Non-player characters, or “NPCs", are characters in video games and in tabletop role-playing games like Dungeons and Dragons who are controlled by the game itself or by the storyteller, rather than by one of the players. NPCs in the real world would appear as normal living creatures, yet they would lack phenomenal consciousness. According to a popular theodical approach, God enables evil to exist because it is necessary for bringing about a greater good. However, some theodicies are built (...) around greater goods that are obtainable even if conscious creatures hardly ever suffer and instead instances of evil mostly affect NPCs who conscious creatures cannot recognize as such. I characterize these theodicies as “NPC-inviting theodicies”, as they invite the thought that God should make NPCs exist in the real world to bring about plentiful goods with hardly any creaturely suffering. Examples of NPC-inviting theodicies include several free-will theodicies and the soul-making theodicy. I argue that NPC-inviting theodicies cannot explain why God would enable conscious creatures to undergo a great deal of suffering rather than NPCs, and I show this to be problematic for those theodicies in three ways. I then consider four possible responses on behalf of NPC-inviting theodicies. (shrink)

This paper advances the development of a phylogeny-based psychology in which cognitive ability types are individuated as characters in the evolutionary biological sense. I explain the character concept and its utility in addressing (or dissolving) conceptual problems arising from discoveries of cognitive abilities across a wide range of species. I use the examples of stereopsis in the praying mantis, internal cell-to-cell signaling in plants, and episodic memory in scrub jays to show how anthropocentric cognitive ability types can be reformulated (...) into cognitive characters, thereby promoting the integration of psychology with other sciences of evolved traits. (shrink)

Characters—those imaginary agents populating the fictional worlds we spend so much time absorbed in—are ubiquitous in our lives. We track their fortunes, judge their actions and attitudes, and respond to them with anger, amusement, and affection—indeed, the whole palette of human emotions. Often enough, powerfully drawn characters transcend the stories to which they owe their genesis, migrating into our imaginations and deliberations about the actual world. And yet there has been remarkably little sustained and systematic reflection on these (...) creatures that engage our minds and shape our feelings in equal measure. In Engaging Characters, Murray Smith sets out a comprehensive theory of character, exploring the role of characters in our experience of narrative and fiction. While focussing on film, Smith’s analysis also illuminates character in literature, opera, song, cartoons, new media, and social media. At the heart of Smith’s account is an explanation of the capacity of characters to move us. Teasing out the different dimensions of character, Smith explores the means by which films draw us close to characters, or hold us at a distance from them, and how our beliefs and attitudes are formed (and sometimes reformed) by these encounters. Integrating these arguments with research on emotion in philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and anthropology, Engaging Characters advances an account of the nature of fictional characters and their functions in fiction, imagination, and human experience as a whole. Opening with a Foreword by David Bordwell, in this revised, twenty-fifth anniversary edition of Engaging Characters, Smith refines and extends the arguments of the first edition, with a substantial new Afterword reviewing the debates on emotion, empathy, and character inspired by the book. (shrink)

Is Homer’s Ulysses the same character as Dante’s Ulysses? How many characters are involved in Sauron’s orcs army? And what about fictional people featuring in inconsistent stories? These and similar conundrums regard the identity of the mysterious inhabitants of fictions: fictional characters (ficta, for short). This book tackles such issues from the standpoint of three major metaphysical perspectives – objectual realism (ficta as objects), non-objectual realism (ficta as properties), anti-realism – and in interplay with literary interpretive practices.

