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Sensitivity to Evidential Dependencies in Judgments Under Uncertainty
Cognitive Science 46 (5):e13144 (2022)
Abstract
Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 5, May 2022.Other Versions
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Citations of this work
Naïve information aggregation in human social learning.J. -Philipp Fränken, Simon Valentin, Christopher G. Lucas & Neil R. Bramley - 2024 - Cognition 242 (C):105633.
Belief polarization can be caused by disagreements over source independence: Computational modelling, experimental evidence, and applicability to real-world politics.David J. Young, Jens Koed Madsen & Lee H. de-Wit - 2025 - Cognition 259 (C):106126.
How wise is the crowd: Can we infer people are accurate and competent merely because they agree with each other?Jan Pfänder, Benoît De Courson & Hugo Mercier - 2025 - Cognition 255 (C):106005.
References found in this work
Conservatism in a simple probability inference task.Lawrence D. Phillips & Ward Edwards - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (3):346.
Bayesian models of cognition revisited: Setting optimality aside and letting data drive psychological theory.Sean Tauber, Daniel J. Navarro, Amy Perfors & Mark Steyvers - 2017 - Psychological Review 124 (4):410-441.
How Communication Can Make Voters Choose Less Well.Ulrike Hahn, Momme von Sydow & Christoph Merdes - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):194-206.
Sampling Assumptions in Inductive Generalization.Daniel J. Navarro, Matthew J. Dry & Michael D. Lee - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (2):187-223.
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