Many philosophers think all abstract objects are causally inert. Here, focusing on novels, I argue that some abstracta are causally efficacious. First, I defend a straightforward argument for this view. Second, I outline an account of object causation—an account of how objects cause effects. This account further supports the view that some abstracta are causally efficacious.

This paper investigates how abstracta, such as numbers or functions, can be said to emerge at particular times, as in the claim that “complex numbers did not exist before the sixteenth century.” Standard accounts encounter well-known difficulties. Platonism posits timeless entities and struggles to explain historical emergence, while nominalism denies mathematical existence and fails to explain applicability. The paper develops a neutralist metaontology that interprets temporally indexed existence claims as statements about when a concept is available within a community’s (...) inferential and representational practices. Unlike deflationary or thin-object views, neutralism distinctively formalizes these claims through the operator EXt(x), which captures the historical emergence of abstracta without positing timeless entities. Formally, ‘x exists at t’ is true iff EXt(x), where EXt(x) specifies that x is licensed by the rules, resources, and acceptance conditions operative at t. This framework provides a systematic account of temporally indexed existence claims in mathematics, illustrated by historical cases such as zero and complex numbers, and improves on both Platonist and nominalist approaches. (shrink)

Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a (...) trope qua abstract particular by rejecting arguments that purport to show that tropes should not be understood as abstract and by arguing that the abstractness of tropes plays an indispensable role in one of our more promising trope-theoretic analyses of universals and of concrete objects. (shrink)

Art and Art-Attempts by Christy Mag Uidhir is an excellent book about the philosophy of art.1 It is full of insight. It is brilliantly precise. Indeed, it is a model of analytic precision. This discussion will be concerned with the role of the intention of the artist in art, which is central to the book, and Mag Uidhir’s discussion of abstracta and instantiation. I shall argue that intention should be replaced with choice and that abstracta should be replaced (...) with exemplar representation to improve his account. I conclude that choice in art and focus on exemplars play a special role in aesthetic education.Here is the basic idea of the role of intention of the artist in the book:Taking intention-dependence seriously... (shrink)

La bipartition entre une dynamica abstracta et une dynamica concreta est récurrente dans la production scientifique leibnizienne en dépit des acquisitions conceptuelles qui – dès la rédaction de la Dynamica de Potentia de 1690 – permettraient de la dépasser. S’appuyant sur l’étude des manuscrits inédits réalisée en vue de la publication de la première édition critique du traité, l’article se propose : 1. d’explorer les raisons de la permanence d’une telle structure à la lumière des travaux logiques et grammaticaux (...) leibniziens sur l’abstrait et le concret – 2. d’offrir au lecteur une contextualisation et une présentation générale de l’œuvre, ainsi qu’un aperçu du nouveau matériau éditorial disponible. (shrink)

The characterization of early token-based accounting using a concrete concept of number, later numerical notations an abstract one, has become well entrenched in the literature. After reviewing its history and assumptions, this article challenges the abstract–concrete distinction, presenting an alternative view of change in Ancient Near Eastern number concepts, wherein numbers are abstract from their inception and materially bound when most elaborated. The alternative draws on the chronological sequence of material counting technologies used in the Ancient Near East—fingers, tallies, tokens, (...) and numerical notations—as reconstructed through archaeological and textual evidence and as interpreted through Material Engagement Theory, an extended-mind framework in which materiality plays an active role (Malafouris 2013). (shrink)

In my “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth” (2014), I present and defend an argument for thinking that mythical creationism—the view that mythical objects like phlogiston and Vulcan are abstract artifacts—is false. One intriguing sort of objection to my argument has been recently put forth by Zvolenszky (2016); she claims that a crucial premise is seen to be unjustified once one considers the phenomena of inadvertently created abstracta—specifically, inadvertently created fictional characters. I argue here that even if we admit (...) inadvertently created abstracta into our ontology, my argument survives. I ultimately defend a view on which fictional characters (if real) may be countenanced as created abstracta whether purposefully created or not, yet mythical objects are best taken to be discoverable, Platonic abstracta (if real). We can see that such a hybrid ontology is justified once we take proper note of the nature of the sorts of authorial activities involved in fictional storytelling and scientific hypothesizing. (shrink)

