In this article, I argue that somethingness must be eternal and include some kind of consciousness, be it God or something else. In light of this, I discuss the nature of consciousness, support for some kind of universal consciousness, and existing human biases regarding consciousness.

This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take (...) something as a reason for action. On the basis of this, I will then offer a new account of what it is to act for reasons. (shrink)

What makes any intentional state about something? Call this the Question of Aboutness (QA). In his article, Crane discusses and criticizes Putnam’s argument for the assumption that a plausible theory of intentionality should answer QA. Crane focuses on the crucial premise: the claim that what goes for physical representations goes for mental representations. Accepting such a claim, Crane argues, depends on one’s commitment to physicalism or anti-psychologism, two substantial and controversial assumptions one is not forced to accept. Hence, he (...) concludes, the requirement of answering QA should not be imposed as a constraint on theories of intentionality. In my commentary, I do three things. First, contra Crane, I argue that Putnam’s crucial premise can be accepted regardless of one’s commitment to physicalism or anti-psychologism. Second, I sketch an alternative way of justifying that premise on purely methodological grounds. This leads to an improved version of Putnam’s argument. Third, borrowing Kriegel’s distinction between subjective and objective mental representation, I sketch a way of resisting the improved version of Putnam’s argument. However, I argue, that is not enough to prevent some version of QA from arising. So, an answer to QA (or some version of it) still constrains theories of intentionality. (shrink)

The paper puts forward a novel solution to the so-called All or Nothing Problem. Contrary to what many believe, I argue that it is permissible to go some way towards benefiting others without going all the way. Something Is Okay! If this is true, it is not the case (which would be absurd) that we should rather Do Nothing than Something if we are not going to do the Best. If my main claim is correct, this is a (...) blow to a key tenet of Effective Altruism, namely, that if we do good (e.g., contribute to charities), we should do what is best. A side benefit of my solution is the introduction of a neglected sort of supererogation, namely, Self-Regarding Suboptimal Supererogation (i.e., the self-regarding equivalent of the more familiar other-regarding notion of going halfway towards supererogation). Regarding this, my view implies that we are not obliged to do what is best for ourselves (e.g., maximize our health or looks) once we go some way towards benefiting ourselves (incurring considerable costs in doing so). -/- . (shrink)

The opening lines of the first issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics —an unsigned April 1975 editoriali—capture the uselessness of editorial policy statements: > The reputation of a newly founded journal must be established by the style, quality and range of the material it offers. Perhaps then editorial policy statements achieve very little, for, either the reader can appreciate the usefulness of the journal’s contents without editorial encouragement, or he discovers for himself their irrelevance to his interests.1 As incoming (...) editors, succeeding John McMillan who ably led the journal for more than half a decade, we appreciate this insight. Whatever we might say about our plans for the journal as it hurtles past its 50th birthday, the proof of the pudding will be in the tasting—or the reading—not in editorial promises. Nevertheless, we will say a few words about our mindset and aspirations as we jointly assume the editor-in-chief role of this venerable journal. First, something ‘old.’ We are as committed as ever to the founding promise of the journal to ‘provide a forum for the reasoned discussion of moral issues arising from the provision of medical care’ (emphasis ours) while—just as crucially—holding ‘no brief for one particular professional, political or religious viewpoint.’1 In other words, we will not be favouring articles that are politically convenient—for any one side of a morally charged debate—and nor will we allow prejudice for, or against, positions associated with certain professional or religious (or for that matter, non-religious) viewpoints to sway our decisions about what to publish. We are, instead, concerned first and foremost with the strength of the reasons, argument and evidence marshalled in favour of a given view, based on premises that can be reasonably shared (or at least seriously entertained) among a wide set of interlocutors.2 …. (shrink)

This chapter concentrates on the nature of the image as it presents itself in experience, with its remarkable capacity to represent within itself people, events, emotions, and many other things, and with its place in art. The Husserlian perspective has many affinities with more recent investigations of images. The physical dimension of image plays an important role in imaging and has been largely neglected by philosophers, though not by artists. The uniqueness of image consciousness rests in its ability to see (...) something in something else. Then, the chapter assesses the differences between image consciousness and symbolic or signitive consciousness. The resemblance in image consciousness must precisely not be perfect; it must be paired with and permeated by difference and even conflict. Images improve experience by folding into themselves the world. (shrink)

It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The (...) suggestion is that there may be something rather than nothing in virtue of the truth of certain sorts of subjunctive conditionals. (shrink)

A non-technical introduction to quantum mechanics, the Everett interpretation, and the emergence of spacetime.

