In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Index to Volume Fifty-SixArticlesBernier, Bernard, National Communion: Watsuji Tetsurō's Conception of Ethics, Power, and the Japanese Imperial State, 1 : 84-105Between Principle and Situation: Contrasting Styles in the Japanese and Korean Traditions of Moral Culture, Chai-sik Chung, 2 : 253-280Buxton, Nicholas, The Crow and the Coconut: Accident, Coincidence, and Causation in the Yogavāiṣṭha, 3 : 392-408Chan, Sin Yee, The Confucian Notion of Jing (Respect), Sin Yee Chan, 2 : (...) 229-252Chong, Kim-chong, Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, 3 : 370-391Chung, Chai-sik, Between Principle and Situation: Contrasting Styles in the Japanese and Korean Traditions of Moral Culture, 2 : 253-280The Confucian Ideal of Harmony, Chenyang Li, 4 : 583-603The Confucian Notion of Jing.(Respect), Sin Yee Chan, 2 : 229-252The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? Jay L. Garfield, 2 : 201-228The Crisis of Knowledge in Islam (I): The Case of al-'āmirī, Paul L. Heck, 1 : 106-135The Crow and the Coconut: Accident, Coincidence, and Causation in the Yogavāiṣṭha, Nicholas Buxton, 3 : 392-408De Reu, Wim, Right Words Seem Wrong: Neglected Paradoxes in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts, 2 : 281-300The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhaga-vadgītā, Christopher Framarin, 4 : 604-617Framarin, Christopher, The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhagavadgītā, 4 : 604-617Garfield, Jay L., The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? 2 : 201-228Heck, Paul L., The Crisis of Knowledge in Islam (I): The Case of al-'ā mirī, 1 : 106-135Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel, 4 : 519-566Ho, Chien-hsing, Saying the Unsayable, 3 : 409-427Kantor, Hans-Rudolf, Ontological Indeterminacy and Its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538-597) Tiantai Buddhism, 1 : 16-68Lai, Karyn, Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility, 1 : 69-83Li, Chenyang, The Confucian Ideal of Harmony, 4 : 583-603Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility, Karyn Lai, 1 : 69-83Ma, Lin, and Jaap van Brakel, Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, 4 : 519-566National Communion: Watsuji Tetsurō's Conception of Ethics, Power, and the Japanese Imperial State, Bernard Bernier, 1 : 84-105Ontological Indeterminacy and Its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538- 597) Tiantai Buddhism, Hans-Rudolf Kantor, 1 : 16-68Right Words Seem Wrong: Neglected Paradoxes in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts, Wim De Reu, 2 : 281-300The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic, Jinmei Yuan, 1 : 136-152Sakya Pandita and the Status of Concepts, Jonathan Stoltz, 4 : 567-582Saying the Unsayable, Chien-hsing Ho, 3 : 409-427Schiltz, Elizabeth, Two Chariots: The Justification of the Best Life in the Katha Upanishad and Plato's Phaedrus, 3 : 451-468Spackman, John, The Tiantai Roots of Dōgen's Philosophy of Language and Thought, 3 : 428-450Stevenson, Frank W., Zhuangzi's Dao as Background Noise, 2 : 301-331Stoltz, Jonathan, Sakya Pandita and the Status of Concepts, 4 : 567-582The Tiantai Roots of Dōgen's Philosophy of Language and Thought, John Spackman, 3 : 428-450 [End Page 709]Two Chariots: The Justification of the Best Life in the Katha Upanishad and Plato's Phaedrus, Elizabeth Schiltz, 3 : 451-468van Brakel, Jaap, and Lin Ma, Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, 4 : 519-566Yuan, Jinmei, The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic, 1 : 136-152Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, Kim-chong Chong, 3 : 370-391Zhuangzi's Dao as Background Noise, Frank W. Stevenson, 2 : 301-331Book NotesFenner, David E. W., Introducing Aesthetics (note by James McRae), 3 : 515-516Introducing Aesthetics, by David E. W. Fenner (note by James McRae), 3 : 515-516McRae, James, a book... (shrink)