Fictional characters are awkward creatures. They are described as being girls, detectives, and cats; as being famous, based on real people, and well developed, and as being paradigmatic examples of things that don’t exist. It’s not hard to see that there are tensions between these various descriptions—how can something that is a detective not exist?—and there is a range of views designed to make sense of the pre-theoretical data. Fictional realists hold that we should accept that fictional characters (...) are part of ‘the furniture of our world’. Others are fictional anti-realists, who hold instead that our world does not contain any such things. In this article, I deploy an independently motivated metaontology to defend a novel version of fictional anti-realism. On the view I develop and defend, the central task we face is that of explaining facts concerning fictional characters, where the relevant notion of explanation is distinctively metaphysical in character. Fictional anti-realism emerges as the plausible thesis that facts about fictional entities can be completely explained in terms of the existence and features of other things. (shrink)

Is there any difference between playing video games in which the player’s character commits murder and video games in which the player’s character commits pedophilic acts? Morgan Luck’s “Gamer’s Dilemma” has established this question as a puzzle concerning notions of permissibility and harm. We propose that a fruitful alternative way to approach the question is through an account of aesthetic engagement. We develop an alternative to the dominant account of the relationship between players and the actions of their characters, (...) and argue that the ethical difference between so-called “virtual murder” and “virtual pedophilia” is to be understood in terms of the fiction-making resources available to players. We propose that the relevant considerations for potential players to navigate concern (1) attempting to make certain characters intelligible, and (2) using aspects of oneself as resources for homomorphic representation. (shrink)

This article presents three studies examining the importance of identification with characters in research on media entertainment. In Study 1 it was found that identification with characters was associated with spectators' degree of enjoyment of feature films of different genres. Study 2 showed that identification with characters predicts the affective impact of a dramatic film and, also, it was associated with greater cognitive elaboration and a more complex reflexive process during the viewing of the dramatic film. In (...) Study 3 it was observed that identification with characters predicted the incidental impact of a full length fictional film on attitudes and beliefs. These results support the centrality of the construct of identification with characters in narrative persuasion research. (shrink)

In this article, I want to defend two claims. First, as regards fictional characters (ficta), one must appeal to constitutive properties, i.e., properties that are not only necessary but also essential for a fictum involved by a certain narration; namely, the internal discourse about a fictum. Such properties are indeed the properties that are truly predicated of ficta, either explicitly or implicitly, in that narration. For the appeal to such properties may explain not only i) the truth of important (...) bits of external discourse, i.e., the discourse concerning a fictum outside that narration, but also ii) a fictum’s individuation, i.e., what makes that fictum the object it is. Second, ficta are truly internally predicated such properties, i.e., they possess such properties in a specific, constitutive, mode. For those properties are members of the property sets with which ficta are somehow correlated; indeed, possession of truly internally predicated properties precisely amounts to set-membership. (shrink)

This paper aims to present the role of female characters in the skeptical fiction of Machado de Assis. We take as a basis the interpretation of José Raimundo Maia Neto. According to the author, this skeptical fiction presents the development of a narrator throughout Machado’s fiction. The article is divided into three parts. In the first, the type of skepticism present in Machado’s work according to Maia Neto is presented in its most important elements. In the second, the comprehensive (...) meanings of female characters in this context are discussed in general. In the third, some of the Machado’s characters are analyzed individually. (shrink)

The number of Chinese language learners across the world has been on the rise in recent years. While those used to phonetic languages often find Chinese characters difficult to learn, some learners may experience the gratification of discovering historical and cultural elements in the process. This unique system of signs represents the accumulation of rich historical and cultural content. When learning the Chinese language, foreigners may even feel the subtle mindset of this Oriental nation.

This article focuses on those Iliadic characters who fall in battle to the poem’s major heroes. Homer has various ways to make these characters minor, such as through processes of obscuring or typification or by focusing on a specific body part. By making a character minor, the poet signals that we need not attend to him. After he makes a character minor, the poet can suggest that in the process of being made minor a character paradoxically ends up (...) diverting attention from another character, or he can portray minorness as marked by an inability to divert attention from another. The poet can present in one episode these two different visions of minorness and can make one character depict another as minor by using the tactics deployed by the narrator. This study accentuates the narratological complexities that arise in the poet’s depiction of minor characters. That complexity shapes our understanding of the Iliad’s concern with the distribution of narrative attention among all its characters. (shrink)