The Stoics have often been compared to the earthborn Giants in the Battle of Gods and Giants in Plato’s Sophist, but with diverging opinions about the lessons they drew in reaction to Plato. At issue are questions about what in the Sophist the Stoics were reacting to, how the Stoics are like and unlike the Giants, the status of being for the Stoics, and the extent to which they were Platonizing with their incorporeals. With these open questions in mind, I (...) reexamine the Sophist from the Stoic perspective, finding eight distinct challenges that are likely to have been salient to the Stoics, and offer a new account of the Stoics as responding to these challenges with an innovative ontology that prises apart something from being to make room for what is not, and a sophisticated one-world metaphysics that grounds everything there is in two fundamental bodies. (shrink)

Mitate is the name used to describe a typically Japanese visual trope, in which one object is meant to be seen as something else. While mitate is a defining element of Edo period haikai and ukiyo-e, a this kind of overlapping meanings can be found in much earlier sources. Its aesthetic effects are often smile, laughter, and parody, but mitate can also bestow a hidden depth to the commonplace and the contemporary through explicit and implicit connections to more noble (...) and remote cultural antecedents. In this paper I examine mitate and mitate-like configurations throughout the history of Japanese aesthetics, and conclude by asking whether mitate is indeed a uniquely Japanese phenomenon and by analysing whether and how it can be relevant to some philosophical discussions (Husserl's and Wittgenstein’s) concerned with the phenomenological and ontological status of images. (shrink)

An intuitive view is that creativity involves bringing together what is already known and familiar in a way that produces something new. In cognitive science, this intuition is typically formalized in terms of computational processes that combine or associate internally represented information. From this computationalist perspective, it is hard to imagine how non-representational approaches in embodied cognitive science could shed light on creativity, especially when it comes to abstract conceptual reasoning of the kind scientists so often engage in. The (...) present article offers an entry point to addressing this challenge. The scientific project of embodied cognitive science is a continuation of work in the functionalist tradition in psychology developed over a century ago by William James and John Dewey, among others. The focus here is on how functionalist views on the nature of mind, thought, and experience offer an alternative starting point for cognitive science in general, and for the cognitive science of scientific creativity in particular. The result may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, the article claims that the functionalist conceptual framework motivates rejecting mainstream cognitive views of creativity as the combination or association of ideas. On the other hand, however, the strategy adopted here—namely, revisiting ideas from functionalist psychology to inform current scientific theorizing—can itself be described as a process of arriving at new, creative ideas from combinations of old ones. As is shown here, a proper understanding of cognition in light of the functionalist tradition resolves the seeming tension between these two claims. (shrink)

Just days after the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States, specific passages from American philosopher Richard Rorty’s 1998 book were shared thousands of times on social media. Both and wrote about Rorty’s prophecy and its apparent realization, as within the haze that followed this unexpected victory, Rorty seemed to offer a presciently trenchant analysis of what led to the rise of “strong man” Trump. However, in this paper, Forstenzer points to Rorty’s own potential intellectual responsibility (...) in the unfolding crisis of liberal democracy. -/- This paper seeks to elucidate the relationship between Rorty’s liberal ironism and contemporary post-truth politics. While the paper ultimately concludes that Rorty is not causally responsible and thus not complicit with the rise of post-truth politics, it contends that Rorty’s philosophical project bears some intellectual responsibility for the onset of post-truth politics insofar as it took a complacent attitude towards the dangers associated with over-affirming the contingency of our epistemic practices in public debate. In the last instance, this paper argues that Rorty’s complacency is a pragmatic failure and thus cuts to the heart of his pragmatism. (shrink)

The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self-refuting position not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of alethic nihilism—that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the inconsistency account. After offering an account of alethic nihilism, and how it purports to avoid the self-refutation problem, I (...) argue that it avoids the problem at the expense of changing the subject. I then present other arguments against nihilism and responses to the considerations offered in defense of it. The only tenable position is that something is indeed true. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the (...) question van Inwagen wanted to answer. (shrink)

The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between (...) active and passive euthanasia, and to the exoneration of God for the production of evil. In particular, I shall try to show, first, that the American Medical Association's recent attempt to distinguish between active and passive euthanasia is seriously defective. Second, I shall try to show that a popular version of the so-called Free Will Defense of God for Evil is also seriously defective. (shrink)

