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When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains
Cognition 120 (2):202-214 (2011)
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Citations of this work
Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment.H. Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Alyssa N. Crittenden, Daniel M. T. Fessler, Simon Fitzpatrick, Michael Gurven, Joseph Henrich, Martin Kanovsky, Geoff Kushnick, Anne Pisor, Brooke A. Scelza, Stephen Stich, Chris von Rueden, Wanying Zhao & Stephen Laurence - 2016 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (17):4688–4693.
The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments.Joshua May, Clifford I. Workman, Julia Haas & Hyemin Han - 2022 - In Felipe de Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Neuroscience and philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. pp. 17-47.
Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations.John Turri, Ori Friedman & Ashley Keefner - 2017 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (3):504-515.
References found in this work
Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future.John Mikhail - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.
Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality.Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page Fiske - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):57-75.
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