Reading a text involves the synthesis of the reader’s understanding of multiple juxtaposed meaning units. Their meanings become interrelated through this largely passive synthesis of experience. The case of a narrative text is then of special interest. For, in a narrative text, characters experience their own world, hence must be assumed to synthesize their experiences. Understanding a narrative then involves synthesizing in the reader’s experience a character’s synthesis of experience. Modern narratives often foreground the character’s synthesis of their experience (...) by indicating directly or indirectly the ‘inner life’ of a character. This chapter explores various scenarios of how readers might passively synthesize a text which verbalizes, or treats in silence, the synthesis of experience of a character or a narrator. (shrink)

This paper delves into the character concept as applied to reproduction. Our argument is that the prevailing functional-adaptationist perspective falls short in explaining the evolution of reproductive traits, and we propose an alternative organismal-relational approach that incorporates the developmental and interactive aspects of reproduction. To begin, we define the functional individuation of reproductive traits as evolutionary strategies aimed at enhancing fitness, and we demonstrate how this perspective influences the classification of reproductive characters and modes, the comprehension of shared traits (...) as resulting from conflicts of evolutionary interest between individuals, and the explanation of reproductive diversity. After outlining the shortcomings of this framework, we introduce an organismal-relational approach grounded in evolutionary developmental studies of reproduction. This view provides a revised classification for reproductive characters and modes and offers a new understanding of interorganismal traits that takes into account their inherently relational nature. Lastly, we present the research agenda that emerges from this approach, which addresses the core explanatory gaps left by the adaptationist perspective, including the explanation of reproductive homologies and homoplasies, the developmental constraints associated with the evolution of reproductive modes, and the evolvability of reproductive characters. (shrink)

How can providing less textual information about a fictional character make his or her mind more transparent and accessible to the reader? This is the question that emerges from an empirical study of reader response conducted by Kotovych et al. Taking my cue from this study, I discuss the role of implied information in readers’ interactions with characters in prose fiction. This is the textual strategy I call ‘character-centered implicature.’ I argue that the inferential work cued by implicature creates (...) an intersubjective dynamic analogous to what philosophers Zahavi and Rochat discuss under the heading of ‘experiential sharing.’ Effectively, readers complement the textual evocation of mind by drawing on their own past experiences, which leads to a distinctive first-person plural perspective—a sharing of cognitive resources that is responsible for the perceived transparency of the character’s mind. While this experiential sharing may result in empathetic perspective-taking, not all instances of empathy for fictional characters involve sharing. (shrink)

© British Society of Aesthetics 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] essays collected in Fictional Characters, Real Problems: The Search for Ethical Content in Literature present unique perspectives on the representation of ethical concerns in literature. Edited by Garry L. Hagberg, these essays address different ways that ethical and aesthetic concerns are interwoven in works of long-form literature such as novels and theatrical works. (...) The majority of these essays also support a related claim: due to their long-form nature, these types of literary works provide a reader with ethical perspectives that are both more holistic and nuanced than is possible in typical philosophical thought experiments. Long-form literature affords the time and space to show us the breadth and depth of both our ethical motivations and their consequences.Hagberg has divided this work into... (shrink)