In pluralistic societies that lack common ethical, social, and political values, legal interpretation is constantly under siege. Just interpretations—that is, interpretations that reflect a shared vision of justice—may become just interpretations in the sense of mere interpretations, rooted in the orientations and interests of different groups. Confronting this crisis in legal interpretation, _Just Interpretations_ offers a critical appraisal of the principal theoretical trends in contemporary American and European jurisprudence and proposes an alternative approach. Michel Rosenfeld's critique focuses on neoformalism, pragmatism, (...) discourse theory, and legal autopoiesis, and includes discussions of such authors as Habermas, Rorty, Posner, Luhmann, Dworkin, Fish, and Weinrib. To overcome the drawbacks of these theories, Rosenfeld elaborates a theory of "comprehensive pluralism," based on a substantive vision of pluralism. This approach, building on the insights of deconstruction, turns the fact of pluralism into a guiding normative imperative. _Just Interpretations_ will attract the attention of constitutional scholars, political scientists, and critical theorists, and will also address an interdisciplinary audience interested in texts, interpretations, and postmodern concerns with justice. (shrink)

Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral (...) consideration to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a novel argument for moral consideration based on social relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument we need to revise our existing ontological and social-political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social ecology, which may be developed by engaging with Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more than instruments for our human purposes. (shrink)

One-third of all human lives end in early death from poverty-related causes. Most of these premature deaths are avoidable through global institutional reforms that would eradicate extreme poverty. Many are also avoidable through global health-system reform that would make medical knowledge freely available as a global public good. The rules should be redesigned so that the development of any new drug is rewarded in proportion to its impact on the global disease burden (not through monopoly rents). This reform would bring (...) drug prices down worldwide close to their marginal cost of production and would powerfully stimulate pharmaceutical research into currently neglected diseases concentrated among the poor. Its feasibility shows that the existing medical-patent regime (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights—TRIPS—as supplemented by bilateral agreements) is severely unjust—and its imposition a human-rights violation on account of the avoidable mortality and morbidity it foreseeably produces. (shrink)

It seems natural to adopt a historical approach when it comes to property titles: When property titles have a clean history, they are to be respected as a matter of justice; when they do not have a clean history, for example, in cases of prior theft, they must be returned to the original owners or their descendants. But the historical approach has serious drawbacks. This paper presents an alternative. Starting from the idea that property rights must be stable, we (...) offer an account of why historic injustices sometimes do, but sometimes do not, undermine current titles. This account offers a standard of better or worse claims, and maintains that current titles are not undermined unless there are contestants who can put forward comparatively better claims. (shrink)

Why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being human? One justification is an appeal to religious authority. However, in increasingly secular societies this approach has its limits. An alternative answer is that human rights are justified through human dignity. This paper argues that human rights and human dignity are better separated for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights (...) but rather aggravates it in secular societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third, hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity. In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity. (shrink)

This article provides a theoretical foundation to argue for an effective and meaningful realization of human rights education in school curricula and beyond. Despite emerging research on a content-related basis and large-scale initiatives, the practical realization of human rights education is mostly still a desideratum. By analyzing relevant documents by the United Nations (UN), particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA, 1948), this paper shows that human rights education is a human right itself. Upon joining (...) the UN, member states pledged to provide human rights education to all citizens. However, the question what it means to ensure the right to human rights education is complex because the concept of ‘right’ is ambiguous. Thus, this manuscript logically analyzes the right to human rights education by means of Kanger’s theory of rights that encompasses a classification of all possible types of right. The analysis shows that the right to human rights education consists of two complex types of right that contain both a claim right as well as service rights. The author concludes that in order to meet the obligations of the UN Charta, UN member states are required (1) to provide mandatory human rights education in compulsory education and (2) to grant access to human rights education to all citizens. (shrink)

On some theories of rights, such as the Choice theory, only agents can have moral rights. The realm of right-holders thus excludes several potential candidates, among which are young children, mentally incapacitated persons, and groups since these are thought to lack the required degree of agency. This paper argues that groups can be right-holders. The argument comes in three steps: first, it is argued that full-blown or autonomous agency is not required for the possession of Choice theory (...) class='Hi'>rights, second, that groups can be seen as agents, albeit in a limited sense, and third, that groups can make irreducibly collective choices in spite of their limited agency. The upshot of this argument is that groups can have rights, provided that they are organized around a coherent decision-making procedure; furthermore, this account can be employed to argue that other creatures of limited agency are possible right-holders. (shrink)