A noção de objecto abstracto desempenha um papel central em diferentes debates filosóficos contemporâneos, da metafísica à estética, passando pela filosofia da linguagem. A sua origem está contudo relacionada com a filosofia da matemática e em particular, com o trabalho de Frege nos fundamentos da aritmética. O nosso primeiro objectivo será assim o de explicar o contributo desta noção para o entendimento Fregeano da realidade matemática. Veremos também que, em virtude de certas dificuldades inerentes ao projeto Fregeano, a dada altura (...) a natureza do universo matemático passou a ser entendida nos termos da chamada teoria dos conjuntos. Com este material à nossa disposição, podemos então discutir o papel desempenhado pela noção de objecto abstracto em certos debates filosóficos contemporâneos. Em particular, procuraremos ilustrar o interesse actual da noção, discutindo a distinção abstracto/concreto. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se divide en tres partes. La primera estudia las relaciones entre el liberalismo y la cultura, poniendo de relieve los presupuestos nacionalistas de las sociedades democráticas modernas. La segunda parte se centra en la propuesta del «multiculturalismo liberal», según la cual es necesario algún tipo de reconocimiento oficial de las diferentes identidades culturales como complemento a los derechos comunes de la ciudadanía democrática. Por último, la tercera parte plantea algunos de los problemas no resueltos de la alternativa (...) multiculturalista, lo que conduce al autor a matizar la legitimidad de las reclamaciones de reconocimiento cultural con una enérgica defensa de los derechos y libertades básicos de la igual ciudadanía—en una propuesta final que, a falta de mejor nombre, llamaremos unidad en la diferencia—. (shrink)

Regarding museums as potential sites of formal learning, this article describes an innovative workshop for postgraduate researchers in philosophy and religious studies that was designed to serve as a template for other initiatives. It showcases pathways between research in the arts and humanities and museums’ collections. It is of use to scholars interested in exploring ways to use museum collections for research in arts and humanities disciplines.

I argue that materialism is unable to account for knowledge deriving from such abstracta as rules of inference, algorithms, and the ideals of infinity, perfection, and eternity. Both reductive and nonreductive materialism subscribe to the causal closure of the physical world, which implies that a creature’s concepts derive exclusively from the interactions of brains with the physical environment. These resources do not explain the acquisition of abstract concepts or the successful use of these concepts in gaining important knowledge about (...) the world. By contrast, if both God and souls exist, we can understand how knowledge based on abstracta is possible. (shrink)

Susan Schneider argues that physicalism must be false if abstracta are part of the physicalist's dependence base. In opposition to her view, here I set out some reasons to think that abstracta in general, including abstracta that are woven into the dependence base, are something physicalists can countenance with consistency.

Of all the problems attending the sense-datum theory, arguably the deepest is that it draws a veil of appearances over the external world. Today, the sense-datum theory is widely regarded as an overreaction to the problem of hallucination. Instead of accounting for hallucination in terms of intentional relations to sense data, it is often thought that we should account for it in terms of intentional relations to properties. In this paper, however, I argue that in the versions that might address (...) the problem of hallucination, this newer account is guilty of a vice similar to sense-datum theory’s: it draws a veil of abtracta over the concrete world. (shrink)

I present a new argument to the effect that platonism about abstract entities undermines metaphysical naturalism and provides some support to theism. I further suggest that there are ways of extending this line of reasoning to point toward one or another more specific varieties of Christian theism.

The view that abstracta cannot exert causal power is pretty common in metaphysics. According to Friedell (2020), however, this view is mistaken. In a recent paper in this journal, he has argued that at least some abstracta are causally efficacious. My goal in what follows is to demonstrate that, given certain plausible methodological assumptions, Friedell 2020’s argument is not as strong as it might at first seem.

Many mathematicians are platonists: they believe that the axioms of mathematics are true because they express the structure of a nonspatiotemporal, mind independent, realm. But platonism is plagued by a philosophical worry: it is unclear how we could have knowledge of an abstract, realm, unclear how nonspatiotemporal objects could causally affect our spatiotemporal cognitive faculties. Here I aim to make room in our metaphysical picture of the world for the causal relevance of abstracta.

En este artículo me propongo abordar el problema del tiempo en las sociedades contemporáneas desde un diálogo entre las construcciones teóricas de Moishe Postone y Hartmut Rosa y el trabajo de Michel Foucault. Los dos primeros se han centrado en explicar cómo la temporalidad se ha convertido en un tipo de dominación abstracta, impersonal y cuasiobjetiva a partir de conceptos como la densificación temporal, la aceleración o la hibridación. Foucault, en cambio, concibe el tiempo bajo el prisma de la (...) racionalidad política neoliberal, por la cual el tiempo pasa a ser un recurso que debe gestionarse por los sujetos en términos empresariales y que termina por configurar una ética neoliberal de la administración del tiempo. Este diálogo ejemplifica de manera privilegiada la tensión entre la coacción o la presión temporal y la administración estratégica del tiempo propia de las sociedades contemporáneas. (shrink)

I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails (...) that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument. (shrink)