In an important article, Chris Hart makes the case that CDA needs to draw on a wider range of theoretical sources in Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Science, giving particular attention to Evolutionary Psychology. While I support Hart’s case for this approach to CDA, and also support his argument, as a corrective to Chilton, that Evolutionary Psychology actually shows the need for something like CDA, this present article advances three further points, aimed to supplement the cognitive approach to CDA. The (...) first is that CDA could fruitfully draw on Cognitive Linguistics in a more detailed way than it has hitherto, and in particular on work that articulates Cognitive Linguistics with Cognitive Psychology of the kind developed by Tomasello. The second is that the insights of Habermas, much mentioned in CDA, need to be better integrated within a linguistic approach to CDA. The third and most important point is that the question of the underlying moral values of the critical stance in CDA now need to be explicated in view of the global context in which CDA operates. I also show, using Hart’s own data, how values are presupposed in many types of utterance. Hart is right to focus on evidentials in his data, as evidence of the critical abilities of human communicators. But there is something important missing for CDA to explore further: the presence of contestable values. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to suggest a definition of genetic information by taking into account the debate surrounding it. Particularly, the objections raised by Developmental Systems Theory to Teleosemantic endorsements of the notion of genetic information as well as deflationist approaches which suggest to ascribe the notion of genetic information a heuristic value at most, and to reduce it to that of causality. Design/methodology/approach The paper presents the notion of genetic information through its historical evolution and analyses (...) it with the conceptual tools offered by philosophical theories of causation on one side and linguistics on the other. Findings The concept of genetic information is defined as a special kind of cause which causes something to be one way rather than another, by combining elementary units one way rather than another. Tested against the notion of “genetic error” this definition demonstrates to provide an exhaustive account of the common denominators associated with the notion of genetic information: causal specificity; combinatorial mechanism; arbitrariness. Originality/value The definition clarifies how the notion of information is understood when applied to genetic phenomena and also contributes to the debate on the notion of information, broadly meant, which is still affected by lack of consensus. (shrink)

The idea of doing something for its own sake interests me for two reasons. First, I should like to understand better two opposing reactions that I have felt on coming across the phrase ‘for its own sake’ used in earnest. When told that knowledge is worth pursuing for its own sake and that this is what the study of science at a university ought to be like—not an adjunct to commercially motivated research in a product I design and development (...) team funded by local industry—I, and others, feel that something pure and noble, holy, good and true is being said. On the other hand, I recognize that to some, who would probably describe themselves as more realistic than myself, the claim that knowledge should be, and is being, pursued for its own sake has a hollow ring. Nowadays, academics themselves feel uneasy when they hear this sort of thing being said in public in mixed company. But they do continue to say such things to each other, at least occasionally in private, among consenting adults. Furthermore, I do attach impor- tance to the thought that to do the right thing for its own sake is a shining example of moral goodness. At the same time I acknowledge that the idea of a good deed done for its own sake is less than crystal clear I and that, to many, the person who claims to be doing something for its own sake sounds like someone who smiles at himself in the mirror in the morning in order to find one approving face before setting out to commit his next crime against humanity. I should like to know whether this phrase ‘for its own sake’ will bear the weight I want to place on it or whether a more sceptical attitude is called for. (shrink)

This paper discusses the concept of nothing (nothingness) from the point of logic and ontology (metaphysics). It is argued that the category of nothing as a denial of being is subjected to various interpretations. In particular, this thesis concerns the concept of negation as used in metaphysics. Since the Leibniz question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ and the principle of sufficient reason is frequently connected with the status of nothing, their analysis is important for the problem in (...) question. Appendix contains a short critical analysis of Heidegger’s famous statement Das Nichts nichtet. (shrink)