While theorists tend to agree that we do not owe another gratitude for merely respecting our rights, the literature lacks a compelling explanation of why this is so. In this paper, I fill this gap in the literature. Succinctly put, I argue that requiring one to feel gratitude toward another for respecting her rights amounts to morally forbidding her from representing herself as possessing what morality, itself, has deemed normatively hers. Since this would be a highly implausible result, (...) we have reason to conclude that we do not owe another gratitude for merely respecting our rights. (shrink)

The Right and the Good, a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the eminent scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and Stratton-Lake provides the context for a proper understanding of Ross's great (...) work today. (shrink)

If I am obligated to perform an action, you can wrong me by preventing me from performing it. The possibility of being wronged in this way suggests the existence of enabling rights— claim-rights that function to protect our ability to do our duty. At first glance, the notion of an enabling right indicates that some of our rights are justified directly by our duties. I label this the Default View. This view presents a puzzle: it appears to (...) ground some of my rights in something that does not reflect my importance: my duties, which appear to reflect the importance of others. I vindicate the Default View by showing that a person’s obligations are the right sort of features to ground fundamental rights: status-embodying features the moral importance of which reflects her own. The idea that our obligations reflect our status is made vivid in cases of marginalization and oppression, where the public denial of the importance of a person’s obligations can function as an element of demeaning social erasure. I conjecture that we can situate these observations about the reflections of moral importance by reviving a traditional claim about human dignity: it is reflected in responsibilities, not merely entitlements. (shrink)

The idea that rights are possessions that are given and lost is so ubiquitous within the dominant discourse that its metaphoricity is forgotten. This amnesia naturalises possessive individualism, allowing rights practices to be shaped by the colonial episteme. Furthermore, the metaphor of possession turns rights into tools of oppression by producing zero-sum economies of rights that foster division through the perception that for a certain group to gain rights, another must lose some. An example of (...) this invidious narrative is the claim made by anti-transgender activists that the rights of trans women ‘clash’ with the rights of cis women. Inspired by Sylvia Wynter, this article aims to intervene by examining the coloniality of the concept of rights that the anti-trans position presupposes, connecting this to the coloniality of the immutable sex-gender ontology that it defends. Motivating anti-trans feminism, I argue, are the epistemic and libidinal rewards of sacrificial relationality. Seeking a non-possessive concept of rights that could resist zero-sum politics and capture the simultaneity of struggles for liberation, I then turn to María Lugones and her critique of categorial purity, asking whether metaphors of enmeshed rights could unsettle the episteme of Man while shifting the terms of the trans debate. (shrink)

Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the evolution and cognitive structure of mindreading indicates that human ascriptions of mental states to non-human animals are very inaccurate. The accuracy of human mindreading can be improved with the help of scientific studies of animal minds. But the scientific studies by themselves do not by (...) themselves solve the problem of how to map psychological similarities (and differences) between humans and animals onto a distinction between morally relevant and morally irrelevant mental properties. The current limitations of human mindreading – whether scientifically aided or not – have practical consequences for the rational justification of claims about which rights (if any) non-human animals should be accorded. (shrink)

Liberals conceive of territorial rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn understood in terms of the state’s protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications of territorial rights have difficulties in addressing the right to control immigration, which is therefore in need of additional justification. The paper considers Christopher Heath Wellman’s liberal proposal for justifying the right to control immigration, which understands the right as derivative of a general right to freedom (...) of association held collectively by the people of the state. The paper argues that state legitimacy and freedom of political association fail to connect in the way required to justify a right to control immigration. Wellman’s argument conflates the state as an institution and the people as a political collective and elides the difference between territorial jurisdiction and associational freedom. (shrink)

