed by a kind of fever-pitched industrial bonanza around the latest technologies and the latest commercial ventures. One common (...) response to the question of the digital is to make reference to things like Twitter, Playstation, or computers in general. Here one might be correct, but only coincidentally, for the basic order of digitality (the digitality of digitality) has not yet been demonstrated through mere denotation. And the second question—the question of the analog—is harder still, with responses often also consisting of mere denotations of things: sound waves, the phonograph needle, magnetic tape, a sundial. At least denotation itself is analogical. This article will aim to define the analog explicitly and argue, perhaps counterintuitively, that the golden age of analog thinking was not a few decades past, prior to the wide-spread adoption of the computer. In fact, the fields of structuralism and poststructuralism that emerged in the middle to late twentieth century, concurrent with the deployment of the digital computer, were characteristically digital, what with their focus on the symbolic order and logical economies. If anything, the golden age of analog is happening today, all around us, as evidenced by the proliferation of characteristically analog concerns: sensation, materiality, experience, affect, ethics, and aesthetics. (shrink)

A novel focus on "personal responsibility" has transformed political thought and public policy in America and Europe. Since the 1970s, responsibility--which once meant the moral duty to help and support others--has come to suggest an obligation to be self-sufficient. This narrow conception of responsibility has guided recent reforms of the welfare state, making key entitlements conditional on good behavior. Drawing on intellectual history, political theory, and moral philosophy, Yascha Mounk shows why the Age of Responsibility is pernicious--and how it might (...) be overcome. Mounk shows that today's focus on individual culpability is both wrong and counterproductive: it distracts us from the larger economic forces determining aggregate outcomes, ignores what we owe our fellow citizens regardless of their choices, and blinds us to other key values, such as the desire to live in a society of equals. Recognizing that even society's neediest members seek to exercise genuine agency, Mounk builds a positive conception of responsibility. Instead of punishing individuals for their past choices, he argues, public policy should aim to empower them to take responsibility for themselves--and those around them. (shrink)

The slogan "one person, one vote" is held to be essential to democracy. I argue, against its standard interpretation, that the power of one's vote should decline with age. The idea of relational equality it expresses is ambiguous, in ways currently unappreciated, between synchronic and diachronic conceptions. The standard interpretation is that voters must relate as equals synchronically in each election. I argue that they can do so diachronically, across elections. From the original position, rational people would prefer a voting (...) procedure giving more weight to their younger selves. The argument turns on the asymmetrical structure of political authority between cohorts: older cohorts influence the formative conditions of younger ones in ways the young can never reciprocate. Age-weighted voting addresses this asymmetry, concentrating more of our overall political influence on the parts of our lives that we actually live to experience. The strongest counterargument is committed to a form of epistocracy. (shrink)

Justice Across Ages offers an attractive account of justice between the young and the old that brings together three notable principles of age-group justice: complete-lives equality, relational equality, and prudence. Yet, the book says little about the fact that many of us live longer than others, and the little it does say casts doubt on whether lifespan inequality threatens justice as construed by the three principles. This essay argues, instead, that theories of justice between the young and the old should (...) not dispense with a conception of justice between different longevity groups. It concludes that we must be sensitive to lifespan variations when designing policies to promote justice across age groups. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic put a large burden on many healthcare systems, causing fears about resource scarcity and triage. Several COVID-19 guidelines included age as an explicit factor and practices of both triage and ‘anticipatory triage’ likely limited access to hospital care for elderly patients, especially those in care homes. To ensure the legitimacy of triage guidelines, which affect the public, it is important to engage the public’s moral intuitions. Our study aimed to explore general public views in the UK on (...) the role of age, and related factors like frailty and quality of life, in triage during the COVID-19 pandemic. We held online deliberative workshops with members of the general public (n=22). Participants were guided through a deliberative process to maximise eliciting informed and considered preferences. Participants generally accepted the need for triage but strongly rejected ‘fair innings’ and ‘life projects’ principles as justifications for age-based allocation. They were also wary of the ‘maximise life-years’ principle, preferring to maximise the number of lives rather than life years saved. Although they did not arrive at a unified recommendation of one principle, a concern for three core principles and values eventually emerged: equality, efficiency and vulnerability. While these remain difficult to fully respect at once, they captured a considered, multifaceted consensus: utilitarian considerations of efficiency should be tempered with a concern for equality and vulnerability. This ‘triad’ of ethical principles may be a useful structure to guide ethical deliberation as societies negotiate the conflicting ethical demands of triage. (shrink)