1. Introduction: a look back at the reasons vs. causes debate. 2. The interventionist account of causation. 3. Four objections to interventionism. 4. The counterfactual analysis of event causation. 5. The role of free agency. 6. Causality in the human sciences. -- The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are causal or not. Melden, (...) Peters, Winch, Kenny and Anscombe had contributed their anticausal conceptions. The neo-Wittgensteinians seemed to be winning the day when in 1963 Donald Davidson published his seminal paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Davidson’s paper devastated the Wittgensteinian camp. It contained, among other things, a powerful attack on the logical connection argument. Davidson argued that the existence of a logical or conceptual connection between descriptions can never eliminate a causal relation, which holds between events simpliciter, not between events under certain descriptions. Davidson maintained that in a way, reasons can be causes. When somebody acts for a certain reason, his intentional attitudes, or rather changes in his attitudes, cause his bodily movements. Davidson also argued that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. For the definition of action, he argued that intentional actions are bodily movements caused in the right way by beliefs and desires that rationalize them. Davidson’s paper paved the way for causal theories of action, which superseded neo-Wittgensteinian analyses in the following decades. The causal theory was rapidly adopted by Alvin Goldman, David Armstrong, Paul Churchland, Myles Brand and many others, entering the mainstream and dominating the philosophy of action to this very day. In 1971 Georg Henrik von Wright published his book "Explanation and Understanding". The second chapter did not deal with agency, but with causation. It developed a new account of causation, the interventionist or experimentalist account. Focusing on causation, von Wright remedied a major shortcoming of the reasons vs. causes debate. The concept of causality, and the nature of the causal relation, received little attention in this debate, a fact that holds true for both camps. Mostly it was simply taken for granted that, as Hempel had declared, “causal explanation is a special type of deductive-nomological explanation”. One camp then aligned intentional explanations with D-N explanations, while the other camp insisted on their disparity. So strictly speaking, the label “reasons/causes debate” was a misnomer. The controversy dealt primarily with the question as to whether intentional explanations can take the form of D-N explanations, while the notion of causation, and the metaphysics of the causal relation, were left obscured. With von Wright’s new approach, the situation changed. Von Wright was primarily concerned with causation, but his approach contained an implicit attack on the causal theory of action as well. His core idea was that the notion of causality is intimately linked with, or even derived from, the notion of intentionally making something happen. Other philosophers, even Hume, had considered such a connection before, but often just to reject this view, regarding it as a kind of myth belonging to the infancy of the human mind. Von Wright took the idea seriously. He submitted the analysis that p is the cause of q if and only if by doing p we could bring about q. The causal theory of action was also concerned with the relation between causation and agency, to which its name bears witness. The causal theory of action holds that actions are bodily movements with a certain causal history. This is why von Wright’s account constituted a momentous challenge to the causal theory: it reversed the direction of conceptual dependency between both notions. Davidson and his followers tried to define what an intentional action is by using the notion of causation. The causal condition which the causal theory sets is part of the definition of “doing something intentionally”. Von Wright claimed that the conceptual dependency is the other way round. He used the notions of doing, and bringing about, to explain what causal relations are. So, instead of a causal theory of action, he advocated an agency theory of causation, as it may be dubbed. It is remarkable how seldom this clash of opinions about conceptual primacy is reflected in the literature. There are few exceptions: Fred Stoutland noticed the conflict, and he published a number of papers in which he compared Davidson’s and von Wright’s views. Von Wright’s book "Explanation and Understanding" was widely read and discussed in the seventies, especially in Europe. But it strikes me that especially in North America, where the causal theory of action became the orthodoxy of the day, von Wright’s challenge went largely unnoticed. Even Davidson did not seem to take it seriously. He nowhere takes notice of the interventionist theory of causation, while he does discuss von Wright’s earlier book "Norm and Action". As is well-known, Davidson favoured an alternative account of causation, based on “the principle of the nomological character of causality”, as he somewhat clumsily called it, or, later and less clumsily, “the cause-law thesis”. Davidson’s firm adherence to a nomological theory of causality may explain why he did not take much interest in alternative accounts. [...] -/- . 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Because of its practical advantages, machine learning (ML) is increasingly used for decision-making in numerous sectors. This paper demonstrates that the integral characteristics of ML, such as semi-autonomy, complexity, and non-deterministic modeling have important ethical implications. In particular, these characteristics lead to a lack of insight and lack of comprehensibility, and ultimately to the loss of human control over decision-making. Errors, which are bound to occur in any decision-making process, may lead to great harm and human rights violations. It is (...) important to have a principled way of assigning responsibility for such errors. The integral characteristics of ML, however, pose serious difficulties in defining responsibility and regulating ML decision-making. First, we elaborate on these characteristics and their epistemic and ethical implications. We then analyze possible general strategies for resolving the assignment of moral responsibility and show that, due to the specific way in which ML functions, each potential solution is problematic, whether we assign responsibility to humans, machines, or using hybrid models. Then, we shift focus on an alternative approach that bypasses moral responsibility and attempts to define legal liability independently through solutions such as informed consent and the no-fault compensation system. Both of these solutions prove unsatisfactory because they leave too much room for potential abuses of ML decision-making. We conclude that both ethical and legal solutions are fraught with serious difficulties. These difficulties prompt us to re-weigh the costs and benefits of using ML for high-stake decisions. (shrink)

Three pictures of integrity have gained philosophical currency. On the integrated self picture, integrity involves the integration of "parts" of oneself into a whole. On the identity picture, integrity means fidelity to projects and principles constitutive of one's core identity. On the clean hands picture, integrity means maintaining the purity of one's agency, especially in dirty hands situations. I sketch each picture and suggest two general criticisms. First, integrity is reduced to something else with which it is not equivalent--to (...) the conditions of unified agency, to the conditions for continuing as the same self, and to the conditions for having reason to refuse cooperating with evil. Second, integrity is understood as a personal, but not also a social virtue; this limits the analysis of what integrity is and why it is a virtue. In the last section, I suggest a way of understanding integrity as the social virtue of standing before others for what, in one's best judgment, is worth persons' doing. (shrink)

This chapter argues that it’s possible for something to be brought into existence by something that is non-actual. Segal distinguishes his argument from arguments for causation by omission, and draws a comparison between his argument and Zeno causation. Finally, he connects the topic to Jewish mystical traditions.