In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and how to explain truths of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street” and “Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle” have been subject to much debate. The main aim of my thesis is to wrestle with key proponents of the abstractionist view that fictional entities are abstract objects that exist (van Inwagen 1977, 2018, Thomasson 1999 and Salmon 1998) as well as Walton’s (...) (1990) pretense view, which denies the existence of such entities. In the process, I propose modifications to these views to deal with problems they face and show how the modifications better account for the philosophical data. Key abstractionists (van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999) make a strict distinction between discourse within fiction, in which statements about literary characters cannot be literally true, and discourse about fiction, as it occurs in literary criticism, where statements about fictional characters can be literally true. Fictional objects are postulated to account for the truth of the latter. This runs into trouble because statements thought to be literally true are not literal. (Yagisawa 2001, Friend 2002) I provide a uniform analysis to account for the truth of statements involving fictional characters by appealing to a presupposition involving a metaphor in both contexts. The presupposition is that there is an x such that x is fictional; x is likened to a real person; and x is and ought to be treated/counted as a real person for all relevant intents and purposes. More generally, I adopt Everett and Schroeder’s (2015) realist view that fictional characters are ideas constituted by mental representations. This, to me, better accounts for how fictional characters are created within the world’s causal nexus (unlike non-spatiotemporal entities in abstractionism), among other things. One key challenge they face is to explain how ideas can possess properties such as being a detective. I present a fine-grained version of their view, according to which the mental representations constituting fictional entities encode mind-dependent properties. Moreover, I explain how reference to such representations is possible, using Bencivenga’s (1983) Neo-Kantian view of reference and Karttunen’s (1976) view on discourse referents. Finally, I suggest that the identity of fictional characters is interest-relative. The constant, and sometimes radical, change of properties that, fictional characters can undergo is taken to be a consequence of the fact that unified mental representations are bundles of simpler mental representations. As change occurs, simpler representations are replaced by others. A key theme that runs through the thesis is that neither fictionality nor pretense is relevant to the semantics of fictional sentences—a claim bolstered by Matravers’ (2014) arguments. Whether or not my account works, this claim, as well as the new philosophical data I bring up, are some of the challenges I pose to the heart of established views. (shrink)

Heroes, villains, victims, and minions have been the building blocks of moral and political reputations throughout human history. In Public Characters, the authors look at visual images, music, and words to show the techniques by which these characters get constructed. They also trace the impact of these public characters in politics, including the 2016 triumph of Donald J. Trump through his ability to cast opponents as villains and minions.

Writing, or calligraphy, in China is strongly influenced by ancient techniques of making art. Chinese characters have evolved from the patterns of bronze drawings, and China’s earliest hieroglyphs usually retain the traces of their origin in paintings. These paintings usually recorded daily life, and the related Chinese characters have evolved from these with general, simplified and abstract features. The composition that makes Chinese characters is a manifestation of ancient Chinese philosophy, of which Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism are (...) the three key strands. They have affected Chinese culture and aesthetics in all dynasties. Chinese philosophy emphasizes the integration of individuals in their surrounding environment. The art of ancient China consequently combines skills that relate to the artificial, or constructed, and to natural patterns. Chinese characters make a perfect example of this. The article/presentation will outline the research that I have so far undertaken on the relation between Chinese calligraphy and architectural space, between writing and constructing environments. It will also present some experimental design research that aims at developing from the above-mentioned basic research new architectural typologies that are contemporary, resonant and sensitive to the Chinese context. (shrink)

Conceiving of fictional characters as types allows us to reconcile intuitions of sameness and difference about characters such as Batman that appear in different fictional worlds. Sameness occurs at the type level while difference occurs at the token level. Yet, the claim that fictional characters are types raises three main issues. Firstly, types seem to be eternal forms whereas fictional characters seem to be the outcome of a process of creation. Secondly, the tokens of a type (...) are concrete particulars in the actual world whereas the alleged tokens of a fictional character are concrete particulars in a fictional world. Thirdly, many fictional characters, unlike Batman, only appear in one work of fiction, and therefore one can wonder whether it does make sense to treat them as types. The main aim of this paper is to address these issues in order to defend a creationist account of fictional characters as types. (shrink)

This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagination. A third family of approaches, based on (...) work by Alexius Meinong, seeks an alternative to the realist/irrealist dilemma. Neo-Meinongian theories rely upon a distinction between being and existence, the key contention being that unlike human beings, fictional characters have only the former. Having surveyed relevant work by contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of language, this paper discusses issues related to the distinction between characters and other aspects of the content of fictions, including the relation between personality theory and literary conceptions of character. (shrink)