Access to state-funded fertility treatments is age-restricted in many countries based on epidemiological evidence showing age-associated fertility decline and aimed at administering scarce resources. In this article, we consider whether age-related restrictions can be considered ageist and what this entails for a normative appraisal of access criteria. We use the UK as a case study due to the state-funded and centrally regulated nature of in vitro fertilization provision. We begin by reviewing concepts of ageism and age discrimination in gerontological scholarship (...) and contend that it is analytically useful to differentiate between them when considering age-restricted health services. We then argue that criteria to access IVF could be considered indirectly ageist so far as they rely on an age-related evidence base that manifests ageist categorizations of persons. Lastly, we examine whether there could be more normatively desirable alternatives to devise criteria to access fertility treatment, considering “lifestyle” as a potential candidate. We conclude, however, that lifestyle-based discrimination is problematic because, unlike age-based discrimination, it risks exacerbating existing socioeconomic and ethnic inequalities. (shrink)

Should a person who feels his legal age does not correspond with his experienced age be allowed to change his legal age? In this paper, I argue that in some cases people should be allowed to change their legal age. Such cases would be when: 1) the person genuinely feels his age differs significantly from his chronological age and 2) the person’s biological age is recognized to be significantly different from his chronological age and 3) age change would likely prevent, (...) stop or reduce ageism, discrimination due to age, he would otherwise face. I also consider some objections against the view that people should be allowed to change their legal age and find them lacking. (shrink)

Machine learning, and more broadly artificial intelligence (AI), is a fascinating technology and can be considered as the closest approximation to the Cartesian “thinking thing” that humans have ever created. Just as the industrial revolution required a new ethos, the age of intelligent machines will create its own, challenging the established moral, economic, and political presuppositions. This paper discusses the relationship between AI and society; it presents several thought experiments to explore the complexity of the relationship and highlights the insufficiency (...) of the current normative paradigm in addressing technological expansion. I argue that many of the externalities, such as security risks, loss of privacy, and economic instability will result from trying to fit the emerging technologies into the existing frame of efficiency and utility, by redefining the notions of human value, identity, autonomy, purity, and truth, among others. The age of the intelligent machine is elevating alienation to new levels, treating the individual as mere patterns in data—its primary commodity. I further argue that while the possibility of unintended consequences, due to the potential misuse of AI is ever present, the intelligent machine per se is unlikely to engage in a zero-sum game for power on its own initiative. I question whether singularity is at all attainable and argue that technology will forever remain a proxy for human interests. I conclude by posing questions for charting the path forward. Through this analysis, I aim to provide a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between the AI and humans. (shrink)

《人造神时代：民主、自由、平等的幻象》 —基于“老-杨创世纪宇宙观”的文明批判宣言 -/- The Age of Artificial Gods: The Illusion of Democracy, Freedom, and Equality -/- 杨兴平 Charles X. Yang -/- 序言｜当人类开始膜拜自己 -/- 当星系仍在遵循引力运行， 当恒星仍在守护能量边界， 当生态仍在维持负反馈循环， -/- 人类却开始—— 崇拜自身的欲望。 -/- 他们不再仰望银河，而是仰望屏幕； 不再敬畏自然，而是敬畏舆论。 -/- 于是， 三个新神被铸造出来：民主，自由，平等。 -/- 不是作为制度工具， 而是作为终极信仰。 -/- Preface | When Humanity Began to Worship Itself -/- While galaxies still follow gravity, While stars still guard energy boundaries, While ecosystems still maintain negative feedback loops, -/- Humanity began— to worship its own desires. -/- No longer gazing at the Milky (...) Way, but at screens; No longer revering nature, but public opinion. -/- Thus, three new gods were forged: -/- Democracy, Freedom, Equality. -/- Not as institutional tools, but as ultimate beliefs. (shrink)

