Abstract

It has been argued by Brian Leiter that Nietzsche denies the reality of value on skeptical grounds, i.e., due to the historical failure of philosophers to reach rational consensus on value judgments, despite being well-situated epistemic observers. This paper argues that textual evidence strongly conflicts with this reading in three ways. Firstly, Nietzsche does not see philosophers as well-situated epistemic observers of value given their dogmatic refusal to undertake a diagnostic comparison of their values as “types” of “symptoms” based on their relationship to the presuppositions of “life”: values which are “healthy” and “true” and those which are “decadent” and “false.” Secondly, Nietzsche attributes the historical failure of philosophers to converge on healthy and true values (instinctive-natural values) to their negation of such value in favor of decadent and false values (decadent-moral values), and he explains this negation in terms of the personal and epistemic inadequacies of the philosophers themselves as valuing agents. Thirdly, this alternative explanation better coheres with the primary textual evidence for Leiter’s value skepticism wherein Nietzsche agrees with the Sophists in rejecting the dialectical justification of value because it signified the negation of instinctive-natural value among the Greeks, and not because of a failure to reach philosophical consensus. The paper concludes with the proposition that this alternative explanation for Nietzsche’s anti-realism about decadent-moral values is not one that precludes the possibility of value realism.