It strikes many as obvious that negative facts—such as that Justin Trudeau is not the prime minister of Australia—are not fundamental: negative facts must ultimately be explained in terms of positive facts (for instance, that Justin Trudeau is the prime minister of Canada). I focus on a particular class of negative facts: contingent negative existentials (such as that there are no 10ft tall humans). If contingent negative existentials are not fundamental, then they must be explained. But the claim that contingent (...) negative existentials are explained is in tension with the widely held view that any universal generalization can be explained by its instances together with a totality fact (i.e. a fact to the effect that the instances exhaust the relevant domain). This is because a totality fact is itself a negative existential, and equivalent to a universal generalization. If the explanation for any contingent negative existential must appeal to another contingent negative existential, then—unless there are no fundamental facts—not all contingent negative existentials can be non-fundamental. I argue that we should give up the age-old mantra that only positive facts can be fundamental. I show that at least some contingent negative existentials are fundamental. I first make the case for including a totality fact in the explanans for a contingent negative existential and show that alternative accounts for explaining such facts are inadequate. I then undermine the standard arguments for subscribing to the view that there are no negative facts—including negative existentials—at the fundamental level. (shrink)

This article is intended to examine the lines 1006a34-b9 of Metaphysics Γ 4, where Aristotle conjectures and discusses an objection to the very first step of his proof of the principle of the most universal science. As we shall see in detail, this objection consists in claiming that the meaning of a word is multiple, so that it is not possible for a word to have one single meaning, contrarily to what it seems to be required for one to say (...) something. As we shall also see, some crucial aspects of aristotelian notion of meaning emerge in this context, among which those related to the unity proper to it. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’: There is something, because the probability of there being nothing is 0. Some philosophers have recently examined van Inwagen's argument and concluded that it does not really work. Three points are central in their criticism: the premise which states that there is only one empty possible world is false, the premise which states that all possible worlds have the same (...) probability is not plausible and the argument is not significant for the question it sets out to answer. In this paper, I shall show that even if there are many empty worlds, this does not necessarily invalidate the argument in its general lines, the examples they offer to support the intuition that possible worlds may have different probabilities fail, and even if the conclusion of the argument does not really answer the question van Inwagen sets out to answer, it is still not an insignificant response to the question. (shrink)

Images of encounters between animals and drones or Google Street View cars are quite viral on the web. This article focuses on the different regimes of animacy and conflicts of affects in these images using an anthropo- semiotic approach. It investigates how other- ness reveals something that exceeds us, from the materiality of the machine to systems of values. It suggests that the disturbance of ani- mal presence in contemporary digital images helps us to read media technologies.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Something Breaks Through a Little”: The Marriage of Zen and Sophia in the Life of Thomas MertonChristopher PramukThe fact that you are a Zen Buddhist and I am a Christian monk, far from separating us, makes us most like one another. How many centuries is it going to take for people to discover this fact? 1Though Merton’s “turn to the East” began well before Vatican II would turn (...) the eyes of Roman Catholics toward the ecumenical and non-Christian world, its fruits would not generally appear in published form until after the Council. In works such as Mystics and Zen Masters (1967) and Zen and the Birds of Appetite (1968), Merton spends much labor correcting caricatures of Eastern spirituality prominent in the West, especially in the American counterculture. These remain vital texts today because they give us the mature Merton at his best, pressed to the limit of discursive communication on vexatious systematic and epistemological problems—and this after more than a decade of reflection and growth with respect to interfaith dialogue. Indeed, brilliantly realized essays such as “The New Consciousness” and “A Christian Looks at Zen” reveal Merton to be much more “conservative” than conservative caricatures make him out to be, and much more “liberal” than most progressives. Merton writes with the authority of a committed Christian immersed in serious dialogue, with all its challenges and risks, and not just as one who talks about it.Few serious students of Merton’s life and writings—whether inspired by his universal scope of vision or scandalized by it—would dispute that his conception of the divine changed as he allowed deeper encounters with Eastern traditions to interrogate his faith. What is less commonly understood, however, is how closely Merton’s engagement with Zen corresponded with his internalization of a deep thread in the Christian East, namely, the Sophia tradition of Russian Orthodoxy, or “sophiology” as known in its speculative form, associated with thinkers such as Vladimir Soloviev (d. 1900), Sergius Bulgakov (d. 1944), and Paul Evdokimov (d. 1970). What attracted Merton to these thinkers was their recasting of the Christian narrative of salvation in the boldest imaginative and metaphysical terms; from biblical, patristic, and modern philosophical sources they had fashioned a “positive theology,” a theology brimming with content. Though Merton himself would never develop a formal [End Page 67] sophiology, his internalization of Russian imagery is amply evidenced in journals, letters, notes, and in seminal works such as The Behavior of Titans (1961), The New Man (1961), and New Seeds of Contemplation (1961). The prose poem Hagia Sophia (1962), still one of Merton’s most understudied and “secret” works, is by far the most realized, lyrical, and daring of his meditations on the Wisdom figure of Sophia.In this article I wish to suggest that the striking “coincidence” of Zen and Sophia in Merton’s life during the late 1950s was not merely a coincidence, but hinged in part on epistemological difficulties he was wrestling with in the midst of radically shifting cultural, ecclesial, and political horizons. While in one sense the irruption of Sophia into Merton’s consciousness in the late 1950s was just one thread woven into the larger mosaic of his “turn to the world,” it was, I believe, the golden thread that helped him to hold the fabric together, ever more centered in Christ. In other words, this “bringing together” of apparent opposites does not end with epistemology. What emerges in Merton’s concurrent study of Zen and Russian sophiology is a kind of “story-shaped” Christology, a story told through the life of Merton but haunted more and more by the mysterious figure of Sophia.2Nondualism: A Zen and Ancient Christian “Way of Seeing”In a letter dated March 12, 1959, Merton introduced himself to Zen scholar D. T. Suzuki, then known worldwide for his gift for translating the teachings of Zen Buddhism to the West.3 After receiving a warm reply and some poems from Suzuki, Merton wrote a second letter. His tone is warm and forthright, written as one might address a respected mentor or a long-time friend. What is most striking is the intimacy with which... (shrink)