Policies that determine whether someone is allowed access to reproductive healthcare or not vary widely among countries, especially in their age requirements. This raises the suspicion of arbitrariness, especially because often no underlying justification is provided. In this article, we pose the question—under which circumstances is it morally acceptable to use age for policy and legislation in the first place? We start from the notion that everyone has a _conditional positive_ right to fertility treatment. Subsequently, we set off to formulate (...) a framework that helps to determine who should be excluded from treatment nonetheless. The framework’s three core elements are: choosing and ethically justifying exclusion criteria (target), determining the actual limit between in- and exclusion (cut-off), and selecting variables that help to predict the exclusion criteria via correlation (as they are not directly measurable) (proxy). This framework allows us to show that referring to age in policy and legislation is only ethically justifiable if there is a sufficiently strong correlation with a non-directly measurable exclusion criterion. Moreover, since age is only one of many predicting variables, it should therefore not be ascribed any special status. Finally, our framework may be used as an argumentative scheme to critically assess the ethical legitimacy of policies that regulate access to (fertility) treatments in general. (shrink)

This paper addresses a philosophical problem concerning the ontological status of age classification. For various purposes, people are commonly classified into categories such as “young adulthood”, “middle adulthood”, and “older adulthood”, which are defined chronologically. These age categories prima facie seem to qualify as natural kinds under a homeostatic property cluster account of natural kindhood, insofar as they capture certain biological, psychological, and social properties of people that tend to cluster together due to causal processes. However, this is challenged by (...) the observation that age categories are historically unstable. The properties that age categories are supposed to capture are affected by healthcare and cultural developments, such that people are staying biologically, psychologically, and socially young for longer. Furthermore, the act of classifying people into age categories can bring about changes in their behaviors, which in turn alter the biological, psychological, and social properties that the categories are supposed to capture. Accordingly, I propose that age categories are best understood as interactive kinds that are influenced in dynamic ways by looping effects. I consider some implications of these looping effects for our classificatory practices concerning age, including how different disciplines may need to review the ways they define and use age categories in their inductive inferences. (shrink)

This article brings together two debates in contemporary political philosophy: on the one hand, the dispute between the distributive and relational approaches to equality and, on the other hand, the field of intergenerational equality. I offer an original contribution to the second domain and by doing so, I inform the first. The aim of this article is thus twofold: (1) shedding some light on an under-researched and yet crucial question – ‘which inequalities between generations matter?’ and (2) contributing to a (...) far-reaching debate that touches upon the nature of egalitarianism. After showing that there are two key problems that fall within the scope of intergenerational equality – questions of justice between age groups and questions of equality between birth cohorts – I argue that, contrary to what the default distributive view (complete lives egalitarianism) states, some inequalities between age groups matter independently of their diachronic impact, and so partly for relational reasons. I argue that, even if we are distributive egalitarians, we must endorse the relational egalitarian conception to successfully make sense of some inequalities between age groups. I infer from this both that the putative view that the ‘relational’ conception of equality can be redescribed as distributive must be rejected and that the distributive view requires supplementation (but not necessarily displacement) by the relational view. (shrink)

In ‘Moral case for legal age change’, I argue that sometimes people should be allowed to change their age. I refute six immediate objections against the view that age change is permissible. I argue that the objections cannot show that legal age change should always be prohibited. In this paper, I consider some further objections against legal age change raised by Iain Brassington, Toni Saad and William Simkulet. I argue that the objections fail to show that age change should never (...) be allowed. (shrink)

Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. Age seems to matter when considering severity, but perhaps not small age differences. In the following article we consider Small Differences : small differences in age are not relevant when considering differential illness severity. We show that SD cannot be accommodated within utilitarian, prioritarian or egalitarian theories. Attempting to accommodate SD by postulating a threshold model becomes exceedingly complex and self-defeating. The only way to accommodate SD seems to be to (...) accept some form of relevance view, where some age differences are irrelevant. This view can accommodate SD, but at the expense of consistent priority orderings. Severity thus becomes unsuitable for systematic decision-making. We argue that SD should be dismissed and that we should accept a continuous relationship between severity of illness and age. (shrink)