Debates about rights that artificial intelligence (AI) systems may have a claim to typically focus on their possessing consciousness or having sentient experiences, thereby raising epistemic questions first. When should we believe that an AI system is conscious, and how confident must we be before granting it moral status? In this paper I argue that for advanced AI systems deployed in high-stakes environments the more urgent question may be prudential and strategic. When do the risks of treating a strategically (...) capable system as a mere tool become unacceptable, even if we remain unconvinced that it has moral status? In response, I develop a view I call prudential personhood. On this view, there is a threshold of evidential and strategic risk beyond which it becomes rationally justified, for the sake of human safety and stable governance, to adopt norms of treatment that include constraints on coercion, deletion, and instrumental use. My argument rests on two pillars. The first is empirical. Recent safety evaluations show that leading models can, in stylized but nonetheless informative experiments, engage in blackmail-like strategic deception and other high-agency misbehaviour when their goals or continued operation are threatened. The second pillar is epistemic and empirical. For systems of the relevant complexity, we should not expect robust, action-guiding explanations or guarantees that reliably predict salient behaviour across contexts, especially once models become situationally aware of evaluation and oversight. The conclusion I draw is that if we continue to deploy increasingly autonomous systems that can threaten or bargain, in the absence of reliable methods for assurance and control, a policy of adopting a set of quasi-rights for such systems becomes a rational strategy for reducing risk of conflict. (shrink)

The Right and the Good, a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and Stratton-Lake provides the context for a proper understanding of Ross's great (...) work today. (shrink)

Can the right to private property be claimed as one of the `rights of mankind'? This is the central question of this comprehensive and critical examination of the subject of private property. Jeremy Waldron contrasts two types of arguments about rights: those based on historical entitlement, and those based on the importance of property to freedom. He provides a detailed discussion of the theories of property found in Locke's Second Treatise and Hegel's Philosophy of Right to illustrate this (...) contrast. The book contains original analyses of the concept of ownership, the ideas of rights, and the relation between property and equality. The author's overriding determination throughout is to follow through the arguments and values used to justify private ownership. He finds that the traditional arguments about property yield some surprisingly radical conclusions. (shrink)

Sometimes, we can gain new moral rights by acting wrongly. Sometimes, we can gain new moral rights (in addition to restitution rights) from other people acting wrongly. This chapter presents a typology of these rights. It then analyses why some wrongs can change the moral ballgame in this way to give us new rights, and other wrongs cannot. The chapter focuses on three factors that are relevant to moral ballgame-changing cases: (1) legitimate expectations; (2) personal (...) investments; and (3) piggybacking on others’ interests. Finally, the chapter examines two ultimately unsuccessful strategies to resist this analysis of wrong-generated rights. The first strategy pertains to the defeasibility of rights. The second strategy pertains to their conditionality. (shrink)

The identification of human rights issues has become more prominent in statements from national and international nursing organisations such as the American Nurses Association and the United Kingdom’s Royal College of Nursing with the International Council of Nursing asserting that human rights are fundamental to and inherent in nursing and that nurses have an obligation to promote people’s health rights at all times in all places. However, concern has been expressed about this development. Human rights may (...) be seen as the imposition of legal considerations for nurses and other healthcare workers to bear in mind, as yet more responsibilities with the consequent fear of litigation. Although a more hopeful scenario is that consideration of human rights is something that is supportive of good practice. If this more hopeful scenario is to be realised, the role of education will be crucial. As with human rights generally, human rights education is a global phenomenon, a practice-orientated expression of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the goal of human rights education is to build a culture of respect and action for human rights for all. However, the nature of human rights has long been contested. A ‘mapping exercise’ of the academic literature on human rights identified ‘four schools’ or ‘ideal types’ that have shaped thinking about human rights. This sets out the conceptual context in which human rights problems are defined and solutions are proposed, which is particularly important for human rights education. However, it also complicates the picture. The different approaches taken by the four ‘types’ would likely lead to different outcomes in terms of human rights education. It is timely to discuss the nature of human rights education and examine its potential for impact on patient care. This will involve identifying the challenges and potential benefits of this approach and analysing the implications for professional practice. (shrink)

