Constitutivism is the view that we can derive a substantive account of normative reasons for action—perhaps a Kantian account, perhaps a hedonistic account, perhaps a desire-fulfillment account, this is up for grabs—from abstract premises about the nature of action and agency. Constitutivists are thus bound together by their conviction that such a derivation is possible, not by their agreement about which substantive reasons can be derived, and not by agreement about the features of action and agency that permit the derivation. (...) In the final section of the penultimate chapter of Reasons, a chapter devoted to discussing the merits of constitutivism, Eric Wiland has this to say: Constitutivism is ambitious. It attempts to extract an account of reasons for action from reflection on the bare ideas of action and agency. So we shouldn’t be surprised if doubts remain. Those who claim to extract reasons out of agency might remind us of those who claim to pull rabbits out of hats. you suspect that there must be a trick. (shrink)

Recent critiques of methodological naturalism (MN) claim that it fails by conflicting with Christian belief and being insufficiently humble. We defend MN by tracing the real history of the debate, contending that the story as it is usually told is mythic. We show how MN works in practice, including among real scientists. The debate is a red herring. It only appears problematic because of confusion among its opponents about how scientists respond to experimental anomalies. We conclude by introducing our preferred (...) approach, Science‐Engaged Theology. (shrink)

The existence of Otto Weinreich's excellent Türöffnung im Wunder-, Prodigienund-und Zauberglauben der Antike, des Judentums und Christentums continues to make an apology necessary for any re-examination of texts in which doors are made, or encouraged, spontaneously to open, to admit a divinity or, occasionally, to speed his departure. But what little fresh sustenance remains to be sucked from some of these well-gnawed bones may now be usefully supplemented with comment on a number of more recently suggested examples.

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Ahead of Print.

Max Weber was half right: modernity is indeed characterized most centrally by the “disenchantment of the world.” At the same time, however, modernity is also characterized by the re-enchantment of the world, an enchantment, this time, on strictly secular terms. In their different ways, stage magician Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin and Symbolist poet Stéphane Mallarmé both sought new, secular sources of wonder, order, and value; both came to see self-deception as indispensable to that end; and both, finally, understood that in order to (...) maintain our necessary illusions—in order to preserve them, though we recognize them for what they are—we have to become skilled at adopting a rather peculiar state of mind. It is precisely this state of mind, a state of quasi-simultaneous conviction and distrust, that Robert-Houdin’s tricks and Mallarmé’s poems, with their paradigmatically proto-modernist reflexivity, require for their appreciation. Aesthetic self-reference is not just a game, a marketing ploy, a “statement,” or a symptom; it is, instead, a literary training-ground. To become skilled at handling modernist fictions is, in the end, to strengthen our capacity to re-enchant the world. (shrink)

This paper introduces a new infinite paradox. The main novelty is that it poses problems of causality in a very different form from to the one in use until now. By means of a probabilistic generalization, the paradox shows that the disposition to act according to a specific plan is not always necessary to derive causal effects in Benardete-type contexts involving infinity. It also suggests that, in such cases, the explanation for those causal effects requires a propensity interpretation of probability.

Evaluation of a volume of English renderings of Akkadian-language texts con- cerning treatment of illness in ancient Assyria and Babylonia.

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 112 Heft: 1 Seiten: 256-260.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.