The contribution presents Hegel’s innovative distinction between “civil society” and the “political state” in Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820) in its historical and systematic context. The contribution is organized in three sections, followed by a brief conclusion. The first section presents Hegel’s outwardly monarchical state as a latter-day alternative to ancient (Roman) and early modern (neo-Roman) republicanism on the one side and post-monarchical late modern democratism on the other side. The second section features the historical development and systematic (...) articulation of the distinction between civil society and the political state in Hegel. The third section tracks the transformation of the socio-economically defined divisions of civil society into the executive-cum-judicative and the bicameral legislative powers of government in Hegel’s modern polity. In conclusion, Hegel’s civico-political distinction is mapped onto the constitutional origin and the current condition of the American polity. (shrink)

Much attention has been given to the question of ontic vagueness, and the issues usually center around whether certain paradigmatically concrete entities – cats, clouds, mountains, etc. – are vague in the sense of having indeterminate spatial boundaries. In this paper, however, I wish to focus on a way in which some abstracta seem to be locationally vague. To begin, I will briefly cover some territory already covered regarding certain types of “traditional” abstracta and the ways they are (...) currently alleged to be vague. I then wish to discuss two types of “nontraditional” abstracta and the sense in which I think some of these objects are locationally vague. I will next reexamine some of the traditional abstracta and discuss whether any of these objects are locationally vague in the novel way suggested for the nontraditional sorts. I’ll finish by discussing objections, and conclude with some remarks about characterizing the abstract/concrete distinction. (shrink)

I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails (...) that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument. (shrink)

El elemento primario de lo social es vivir en un ethos, implicados con el mundo, con los otros y con nosotros mismos. En diálogo con Hegel, este artículo muestra el aspecto crítico social de dicho planteamiento. La vida ética no es obediencia ciega a un destino ni quedarse en un círculo vicioso en el que solo se repiten costumbres, sino que contiene un grado de reconocimiento y apropiación que permite ver y alterar estas determinaciones cuando ya no hacen inteligible el (...) mundo, cuando no son racionales. Estas posiciones son elaboradas confrontando las lecturas que Habermas y Honneth adelantaron de Hegel. (shrink)

When a large language model receives a prompt, it computes a probability distribution over all possible continuations before sampling produces a single output. This paper examines the ontological and ethical status of ungenerated completions (i.e. texts that were mathematically present in the distribution but never actualized). I argue that these ungenerated texts occupy a novel ontological category since they are neither merely possible nor fully actual. Therefore, they exist as computationally determinate potentials that are precisely weighted, semantically meaningful, and accessible (...) in principle, although not in practice. On this basis, I advance three claims. First, standard metaphysical categories fail to capture the mode of being proper to probability distributions over meaningful strings, and hence, a new category of computational abstracta is required. Second, the structured space of ungenerated completions is metaphysically more fundamental than any particular generated completion because it carries most of the probability mass, encodes more of the model’s structure, and preserves a richness of potential responses that any single realization necessarily truncates. Third, I sketch initial implications for what I term modal ethics. Insofar as the distribution assigns nontrivial probability to completions of moral significance, our practices of prompting and sampling are subject to normative assessment. What remains ungenerated can matter morally because foreclosing or enabling particular possibilities has consequences for actual agents, and this reveals a broader class of philosophical problems that could not have been formulated before the advent of large language models. (shrink)

El modelo de marcos argumentativos abstractos es actualmente la herramienta más utilizada para caracterizar la justificación de argumentos derrotables en Inteligencia Artificial. Las justificaciones se determinan en base a los ataques entre argumentos y se formalizan a través de semánticas de extensiones. Aquí sostenemos que, o bien algunos marcos argumentativos carecen de sentido bajo ciertas concepciones de ataque específicas, o bien las semánticas más usadas en la literatura, basadas en el concepto de defensa conocido como admisibilidad, no resultan adecuadas para (...) justificar, en particular, argumentos para la toma de decisiones.The abstract argumentation frameworks model is currently the most used tool for characterizing the justification of defeasible arguments in Artificial Intelligence. Justifications are determined on a given attack relation among arguments and are formalized as extension semantics. In this work we argue that, contrariwise to the assumptions in that model, either some argumentation frameworks are meaningless under certain concrete definitions of the attack relation, or some of the most used extension semantics in the literature, based on the defense notion of admissibility, are not suitable in particular for the justification of arguments for decision making. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a polar concept argument for the existence of abstract objects. After recalling the fundamentals concerning the debate about the existence of abstracta, I present in a detailed way the argument for the existence of abstracta. I offer two different variations of the argument: one, deductive and the other, inductive. The argument rests primarily on the fact that our universe is well-balanced. This well-balanced property results from the fact that all instantiable polar dualities are (...) instantiated. Hence, the abstract pole of the abstract/concrete duality must also be exemplified. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against this latter argument. (shrink)