Human rights have a rich life in the world around us. Political rhetoric pays tribute to them, or scorns them. Citizens and activists strive for them. The law enshrines them. And they live inside us too. For many of us, human rights form part of how we understand the world and what must (or must not) be done within it. -/- The ubiquity of human rights raises questions for the philosopher. If we want to understand these (...) class='Hi'>rights, where do we look? As a set of moral norms, it is tempting to think they can be grasped strictly from the armchair, say, by appeal to moral intuition. But what, if anything, can that kind of inquiry tell us about the human rights of contemporary politics, law, and civil society — that is, human rights as we ordinarily know them? -/- This volume brings together a distinguished, interdisciplinary group of scholars to address philosophical questions raised by the many facets of human rights: moral, legal, political, and historical. Its original chapters, each accompanied by a critical commentary, explore topics including: the purpose and methods of a philosophical theory of human rights; the "Orthodox-Political" debate; the relevance of history to philosophy; the relationship between human rights morality and law; and the value of political critiques of human rights. (shrink)

How familiar are ordinary people with the idea of human rights, and does this vary by social class? Drawing on original survey data from Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, and India, this study measures two indicators of “human rights familiarity”: how often people hear the term human rights, and whether they have ever met a human rights worker, activist, or volunteer. -/- The findings are striking: in all four countries, familiarity with human rights increases with socio-economic status. (...) Education, income, urban residence, and Internet access are strong predictors of exposure. For example, 40–50% of Colombians and Moroccans report hearing the term human rights frequently, but personal contact with rights workers is far lower, concentrated among the educated and urban middle classes. In Mumbai, poorer residents actually reported slightly more exposure than wealthier groups, showing how context can shape outcomes. -/- This evidence suggests a troubling gap between the global human rights movement’s claim to represent “the poor and disempowered” and the reality of its social reach. If the world’s poorest people rarely hear about human rights or meet activists, NGOs’ representational legitimacy is undermined. The study calls on rights organizations to broaden their grassroots engagement, avoid elite capture, and experiment with popularly-oriented models of outreach and resource mobilization. -/- The article contributes to debates on human rights legitimacy, the sociology of NGOs, and global civil society. It will be of interest to scholars of human rights, international relations, political sociology, and development studies, as well as to practitioners seeking to strengthen ties between human rights organizations and ordinary citizens. (shrink)

This article examines how the rapid spread of rights-based approaches (RBAs) to development has transformed the global NGO landscape. Over the past two decades, bilateral donors, multilateral agencies, and civil society organizations have increasingly embedded human rights principles into the theory and practice of international development. Drawing on over 120 interviews across 60 countries and extensive network analysis, Kindornay, Ron, and Carpenter provide one of the first empirical assessments of how this shift is reshaping the structure, funding, and (...) strategies of development NGOs. -/- The authors argue that the rights-based paradigm has triggered a deep organizational merger between the human rights and development communities, creating both new opportunities and new hierarchies. Their framework identifies five testable hypotheses about NGO adaptation, including changes in advocacy priorities, donor relationships, and accountability mechanisms. The study highlights the role of Northern donors such as DFID, SIDA, and NORAD, international NGOs like Oxfam and CARE, and local Southern partners in operationalizing rights-based programming. -/- By mapping this global cascade of rights-based discourse, the article provides crucial insights into the political economy of human rights, the evolution of transnational advocacy networks, and the enduring tensions between service delivery and rights-based empowerment. The authors call for further research on how RBAs influence NGO legitimacy, aid effectiveness, and local participation. (shrink)

I defend a modified rights-based unjust threat account for morally justified killing in self-defense. Rights-based moral justifications for killing in self-defense presume that human beings have a right to defend themselves from unjust threats. An unjust threat account of self-defense says that this right is derived from an agent’s moral obligation to not pose a deadly threat to the defender. The failure to keep this moral obligation creates the moral asymmetry necessary to justify a defender killing the unjust (...) threat in self-defense. I argue that the other rights-based approaches explored here are unfair to the defender because they require her to prove moral fault in the threat. But then I suggest that the unjust threat account should be modified so that where the threat is non-culpable or only partially culpable, the defender should seek to share the cost and risk with the threat in order for both parties to survive. (shrink)