This essay addresses a tension at the heart of the phenomenological method, namely the idea that phenomenology is both a method and an experience – it is both something we do and something we undergo. This dual understanding of the method generates questions as to how to best understand it. The above epigraphs are testament to the fact that the phenomenological reduction is not only something we perform; it is also something that can happen to us (...) – or “descend” upon us – leaving us in a state of generative disorientation. While the reduction is typically conceived as the heart of the phenomenological method, this paper explores a reading of the reduction that foregrounds its existential force as much as its methodological significance. This reading is not new; its origin lies in part with Eugen Fink, Edmund Husserl’s research assistant from 1928 till Husserl’s death in 1938, but it has carried forward in critical phenomenology, phenomenology of illness (Carel 2016), and Latinx feminisms (Martinez 2014, Grimm 2024). This narrative continues to grant the phenomenological reduction – and the epochē in particular – pride of place at the heart of the method. Crucially, however, in the lineage traced here, the epochē is conceived not only as a central aspect of phenomenological method, but also as an existential undergoing. Attending to the existential aspects of the epochē is vital if we are to come to grips with why and how phenomenology changes us, and with the transformative aspects of the method. The question as to how phenomenology changes us is central for critical phenomenology, wherein phenomenology has an ameliorative, and not only descriptive, potential. (shrink)

Our know-it-alls, the new spirits, assert that faith alone saves and that works and external things contribute nothing to this end. We answer: It is true, nothing that is in us does it but faith, as we shall hear later on. But these leaders of the blind are unwilling to see that faith must have something to believe—something to which it may cling and upon which it may stand. Thus faith clings to the water and believes it to (...) be Baptism in which there is sheer salvation and life, not through the water, as we have sufficiently stated, but through its incorporation with God's Word and ordinance and the joining of his name to it. When I believe this, what else is it but believing in God as the one who has implanted his Word in this external ordinance and offered it to us so that we may grasp the treasure it contains? 1. (shrink)

Written from a broadly atheist point of view, this paper explores the religious dimension of moral experience, that is, whether in order to be moral and/or to live a life that in our own eyes means something it is necessary to believe in something that transcends what we can verify through science or direct observation and even what we can clearly articulate. I investigate the question through an interpretation of the work of four very different writers, namely Hans (...) Jonas, Alfred North Whitehead, Albert Camus, and Cormac McCarthy, who all contribute valuable insights that suggest the impossibility of a moral life, and indeed any decent human life at all, that is based purely on tangible reality and the rationally justifiable. (shrink)

Nineteenth-century literary criticism read literature as a commentary on the world it inhabited. Thecommentators understood what they read in terms of the judgments and values they registered in it, andwhich they themselves, as commentators, as critics, made explicit - as if, somehow, the literary textunder investigation always fell short in this regard. Their criticism, then, took up, or extended, theintention of the texts they engaged, as they understood it: to say something significant about the world.In this climate, the literary (...) object, as literary, scarcely existed. Where successful, it was a transparency,in itself barely visible, so well did it convey a world.This is, briefly, the caricature of this period of literary criticism produced by those polemicists who,coming after, were keen to situate themselves in the vanguard of a new critical method. (shrink)

_Little Eyolf_ (1894) is one of Henrik Ibsen’s most difficult plays. In this new full-scale reading, Toril Moi shows that formally as well as thematically the play is preoccupied with the conflict between fantasy and reality. Ibsen uses this conflict to explore the possibilities of realism as a theatrical form, and to lay the foundations for modernism in the theater. Deeply destructive to their child, the parents’ egocentric fantasies make them incapable of love, and also prevent them from seeing themselves (...) and others as they really are. In the last two acts, the characters slowly realize that in order to live in a world full of suffering and death, they must develop the capacity to see reality clearly, to develop what Iris Murdoch calls a “just and loving gaze.” Only then do they have a chance to do something meaningful for themselves and others. (shrink)