Despite protestations to the contrary, philosophers have always been renowned for espousing theories that do violence to common-sense opinion. In the last twenty years or so there has been a growing number of philosophers keen to follow in this tradition. According to these philosophers, if a story of pure fic-tion tells us that an individual exists, then there really is such an individual. According to these realists about fictional characters, ‘Scarlett O’Hara,’ ‘Char-lie Brown,’ ‘Batman,’ ‘Superman,’ ‘Tweedledum’ and ‘Tweedledee’ are (...) not denotationless terms, but names that really refer. What is truly surprising about this situation is that almost no one has inveighed against this unfortunate real-ist tendency. My aim here will be to challenge this new orthodoxy, and to defend an anti-realist position against the arguments proffered by the realist. (shrink)

As a way of arguing that Platonic characters' individual roles within familial, social, and religious structures could deepen our understanding of some philosophical issues--human nature, epistemology, justice and education in the polis, virtue--I present information about the characters Meno of Thessaly, Theaetetus of Sunium, Diotima of Mantinea, Phaenarete (wife of Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus), and [unnamed] of Athens (wife of Pericles and Hipponicus).

This paper delves into Jody Azzouni's ideas on the ontology of fictional characters. Azzouni interestingly maintains that even though fictional characters like Hermione Granger, Sherlock Holmes, and Mickey Mouse do not exist in reality, assertions about them can still be true. However, Azzouni dismisses the necessity of these characters to be ontologically real to validate the truth of sentences concerning them. Instead, Azzouni proposes that truth in speech and thought corresponds with the world, but not necessarily by (...) attributing properties and relations to tangible things in it. This stance opposes the conventional philosophical notion that every true statement must directly represent an aspect of reality. This paper scrutinizes Azzouni’s argument and appreciates his attempt to dissociate ontology from the truth in fictional discourse. Nonetheless, it also recognizes certain gaps in this perspective. The paper endeavors to refine and extend Azzouni's approach by introducing the concept of 'metaphysical explanation', which explains the truth of statements about fictional characters by correlating them to relevant acts of fiction, rather than positing the reality of fictional entities. This extension preserves the essence of Azzouni’s view while addressing its limitations, thus paving the way for a more comprehensive understanding of how we can talk truly about fictional characters without holding that such entities are real in any sense. (shrink)

The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to refer to fictional (...) class='Hi'>characters. I then address two objections to such realist theories of fiction: One, that they can’t adequately account for the truth of singular nonexistence claims involving fictional names, and two, that accepting that there are fictional characters to which we refer is implausible or ontologically profligate. (shrink)

In several papers, Petr Koťátko defends an “ontologically modest account of fictional characters”. Consider a position (which I have been defending) that is anything but ontologically restrained: positing fictional characters like Andrei Bolkonsky in War and Peace as abstract artifacts. I will argue, first, that such a position turns out to offer a nice fit with Petr Koťátko’s proposal about narrative fiction, one that fares better than an alternative pretense-based theory that doesn’t posit Bolkonsky as existing in any (...) sense. Second, I will explore a recent challenge by Jeffrey Goodman—which I will call the inadvertent creation challenge—that is originally posed for those who hold that fictional characters and mythical objects alike are abstract artifacts. The crux of the challenge is this: if we think that astronomers like Le Verrier, in mistakenly hypothesizing the planet Vulcan, inadvertently create an abstract artifact, then the inadvertent creation” element turns out to be inescapable yet theoretically unattractive. Third, based on considerations about actually existing concrete objects being featured in fictional works (as Napoleon is in War and Peace), I argue that regardless of where one stands on mythical objects, admitting fictional characters as abstract artifacts is enough to give rise to the inadvertent creation challenge; yet this very set of considerations serves to undermine the challenge, indicating that inadvertent creation is not nearly as worrisome after all as Goodman is suggesting. Taking fictional characters (and mythical objects) to be abstract artifacts therefore remains a viable option. -/- . (shrink)

