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When representations conflict with reality: The preschooler's problem with false beliefs and “false” photographs
Cognition 35 (1):41-68 (1990)
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Citations of this work
Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism.Alan M. Leslie & Laila Thaiss - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):225-251.
Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM.Alan M. Leslie - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):211-238.
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