The long history of the overlap of science and philosophy finds a focal point in cosmology. In an effort to examine what happens when science and deconstruction encounter, this essay thus begins with, and follows the path of, cosmology. I start by suggesting a new solution to the oldest question in cosmology: why is there something rather than nothing? From this, I attempt to outline the way in which necessity is thought to operate by means of natural laws, tracing (...) the sense in which science's demand for falsifiable claims creates an aporia in which its truths are not ultimately truthful and its necessity is not necessary. Focusing on the ways in which différance and the autoimmune can help us open up the work of science, I come to suggest two new tropes, that of apoptosis and the remainder, arguing that the inherent openness of science can be one of its strengths, especially if we ask the question of what remains to be asked once science has answered a question. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Something to do with Demeter:Ritual and Performance in Aristophanes' Women at the ThesmophoriaAngeliki TzanetouLike his character the Kinsman, Aristophanes invades Athenian women's religious space. He puts onstage for the whole city a religious festival restricted to women. He suggests that women use this occasion to drink and plot against men, and he portrays them as carrying on adulterous affairs and duping their husbands. As a result of this (...) negative portrayal of women, scholars have concluded that the play undermines women's position in the festival and in the city. Elizabeth Bobrick (1997), for example, argues that the play misrepresents women's experience in ritual. Lauren Taaffe (1993) insists the play shows that women are only men in disguise, that it is not really about women at all but rather uses them to highlight male concerns. And Angus Bowie (1993, 227) concludes that in this play Aristophanes demonstrates that comedy, not tragedy, has the right to "give an accurate and fulsome picture of female villainy."On the face of it, Women at the Thesmophoria satirizes women's real ritual experience and does not respectfully depict the Thesmophoria-a very important festival celebrated throughout Greece, which promoted agricultural and human fertility. And yet, despite the Kinsman's invasion and his mockery of women, the role of women in ritual is not really undercut in this play. The female characters who inhabit the comic stage and protest their portrayal in drama do not aim to redefine their social roles as wives and mothers. Instead, they use the authority of their roles to mount a successful attack against Euripides because he undermines these functions. In fact, the play acknowledges and validates women's contribution to the fertility of the polis in two different ways.After the Kinsman is unmasked and taken captive by the women, four different strategies for rescuing him are staged. After all these strategies, derived from plays by Euripides, fail, a fifth strategy succeeds. As scholars have noted, the Kinsman's captivity and rescue parallel the founding myth of the Thesmophoria festival, the story of Persephone's [End Page 329] abduction and imprisonment by Hades and her rescue by her mother Demeter.1 My reading of Women at the Thesmophoria builds on this analysis by demonstrating how each of the Euripidean parodies moves closer to the myth of Demeter and Persephone. Moreover, with each of the parodies the actors become increasingly feminized. In the final scene of the play every character onstage but one is wearing female dress. Ironically, structurally and theatrically, Aristophanes' play celebrates women's power, as it is demonstrated in Demeter's rescue of her daughter and the rebirth of human and agricultural fertility.Moreover, the play affirms the centrality of women to the fertility of Athenian drama. Earlier studies have seen Women at the Thesmophoria as a competition between Euripides and Aristophanes and between tragedy and comedy (e.g., Hubbard 1991, Henderson 1996, Zeitlin 1996b, Gibert 1999-2000). The play's movement from male to female, especially in the arrangement of the parodies, is also a move from Dionysus to Demeter. The captivity/rescue plot is associated with not only Demeter and Persephone but also Dionysus, the presiding deity of Athenian theater. The stories of Dionysus' captivity and rescue are different, however; in these the god rescues himself and punishes his captors (e.g., Pentheus and Lycurgus). As the rescue strategies in Women at the Thesmophoria [End Page 330] unfold, they move from the Dionysian pattern of self-liberation and punishment of opponents to a Demetrian one of cooperation and reconciliation. This is also a movement from tragedy to comedy, in which tragedy fails to liberate while comedy succeeds. The four parodies and the final scenario move from explicitly tragic situations, including the threat of human sacrifice, to love/marriage plots and finally to men dressing as women to deceive a parodically hypermasculine male, thereby achieving a return to normality. By the end of the play, male cross-dressing does not show how easy it is to become female, but how essential women are to comedy-not only to creating laughter but also to the basic function of comedy: affirming and celebrating the... (shrink)

What it is to be determinate, to have quality, to be something, hardly appears to be a problem worthy of thought. How could anything be more self-evident or familiar or resistant to questioning? It seems virtually impossible to be unacquainted with the category of something, whether in reality or in thought or speech. To encounter anything real at all is to encounter something, whereas to think or speak any intelligible content is already to refer to something (...) thought or spoken. Indeed, it is unimaginable how one could fail to understand something, since if one did lack all notion of something there would be nothing determinate to understand or encounter. (shrink)