A minimum voting age is defended as the most effective and least disrespectful means of ensuring all members of an electorate are sufficiently competent to vote. Whilst it may be reasonable to require competency from voters, a minimum voting age should be rejected because its view of competence is unreasonably controversial, it is incapable of defining a clear threshold of sufficiency and an alternative test is available which treats children more respectfully. This alternative is a procedural test for minimum electoral (...) competence. A procedural test for minimum electoral competence also succeeds in fulfilling adults’ duties to promote children’s rational and moral engagement with democracy. A minimum voting age should therefore be rejected, all things considered. A procedural test for minimum literacy and independent voting is the most justified means to ensure competency from voters and to promote the democratic agency of children. (shrink)

This article aims at answering the following questions: What is the influence of age structure on the spread of coronavirus disease 2019? What can be the impact of stringency policy on the spread of COVID-19? What might be the quantitative effect of development levelincome and number of hospital beds on the number of deaths due to the COVID-19 epidemic? By employing the methodologies of generalized linear model, generalized moments method, and quantile regression models, this article reveals that the shares of (...) median age, age 65, and age 70 and older population have significant positive impacts on the spread of COVID-19 and that the share of age 70 and older people in the population has a relatively greater influence on the spread of the pandemic. The second output of this research is the significant impact of stringency policy on diminishing COVID-19 total cases. The third finding of this paper reveals that the number of hospital beds appears to be vital in reducing the total number of COVID-19 deaths, while GDP per capita does not affect much the level of deaths of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, this article suggests some governmental health policies to control and decrease the spread of COVID-19. (shrink)

Social categorizations regarding gender or age have proven to be relevant in human-robot interaction. Their stereotypical application in the development and implementation of robotics in eldercare is even discussed as a strategy to enhance the acceptance, well-being, and quality of life of older people. This raises serious ethical concerns, e.g., regarding autonomy of and discrimination against users. In this paper, we examine how relevant professional stakeholders perceive and evaluate the use of social categorizations and stereotypes regarding gender and age in (...) robotics for eldercare. Based on 16 semi-structured interviews with representatives from technology development, industry, and nursing science as well as practice, we explore the subjects’ awareness, evaluations, and lines of argument regarding the corresponding moral challenges. Six different approaches of dealing with categorizations and stereotypes regarding gender and age in care robotics for older people are identified: negation, functionalistic relativization, explanation, neutralization, stereotyping, and queering. We discuss the ethical implications of these approaches with regard to professional responsibility and draw conclusions for responsible age tech in pluralistic societies. (shrink)

Almost all countries and fertility clinics impose age limits on women who want to become pregnant through Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART). Age limits for aspiring fathers, however, are much less common and remain a topic of debate. This article departs from the principle of reproductive autonomy and a conditional positive right to receive ART, and asks whether there are convincing arguments to also impose age limits on aspiring fathers. After considering three consequentialist approaches to justifying age limits for aspiring fathers, (...) we take in a concrete normative stance by concluding that those are not strong enough to justify such cut-offs. We reinforce our position by drawing a comparison between the case of a 39-year-old woman who wants to become a single mother via a sperm donor on the one hand, and on the other hand the same woman who wants to have a child with a 64-year-old man who she loves and who is willing to care for the child as long as he is able to. We conclude that, as long as appropriate precautions are taken to protect the welfare of the future child, couples who want to receive fertility treatment should never be limited on the basis of the age of the (male) partner. An absence of age limits for men would respect the reproductive autonomy of both the man and the woman. (shrink)

This article examines whether the voting age should be lowered to 16. The dominant view in the literature is that 16-year-olds in the United Kingdom are not politically mature enough to vote since they lack political knowledge, political interest and stable political preferences. I reject this conclusion and instead argue that the voting age should be lowered to 16. First, I look at Chan and Clayton’s empirical claims and show that these features of 16- and 17-year-olds are in fact created (...) by exclusionary social practices and therefore that these features cannot be used to justify their exclusion from the vote. Second, I evaluate preliminary evidence from Austria which suggests that 16- and 17-year-olds, when actually given the vote, are politically mature. Third, I show that, on a balance of harms, considering that some 16- and 17-year-olds are mature, we still should lower the voting age even if some 16- and 17-year-olds are not politically mature. I conclude that the voting age should be lowered to 16. (shrink)