In the world according to Hume, people are complicated creatures, with convoluted, often contradictory characters. Consider, for example, Hume's controversial assessment of Charles I: "The character of this prince, as that of most men, if not of all men, was mixed.... To consider him in the most favourable light, it may be affirmed, that his dignity was free from pride, his humanity from weakness, his bravery from rashness, his temperance from austerity, his frugality from avarice.... To speak the most (...) harshly of him, we may affirm, that many of his good qualities were attended with some latent frailty, which, though seemingly inconsiderable, was able, when seconded by the extreme malevolence of his fortune, to disappoint them of all their influence: His beneficent disposition was clouded by a manner not very gracious; his virtue was tinctured with superstition; his good sense was disfigured by a deference to persons of a capacity inferior to his own; and his moderate temper exempted him not from hasty and precipitate resolutions." This sketch shows Charles in all his complexities, with his virtues, near virtues, and contradicting virtues. I have quoted it at length because it is hard to summarize without losing the subtleties that lie within it. Hume's moral theory is based fundamentally on judgments of character, 2 so those subtleties are important to his view. The character sketches that pervade the.. (shrink)

This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This (...) does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name. (shrink)

Fictionalism about fictional characters is a view according to which all claims ostensibly about fictional characters are in fact claims about the content of a story. Claims that appear to refer to or quantify over fictional objects contain an implicit prefix of the form “according to such-and-such story. In.

This book first reviews Miller's theory of Mixed Traits, as developed in his 2013 book Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. It then engages extensively with situations, the CAPS model in social psychology, and the Big Five Model in personality psychology. It ends by taking up implications for his view in meta-ethics (a modified error theory) and normative ethics (a challenge for virtue ethics).

Children’s movies and animated cartoons today increasingly include homosexual characters, which can be welcomed from an equal-rights perspective. Yet, an intensive public debate has been initiated regarding the (age) appropriateness of such depictions. So far, it is unclear how heterosexual adults react to the presence of gay characters in children’s animated cartoons. Drawing from social identity theory, we conducted an experiment in Germany. Using the Powtoon animation software, we created two versions of a trailer of a fictitious animated (...) cartoon based on two almost identical storylines – one involving a heterosexual couple and the other a lesbian couple. Participants were exposed to only one version. Results of the experiment revealed that adults gave higher age ratings to the version that featured the lesbian couple. Yet, this effect was moderated, with only center- to right-leaning persons being affected. No effects were detected for left-leaning individuals. An exploratory analysis further revealed a moderation effect for individuals who believed in protection myths (i. e., protecting children from exposure to homosexuality), resulting in them giving higher age ratings compared to people who did not believe in protection myths. Implications are discussed, and age-rating measures are proposed for examining reactions to gay characters in communication research. (shrink)

This paper looks at how digital humanities can modify our more traditional understanding and conceptualisation of literary characters. Through the analysis of cast lists from more than 880 French plays from 1630 to 1810, and the “close reading” of some sample texts, it proposes a classification of units of characterisation (caractérisèmes) that can be identified in plays. In the last part, the paper sketches a protocol for the encoding of these characters in a TEI conformant way, and discusses (...) the advantages and the drawbacks of such an endeavour. (shrink)

In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke’s works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept “fictional entities” in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that (...) there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore’s paradox: it is paradoxical to say: “I made it, but I do not believe it exists”. Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of “exist” that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people. (shrink)

The goal of this book is to develop a new framework for thinking about what moral character looks like today. My central claim will be that most people have moral character traits, but at the same time they do not have either the traditional  ...