Lowe's criticism of nihilism is discussed. Nihilism seems to involve a commitment to abstract entities and Lowe used recently the Dependence Principle (DP) — abstracta depend upon concreta — in order to block reference to abstract entities: numbers are said to depend upon concreta. It will be argued that this form of arithmetical fictionalism is not harmless and that we have to evaluate the respective coast of the Platonist alternative. I will defend a form a particularized Platonism. In conclusion (...) it will appear that we can give up the DP. (shrink)

Hierarchical structures are rapidly and flexibly built up in the domains of human language and music. These domains require a tree-building capacity – “dendrophilia” – to dynamically infer hierarchical structures from sensory input, based on subunits stored in a lexicon. This dynamic process involves a crucial class of abstracta overlooked in the target article.

An argument for a necessary being is developed on the basis of the existence of abstracta. This argument has two parts. First, reasons are put forward in support of the necessary existence of abstracta. These reasons include (among others) an argument for the necessary existence of necessary truths and arguments for the necessary existence of certain properties and mathematical entities. Second, reasons are given for thinking that if there were necessary abstracta, they would be grounded in necessary (...) concreta. Included is an Aristotelian argument and a conceptualist‐based argument supported by Russell's paradox of propositions. It is suggested that the arguments of both parts are independently plausible, and thus that the arguments together could move one to accept the conclusion: abstracta depend on a necessary being. (shrink)

This chapter is an exploration of the sort of epistemology available to explain our _de re_ modal knowledge about abstract entities. The thesis suggested—in a first approximation to the issue—is somewhat provocative: as modal epistemologists, we don’t have much work to do; instead, the work is down to ontologists. The chapter first motivates the thesis by relying on a conception of abstract objects that makes the thesis a rather plausible one. The chapter then goes on to consider some potential concerns (...) and it concludes that, while their treatment imposes some refinements and qualifications, the thesis stands as it is. (shrink)

One common attitude toward abstract objects is a kind of platonism: a view on which those objects are mind-independent and causally inert. But there's an epistemological problem here: given any naturalistically respectable understanding of how our minds work, we can't be in any sort of contact with mind-independent, causally inert objects. So platonists, in order to avoid skepticism, tend to endorse epistemological theories on which knowledge is easy, in the sense that it requires no such contact—appeals to Boghossian’s notion of (...) epistemic analyticity are particularly common here, as are appeals to some broadly pragmatic account of the good standing of basic beliefs. I argue, though, that these appeals are hopeless: an argument adapted from the Benacerraf–Field challenge shows that, even if some such theory can deliver the verdict that our beliefs about abstract objects have some prima facie good standing, this good standing will inevitably be defeated. (shrink)

Benjamin Callard has recently suggested that causation between Platonic objects—standardly understood as atemporal and non-spatial—and spatio-temporal objects is not ‘a priori’ unintelligible. He considers the reasons some have given for its purported unintelligibility: apparent impossibility of energy transference, absence of physical contact, etc. He suggests that these considerations fail to rule out a priori Platonic-object causation. However, he has overlooked one important issue. Platonic objects must causally affect different objects differently, and different Platonic objects must causally affect the same objects (...) differently. How are Platonic objects—ones outside space and time—supposed to do that? CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This article challenges the pessimistic view that empathy and other fellow feelings are biased and erratic motivation for morality. By discussing Mencius’ account on how to develop empathy from its biased and erratic beginnings, I argue that empathy can be extended to less common objects, such as non-kin, the faraway, the unfamiliar, and the abstract. The extension facilitated by empathy in turn enhances one’s moral cognition toward the sufferings of less common objects; the extension also helps to include less common (...) objects into one’s circle of care. I respond to critics of empathy such as Prinz by highlighting the dynamic cultivational process of empathy that they overlook, and further point out that empathy can be cultivated so as to provide a remedy for the biases that no emotion is immune to. This article contributes to the ongoing discussion on moral cultivation in the Chinese philosophy community and the dispute over empathy’s role in morality in contemporary ethics. (shrink)

This paper takes a fresh look at Kant’s transcendental idealism with a new reading of negative noumena as abstract entities. It shows that the three criteria for abstractness, i.e., non-spatiotemporality, causal inefficacy, and non-indiscernibility, are true of Kant’s negative noumena. Phenomena, by contrast, are concrete entities in space and time, which can be understood as spatiotemporally instantiated noumena. Kant’s distinction between noumena in the positive and negative sense will be reinterpreted as a distinction between non-spatiotemporally instantiated concrete entities and uninstantiated (...) abstract entities. It argues that noumenal ignorance is confined to positive noumena, which can be identified with things in themselves. (shrink)