This book by one of Italy's oldest and wisest intellectuals is a philosophical and personal meditation on ageing. The question of old age has preoccupied writers from Cicero to Améry, but in this volume Norberto Bobbio produces an account that is specific to our times. Born in 1909, Bobbio has lived through the major events of the past century, and his experiences of Fascism, Communism and the Cold War lend his reflections a melancholy that distinguishes them from earlier eulogies on (...) old age and death. Bobbio's conclusions are often sobering, yet his investigation into memory and mortality is written with both humour and emotion. In the opening chapter, Bobbio reassesses the notion of progress from the perspective of an old man. Arguing for an understanding of historical change as the transfer between generations, Bobbio explains how the elderly are increasingly marginalized in contemporary society. Referring to the traditional idea of old age as the 'age of wisdom', Bobbio argues that our ever-accelerating technological progress has dramatically shifted the power of knowledge from old to young. This discussion of old age as a social problem is accompanied by a reflection on old age as a personal predicament. In his elegant and lucid prose, Bobbio confronts the facts of decrepitude and death. In taking stock of his life, he argues once again for the importance of democracy and human rights. This is a beautifully written book that will be of great interest to the academic and general reader alike. Its intellectual content renders it of particular value to students in the fields of philosophy, politics and the social sciences. (shrink)

Recent disputes over whether older people should pay more for health insurance, or receive lower priority for transplantable organs, highlight broader disagreements regarding the legality of using age-based criteria in health care. These debates will likely intensify given the changing age structure of the American population and the turmoil surrounding the financing of American health care. This Article provides a comprehensive examination of the legality and normative desirability of age-based criteria. I defend a distributive justice approach to age-based criteria and (...) contrast it with two prevailing theoretical approaches to age-based criteria, nondiscrimination and discretion. I propose a detailed normative framework for the use of age-based criteria in health care, the lifetime justice approach, that considers the future life patients can gain from treatment and the past years of life they already have experienced. -/- This paper is available by open access from the Boston College Law School Digital Commons. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, Alain Badiou revisits the age-old problem of the relation between literature and philosophy, arguing against both Plato and Heidegger's famous arguments. Philosophy neither has to ban the poets from the republic nor abdicate its own powers to the sole benefit of poetry or art. Instead, it must declare the end of what Badiou names the "age of the poets," from Holderlin to Celan. Drawing on ideas from his first publication on the subject, "The Autonomy of (...) the Aesthetic Process," Badiou also offers an illuminating set of readings of contemporary French prose writers, giving us fascinating insights into the theory of the novel while also accounting for the specific position of literature between science and ideology. (shrink)

The debate about a new geological epoch ‘The Anthropocene’ has helped spawn ‘Age of Man Environmentalism’ (AME). According to AME, humans’ planetary impact indicates that respect for independent nature can no longer serve as a guiding value for environmentalism. Traditional goals of nature preservation and restoration are grounded in the illusory ideal of pristine nature. Humans are now fully integrated into nature and must become responsible managers of an earth we have created, governing it by our ideals. This essay repudiates (...) AME, defending traditional environmental values of naturalness and respect for nature’s autonomy. AME’s exaggeration of human influence over Earth manifests an anthropocentric narcissism blind to nature’s ongoing agency. Rather than becoming gods or parents of a nature that allegedly needs us, human flourishing requires we strengthen our commitment to humility, restraint, and respect for nature’s gifted character. Naturalness becomes increasingly valuable the rarer it becomes, even in highly humanized areas. AME’s thoroughly managed future ignores the possibility of rewilding and turning nature loose. Its promotion of non-native species and ‘novel ecosystems’ attempts to polish the image of human-impacted nature and denigrates preserved wild areas. Taking seriously humans’ massive impact on earth does not require abandoning traditional environmental values. (shrink)

When the moon is in the Seventh HouseAnd Jupiter aligns with MarsThen peace will guide the planetsAnd love will steer the starsThis is the dawning of the age of Aquarius–‘The Age of Aquarius’, 5th...