The theory and practice of contemporary comparative biology and phylogeny reconstruction (systematics) emphasizes algorithmic aspects but neglects a concern for the evidence. The character data used in systematics to formulate hypotheses of relationships in many ways constitute a black box, subject to uncritical assessment and social influence. Concerned that such a state of affairs leaves systematics and the phylogenetic theories it generates severely underdetermined, we investigate the nature of the criteria of homology and their application to character conceptualization in the (...) context of transformationist and generative paradigms. Noting the potential for indeterminacy in character conceptualization, we conclude that character congruence (the coherence of character statements) relative to a hierarchy is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for phylogeny reconstruction. Specifically, it is insufficient due to the lack of causal grounding of character hypotheses. Conceptualizing characters as homeostatic property cluster natural kinds is in accordance with the empirical practice of systematists. It also accounts for the lack of sharpness in character conceptualization, yet requires character identification and re-identification to be tied to causal processes. (shrink)

I analyze multimodal viewpoint construction in comics to engage with how modalities function within the medium as a specific discourse context with distinct conventions and material qualities. I show how comics employ established storytelling practices with character, narrator, and narrative viewpoint levels, while building up and interweaving these through strategic uses of the modalities of the medium. I mobilize the cognitive theories of embodiment, domains, mental simulation, and mental space blending as an analytical framework. I examine the asynchronicity of viewpoint (...) elements between modalities and their synthesis into composite character viewpoints in several examples. I show how modalities can be prioritized and their different qualities and functions strategically manipulated for viewpoint construal. These brief examples show the complexity inherent in multimodal communication and interpretation and the usefulness of encouraging the medium-specific and interdisciplinary analyses of cultural works from a cognitive linguistic perspective. (shrink)

The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as extended baptisms, and the (...) details of this response receive attention in the paper. Once the storytelling is complete, and the characters have been baptized, a priori metaphysical principles linking the storytelling with the realm of nonexistent objects provide the referential, non-causal connection between the names used in the storytelling and the objects denoted by such names. [This is the original English version of an article that first appeared in German translation, translated into German by Arnold Günther and published in the Zeitschrift für Semiotik 9/1-2 (1987): 85-95. The version that appears here is, for the most part, unaltered.]. (shrink)

The claim that dual-character concept terms are polysemous is often understood to be supported solely on the basis that it provides an elegant explanation of the normativity of normative generics. Understood so narrowly, this hypothesis has been vulnerable to challenges from competitor views that purport to explain normative generics equally well. This paper offers new, independent evidence for the polysemy of dual-character concept terms—namely that they are linguistically marked in other languages such as French and Spanish. I argue that this (...) data puts pressure on competitor accounts, showing polysemy to be the strongest explanation for the linguistic behaviour of dual-character concept terms and the expressions containing them. (shrink)

Theophrastus’ Characters has been a favorite with classicists and non-classicists for generations or rather centuries. There are thirty sketches of bizarre and often offensive behavior. The tone is light-hearted and the presentation brief. Much has already been written on the Characters, but the topic has not been exhausted, so that Professor Diggle’s book is most welcome. It begins with a wide-ranging introduction. The topics covered include : (1) Theophrastus and the world in which he lived...

We like to think of ourselves, our friends, and our families as decent people. We may not be saints, but we are still honest, relatively kind, and mostly trustworthy. Miller argues here that we are badly mistaken in thinking this. Hundreds of recent studies in psychology tell a different story: that we all have serious character flaws that prevent us from being as good as we think we are - and that we do not even recognize that these flaws exist. (...) But neither are most of us cruel or dishonest. Instead, Miller argues, we are a mixed bag. On the one hand, most of us in a group of bystanders will do nothing as someone cries out for help in an emergency. Yet it is also true that there will be many times when we will selflessly come to the aid of a complete stranger - and resist the urge to lie, cheat, or steal even if we could get away with it. Much depends on cues in our social environment. Miller uses this recent psychological literature to explain what the notion of "character" really means today, and how we can use this new understanding to develop a character better in sync with the kind of people we want to be. (shrink)

In this article, I will discuss some differences between empathy with real persons and empathy with fictional characters. Philosophers who have thought about th.