Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem

Analysis 75 (4):615-627 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (3):199-205.
Comments on Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism.Sanford Goldberg - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:183-191.
McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism?Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):202-217.
The (Un)Holy Grail of Epistemology.Paweł J. Zięba - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1):21-33.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-11-12

Downloads
327 (#137,205)

6 months
23 (#460,952)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

José L. Zalabardo
University College London

Citations of this work

Hinge Epistemology?Martin Miragoli - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.
Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

View all 26 references / Add more references