In this study, we investigated explicit and implicit endorsement of prescriptive age stereotypes. To achieve that, we captured endorsement of a wide range of prescriptive expectations targeting both younger and older people. Younger and older adults participated in the study. We assessed implicit endorsement of prescriptive age stereotypes with the Propositional Evaluation Paradigm and used a direct measure to assess explicit endorsement. In general, we found strong support for age-specificity in both explicit and implicit endorsement of prescriptive age stereotypes: Sentences (...) ascribing expectations for young/old to the respective age group were endorsed much more strongly than sentences in which expectations for young/old were ascribed to the other age group. Age group differences in the endorsement of prescriptive age stereotypes were found. Compared to younger participants, older participants showed stronger endorsement for prescriptive beliefs targeting both younger and older targets. Explicit and implicit endorsement of prescriptive age stereotypes did not correlate with one another, thus revealing they might assess independent belief systems with different predictive potential. (shrink)

Age-based rationing remains highly controversial. This question has been paramount during the Covid-19 pandemic. Analyzing the practices, proposals, and guidelines applied or put forward during the current pandemic, three kinds of age-based rationing are identified: an age-based cut-off, age as a tiebreaker, and indirect age rationing, where age matters to the extent that it affects prognosis. Where age is allowed to play a role in terms of who gets treated, it is justified either because this is believed to maximize benefits (...) from scarce resources or because it is believed to be in accordance with the value of fairness understood as (a) fair innings, where less priority is given to those who have lived a full life or (b) an egalitarian concern for the worse off. By critically assessing prominent frameworks and practices for pandemic rationing, this article considers the balance the three kinds of age-based rationing strike between maximizing benefits and fairness. It evaluates whether elements in the proposals are, in fact, contrary to the justifications of these measures. Such shortcomings are highlighted, and it is proposed to adjust prominent proposals to care for the worse off more appropriately and better consider whether the acquired benefits befalls the young or the old. (shrink)

For nearly 70 years, studies have shown large sex differences in human mate selection preferences. However, most of the studies were restricted to a limited set of mate selection criteria and to college students, and neglecting relationship status. In this study, 21,245 heterosexual participants between 18 and 65 years of age (mean age 41) who at the time were not involved in a close relationship rated the importance of 82 mate selection criteria adapted from previous studies, reported age ranges for (...) the oldest and youngest partner that they would find acceptable, and responded to 10 yes/no questions about a potential marriage partner. For nearly all mate selection criteria, women were found to be the more demanding sex, although men placed consistently more value on the physical attractiveness of a potential partner than women. Also, the effects of the participants’ age and level of education were nearly negligible. These results demonstrate the robustness of sex differences in mate selection criteria across a substantial age range. (shrink)

This paper examines whether biological age, as distinct from chronological age, could become a new basis for discrimination. Drawing on Räsänen’s proposal that individuals be allowed to change their legal age to mitigate chronological age-based discrimination, it assesses whether this could introduce discrimination based on biological age. The analysis distinguishes chronological from biological age and clarifies differences. Chronological age measures the time elapsed since an entity’s existence, with unidirectional and perfect passage-of-time correlation. Biological age is the attempt to quantify the (...) state of the ageing process—gradual deterioration of body and mind—via biomarkers compared with population averages. It is variable and potentially reversible. For these reasons, biological age currently is not familiar to the public; it lacks stability and institutional recognition and thus does not meet the conditions for discrimination as discussed by prominent theories of discrimination by Lippert-Rasmussen and Behrendt. Therefore, individuals are unlikely to face discrimination on this basis in the same sense as they might based on chronological age. However, if biological age were formally adopted—say, through legal reforms substituting or even replacing chronological age—it could acquire normative significance and potentially serve as a new basis for discrimination. Hence, openly available information about biological age should be limited to mitigate the risk that it could become a basis for discrimination. (shrink)

In this paper, I endorse the idea that age is a defensible criterion for eligibility to vote, where age is itself a proxy for having a broad set of cognitive and motivational capacities. Given the current (and defeasible) state of developmental research, I suggest that the age of 16 is a good proxy for such capacities. In defending this thesis, I consider alternative and narrower capacity conditions while drawing on insights from a parallel debate about capacities and age requirements in (...) the criminal law. I also argue that the expansive capacity condition I adopt satisfies a number of powerful and complementary rationales for voting eligibility, and conclude by addressing challenging arguments that, on the one hand, capacity should not underlie voting eligibility in the first place, and, on the other, that capacity should do so directly and not via any sort of proxy, including age. (shrink)