Synthetic content, which has been produced by generative artificial intelligence, is beginning to spread through the public sphere. Increasingly, we find ourselves exposed to convincing ‘deepfakes’ and powerful chatbots in our online environments. How should we mitigate the emerging risks to individuals and society? This article argues that labelling synthetic content in public forums is an essential first step. While calls for labelling have already been growing in volume, no principled argument has yet been offered to justify this measure (which (...) inevitably comes with some additional costs). Rectifying that deficit, I conduct a close examination of our epistemic and expressive interests in identifying synthetic content as such. In so doing, I develop a cumulative case for social media platforms to enforce a labelling duty. I argue that this represents an important element of good platform governance, helping to shore up the integrity of our contemporary public discourse, which takes place increasingly online. (shrink)

The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson’s classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes , is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. . Failure to detect mismatches between intention and (...) outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310, 116–119.]. In the choice blindness paradigm participants fail to notice mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they are presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. In this article, we use word-frequency and latent semantic analysis to investigate a corpus of introspective reports collected within the choice blindness paradigm. We contrast the introspective reasons given in non-manipulated vs. manipulated trials, but find very few differences between these two groups of reports. (shrink)

'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is a question that is arguably as old as philosophy itself. Nevertheless, despite the fact that it is of perennial philosophical, scientific, and religious interest, it receives less attention than many other classic questions in philosophy. And despite continued fascination with 'the Question', and its status as one of the great intellectual mysteries, there are few academic book-length discussions of the subject. This book serves as the definitive guide to the Question. It (...) includes a discussion of the proper interpretation of the Question, whether it can be expected to have an answer, an overview of the major answers which have been proposed, and, most significantly, a new and innovative explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. (shrink)

Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language.

By delving into the history and development of logic from its beginnings to the modern era, George Englebretsen rehabilitates term logic and demonstrates that an enhanced traditional logic remains a viable possibility. Taking inspiration from Fred Sommers' work, he creates an updated and fascinating version of term logic; one he believes to be just as legitimate as, and in ways superior to, the currently predominant mathematical logic.

This essay examines the role of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy in the ideology of what the author calls the “Nationalist International,” a loosely affiliated international network of “New” Right, nationalist, alt-right, and neo-fascist groups. The author argues that thought leaders of this movement, from the relatively obscure to politicians and organizers in major political parties, such as Steve Bannon in the MAGA movement in the United States or Marc Jongen of Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, have drawn upon Heidegger to articulate (...) their principles and aims. More openly neo-fascist thinkers, such as Greg Johnson in the United States and Aleksandr Dugin in Russia, have produced sophisticated readings of Heidegger to support their causes. Such figures use Heidegger’s critique of Plato, as the onset of a metaphysical nihilism that culminates in modernity, to condemn liberalism as a facet of a rootless universalism that deprives a people of its history and identity. The repudiation of classical liberal democracy in many militant alt-right organizations and online communities played a role in assault on Congress on January 6, 2021 and Donald Trump’s attempted coup that day. The conclusion addresses the question of how educators and others can engage a new generation vulnerable to radicalization and argues for a form of “absolute welcome” as a response to increasing polarization. (shrink)

This paper is about the question: what is it for a mental state to mean (or present) something as an intentional object? This issue is addressed from a broad perspective, against the background of Brentano’s philosophical programme in Psychology from an empirical standpoint, and the controversy between the proponents of a non-canonical interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and the so-called orthodox interpretation advocated namely by R. Chisholm. My investigation is divided into six parts. In the first section, I (...) explain the meaning and function of the notion of phenomenon in light of Brentano’s philosophical programme, and I briefly elucidate the notion of physical phenomenon which, in Brentano’s Psychology, constitutes the primary object of consciousness. In the next two sections, I look at two aspects of Brentano’s criticism of the identity thesis that he attributes to British empiricism, namely the psychological aspect, which concerns the identification of the two classes of phenomena, and the metaphysical aspect relating to the relationship between physical phenomena and the reality of an extramental world. Once this double distinction will be established, I will turn to the relation of intentional objects to presentations and put forward the hypothesis that intentional objects are conceptually dependent upon presentations and that this dependence rests, in turn, upon the content of the mental phenomena. The next step concerns Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects, and one of the main non-orthodox arguments against the canonical interpretation, namely that the latter conflates primary and secondary objects. In this context, I examine a second hypothesis: that the secondary object, or intentional correlate of an act, is an intentional content, which is distinct both from the intentional object and from the reality to which it relates, and I maintain that the intentional content has the function of mediating the mental acts’ relation to their objects. Finally, I shall examine some objections against the hypothesis of intentional content in Brentano’s Psychology, and I will conclude with a brief commentary on the bearing of this investigation with regard to the interpretation of the genesis of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, before and after the reistic turn of his philosophy. (shrink)