Background Intensive care unit (ICU) admissions among older patients are increasing, posing significant challenges to already strained healthcare systems. Decision-making around ICU admission in times of limited resources may provide important knowledge about difficult prioritisations, particularly for older patients. Thus, the aim was to investigate ICU-admission decisions for older patients with COVID-19. Methods A mixed-methods approach. We audio-recorded ten COVID Rounds and nine Moral Case Deliberations for 34 patients across three Swedish hospitals during the pandemic, and collected data from medical (...) records of 329 patients aged ≥ 65 diagnosed with COVID-19. Data were analysed using qualitative content analysis and multiple regression. Results Among 239 patients with documented decisions in medical records, 56% included explicit justifications. The justifications included considerations of medical benefit (not-too- ill/too-ill), general condition (good/frail), age (not-too-old/high age), professional duty (benefit of the doubt/do no harm) and “worth giving it a go” (grit and will to live/lack of will and coping). A minority (31%) of decisions favoured ICU admission. Justifications supporting admission were predominantly drawn from discussions in COVID Rounds and MCDs, where patient grit was a recurring argument. In regression analyses, age ≥ 80 years was the only factor significantly associated with not being admitted to ICU and having a documented justification. Few decisions explicitly referred to COVID-19-specific factors. Conclusion Our findings reflect patterns similar to pre-pandemic ICU decision-making, suggesting continuity in clinical reasoning. However, the limited documentation of justifications—especially in favour of admission—warrants attention, emphasising the need for clearer reasoning in medical records. Our findings identify chronological age as a key triage factor, normatively supported by the ethical principles of non-maleficence, justice, and Sweden’s legal priority-setting principle of Needs and Solidarity—which emphasises care only when benefit is likely. We therefore advocate for national (and potentially international) guidance on triage systems that support a palliative approach for very old patients. While grit may be relevant to ICU admission due to its link to potential benefit, its use raises ethical concerns, particularly in relation to Needs and Solidarity and Human Dignity. We recommend its cautious application pending further research. (shrink)

Each year policymakers around the world must make hard decisions about how to allocate scarce health care resources. Given the scarcity of many life-saving interventions, making allocation decisions entails determining who lives and who dies. One relevant aspect of such allocation decisions concerns the relative importance of death at different ages. The purpose of this chapter is to explore this issue by examining three age-specific allocation principles and their underlying moral foundations: a _youngest first principle_, prioritizing infants; a _children first (...) principle_, prioritizing children; and a _young adults first principle_, prioritizing adolescents and young adults. My claim is that a youngest first principle can draw support from the Deprivation Account, a children first principle can draw support from a gradualist view, and a young adult first principle can draw support from the Complete Lives Account. I conclude, tentatively, that gradualism and children first allocation should be our favored choice. (shrink)

When “digitalization” meets “aging,” to understand the theoretical updates and value reconstruction of concepts like corporate digital responsibility and age inclusion, research should be conducted from the perspective of age-inclusive digital responsibility. We adopt a mixed research method to comprehensively analyze age-inclusive digital responsibility. The study results indicate that the formation of age-inclusive digital responsibility arises from the intersectional evolution of corporate digital responsibility and age-inclusive management while facing ethical dilemmas in four areas: the digital divide, digital trust, digital exclusion, (...) and digital addiction. It presents a completely new theoretical connotation from four levels: society, business, individual, and technology, and has important impacts on age-friendly society, organizational culture, and digital recognition. The research constructs a governance system from four aspects. These results provide theoretical guidance for eliminating the digital divide and achieving shared digital responsibility, as well as motivation for companies to engage in responsible digital innovation. (shrink)

Main objective of this paper is to describe emergence of a Polish Universities of the Third Age model. These are a multidisciplinary non-formal education centers, which allow formation of positive responses to the challenges of an ageing population. Article indicates main organizational changes of these institutions conditioned by internal and external factors. Essay describes transformation, differentiation factors, and characteristics of these institutions for elderly based on a critical analysis of literature.